Thadani C. J.-This is a first appeal from the judgment and decree of the learned Subordinate Judge, L. A. D., dated 27-6-1949 by which he decreed the plaintiff's suit-with proportionate costs for a sum of RS. 7,098-10-0. [2] The plaintiff Assam Valley Supply Syndi­cate, a registered firm brought a suit against the Governor-General-in-Council claiming a sum of RS. 7,644-10-0 as the value of 500 bags of undeliver­ed salt consigned to the Bengal Assam Bailway. The plaintiff-firm was the Agent of Messrs. Shaw Wallace and Company for all the Assam Valley districts up to 31-3-1949. [3] It appears that Messrs. Shaw Wallace and Company booked the consignment of 500 bags' of Silt on the E. I. Railway on 19-8-1944 at a station called Salkea. The consignment was to be despat­ched to Barpeta Eoad on the B. A. Railway under Invoice NO. 5, R/R. NO. A. 3689. The railway receipt was in due course forwarded to the plain­tiff's branch office at Barpeta. On receiving the railway receipt, the plaintiffs made enquiries at the Barpeta Station on the Bengal Assam Railway but obtained no information about the arrival of the consignment. On 27-1-1945 and. again on 12-6-194S, the plaintiffs wrote to the Chief Com­mercial Managers of the Bengal and Assam Bail-way and the East India Railway, but the plain­tiffs received no reply. Oil 3-7-1945, the plaintiffs served a notice under S. 80,-Civil P. C., upon the Secretary to the Railway Board claiming a sum of BS. 7.000/- odd. On 18-7-1945, the Secretary, Railway Board requested the plaintiff's to address all further references to the General Manager, Bengal and Assam Railway. Calcutta. According, to the plaintiffs, the cause of action arose on 19-8-1944 when the consignment was booked; on 27-1-1945, the date on which the plaintiffs first wrote to the General Manager and lastly on 3.9-1945, the date on which the statutory notice under s. 80, Civil P. C., was sent. It is to be ob­served that the plaintiffs have not said a word as to when the goods ought to have been delivered. We will refer to this aspect of the case presently when we consider the question of limitation. [4] One of the defences to the suit was that the suit was barred by limitation. The defendants denied that the 500 bags of salt were not deli­vered at all. According to them, the consignment loaded in wagons NO. 4,980 (BB) and NO. We will refer to this aspect of the case presently when we consider the question of limitation. [4] One of the defences to the suit was that the suit was barred by limitation. The defendants denied that the 500 bags of salt were not deli­vered at all. According to them, the consignment loaded in wagons NO. 4,980 (BB) and NO. 68,759 (EI) arrived at Parbatipur and there it was transshipped into M. G. Wagons 4,122/250 and 4,450 250 on 28-8-1944 and despatched therefrom in good condition. Subsequently the two wagons contain­ing 250 bags each were misdespatched to DEBT (instead of to BPRD) where the contents of wagon NO. 4122 along with the' contents of some other wagons were taken delivery of by the plaintiffs on 2-9-1944. [5] We have reproduced a part of the written statement in some detail in order to facilitate the understanding of the contention raised by Mr. Lahiri for the respondent that, in this case, the question of limitation is to be decided with refer­ence to Art. 48 or 49 or 115, Limitation Act, and .not Art. 31. [6] On the pleadings, the trial Court framed the following issues: (1) Have the plaintiffs any right to sue the defendant? (2) Is the suit barred by limitation? (3) Is the suit bad for want of legally valid notices •a/a. 77 I. B. Act and S. 80, 0. P. G.? (4) Whether the consignment in question had been delivered to the plaintiffs? If not, whether the defendant is liable for non-delivery? (a) What relief, if any, are the parties entitled to? On the issue of limitation, the trial Court stated : "There is nothing in the evidence to show that the suit is barred by limitation. This point was neither argued at the bar. It, therefore, stands answered in the negative." Mr. Medhi far the State states that he is unable to say whether or not the question of limitation was argued as he did not appear in the trialCourt. Be that as it may, it seems to us that it was the duty of the trial Judge to go into the question of limitation when it was raised in the .pleadings and a specific issue was raised in that behalf. Mr. Be that as it may, it seems to us that it was the duty of the trial Judge to go into the question of limitation when it was raised in the .pleadings and a specific issue was raised in that behalf. Mr. Lahiri contends that we ourselves ought not to give any decision on the question of limitation as it is not a question purely of law but a mixed question of law and fact ; the proper course would be to remand the appeal. We have decided on the facts of this case not to re­mand the appeal. All the material facts bearing join the question of limitation are before us. All we have to do is to apply the appropriate article of the Indian Limitation Act. . [7] In order to appreciate the applicability of the relevant articles of the Limitation Act, it is necessary to set out certain dates. As we have stated, the consignment was despatched on 19-8-1944. It was miscarried to Dibrugarh on 5-9-1944. Ordinarily, the consignment booked at Salkea on the E. I. Railway for Barpeta on the B. A. Bail-way takes about a fortnight. Mr. Medhi for the appellant contends that the only Article which is applicable to the suit is Art. 31, Limitation Act, which is in these terms: "Against a carrier for One year When the goods compensation for non-deli- ought to be very of, or delay in delivered." delivering goods. [8] Mr. Medhi points out that the plaint makes it abundantly clear that the suit is one for com­pensation for non-delivery of the 500 bags of salt. He has referred to the contents of para. [8] Mr. Medhi points out that the plaint makes it abundantly clear that the suit is one for com­pensation for non-delivery of the 500 bags of salt. He has referred to the contents of para. 4 of the plaint and rightly contended that the claim is indubitably a claim for compensation for non­delivery of the consignment, and that when there is a specific article in the Limitation Act provid­ing for a particular suit, that Article is to be applied to the exclusion of other Articles; the de­fendant was undoubtedly a carrier within the meaning of Art. 31, Limitation Act; it is also clear that the consignment in question was not deli­vered; the determination of the question 'when the goods ought to have been delivered' depends on the facts and circumstances of a particular case; it may be that in arriving at the solution of this question, the date of the refusal to deliver the consignment by the party bound to deliver it, is an important fact but it is not the determining factor. Mr. Medhi points out that the plaintiff himself has not mentioned any particular date on which the goods ought to have been delivered as the starting point of limitation; the correspondence between the parties makes it clear that the plaintiffs defi­nitely took the position that the goods ought to have been delivered on or before 3-7-1945. [9] We think there is considerable force in this contention. There is on the record a letter dated 12-6-1945 (Bxh. 6) addressed to the Chief Com­mercial Manager of Bengal and Assam Railway in which the plaintiffs have drawn the attention of the Chief Commercial Manager to the non-arrival of the consignment. The earlier correspondence on the subject is dated 27-1-1945, a letter addres­sed to the Chief Commercial Manager, Bengal and Assam Railway in which also the plaintiffs com-plained about the non-delivery of the consignment. These two letters are Exs. 5 and 6 in the case. The earlier correspondence on the subject is dated 27-1-1945, a letter addres­sed to the Chief Commercial Manager, Bengal and Assam Railway in which also the plaintiffs com-plained about the non-delivery of the consignment. These two letters are Exs. 5 and 6 in the case. The plaintiffs then sent a notice to the Secretary, Railway Board, Government of India, New Delhi, o* 3-7-1945 under S. 80, Civil P. C. To this notice, the Secretary of the Railway Board replied to the plaintiff on 18-7-1945 in these terms : "Dear Sir, Claim for compensation of M/s Assam Valley Syndicate, I am directed to state that your 2 notices, dated 29-6-1945 and 3-7-1945 have been forwarded for disposal to the General Manager, Bengal and Assam Railway, Calcutta, who ia the competent authority to deal with the matter and to whom all further reference on the S'ubject should lie made." It is not disputed that the plaintiffs did not write , to the General Manager as advised by the Secretary to the Railway Board.' The plaintiffs adhered to their notice of the suit which they had sent under s. 80, Civil P. C. on 3-7-1945. We think it is reasonable to say in these circumstances that the plaintiffs had made up their minds that as the consignment ought to have been delivered by the 3-7-1945 and it had not been delivered, they were justified in bringing the suit. [10] Mr. Lahiri has on the other hand con­tended that the date on which the consignment ought to have been delivered is the date on which the party bound to deliver the consignment has refused to deliver it and not before, and has pointed out that it is only in the written state­ment fat the defendants that they definitely refused to deliver the consignment and that the time began to run from the date of the written state­ment. If*this position were to be accepted, then there is nothing to prevent a plaintiff in a given case from waiting for ten years before he files the : suit and still rely upon the written statement as saving limitation. We are not prepared to accept this position. If*this position were to be accepted, then there is nothing to prevent a plaintiff in a given case from waiting for ten years before he files the : suit and still rely upon the written statement as saving limitation. We are not prepared to accept this position. We think the question as to when the goods ought to have been delivered has to be determined with regard to the circumstances of each case and one of the circumstances to be taken into consideration is the plaintiff's own attitude in the matter of delivery. In the present case the plaintiff's attitude was that the goods ought to have been delivered on or before 3-7-1945. We ourselves think that the consignment ought to have been delivered certainly before 3-7-1945. [11] To resist the bar of Art. 31, Limitation Act, Mr. Lahiri for the respondent contended that the suit in the present ease is not a suit against a carrier for compensation for nondelivery, but a suit for compensation for conversion, in that as, in the Written Statement, the defendants have* pleaded that the goods have been delivered to the plaintiffs, it must be supposed that, in the absence of proof of delivery of the consignment to the plaintiffs the defendants have converted it to their own use. We cannot accept the proposition so broadly stated. Conversion is question of fact and we are unable to construe the defendant's Written Statement as amounting to conversion of the consignment. The plaint in the suit discloses nothing but a case of compensation for non­delivery of the consignment. [12] Mr. Medhi contends that the Calcutta, Nagpur and the Madras High Courts and the Chief Courts of Bind in Chiraji Lal Ram Lal v. B. N. Sly. Co., A.I.R. 1925 cal. 559; Jaldu Venkatasubba Bao v. Asiatic Steam Navigation Co., Calcutta, 39 Mad. 1 ; G.I. P. Ely., Co. v. RadhaMsan Jai-Msan, A.I.R. 1926 Nag. 57 and National Swadeshi Stores v. Governor-General-in-Council, A.I.R. 1948 sind 26, 'have correctly interpreted Art. 31, Limi­tation Act, and that the law laid down by the Patna, Sundarji Shivji v. Secy, of State, A. I. B. 1934 pat. 507, Allahabad, Nawab Boot House v. Secy, of State, A. i. R. 1935 ALL. 156 and Lahore High Courts in Haryana Cotton Mills Co. Ltd., Bhiw.-mi v. B. B. & C. I. Ely. Co., Bombay, A.I.R. 1927 Lah. 507, Allahabad, Nawab Boot House v. Secy, of State, A. i. R. 1935 ALL. 156 and Lahore High Courts in Haryana Cotton Mills Co. Ltd., Bhiw.-mi v. B. B. & C. I. Ely. Co., Bombay, A.I.R. 1927 Lah. 471, on the subject is not the correct law. With respect "we are inclined to agree with the Calcutta, Madras and Nagpur High Courts. Article 31, Limitation Act, applies irrespective of the cause of non-delivery. [13] On the second aspect of the case namely •when the time begins to run under Art. 31, Mr. Lahiri has referred us to certain decided cases reported in South Indian Ely. Go. v. Narayana Aiyer, A. i. n. 1924 Mad. 567; Palanichami Nadar v. Governor-General of India in Council, A. I. R. 1946 Mad. 133; Jugal Kishore v. G. I. P. Rly. Co., A. i. E. 1923 ALL. 22 (2). But the Madras cases are of no assistance to the respondents, as they have no bearing on the facts before us. In A. I. R. 1923 ALL. 22 (2), the head-note contains the, following : "Where no time was fixed for the delivery of goods and the correspondence between the parties showed that the matter was being inquired into and there was no refusal to deliver up to well within a year of the suit, the suit is not time barred." In the case before us, there was no question of any inquiry into the matter after the respondent had sent a notice under s. 80, Civil P. C., on 3-7-1945. In spite of the fact that the Secretary to the Railway Board requested the respondent to corres­pond with the General Manager, Bengal and Assam Railway, the respondent did not do so. We have, therefore, come to the conclusion that the consignment in this case ought to have been delivered on or before 3-7-1945. [14] Mr. Lahiri for the respondent next con­tended that Art. 31 does not apply to a case of deviation from the agreed route and that as the consignment in the case before us was diverted whether by mistake or wilfully the Railway ceased to be a carrier within the meaning of Aft. 31, Limitation Act. He has referred us to a passage in the Law of Inland Transport, by Froud, Edn. 2 p. 170 where it is stated : "Deviation has, however, another and more important aspect. 31, Limitation Act. He has referred us to a passage in the Law of Inland Transport, by Froud, Edn. 2 p. 170 where it is stated : "Deviation has, however, another and more important aspect. While the goods are being carried along a route other than the ordinary one or, in case of an agreement to carry by a specified route, other than the agreed one, the carrier is no longer deemed to possess the goods as carrier. By deviating from the ordinary or agreed route, he becomes a wrongful possessor whose liability is stricter even than that of the common carrier." It is to be observed that in the quotation, the deviation referred to is a deviation from the agreed route. In the case before us, there was no devia­tion from the agreed route. All that happened was that the consignment was over carried beyond its destination namely 'Barpeta to Dibrugarh. Moreover, it is to be observed that the qu6tation does not contain any reference to the English law of limitation, governing a suit brought against a carrier who has deviated from the agreed route. So far as the Indian law of limitation is con­cerned, we think that it would make no difference even if a carrier were to deviate from the agreed route. A suit for compensation for non-delivery of the consignment will still be governed by Art. 31, Limitation Act. Once the goods are delivered to a carrier, Art. 31 applies irrespective of the cause of non-delivery. - [15] Mr. Lahiri lastly contended that Art. 31 applies to a common carrier and that Government as carrier is excluded from the definition of a common carrier. He has referred us to a decision of Lort-Williams J. reported in Golab Rai Pali-ram v. Secy, of State for India in Council, I. L. R. (1941) 2 cal. 160, in support of his conten­tion. Mr. Lahiri concedes that the view of Lort-Williams J. was not accepted by the Division Bench on appeal; that the Division Bench took, the view that no distinction can be made as between Government carrying on business of a carrier and any other carrier for the purposes of Art. 31. [16] The result is that the appeal succeeds. The plaintiff's suit must be dismissed on the issue of limitation. [17] Mr. [16] The result is that the appeal succeeds. The plaintiff's suit must be dismissed on the issue of limitation. [17] Mr. Lahiri's last submission wag that on the 'facts of this case, no costs should he awarded against the plaintiffs. Mr. Medhi states that he does not press the question of costs. The result is that the appeal is allowed with no order as to costs. The suit will stand dismissed with no order as to costs. [18] Deka J. -•I agree. B/K.S. Appeal allowed,.