JUDGMENT : This is an appeal by the plaintiffs against a decision of the District Judge, Bhind affirming the judgment and the decree of the Civil Judge Second Class, Lahar whereby plaintiffs' suit for redemption of a mortgage was dismissed on the ground that it was barred by time. 2. The plaintiffs sued to redeem a mortgage alleged to have been executed on 22-7-1895 in favour of Baldeosingh the father of the present respondents. The suit was filed on 25-7-1940, that is beyond the period of limitation prescribed for redemption suits by the law of Limitation then in force. It was admittedly barred by time. But the plaintiffs relied on an entry in the Khewat of Samvat 1973 to show that the defendant-mortgagee had before the Settlement Officer acknowledged the fact that he was in possession of the property as a mortgagee. It was alleged by the plaintiffs that this entry which was made on 24-8-1916 was signed and verified by the Settlement Officer and by the mortgagee Baldeosingh and that it amounted to an acknowledgment within the meaning of Section 19 of the Limitation Act and thus the plaintiffs' suit was within time. The plaintiffs also relied on an application said to have been made on 14-9-1921 by the respondents for mutatiop in their favour after the death of their father Baldeosingh. It was said that in this application the defendants stated that they were mortgagees and that, therefore, this application also constituted an acknowledgement under Section 19 of the Limitation Act and was sufficient to save limitation. The trial court held that the plaintiffs had failed to prove the fact that the settlement entry was signed by the original mortgagee Baldeosingh and the fact that after his death the defendants had applied to the Tehsildar for mutation in their favour. The suit was, therefore, dismissed by the trial court as barred by time. In appeal the learned District Judge without giving any finding as to whether the documents relied on by the plaintiffs had been proved, held that even if they had been proved, they would not constitute in law acknowledgment within the meaning of Section 19 of the Limitation Act. In appeal the learned District Judge without giving any finding as to whether the documents relied on by the plaintiffs had been proved, held that even if they had been proved, they would not constitute in law acknowledgment within the meaning of Section 19 of the Limitation Act. When the appeal last came up for hearing before me I observed that the question whether a particular document constituted an acknowledgment under Section 19 of the Limitation Act was not merely a question of abstract law, but was one which had to be determined with reference to its contents, and the circumstances and the law under which it was brought into existence. I also said that the learned District Judge had erred in omitting to give any finding as to the nature and contents of the documents relied on by the plaintiffs for saving limitation and in coming to the conclusion that the documents even if proved were not sufficient to save limitation under Section 19 of the Limitation Act. I, therefore, directed the learned District Judge to return a finding as to the contents of the Khewat entry and the application for mutation and the circumstances in which they were made. 3. The learned District Judge has now returned the findings. He has found that the Khewat entry was made on 24-8-1916, that it was verified and signed by the Settlement Officer and by the original mortgagee Baldeosingh, and that by that entry Baldeosingh admitted the fact that he was in possession of the mortgage lands by virtue of a registered mortgage-deed. He has also found that on 14-9-1921 the defendants applied to the Tehsildar for mutation in their favour as the heirs of the mortgagee Baldeosingh. These findings of fact have not been challenged before me by the learned counsel for the parties. 4. The question then arises whether the Khewat entry and the application for mutation constitute valid acknowledgments under Section 19 of the Limitation Act. For an acknowledgment to save limitation, it is necessary that it must be an acknowledgment of an existing liability and it must be as the word 'acknowledgment' implies a conscious acknowledgment of the liability. Taking the settlement entry first, it is clear that it was made within 30 years of the date of the execution of the mortgage. The mortgage was executed on 22-7-1895 and the settlement entry was made on 24-8-1916. Taking the settlement entry first, it is clear that it was made within 30 years of the date of the execution of the mortgage. The mortgage was executed on 22-7-1895 and the settlement entry was made on 24-8-1916. The liability under the mortgage was, therefore, clearly subsisting on the date on which the entry in the Khewat was recorded. This entry was signed and verified by the Settlement Officer and by Baldeosingh the original mortgagee. I see no reason to suppose that when Baldeosingh signed this entry he was unaware of the 30 years' period prescribed for a suit of redemption and of the fact that the purpose of the settlement entry was to ascertain whether his liability to pay land revenue was as a proprietor or as a mortgagee of the land and that, therefore, when he signed that entry he merely admitted the fact that his possession of the land originated under a mortgage and that by signing that entry he was in no way acknowledging the fact that the mortgagor's right to redeem the property subsisted. There being no doubt as to the date of execution of the mortgage and as to the period of limitation for a redemption suit, it must be held that when Baldeosingh signed the Khewat entry which was clearly recorded within 30 years of the date of the execution of the mortgage, he consciously admitted the title of the mortgagor and the liability of the mortgage to be redeemed. The view that in such circumstances an entry in a settlement record signed by the person in possession and acknowledging the fact that his possession was that of a mortgagee, constitutes a conscious acknowledgement of the existence of the liability in respect of a mortgage within the meaning of Section 19 of the Limitation Act is supported by a decision of Oudh Chief Court reported in - 'Sheo Prasad v. Rama Kant', AIR 1948 Oudh 257. The same view has been taken in a number of other cases which have been noted in Chitaley's Limitation Act, 3rd Edition, Volume 1 at page 663. The learned counsel for the respondents has strongly relied on a Full Bench decision of Allahabad High Court, namely - 'Gur Saran v. Shib Singh', AIR 1943 All 393 to support the proposition that such settlement entries do not amount to acknowledgments under Section 19 of the Limitation Act. The learned counsel for the respondents has strongly relied on a Full Bench decision of Allahabad High Court, namely - 'Gur Saran v. Shib Singh', AIR 1943 All 393 to support the proposition that such settlement entries do not amount to acknowledgments under Section 19 of the Limitation Act. In my opinion, the decision of the Allahabad High Court is not in point here. In that case there was an oral mortgage and the date on which it was executed was unknown. The plaintiff mortgagor in that suit relied on an entry in the Khewat of 1878 in which the person in possession of the property sought to be redeemed was shown as a mortgagee. The controversy in Allahabad case centered round the question whether when the date of the mortgage and the specific terms thereof were unknown an acknowledgment contained in the settlement record could be taken as an acknowledgment by the mortgagee that as a matter of fact the entry was made at a time when the liability for redemption subsisted and the period of limitation prescribed for redemption suit had not elapsed from the date of the mortgage. The Allahabad High Court held that from the mere entry of mortgage in Khewat signed by the mortgagee a presumption as to the existence of subsisting mortgage cannot be drawn. I do not regard the decision of the Allahabad High Court as an authority for the proposition that even when it is proved by evidence 'aliunde' that the entry in settlement record was made when the mortgage was subsisting, the entry in the Khewat cannot be taken as constituting a valid acknowledgment under Section 19 of the Limitation Act. The Allahabad decision only lays down that the entry of a mortgage in the settlement record, where the date of the execution is unknown, is good evidence of the factum of mortgage, but it is no evidence of the date of the mortgage or of the fact that on the date of the entry the mortgage was subsisting or that the entry was made within the prescribed period of limitation for redemption suits. This decision is, therefore, clearly distinguishable from the present case. In the present case the date of the execution of the mortgage and the fact that the settlement entry was made within the prescribed period of limitation have been established independently of the 'Kewat' entry. This decision is, therefore, clearly distinguishable from the present case. In the present case the date of the execution of the mortgage and the fact that the settlement entry was made within the prescribed period of limitation have been established independently of the 'Kewat' entry. Counsel for the respondent also relied on - 'Dharma Vithal v. Govind Sadvalkar', 8 Bom 99. But this decision in no way helps the respondents. It lays down the proposition which I have already stated above namely that the question whether a document constitutes an acknowledgment of liability depends purely on the terms of the document and their consideration by the court and the acknowledgment must be with the conscious intention of acknowledging the liability. In my view the settlement entry which was made on 24-8-1916 satisfies the tests of an existing liability and conscious admission and is, therefore, a valid acknowledgment sufficient to save limitation. 4a. As regards the statement in the application of the defendant-respondents for mutation, that their father Baldeosingh held the land as a mortgagee, I think it clearly amounts to a conscious acknowledgment of an existing liability in regard to the mortgage. For on the date on which the application for mutation was made i.e., 14-9-1921 the mortgage was redeemable, it having been executed on 22-7-1895 and by that application the defendants as the heirs of the Baldeosingh claimed that their names be substituted in place of Baldeosingh's name not as proprietors of the land but as mortgagee. Thus, they clearly admitted the fact that their title to the land was as mortgagees. Learned counsel for the respondents had drawn my attention to the observations of the Privy Council in - 'Fatimatulnissa Begum v. Sunder Das', 27 Cal 1004 to the effect that a statement in an application for mutation, of the names by the heirs of a deceased mortgagee that their predecessor held the property as a mortgagee is not a valid acknowledgment as it is not an acknowledgment made to the mortgagor. The view that under Section 19 of the Limitation Act an acknowledgment of the liability must be addressed to the plaintiif or some one through whom he claims is not in accord with the clear language of explanation (1) to Section 19. The view that under Section 19 of the Limitation Act an acknowledgment of the liability must be addressed to the plaintiif or some one through whom he claims is not in accord with the clear language of explanation (1) to Section 19. The Privy Council itself in a number of later decisions, has taken the view that an acknowledgment under Section 19 need not be addressed to the plaintiff or to any one through whom he claims. That being so the observation in 27 Cal 1004', must be taken as meaning only that in that particular case the Privy Council held that there was no sufficient acknowledgment. The Privy Council case cannot be regarded as laying down a proposition quite contrary to the clear wording of explanation (1) to Section 19 of the Limitation Act. I am aware of a decision of this court in - 'Bhero v. Lachhi Ram', 1949 Madh B LR 212 in which Chaturvedi, J., has held that such a statement in an application for mutation is not an acknowledgment of a subsisting liability under the mortgage. In that case the mortgage was executed on 21-10-1901 and the application for mutation was made on 24-12-1930. But the learned Judge did not consider the precise question whether a statement in an application for mutation that the property was held under a mortgage could be regarded as a conscious acknowledgment of liability when it was otherwise manifest that on the date of the application for mutation the liability was not barred by time. It is clear from the judgment in the case of - 'Bhero v. Lachhiram', 1949 Madh B LR 212 that the learned Judge only intended to hold that such a statement in an application for mutation is in itself no proof of the fact that the liability is subsisting. If the learned Judge intended to go further and hold that a statement in an application for mutation that the property was held under a mortgage would not constitute a good acknowledgment even when it is otherwise shown that on the date of application for mutation the liability was subsisting, then I must express my dissent with the view. If the learned Judge intended to go further and hold that a statement in an application for mutation that the property was held under a mortgage would not constitute a good acknowledgment even when it is otherwise shown that on the date of application for mutation the liability was subsisting, then I must express my dissent with the view. I would have referred this question to a larger bench for decision but as in the present case even if the application for mutation dated 14-8-1921 is ruled out of consideration there still remains the statement in the settlement entry of 24-8-1916 which keeps alive the mortgage of 22-7-1895. 5. For the above reasons, I hold that the plaintiffs' suit is not barred by limitation and allow this appeal. The suit is remanded to the trial court for decision on its merits. I grant costs to the appellants incurred in this court and the lower appellate court. The costs incurred in the trial court will abide the result of the suit on merits. Appeal allowed.