The petitioner was a defendant in an ejectment suit. An ex parte decree was passed against him on 26th May 1950. He applied for setting aside of the ex parte decree under o. 9, B. 13, Criminal P. C. The application was dis­allowed by the learned Munsiff. His appeal to the learned Additional District Judge also failed. He has now invoked the revisional jurisdiction of this Court. [2] The suit which was decreed ex parte was instituted against the petitioner in 1949. He was duly served and appeared in answer to the sum­mons. His last appearance in the case was on 11th January 1950 when the case was adjourned to 22nd March 1950. On this date the ease was adjourned to 3rd April 1950 by the ex officio Munsiff, who passed the order as the presiding officer of the Court had been transferred and his successor in office had not arrived. On 3rd April 1950 the Munsiff who had been appointed to take over and who had arrived, ordered that defendant who was absent be proceeded against ex parte and fixed 26th April 1950 as the date for the next hearing. Upto this time he had not been em­powered to act as Munsiff. He adjourned the case-again on 26th April 1950 for ex parte hearing. The-plaintiff alone was present. On 19th May the next hearing in the case, the presiding officer again was not present. He had gone on casual leave. The ex officio Munsiff adjourned the ease to 26th May 1950 stating that plaintiff was present and also ready. On 26th May 1950 ex parts decree was passed by the Munsiff on whom admittedly power had been conferred to hear and dispose of the ca3e by that time. [3] The petitioner alleged that he had been defending the suit diligently till the transfer of the Munsiff of Hailakandi. As there was no Munsiff there, for some time, his counsel informed him that he would intimate to him the next date-for the hearing of the case when fixed after the arrival of the new Munsiff. He got no information from his counsel about the adjourned hearings or of the date when the ex parte decree was passed. As there was no Munsiff there, for some time, his counsel informed him that he would intimate to him the next date-for the hearing of the case when fixed after the arrival of the new Munsiff. He got no information from his counsel about the adjourned hearings or of the date when the ex parte decree was passed. The failure of his counsel to inform him of the due dates was thus put forward as sufficient cause for personal non-appearance within the meaning of o. 9, R. 13, Civil P. C. The learned Munsiff found that defendant had failed to appear on at least four hearings. He thought that the defen­dant did not consider it necessary to appear in this case as he had instituted another suit NO. 12 of 1950 in which he had claimed title to the pro­perty which was the subject-matter of the eject­ment suit. In appeal, two grounds were put forward for obtaining reversal of the ex parte decree; the first ground was that the ejectment suit could not have been decreed as no notice had been served by the plaintiff on the defendant, and the 2nd was that in view of a compromise in the suit NO. 3 of 1949 between the two parties, the ex parte decree was not sustainable. The learned Additional District Judge held that the decree could not be set aside-on the grounds taken up in appeal. The proceed­ing which gave rise to the appeal was under o. 9-K. 13 and the Court acting under o. 9, K. 13 could only set aside the decree if summons was not duly served on the defendant or if the summons was duly served then in that case if the defendant was prevented by sufficient cause from appearing when the case was called on for hearing. The learned Judge further observed that there was no allegation that defendant's counsel was not aware of the different dates that were fixed in the case. He also noticed the fact that the counsel was not examined to prove either that he was not aware of the dates or to support the allegations made in the petition. Sufficient cause for non-appearance was therefore not made out in his view. [4] The learned counsel for the petitioner has not disputed the finding of fact arrived at by the learned Additional District Judge. He has raised a new question. Sufficient cause for non-appearance was therefore not made out in his view. [4] The learned counsel for the petitioner has not disputed the finding of fact arrived at by the learned Additional District Judge. He has raised a new question. His contention is that the peti­tioner was not bound to appear on 22nd March 1950, as the presiding officer of the Court had been transferred and the successor had not yet arrived. The ex officio Munsiff who adjourned the case that day had no power to do so as -the case had not been validly transferred to him. In any case, petitioner had no notice that the case would be put up before him. He was also under no obligation to appear even on the adjourned date or dates without further notice. He also points out that the order of 3rd May, directing ex parte hearing of the suit was passed by a Munsiff who at the time had no authority to act as such. His argument in short is that the petitioner was entitled in law to be informed of the date of hearing when fixed by a competent Court after 22nd March. Non-appearance therefore was due to a sufficient cause and the decree though passed by a competent Court was not sustainable by reason of the omission to notify the date of hearing to the petitioner. The contention was admittedly not raised before the Courts below and though the petitioner may not be entitled to raise it as of right, this Court is not precluded from considering it particularly when no fresh enquiry or further evidence is needed for the decision of the question which eliminates all risk of possible prejudice to the respondent. [3] As to the merits of the contention, the posi­tion is that the application of the petitioner for setting aside the ex parte decree was under o. 9, R. 13. Under this rule, the Court which passed the decree could set aside a decree, if it was satisfied that the summons was not duly served or that the defendant was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing when the suit was called on for hearing. These are the only grounds on which a decree may be set aside under o. 9, E. 13: vide A. H. Gliaznavi v. Gurcharan Singh, A. I. E. 1937 ALL. 691. The summons was duly served in this case. These are the only grounds on which a decree may be set aside under o. 9, E. 13: vide A. H. Gliaznavi v. Gurcharan Singh, A. I. E. 1937 ALL. 691. The summons was duly served in this case. The defendant appeared. He also had his counsel to represent him. All that has to be seen therefore is whether sufficient cause prevented the Defendant from appearing when the suit was called on for hearing. The important date in this connection is 22nd March. On that date the presid­ing officer was not present. He had been transfer­red and had left. The case was put before another ex- officio Munsiff who merely directed the case to be put up on 3rd April 1950, as the successor of the presiding officer of the Court had not arrived. The case was not heard. It had not been transferred to the file of the ex-officio Munsiff. The conten­tion is that in these circumstances defendant-peti­tioner was not under any obligation to appear before the ex-officio Munsiff without any notice that the case would be put up before him. If he was not bound to appear on 22nd March, before the ex-officio Munsiff, there would be no obliga­tion on him to appear on any subsequent date without notice about the date of the hearing from a competent Court. The order on 3rd April 1950-was passed by the successor in office of the presid­ing officer who had arrived but admittedly had no power to act as Munsiff on that date. He directed that the case be heard ex parte against the defendant who was not present. The order does amount to an exercise of jurisdiction in the-case which till then he did not possess. It is not merely an order adjourning the case. The circumstances of this case are peculiar. There-is the transfer of the presiding officer of the Court and as a result the case was put before another Munsiff who had jurisdiction in the area but to whom the case had not been transferred. The petitioner had no notice that the case would be-put before him. The case could not proceed and no order adverse to the petitioner could have been passed on that date. These circumstances when considered cumulatively may be taken to amount to sufficient cause for non-appearance within the meaning of o. 9, E. 13. The petitioner had no notice that the case would be-put before him. The case could not proceed and no order adverse to the petitioner could have been passed on that date. These circumstances when considered cumulatively may be taken to amount to sufficient cause for non-appearance within the meaning of o. 9, E. 13. Without laying down any rule of general application, I hold in the circum­stances of this case, that the petitioner could have been held to have been prevented from appearing for sufficient cause as no notice was sent to him about the hearing of the case after 22nd March. Where the date fixed for hearing was a holiday (Umat-ul-Nughin Begam v. Saligram, A. I. R. 1915 Lah. 476) and the case was taken up next day after the holiday and dismissed for default, it-was held that there was sufficient cause for non-appea­rance. In another case (Satya Pal v. Sant Bam,. A. I. E. 1934 Lah. 91) where a suit was transferred from one Court to another without notice to the parties, non-appearance was excused on the ground-that it was due to a sufficient cause. In the present-case there has been a transfer of the presiding officer. This case is analogous to the last one referred to above. The expression 'sufficient cause' has not been defined anywhere; nor does it admit of any precise definition. What is sufficient cause is a question of fact depending on the circumstances of each case and I feel that though the petitioner could have avoided being proceeded against ex parte by the exercise of the same amount of vigilance as the opposite party exercised there still was suffi­cient cause within the meaning of the rule for non-appearance. I, therefore, allow this petition and order that the ex parte decree against defen­dant-petitioner shall stand reversed and the case reopened on his depositing in the trial Court costs incurred by the opposite party in all the three Courts in connection with the proceeding for setting aside of the ex parte decree within a month from the date of the receipt of the records by the trial Court. If costs are not deposited by the due date as ordered, the ex parte decree shall stand. Hearing fee is fixed at ES. 50. The Rule is disposed of accordingly. Order accordingly.