JUDGMENT & ORDER : 1. This revision arises out of a partition suit which was filed by Madhava opponent No.1 against his brother Parasram and his sons. Parasram is dead and his four sons are opponents Nos.2 to 5. His fifth son Rajaram is the petitioner. Rajaram was a minor at the time of institution of the suit. A preliminary decree was passed by the Civil Judge 2nd Class Kasrawad. A Commissioner was appointed for the actual division of the property, but subsequently a compromise was arrived at between the parties and oh the basis of this compromise a final decree was drawn up by the Court on plain papers and signed on 31-1-1952. In the executing Court certain objections were taken to this decree as it was not on stamp and the decree-holder took the decree back and made an application to the trial Court for drawing up of the decree on the stamp papers which were furnished. The petitioner made an application to the Court that this procedure was wrong, that he had attained majority on the date of compromise but his consent was not taken in the matter; and he also alleged that his elder brother Jagannath had at that date no right to represent him before the Court and to seek leave for compromise which had been granted by the Court on the understanding that the petitioner was a minor. The petitioner maintained that the final decree in a partition suit comes within the definition of an "instrument of partition" in Section 2(15) of the Stamp Act and unless a properly stamped decree was drawn up, the suit for partition must still be considered pending. The Court below overruled the objections and ordered that the decree be drawn on stamp papers. Against this order the petitioner has come to this Court in revision. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner places reliance on - 'Jotindra Mohan v. Bejoy Chand', 32 Cal 483, where the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court at page 491 observed : "A decree to be operative must, under the Indian Stamp Act, be engrossed on paper as required by that Act, and, until the Judge signs the decree so engrossed it cannot be said that the suit had terminated." 3. Their Lordships then added: "Ordinarily the judgment contains the decision as to the rights of the parties and directs what the relief granted is. The decree, which follows, is merely the formal expression of an adjudication arrived at in the judgment. After the judgment is pronounced the parties are not required to do any act to enable the Court to frame and sign the decree and as provided in Section 205, C.P. Code, the decree has retrospective effect and bears the same date as the judgment. But where, as in a suit for partition, the parties are required by law to do a certain act, and the Court cannot frame its decree until such act is performed, the adjudication contained in the judgment does not decide the suit." 4. In - 'Satyanandam v. Paramkusum Nammayya,' AIR 1938 Mad 307 , the principle was further elaborated by laying down that a final decree for partition has no existence as a decree until it is engrossed on proper non-judicial stamp paper. It was added that the decree and the proceedings taken thereunder cannot become validated with retrospective effect on the production of the proper nonjudicial stamp. In - 'Muzaffar Husain v. Sharafat Husain', AIR 1933 Oudh 562 (SB), a Special Bench of the Oudh Chief Court following - 'Thiruvengadathan Aiya v. Mangayya', 35 Mad 26 held that a decree passed on the basis of the compromise filed by the parties in a partition suit which has the effect of allotting specific portions of property to the parties is an "instrument of partition" within the meaning of Section 2(15) and must be stamped" as required under Schedule 1, Article 45 at the Indian Stamp Act. 5. On the basis of these rulings Mr. Joshi strenuously argues that the omission to write the decree on the stamped paper could not be condoned, and accordingly the final decree ought to have been taken to be non-existing on the date the application was made by the petitioner; and, that, under these circumstances, it was incumbent on the trial Court to have instituted an inquiry into the allegations of the petitioners and to have determined the question whether the petitioner was minor or major on the date when a compromise was arrived at by the parties in the case. 6. 6. The principle laid down in - Jotindra Mohan v. Bejoy Chand', 32 Cal 483, in my opinion, should be confined to the facts of that case. In that case a preliminary decree was drawn up and the order was passed confirming the report made by the Commissioner but a final decree was not drawn up. On the other hand, the Court had refused to draw up a final decree and all that their Lordships of the Calcutta High Court decided was that until a properly stamped decree was drawn up, the suit for partition must still be considered pending; and if a suit remains pending an order directing a party to be added can be made in such a case before it has actually terminated. It will be seen that on facts that case can be distinguished from the present case where a final decree had been drawn up though on plain papers. Their Lordships of the Calcutta High Court had not expressed any opinion on the point: where in a case a final decree is already drawn up on plain paper can it still be considered to be a pending litigation? This question had been raised in - 'Gopi Mai v. Vidya Wanti', ILR (1942) Lah 307: AIR 1942 Lahore 260 (FB) and the Full Bench of the Punjab High Court after discussing the case-law on the point and on the basis of the principle enunciated by the Privy Council in - 'Ma Pwa May v. Chettiar Firm', 56 Ind App 379: 7 Rang 624: AIR 1929 PC 279 came to the conclusion that where a Court has drawn up a partition decree without the proper stamp there is no lack of inherent jurisdiction, though there might be an irregularity or illegality in the exercise of jurisdiction and therefore it cannot be said that there is no decree in existence at all. The Full Bench therefore held that in such case it should be deemed that there is definitely a decree but not a decree that can be acted upon until proper stamp is supplied, but the decree can be validated by the addition of the proper stamp and therefore it cannot be said that there is no decree at all in the sense that that decree is merely a piece of waste paper which cannot be validated by the addition of the stamp unless the presiding officer re-signs the decree after it is stamped. With the greatest respect I concur in this view; as after all drawing up of a final decree on plain papers is only an error of procedure which can afterwards be rectified. 7. The attention of their Lordships of the Madras High Court in - 'Satyanandam v. Paramkusum Nammayya', AIR 1938 Mad 307 does not seem to have been directed to this aspect of the question or to the three rulings of the Calcutta High Court. In - Rafluddin v. Latif Ahmed', 14 Cal WN 1101: 7 Ind Cas 94 a final decree for partition had been drawn up on a Court-fee stamp instead of a nonjudicial stamp and it was not until the decree had been appealed from and was sought to be executed that the mistake was discovered. The Division Bench held that on the plaintiff's depositing a non-judicial stamp paper in the appellate Court and on the proper entries being made thereupon, the decree would be validated with retrospective effect from the date when it was drawn up. In giving their direction as to how the defect should be remedied the learned Judges said: "We therefore direct the plaintiff petitioner to file a non-judicial stamp of the value of Rs.100/- this will be defaced, and the cause title and names of the parties in the Court below will be written on it; it will then be attached to the decree as already drawn up. This, in our opinion, will be sufficient to validate the decree with retrospective effect from the date when it was drawn up on the principle explained by this Court in - 'Chhayunnessa Bibi v. Basirar Rahman'. 37 Cal 399." 8. The same principle was relied upon in - 'Jogesh Chandra v. Mohini Mohan', 38 Cal WN 1118: AIR 1935 Cal 125. 37 Cal 399." 8. The same principle was relied upon in - 'Jogesh Chandra v. Mohini Mohan', 38 Cal WN 1118: AIR 1935 Cal 125. Either on principle or on the weight of authority I cannot see my way to follow - 'Satyanandam v. Paramkusum Nammayya', AIR 1938 Mad 307 and with the greatest respect I dissent from the proposition enunciated in it, In my opinion once a compromise decree is passed though it may be drawn up on plain paper, the litigation terminates and the case cannot be re-opened. In this view of the matter the decision of the Court below does not warrant any interference. The petitioner can resort to remedies provided by law for assailing the decree in case he is disposed to do so. The revision fails and is dismissed with costs.