Judgment.- This is an appeal preferred against the acquittal by the learned Sessions Judge of Chittoor Division Mr. M.A. Azeem reversing the conviction under section 161, Indian Penal Code (i.e., receiving illegal gratification by a Supervisor of Highways) and sentence of one year’s rigorous imprisonment awarded by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge of Chittoor Division Sri D.R. Venkatesa Ayyar, M.L., in S.C. No. 17 of 1950. [His Lordship then sets out the facts elaborately the gist of which was as follows: The accused a Supervisor in the Highways Department, Madras State, was alleged to have been taking bribes as fixed mamools from various contractors and on one of such contractors moving in the matter a trap was laid and marked currency notes given by the contractor were recovered from the accused by the Police. There was also other evidence. The accused was charge-sheeted for offences under sections 5 (i)(a) and (d) and 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (II of 1947) and also for an offence under section 161, Indian Penal Code. The Stationary Sub-Magistrate after a preliminary enquiry committed the accused to the Sessions and the accused was tried by the Assistant Sessions Judge.] The learned Assistant Sessions Judge has after thoroughly analysing the evidence with great care in an elaborate judgment come to the conclusion that the offence regarding the first charge, viz., habitual taking of bribes was not made out because of two reasons, namely, that in regard to these payments these contractors stood in the position of accomplices or willing payers of the bribes and that therefore their evidence required independent corroboration in regard to each of them and that in this case, though he accepted the testimony of the four contractors themselves there was such independent corroboration only as regards the testimony of P.W. 7 in regard to the transaction covered by Exhibit P-5 and that therefore the charge under the Prevention of Corruption Act II of 1947 failed as this solitarily corroborated instance would be inadequate to support the finding of habitual bribe-taking which is contemplated under section 5(1)(a) and (2) of Act II of 1947. In regard to the offence under section 161, Indian Penal Code, the learned Assistant Sessions Judge agreeing with the unanimous opinion of the four assessors in the case came to the conclusion that the charge had been brought home by reliable and corroborative evidence against this accused and convicted him thereunder and sentenced him to one year’s rigorous imprisonment. In appeal, the learned Sessions Judge of Chittoor Mr. M. A. Azeem came to the conclusion that the charge under section 161, Indian Penal Code, had not been brought home to the accused and acquitted him. The State of Madras has thereupon preferred this appeal. Before discussing the evidence in this case I must briefly point out that this being an appeal preferred by the State under section 417, Criminal Procedure Code, unlike a criminal revision petition preferred by a private party against an acquittal, it is open to the High Court to review at large the evidence upon which an order of acquittal is founded and the code makes no distinction between an appeal from an acquittal and an appeal from a conviction. In an appeal from an acquittal if the Court thinks the lower Court has taken an erroneous view of the evidence it has no jurisdiction to refuse to convict: see Emperor v. Moti Khoda1. This Court has laid down that in reviewing at large the evidence upon an order of acquittal, the High Court has to consider such matters as (i) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses, (ii) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, (iii) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt, and (iv) the slowness of an appellate Court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses: Sheo Swamp v. Emperor2. But in this case we have the opposite, viz., the lower appellate Court without considering these matters has reversed the conviction and sentence of the learned Assistant Sessions Trial Judge. And yet, bearing in mind these considerations laid down by this Court I shall review the evidence and arrive at my conclusion. The other point to be borne in mind is that in regard to two charges based upon several acts of bribe-taking including the receiving of illegal gratification of Rs. And yet, bearing in mind these considerations laid down by this Court I shall review the evidence and arrive at my conclusion. The other point to be borne in mind is that in regard to two charges based upon several acts of bribe-taking including the receiving of illegal gratification of Rs. 300 the subject-matter of the trap, the trial Court itself 011 the ground that adequate corroboration was not forthcoming, acquitted the accused in respect of offences under Act II of 1947 and convicted him under section 161, Indian Penal Code. This appeal to the High Court has been preferred only against the acquittal tinder section 161, Indian Penal Code, and in such a case can the whole evidence be looked into for the purpose of finding out whether the charge under section 161, Indian Penal Code, has been made out or not? This has been answered in the affirmative in a decision of this Court in In re Rangarao3. In that case an accused was charged for the offence of cheating effectuated by means of forgery, that is to say, for offences under sections 420 and 467, Indian Penal Code. The accused was acquitted in regard to cheating and convicted for forgery. On appeal a reference was made to the High Court by the Sessions Judge and the High Court answered the reference as follows: "The whole evidence is before the Court. He is entitled if he thinks fit, to express his disagreement with the findings of fact in the acquittal although there being no appeal the acquittal still stands. He is not in the least bound by any finding of facts in the acquittal. The fact that the trial Judge was able to acquit of cheating and convict of forgery makes evident that this is not a case when on precisely the same facts a man is tried for two offences........The reference will be returned to the learned Sessions Judge with these observations. He can come to his conclusion with regard to the appeal against the conviction under section 467 quite untrammelled by the fact that the acquittal under section 420 of the Indian Penal Code stands. He can come to his conclusion with regard to the appeal against the conviction under section 467 quite untrammelled by the fact that the acquittal under section 420 of the Indian Penal Code stands. It may act as a plea in bar to further trial of cheating but does not in the least act as a plea in bar with regard to the facts in so far as they are relevant in considering the charge of forgery." But fortunately in this case the evidence for the offence under section 161, Indian Penal Code, stands apart from and was not the subject-matter of adjudication in respect of the offences under Act II of 1947. This was so because the habitual bribe-taking constituted the preliminary part and the offence under section 161, Indian Penal Code, constituted the sequel as a result of the trap to catch this habitual bribe-taker. Therefore, it is not necessary in this case to consider or make use of the evidence on which the acquittal of the trial Court was based though I need not point out it can be made use of wherever relevant and proved in the adjudication of this offence under section 161, Indian Penal Code, for the limited purpose permissible under sections 5 to 9, 11, 14 and 15 of the Indian Evidence Act. There is no dispute regarding the recovery of the three one-hundred rupee currency notes from the person of the accused at the bus stand by P.W.15, and the only point of dispute is according to the prosecution these notes had been given by P.W.1 as an illegal gratification in the circumstances set out by them and in order to catch the accused red-handed and according to the accused P.W. 1, Rangiah Naidu gave him the three currency notes at the Koneri near the bus stand in the following circumstances: The explanation of the accused is that when he met Rangiah Naidu the latter expressed inability to leave Tirupathi to Puttur on account of a case in Court and that Rangiah Naidu’s son-in-law would be waiting at the Puttur bus stand expecting Rangiah Naidu with money and that Rangiah Naidu requested him to take the three currency notes to be handed over to his son-in-law and that the accused undertook the errand with a view to help the coolies so that the work would not suffer and that at that time one T. Ramakrishnayya (D.W.1) was in his company. On a review of the entire circumstances of the case I have come to the conclusion that the prosecution had brought home beyond reasonable doubt that the three currency notes recovered from the accused had been received by him as an illegal gratification as alleged by the P.W.s and in the circumstances set out by them and incidentally that the explanation which the accused has put forward to give an innocent origin for his possession is thoroughly false. I shall now set out my reasons. The first and foremost point in regard to this explanation by the accused to be borne in mind is that it is a deliberate after-thought and that it was not forthcoming when these three currency notes were recovered from him. This is the evidence of the concerned persons. P.W. 1 states: "At the direction of the Deputy Superintendent of Police the accused gor down from the bus. Q.-What did the Deputy Superintendent of Police ask the accused? A.-Where is the three hundred rupee notes that Rangiah Naidu (pointing to me) gave you as bribe? This is the evidence of the concerned persons. P.W. 1 states: "At the direction of the Deputy Superintendent of Police the accused gor down from the bus. Q.-What did the Deputy Superintendent of Police ask the accused? A.-Where is the three hundred rupee notes that Rangiah Naidu (pointing to me) gave you as bribe? (On objection as to admissibility I hold that the portion of the sentence ‘as bribe’ is inadmissible since it is presumption of commission of guilt and invites confession from accused either by express statement or conduct). Accused took out two money purses from his inside coat pocket. From an old money purse M.O. 2 he took out three (one hundred) hundred-rupee currency notes and handed them over to the Deputy Superintendent of Police. He asked Raghava Reddy to verify if the numbers on the currency notes agreed with the numbers in Exhibit P-4......The accused was arrested and taken to his house by the Deputy Superintendent of Police." P.W.2 Dr. Simham gave similar evidence and stated: "The Deputy Superintendent of Police asked the accused to produce the money (portion relating to ‘ given as bribe ‘ held inadmissible). The accused stood without talking for a while. He then unbuttoned his coat and took out two purses........" P.W.4 mentioned: "At Deputy Superintendent of Police’s direction he (accused) got down the bus and the Deputy Superintendent of Police asked him where the money he took was (‘as bribe‘ directed to be omitted being inadmissible). Accused got a fright and after five minutes unbuttoned his coat etc., etc." P.W.15 the Deputy Superintendent of Police stated similarly. There was no suggestion in cross-examination of these witnesses about the present explanation given by the accused. Now, if really this accused had received the three hundred-rupee currency notes as a good samaritan to be handed over to the son-in-law of P.W.1 for disbursement to coolies so that the work would not suffer and public interest would be safe as he says, would he not have pointed out P.W.1 then and there and told all these people present that the money was given to him by P.W.1 in the circumstances now mentioned by him. Therefore this explanation is a. deliberate after-thought evolved later to suit the exigencies of the evidence. This accused has examined one Ramakrishnayya as D.W.1 in support of his explanation. Therefore this explanation is a. deliberate after-thought evolved later to suit the exigencies of the evidence. This accused has examined one Ramakrishnayya as D.W.1 in support of his explanation. The evidence of that witness was disbelieved by the trial Court, viz., the experienced and learned Assistant Sessions Judge who has analysed the evidence of D.W.1 in paragraph 31 of his judgment. The evidence of this witness has to be read in order to be disbelieved as a tissue of falsehoods.. He is stated to have met this accused by chance and accompanied him to the bus stand. His answers in cross-examination showed that he was not acquainted with this accused at all except 011 that occasion and in any case excepting as a co-passenger in the buses at some earlier period. It is unlikely that such a person would go along with this accused in the manner mentioned by him. Then the learned Assistant Sessions Judge has not believed him in regard to his having pretended to have remembered this incident of the handing over the three currency notes because he was not present at the subsequent development in the bus stand and which would have fixed in his mind the giving of the currency notes by P.W.1 to the accused. On the other hand he is said to have left on his own work without going to the bus stand. This witness had no special reason for noting either the handing over of the currency notes or the remembering of the alleged conversation. This witness stated that the accused put the currency notes in a money purse of a particular description which detail on comparison with the actual purse in which the notes were recovered is found to be false. Therefore the learned Assistant Sessions Judge who had the advantage of seeing this witness in the box has declined to accept his testimony and this is a circumstance entitled to weight. I have no doubt that this witness has been giving perjured testimony suborned to on that behalf by the accused. This need not detain us further because it is not for the accused to prove his innocence and it is for the prosecution to prove his guilt. It is on that footing that we shall examine the rest of the evidence. This need not detain us further because it is not for the accused to prove his innocence and it is for the prosecution to prove his guilt. It is on that footing that we shall examine the rest of the evidence. In regard to the handing over of the three currency notes as a bribe in pursuance of a trap, we have first of ail evidence to show that from this very contractor this accused has been taking other amounts not to speak of other contractors P.Ws. 7, 11 and 12, and whose evidence has not been disbelieved at all. In the case of this P.W.1 this accused has been pressing him to cough up the money promised to him. This evidence comes from not only P.W.1 but also from P.W. 5. This P.W.5 testifies: “Fifteen days before the accused was arrested he had asked to bring P.W.1 Rangiah Naidu. I could not find P.W.1 when I first visited his house. I went a second time and met him in the house.. P.W.1 Rangiah Naidu replied saying that he would come. I went away but he did not come to see the supervisor (accused). About 4 days before arrest accused again wanted P.W.1 to come. I met P.W.1 and told him. He asked me to tell the accused that he could not be found.” This evading by Rangiah Naidu to meet the accused, and on the other hand his making arrangements to get the accused trapped, is consistent only with his giving the money to the accused as a bribe in pursuance of a trap and not being-handed over to his son-in-law for disbursement to coolies. Then we have evidence of the petitions put in by P.W.1 and Venkataraju and the corroboration evidence of the Divisional Engineer Mr. N. T. Gnana-prakasam (P.W.13) and the Deputy Superintendent of Police P.W.15 about the bribe-givings to the accused, the accused’s pressure to increase the mamool to 10 per cent, and the evading of the payment on the last bills cashed by P.W.1 and Venkataraju. These facts show beyond doubt that this P.W.1 could not have employed the accused to take the three currency notes for disbursement to the coolies by his son-in-law. In fact, the accused’s own version is that on account of bitter ill-feelings between himself and this P.W.1 and other contractors they have foisted this false case on him. These facts show beyond doubt that this P.W.1 could not have employed the accused to take the three currency notes for disbursement to the coolies by his son-in-law. In fact, the accused’s own version is that on account of bitter ill-feelings between himself and this P.W.1 and other contractors they have foisted this false case on him. If that were so would this accused, as pertinently pointed out by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge, have allowed himself to be saddled with the three hundred-rupee notes by one of his ill-wishers out to ruin him according to the accused and would he have agreed to be the messenger with such tell-tale sum of money. There is further clear evidence that at that stage no contract work of this Rangiah Naidu was going on at Puttur. In fact, if such work had been going on necessitating the disbursement of a large sum of money this supervisor would have easily proved it. On the other hand the only bit of evidence on which the accused relies is that of P.W.5: “No work on the road was being done during the period of the arrest of the supervisor. Some 10 or 15 eoolies were doing stone-blasting work.” In such circumstances would a sum of Rs. 300 be given and that too in the shape of hundred-rupee currency notes for disbursement to coolies and this accused imagining that thereby he would be promoting public interest and non-stoppage of work in progress. This story will not appeal even to the meanest intelligence as a plausible one. There is no evidence whatsoever that at any time before this, accused has acted as a messenger like this for transmission of money either for this Rangiah Naidu or for any other contractor. The learned Assistant Sessions Judge has. pertinently pointed out: “Nor is it possible to believe that the son-in-law would have been waiting, for witness Rangiah Naidu himself had arranged to go and pay and if the difficulty arose only on account of an unexpected detention in Tirupathi. The learned Assistant Sessions Judge has. pertinently pointed out: “Nor is it possible to believe that the son-in-law would have been waiting, for witness Rangiah Naidu himself had arranged to go and pay and if the difficulty arose only on account of an unexpected detention in Tirupathi. If no work was actually going on for some days before that date and no wages were therefore due to coolies it is not likely that Rangiah Naidu would have represented that wages had to be paid to the coolies, nor is it probable or likely that accused would have believed any such representation.” In these circumstances the learned Assistant Sessions Judge after a careful and exhaustive enquiry and after bearing in mind the relevant principles laid down by several High Court decisions regarding corroboration, came to the conclusion that the accused received the three currency notes as gratification for himself and that the prosecution in such a case was entitled to ask for a presumption under section 4 of Act II of 1947, viz., that the gratification was a motive or reward such as was mentioned in section 161, Indian Penal Code, and agreeing with the opinion of the four assessors in this case, convicted the accused under section 161 Indian Penal Code. The learned Sessions Judge has based his acquittal for the reasons given by him in paragraph 11 of his judgment as follows. The first reason is: “The evidence of P.W.1 cannot be sufficient for basing a conviction unless it is corroborated in material particulars by other reliable evidence. There is no direct evidence to corroborate P.W. 1 as to the conversation between him and the accused before or at the moment of delivery of M.O.4 series to the accused.” In advancing this reason the learned Sessions Judge seems to consider that corroboration must consist in the shape of direct oral testimony and which it need not be as laid down in the leading decision of R. v. Basher Ville1. We can look to circumstantial details for such corroboration and how such corroborative evidence has been forthcoming in this case has been indicated above. We can look to circumstantial details for such corroboration and how such corroborative evidence has been forthcoming in this case has been indicated above. In fact, the learned Sessions Judge himself very considerably weakens his own reasoning by adding: “It is true that three one hundred rupee currency notes could not have been used in payment of wages without being changed into smaller currency notes or coins.” The second reason is: “It cannot be said to be improbable that in order to make the accused take the money and put it into his pocket P.W.1 made the representations alleged in the accused’s statement and that the accused believed the representation and agreed to oblige P.W. 1.” This is merely begging the question because the point to be decided itself is when the accused put the money into his pocket did he receive it as a bribe or as an obliging messenger. The third reason given is: “The fact that P.W.1 made accusations against the accused in his (P.W.1 ‘s complaints Exhibits P-1, P-2 and P-3 prior to the occurrence cannot by itself be sufficient corroboration of P.W.1’s evidence about the occurrence.” Why not? The learned Sessions Judge does not indicate why he considers this to be so. The fourth reason is of the same variety, viz., that P.W.1’s avoiding to meet the accused is not corroboration. Why not? Once again the learned Ssssions Judge does not indicate. The fifth reason of the learned Sessions Judge is: “It seems to me that the trap was closed rather too early without giving the accused an opportunity to commit himself by his subsequent dealings with M.O. 4 series. If P.W. 1 had paid the money inside the bus or if the accused had been watched after the payment until he reached Puttur and began to deal with M.O. 4 series some clear corroborative evidence might have been available.” I am unable to follow this reasoning of the learned Sessions Judge who seems to think that he would have arranged the trap more cleverly than the C.I.D. officer, and in any event I am unable to see its relevance or logic. Sixthly, the learned Sessions Judge makes much of the immaterial discrepancy, viz., that when the Deputy Superintendent of Police asked the accused to hand up the money taken as bribe one witness said that the accused got a fright and after five minutes unbuttoned his coat and another witness said that he stood motionless without talking for a while and a third said that he did not tremble. But it is curious that the learned Sessions Judge does not say that on account of these discrepancies lie disbelieves these witnesses but merely contents himself with the remark “There are discrepancies” without finding whether they are more apparent than real or cut at the root of the prosecution story. It has been laid down by several High Courts that immaterial discrepancies of this nature do not affect the conclusion one way or the other. See Emperor v. Narotam1, Ghanshyam Singh v. Emperor2 and Mahla Singh v. Emperor3. It is not surprising that this inconsequential discussion of the evidence of the learned Sessions Judge has been wound up with an observation from the decision in Hector Huntley v. King Emperor4, wholly overlooking that the learned Assistant Sessions Judge himself, an officer of great experience and considerable ability, has scrupulously weighed the evidence and come to his conclusion in the light of the principles laid down in this very decision. On the other hand it is the treatment accorded to the evidence by the learned Sessions Judge which recalls the dissatisfaction expressed by one of the eminent Judges of this Court the late Mr. Justice Sri V. Bhashyam Aiyengar in Ramaswami Goundou v. King Emperor5 about over-subtlising of the law of the country for the protection of corrupt officials and not for the furtherance of justice. I have therefore not the slightest hesitation in setting aside the acquittal by the learned Sessions Judge of Chittoor, and I find the accused guilty of the ofience under the second charge, viz., section 161, Indian Penal Code, and convict him thereunder and sentence him to one year’s rigorous imprisonment. K.S. ------------ Appeal allowed.