Judgment :- 1. Defendants 8 to 11 are the appellants in this Second Appeal. The Appeal is from an order rejecting an application for restitution. The suit was filed on behalf of the Thrikkunnapuram Devaswom for recovery of possession of property on the basis of a lease deed of 1071. A prior suit has been filed on behalf of the Devaswom in O.S No. 132 of 1086 for recovery of possession of the plaint property on the basis of the same lease deed and a decree has been obtained by the Devaswom. But that decree was not executed and it became barred by limitation. In the present suit the defendants contended that the suit was barred by res judicata by reason of the decree in O.S. No. 132 of 1086. The trial court repelled this contention and decreed the suit on 8.10.1104. The Devaswom obtained delivery of possession of property as per this decree on 16.3.1105. The 5th defendant appealed from the decree and the District Court allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit on 12.2.1107. From this decision the Devaswom filed a second appeal before the erstwhile Travancore High Court. In the meanwhile the management of the Devaswom was assumed by the Travancore State and the State was impleaded as additional appellant in the case. The Second Appeal was dismissed by that High Court on 6.11.1114. On 9.3.1115 the State filed a petition for reviewing the judgment of the High Court. That petition was dismissed by the High Court on 30.2.1122. On 8.7.1124 the appellants and their deceased mother applied for redelivery of the property. The trial court allowed the application and ordered redelivery. The appeal filed from that order was allowed by the District Court. That court held that the application for restitution was barred by limitation. This Second Appeal is from that order. 2. The only question for consideration in this Second Appeal is whether the application for restitution is barred by limitation. It is not disputed that an application for restitution under the Code of Civil Procedure is governed by Art.166 of the Travancore Limitation Act corresponding to Art.182 of the Indian Limitation Act. It was so held by a Full Bench of the Travancore High Court in Chacko v. Uzhithiraru (30 T.L.J. 306). It is true that there is difference of opinion among the various High Courts in India on this question. It was so held by a Full Bench of the Travancore High Court in Chacko v. Uzhithiraru (30 T.L.J. 306). It is true that there is difference of opinion among the various High Courts in India on this question. The Calcutta, Allahabad and Lahore High Courts have held that it is Art.181 of Limitation Act that applies to applications for restitution (Vide Ashutosh v. Kumad Kamini A.I.R. 1933 Cal. 422; Giwa Ram v. Nand Ram, 44 All. 407; Chanda Sing v. Bishen Singh, A.I.R. 1924 Lah.166; Gujar Mal v. Narain Singh, 32 Punj. L.R. 395). On the other hand the Bombay, Madras, Patna and Rangoon High Courts and the Chief Courts of Nagpur and Oudh have held that an application for restitution is an application in execution and that therefore Art.182 of the Limitation Act applies to such an application (Vide Somasundaram v. Chockalingam, 40 Mad. 780; Unnamalai Ammal v. Mathan, 33 M.L.J. 413; Punjapakesa Iyer v. Natesa Pathar, 51 M.L.J. 161; Sudalimuthu Pillai v. Sudalimuthu Pillai, 17 M.L.J. 623; Kargodi Gouda v. Ningan Gouda, 41 Bom. 625; Hamidalli v. Ahamadalli, 45 Bom.1137; Scuba v. Parasharam, 76 Ind. C. 255 Nag; Sant Sahul v. Chautai Kumari, 92 Ind. C. 23 Oudh; Chandika Singh v. Bithal Das, A.I.R. 1931 Oudh 51; Muthukarumappan Chetti v. Annamalai,11 Rang. 275; Pathak Bhaumath Singh v. Thakur Kadar Nath Singh, 13 Pat. 411. The Travancore High Court preferred to adopt the view taken by Bombay, Madras, Patna and Rangoon High Courts and the Chief Courts of Nagpur and Oudh. We also prefer to take that view and hold that an application for restitution is an application in execution and that it is Art.182 of the Indian Limitation Act that applies to such an application. 3. The further question for consideration is whether the application filed by the defendants on 8.7.1124 is barred under Art.182 of the Limitation Act. The High Court decree in the case was passed on 6.11.1114 and if the period of limitation is calculated from that date the application will clearly be barred by limitation and it is argued for the appellant that the period of limitation could be calculated from 30.2.1122, the date of dismissal of the review petition. For this position reliance is placed on sub-cl. 3 of Art.182. For this position reliance is placed on sub-cl. 3 of Art.182. According to that sub-clause where there has been a review of judgment the period of limitation should be calculated from the date of the decision passed on the review. The learned Advocate for the appellants argues that the date of the decision passed on the review is the date on which the review petition is disposed of. According to the learned counsel even if a petition to review the judgment is dismissed the period of limitation for execution of the decree should be calculated from date of that dismissal and not from the date of the decree. We do not think that this position is correct. Sub-cl. 3 of Art.182 applies only when there has been a review of the judgment. The words used in the sub-clause are: "(where there has been a review of judgment) the date of the decision passed on the review". This evidently means that the sub-clause will apply only when the judgment has been actually reviewed, or in other words when the petition to review the judgment has been allowed. In the case of an appeal the words used in sub-cl. 2 are: "(where there has been an appeal)". It is not necessary that the appeal should be allowed. But in the case of a review under sub-cl. 3 it is necessary that the petition to review the judgment is allowed. It cannot be said that when a petition to review the judgment is dismissed the judgment is reviewed. That it is so is clear from the wording of 0.47 R. 4(1) which reads thus: "Where it appears to the court that there is not sufficient ground for a review it shall reject the application." From this it is clear that when the application is rejected the judgment is not reviewed. 4. The learned counsel for the appellants relied on a Single Bench decision of the Bombay High Court in Narayan Ganapat v. Radha Bai Krishnaji, (1936 Bom.162) for the position that sub-cl. 3 applies even when the review petition is not allowed. In that case an application for review of the judgment was granted and an appeal was filed from the order granting the review and the appeal was allowed. It was held that the period of limitation should be calculated from the date of the disposal of the appeal. 3 applies even when the review petition is not allowed. In that case an application for review of the judgment was granted and an appeal was filed from the order granting the review and the appeal was allowed. It was held that the period of limitation should be calculated from the date of the disposal of the appeal. This decision is really based on the interpretation of sub-cl. 2 of Art.182. Following the decision of the Privy Council in Nagendranath Dey v. Sureshchandra Dey (1932 P.C.165) it was held that sub-cl. 2 would apply when there has been an appeal of any sort and that it is not necessary that the appeal should be from the decree itself. It is true that Barles, J. who decided the case has observed thus in the judgment. "My view then is that the words in Art.182 (3) 'decision passed on review' mean a decision passed in review proceedings; and whatever such a decision is, it gives a fresh starting point of limitation". If according to the learned judge an order rejecting a review petition is a decision passed on review we must say with respect that we cannot accept that view. 5. This question came up for consideration in Mohammad Naquir v. Allaudin Ahamad (1941 Pat. 213). In that case it was held that Art.182 (3) can have no application where a petition for review has been rejected. Fazalali, J. observed thus in that case: "Art.182 Cl. 3 provides that where there has been a review of judgment the period of limitation begins to run from the date of the decision passed on the review. This provision has been considered in a number of cases wherein it has been held that it does not apply where the application for review has not been granted but rejected, that is to say, in such cases limitation is not enlarged under this clause - See Kuruppam Zamindar v. Sadasiva, (10 Mad. 66); Raj Brijraj v. Nauratam Lal, (3 Pat. L.J. 119); Venugopal Mudali v. Venkitasubbayya Chetty, (39 Mad. 1196 at p. 1202); Pakir Chand v. Daiba Charan, (A.I.R. 1927 Cal. 904) With this view we entirely agree: It is contended on behalf of the respondent that the words "where there has been a review of judgment" mean "where there has been an application for review of judgment". L.J. 119); Venugopal Mudali v. Venkitasubbayya Chetty, (39 Mad. 1196 at p. 1202); Pakir Chand v. Daiba Charan, (A.I.R. 1927 Cal. 904) With this view we entirely agree: It is contended on behalf of the respondent that the words "where there has been a review of judgment" mean "where there has been an application for review of judgment". In our opinion however there is no justification whatever for inserting the word "Application" into this provision. The learned advocate for the respondent contended that as there is similarity in the language of Cls. 2 and 3, the word "review" must be construed to mean an application for review. But the answer to this contention is this: The words "where there has been an appeal" must mean where there has been appeal by the person who is aggrieved by the judgment appealed from, because only such a person is allowed to prefer an appeal. On the other hand, the words "where there has been a review of judgment" must mean a review by some one who can review the judgment, that is to say, by the court which pronounced the judgment to be reviewed. If that is the meaning to be attached to the words it is plain that the Article will have no application where an application for review has been rejected, because in that case there has not been a review of judgment. The learned Advocate for the respondents also contended that the words "Review of judgment" may be construed to mean proceedings for review of judgment. Such a construction however has never been placed upon these words and we do not see any justification for doing so. The same view was taken by the Allahabad High Court in Bengali Mal v. Baijinath Prasad, A.I.R. 1942 All. 338. 6. Reference was also made by the learned Advocate for the appellants to the decision in Firm Dedhraj v. Bhagwan Das (A.I.R. 1937 Pat. 337). That was a case in which the suit was dismissed by the trial court. The appeal filed by the plaintiff was heard exparte and was allowed. The defendant made an application for restoration of the appeal which was dismissed. The appeal filed to the High Court from the order of dismissal was also dismissed. 337). That was a case in which the suit was dismissed by the trial court. The appeal filed by the plaintiff was heard exparte and was allowed. The defendant made an application for restoration of the appeal which was dismissed. The appeal filed to the High Court from the order of dismissal was also dismissed. It was held that the period of limitation under Art.182 started from the date of the order of the High Court dismissing the appeal. This decision was considered in 1941 Pat. 213, referred to above. This case as well as AIR 1936 Bom.162 are distinguished in AIR 1942 All. 338. 7. The Travancore High Court has considered this question in Sirkar v. Krishna Pattar (29 TLJ 1047). It was held in that case that where an application for review of judgment is rejected the period of limitation for execution should be calculated from the date of the decree and not from the date of the dismissal of the review petition. 8. We are clearly of opinion that the period of limitation for the application for restitution in this case should be calculated from the date of the High Court decree, namely, 6.11.1114, and not from the date of the dismissal of the review petition, namely, 30.2.1122. The application filed on 8.7.1124 is therefore barred by limitation. We therefore confirm the order of the lower appellate court and dismiss this second appeal. Dismissed.