Judgment :- 1. The petition is for quashing the proceedings taken by the State to acquire 1.71 acres of land in S. Nos. 8973 and 8974 of Colachel Pakuthy belonging to the petitioner. It is also for an order to stop all further proceedings in the matter and for the necessary orders, directions and writs in the nature of mandamus, prohibition and certiorari being issued to the counter petitioners for securing the rights of the petitioner over the property. There are 3 counter-petitioners in the case, the first of whom is the State of Travancore-Cochin, the second is the Tahsildar of Kalkulam Taluk and the third the South Travancore Latin Catholic Arasar Co-operative Society No. 2577 of Colachel represented by its President Shri. P.M. Simon. 2. The petitioner's case was stated before us as follows: He is the owner of the land in question which is situated in the sea port area of Colachel. It was purchased by him in the year 1117 M.E. (1942 A.D.) for a consideration amounting to Rs. 34,000/- for purpose of his export business and stevedoring work at the port. He had constructed the necessary go-downs in the said property. The extent of the premises available was, however, hardly sufficient for the shipping and export business carried on by the petitioner. This plot was within a few yards of the flag-staff of the Colachel port and was the busiest part of the port area. A portion of this plot of land was in the possession of the parish priest of the Latin Catholic Church at Colachel under a mortgage of the year 1101 M.E. (1926 A.D.) When the petitioner asked for the surrender of the property on receipt of the mortgage money, the said priest started trouble by introducing into the property certain of the parishioners who were fishermen who came and squatted on the land. The priest also moved the Government that the said land might be compulsorily acquired for the purpose of providing house sites for the fishermen of the locality. The petition filed by the priest was dismissed by the Government on 30th March 1943. The petitioner then filed O.S. No. 141 of 1119 in the District Court, Nagercoil, for redemption of the said mortgage. In spite of a hot contest by the priest, a decree for redemption was passed by the District Court. The petition filed by the priest was dismissed by the Government on 30th March 1943. The petitioner then filed O.S. No. 141 of 1119 in the District Court, Nagercoil, for redemption of the said mortgage. In spite of a hot contest by the priest, a decree for redemption was passed by the District Court. But the petitioner was unable to get the fruits of that litigation and secure possession of the property because of the obstruction caused by the fishermen who were brought into the property by the priest. Another suit for eviction of the fishermen (O.S. No. 163 of 1122) had therefore to be brought by the petitioner and that suit is now pending in the above District Court. 3. The said priest, having got foiled in his attempt to persuade Government to acquire the property, set up the third counter-petitioner the South Travancore Latin Catholic Arasar Co-operative Society which had been started under the aegis of the local Latin Catholic Church, to move Government for compulsory acquisition of the said land for providing house sites for the Catholic fishermen of Colachel. This was done by the priest for the purpose of defeating the execution of the mortgage decree for redemption obtained by the petitioner. The Co-operative Society itself was a creature of the Latin Church there, and the president of the society was a tool in the hands of the priest who was the defendant in the redemption suit. The petitioner came to know that the above said persons were moving Government for the acquisition of the said land and that an order was passed on the 12th January 1951 that the land under reference might be acquired. He therefore preferred a petition before the Government on 4th May 1951 for stopping the acquisition proceedings. But Government by its order L. Dis. 2254/51 dated 17th October 1951 allowed the petitioner twenty cents out of the land in dispute and directed the acquisition in respect of the remaining portion of the land. On representation made by the petitioner, the then Chief Minister Shri. T.K. Narayana Pillai had conducted a local inspection of the site on 17th June 1951 accompanied by the Government Secretary concerned who was in charge of this subject in the Secretariat. The notes made by the Minister and the Secretary on inspection are stated to be not now among the records of this case. The notes made by the Minister and the Secretary on inspection are stated to be not now among the records of this case. The petitioner's objections were subsequently heard by the Minister Shri. A.J. John on the 3rd August 1951. Shri. A.J. John relinquished office as Minister without passing any orders and his successor in-office Shri. L.M. Piley, on 17th October 1951, without any further hearing of the petitioner or his Advocate, passed the order now complained against for compulsory acquisition. The petitioner thereupon filed another application before Government on 31st October 1951 praying for a reconsideration of the prior order of Government. But that was not allowed. It is the petitioner's case that the port of Colachel offered a deep anchorage for ships not far from the shore and it was more advantageously situated than the other ports at Alleppey and Trivandrum in the State, so that there was a great possibility for the expansion of that port. Necessarily therefore, all available lands in the port area at Colachel were to be preserved for the purpose of landing and storing goods for export as well as import. As a matter of public policy, the State ought not to interfere with the progress of such export and import trade by instituting acquisition proceedings in respect of the land used for it in the port area, with the ostensible purpose of providing house sites for a few fishermen. 4. The local Latin Catholic Church itself owned extensive properties in the locality and there were vacant lands in the possession of that Church. There were also other plots in the vicinity which could be acquired at a very low price for the proposed housing scheme. In addition to this, there were sufficient poramboke lands belonging to the State in the vicinity and such lands could have been used for the scheme without paying any compensation for those plots. The price of the petitioner's land in question was high and economically the proposition was not sound. The order of the Government to acquire the petitioner's property had been sought by the third counter-petitioner at the instance of the parish priest to circumvent the execution of the redemption decree obtained by the petitioner. The fishermen to whom house sites were intended to be procured by the State were the identical persons obstructing the petitioner in the execution of the redemption decree. 5. The fishermen to whom house sites were intended to be procured by the State were the identical persons obstructing the petitioner in the execution of the redemption decree. 5. The order of acquisition was not passed for any purpose which might be called "public". On the other hand it had been prompted by fraudulent motives. This order was tending to create ill feeling between the Muslim inhabitants on the one hand and the Latin Christian fishermen on the other. Another attempt of the petitioner to induce the Government to re-consider the whole matter was dismissed on 8th February 1952. The State had not considered all the matters raised by the petitioner and the order passed were ultra vires of the powers of the State. The fraudulent motives behind the application by the third counter-petitioner for the acquisition were not noticed by Government. The third Counter-petitioner's application for the acquisition had been considered once before and it was rejected by orders D. Dis. 1341/41/Rev. dated 21st July 1949 and L. Dis. 45/49/RD. dated 8th August 1949. The subsequent application for the identical relief was actuated by mala fides for the purpose of benefitting a few persons who had trespassed into the property. The process of acquisition now ordered by Government involved a discrimination by which one community was preferred to another and was contrary to the principles recognised by the Constitution of India. The orders passed by Government on 17th October and 17th December 1951 and 8th February 1952 were produced along with the petition. A relief by quashing the proceedings started by Government was prayed for on the above grounds. 6. Notice of this petition was given to the counter-petitioners. On behalf of counter-petitioners 1 and 3, counter-affidavits answering the objections raised in the petition were filed. The counter-affidavit on behalf of the State was by a clerk in the Agriculture Section of the Government Secretariat where the matter connected with this subject was dealt with. 6. Notice of this petition was given to the counter-petitioners. On behalf of counter-petitioners 1 and 3, counter-affidavits answering the objections raised in the petition were filed. The counter-affidavit on behalf of the State was by a clerk in the Agriculture Section of the Government Secretariat where the matter connected with this subject was dealt with. It was mentioned in this affidavit that the Government of Travancore-Cochin had launched a co-operative housing scheme in 1950, that Colachel being one of the most thickly populated fishing centres was selected as one of the centres where this scheme was to be worked out immediately, that it was decided that thirty houses should be built there for the benefit of the fishermen, that this scheme was proposed to be worked at Colachel through the third counter-petitioner¬society, that as there was no suitable Government land available in the area, it was decided to acquire the land in question along with other lands for the purpose, that the steps for the acquisition of a block of 10.21 acres were taken by the revenue authorities under the orders of Government, that it so happened that out of the said 10.21 acres thus proposed to be acquired, 1.68 acres belonged to the present petitioner, that the petitioner objected to the acquisition of this land and that the Government considered his objections, heard his Advocate and excluded 20 cents out of the area proposed to be acquired as it was found necessary for the petitioner's business. The acquisition was for a public purpose and the proceedings of Government were quite legal and proper. The allegations that the Government started proceedings for the acquisition of the land at the instigation of the parish priest and the third counter-petitioner were not true. The Government was not also aware of the dispute between the petitioner and the said priest. It was true that a petition of the parish priest for the acquisition of this land was dismissed by Government in 1943. It was done so as at that time there was no housing scheme. The Ministers had inspected the locality, but they were not bound to make any report of their visits to anybody. There were no other available lands in the vicinity belonging to private parties suitable for acquisition. There was also no land, belonging to Government that could be used for house sites. The Ministers had inspected the locality, but they were not bound to make any report of their visits to anybody. There were no other available lands in the vicinity belonging to private parties suitable for acquisition. There was also no land, belonging to Government that could be used for house sites. The statement that the Government by these acquisition proceedings was helping persons to circumvent the execution of the decree obtained by the petitioner was not correct. The acquisition, being for a public purpose, could not cause any ill-feeling between the classes and no communal ill-feeling was caused on account of the acquisition. The several orders referred to in the petition were passed by the Government after careful examination of all the aspects of the case. The acquisition was in no way opposed to the principles of natural justice and the present order could not be interpreted to indicate that the Government made any discrimination between one community and another. The petition was therefore frivolous and was accordingly pressed to be dismissed. 7. The president of the third counter-petitioner-society had also filed an affidavit opposing the application. The petition was therefore frivolous and was accordingly pressed to be dismissed. 7. The president of the third counter-petitioner-society had also filed an affidavit opposing the application. He stated therein that the society in question was formed for the purpose of improving the social and economic condition of the South Travancore Latin Catholic Arasar community, that most of the members of this community had no lands of their own, that they were housed in miserable huts on the coast strip, that about seven thousand persons were occupying huts spread over barely eight acres of land, that because of the miserable conditions of these huts several of these persons happened to die every year on account of epidemics such as small-pox and cholera, that in order to improve the miserable conditions of these people the co-operative society in question was formed about ten years ago, that the Government in or about the year 1949 adopted a housing scheme so that homeless people who had necessarily to remain crowded in small huts could be enabled to live in more sanitary surroundings, that a commissioner for the co-operative housing scheme for the poor with the necessary staff had been appointed for the purpose, that the co-operative society was instrumental in brining to the notice of the Government the miserable conditions of the fishermen in Colachel, that after due investigation and inspection by responsible officers the Government were pleased to bring the Colachel fishing village under their scheme, that the property which was the subject matter of this petition as well as another property which formed the subject matter of the connected O.P. 17 of 1952 were chosen by Government after careful enquiry and inspection at the spot as the only place suitable for the purpose of the housing scheme inaugurated by Government, that during the course of the investigation, the petitioners in both the cases tried to put obstacles in the way of the Government accomplishing their object, that after they got themselves defeated they had resorted to file these petitions, that there was no case of fraud or mala fides or gross partiallity on the part of Government in ordering the acquisition, that there were about a hundred houses of the fishermen spread over the area which had been in existence from very early times, that the portion of the property which the petitioner was in actual possession had been excluded from the acquisition and that there were no grounds made out for interfering with the steps taken by Government. 8. The petitioner has filed a reply affidavit to the counter-affidavits of counter-petitioners 1 and 3. It was stated therein that the facts mentioned in the counter-affidavits were misleading and did not set out the true state of affairs, that the present acquisition was not the result of any housing scheme initiated by Government, that the Government were prevailed upon by the parish priest through the instrumentality of the third counter-petitioner to embark on this acquisition, that there was no public purpose whatsoever, that the objects of the third counter-petitioner-society would show that the acquisition was intended only for the benefit of a few individuals, that the Land Acquisition Act (Travancore) did not permit an acquisition on behalf of a corporation or of a co-operative society, that under the rules of the co-operative society the land acquired would be parcelled among the members thereof, that the acquisition for the co-operative society would ultimately end in benefitting its members, that immediately to the north of the property in question, there were four acres of land belonging to the Church which was used for soaking husks, that the Church was making large income out of it, that this could have been utilised for putting up residential houses for the fishermen, that it was now understood that there was no notification regarding the acquisition published under S. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, that possession of the land had been taken without conforming to the mandatory provisions of S. 9 read with S.17 of the Land Acquisition Act which prohibited such possession being taken before the expiry of the fifteen days period mentioned therein, that the entire proceedings initiated under the Act were ultra vires and totally without jurisdiction, that the declaration under S. 6 of the Act did not conform to the requirements laid down by it in as much as it did not contain specifically a statement that the land was required for a public purpose, that the acquisition proceedings had therefore become void, that there were not hundred houses in the petitioner's property, that there were only sixty one persons squatting on the property and they had all been impleaded in the eviction suit (O.S.163 of 1122) on the file of the Nagercoil District Court, that the proceedings for acquisition were lacking in good faith and that the petitioner was entitled to the reliefs claimed in the main petition. 9. 9. The State Government had published a declaration in the Gazette regarding the acquisition of 10.21 acres in Colachel. The owner of another plot (S.Nos.10253/2 and 4) has filed O.P. No. 17 of 1952 in this Court for the issue of a writ to quash the land acquisition proceedings. The proprietors of the remaining area have not come forward so far. The present petition and O.P. No. 17 of 1952 being connected were heard together. The averments in O.P. No. 17 of 1952 are to some extent different from those made in this petition. But the questions arising for consideration are practically the same in both petitions so that those questions will be considered in this order, a copy of which will be appended to the order in O.P. No. 17 of 1952. 10. The questions argued before us were the following: 1. The entire land acquisition proceedings were ultra vires and not in accordance with the provisions of the Travancore Land Acquisition Act (XI of 1089). The irregularities in the proceedings were mentioned thus: (a) There was no notification under S. 4 of the Act; (b) that the declaration under S. 6 of the Act did not mention that the acquisition was for a public purpose; (c) that the said declaration was also defective in other respects; and (d) that the procedure adopted in taking possession of the property was against the mandatory provisions of S. 9 read with S.17 of the Act. 2. The acquisition itself was not for a public purpose. 3. The proceedings adopted by Government in acquiring the lands were vitiated by mala fides and fraud. 11. The declaration of the Government to acquire the land and the subsequent taking possession of the same under the emergency clause were stated to be irregular. It was first argued that there was no notification published by Government provided for in S. 4 of the Act. It was admitted by the learned Advocate General that there was no such notification and, according to him, the absence of such a notification was not fatal in any way to the proceedings taken to acquire the land. The provisions of the Indian Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894) and of the Travancore Land Acquisition Act (XI of 1089) are not similar. The provisions of the Indian Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894) and of the Travancore Land Acquisition Act (XI of 1089) are not similar. Under the Indian Act, a notification had to be published whenever it appears to Government that land in any locality is needed or likely to be needed for any public purpose. After the publication of this notification, the officers of Government would be entitled to enter upon, survey and take levels of any land in such locality and to do other lawful acts for the purpose of finding out the suitability of the land for which the Government intended to acquire the property. Practically the provisions of the Travancore Act are similar to those mentioned above. There are of course certain differences which are not very material for the purpose of the present case. S. 5 then provides for the payment for all necessary damages which may be caused by the Act mentioned in Cl. 2 of S. 4. This is also the same as in the Travancore Act. Under the Indian Act, a new S. 5(A) was inserted by Act XXXVIII of 1923. That section provides for any person interested in any land which has been notified under S. 4 to object to the acquisition of the land or of any land in the locality within thirty days after the issue of the notification. That objection has to be heard by the Collector who, on a consideration of all such objections and after making such further enquiry, if any, should submit the case for the decision of the Provincial Government. This provision is totally absent in the Travancore Act. Under the Indian Act, S. 6(1) provided for the statutory declaration to be made by the Government if it is satisfied after considering the report, if any, made under S. 5(A) that any particular land is needed for a public purpose, or for a company. In view of the absence of any provision corresponding to S. 5(A) of the Indian Act, S. 6 of the Travancore Act simply laid down that whenever it appeared to Government that any particular land was needed for a public purpose, a declaration shall be made to that effect, over the signature of the Chief Secretary to Government. Cl. 2 of the section states the contents of the declaration. Cl. 2 of the section states the contents of the declaration. Thus unlike the Indian Act, neither the Government nor any of its offices was to call for any objections from parties interested or to hear the same before a declaration under S. 6 was made. In the Indian Act, S. 6 refers to S. 5(A) which again made reference to the notification under S. 4 and the objections filed within thirty days of that notification. Those three sections are therefore really connected unlike the sections in the Travancore Act. Ss. 4 and 5 come under Part II of the Travancore Act under the heading "Preliminary Investigation." Ss.6 to 11 come under the heading "Declaration of Intended Acquisitions." If the Government even at the first instance had pitched upon the property which they wanted to acquire, it would appear that the preliminary investigation proved for under Ss. 4 and 5 would be unnecessary. S. 4(1) states that whenever it appears to the Government that land in any locality is likely to be needed for any public purpose, a notification to that effect shall be published. That does not fix upon the land for any public purpose. The determination of such a land would be after the process mentioned in sub-s. 2 of S. 4 and S. 5 of the Act and when we come to S. 6 we see that the land required is to be ascertained with definiteness, for it states that when it appears to the Government that any particular land is needed for a public purpose, a declaration shall be made to that effect, and sub-cl. 2 provides for the contents of such a declaration. So by the declaration alone the Government fixed the land needed for the public purpose. If it was possible even at the first instance to fix a particular land, a notification under S. 4 was unnecessary. But in this case, it was seen that in the declaration made by Government under S. 6, the survey numbers, and the extent of the land required in the particular locality were given with full descriptions. Thus the absence of a notification under S.4 in the present case was not irregular or fatal to the land acquisition proceedings. 12. Another serious irregularity said to have been committed by the Government related to the declaration itself. Thus the absence of a notification under S.4 in the present case was not irregular or fatal to the land acquisition proceedings. 12. Another serious irregularity said to have been committed by the Government related to the declaration itself. The declaration stated that the particular lands were "required" for the utilisation of the housing scheme at Colachel. It did not mention that it was "needed" for a "public purpose" as mentioned in S. 6(1) of the Travancore Act. From a technical point of view, there was this irregularity, but it did not appear to be one fatal to the acquisition proceedings. Sub-cl. 2 of S. 6 provides that the declaration shall be published in the Gazette and shall state the Taluk and Pakuthy in which the land is situate, the purpose for which it is needed, its approximate area, and, where a plan shall have been made of the land, the place where such plan may be inspected. So, what the declaration should therefore really contain was the purpose for which the land was needed. The question whether that purpose was a public one or not could be gone into by the Courts and if it was found that the purpose mentioned in the declaration for which the land was needed was a public one, then the absence of the words "public purpose" in the declaration could only be an irregularity not affecting the merits of the case. At a late stage we would consider whether the purpose for which the present acquisition was announced was a public purpose or not. For the present purpose, if it could be taken that the purpose was a public one, then the provisions of S. 6 could be deemed to have been substantially complied with. 13. Another objection taken by the petitioner's learned Advocate was that while S. 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act provided for a declaration that any particular land was "needed" for a public purpose, the declaration in this case appearing in the Gazette dated 25th December 1951 was that this land was "required" for the utilisation of the housing scheme at Colachel. Another objection taken by the petitioner's learned Advocate was that while S. 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act provided for a declaration that any particular land was "needed" for a public purpose, the declaration in this case appearing in the Gazette dated 25th December 1951 was that this land was "required" for the utilisation of the housing scheme at Colachel. It was argued that there is a lot of difference between the words "needed" and "required", for the word "required" indicated the expression of a desire, a wish or a want, whereas the word "needed" indicated that a definite decision was taken after consideration of the several facts relating to the necessity of the acquisition. We were also referred to the Malabar Tenancy Act (Madras) where the word "require" in S. 20 was substituted by "need" by an amendment because of certain interpretations put on that word in some of the decided cases. Since the word "need" was not used in the declaration, it was mentioned that the authority which published the declaration had not applied its mind to the necessity that led to the acquisition so that the declaration was defective on that score also. The form prescribed under the Land Acquisition Act for the publication of the declaration used the word "required" instead of "needed". Probably in Malayalam both the words meant the same thing though under the English language, there would be some difference in the idea conveyed by these words. This is not a serious matter affecting the validity of the declaration. 14. A third irregularity that was referred to was the taking possession of the property by the Government under the emergency clause in S.17 of the Travancore Land Acquisition Act. S. 9(1) lays down that the Division Peishkar shall after certain preliminary steps pursuant to the declaration made by the Government, cause public notice to be given at convenient places on or near the land to be taken, stating that the Government intend to take possession of the land and that claims to compensation of land or such lands may be made to him. S. 17(1) then provides that in case of urgency, whenever the Government so direct, the Division Peishkar may, on the expiration of fifteen days from the publication of the notice mentioned in S. 9, Sub-s. (1) take possession of any land needed for public purposes. S. 17(1) then provides that in case of urgency, whenever the Government so direct, the Division Peishkar may, on the expiration of fifteen days from the publication of the notice mentioned in S. 9, Sub-s. (1) take possession of any land needed for public purposes. What was argued before us was that there was not this interval of fifteen days after the publication of the notification and the date of taking possession of the property by the revenue authorities. Cl. 5 of S. 9 provides that the notice shall also be published in the Gazette but the notice referred to in Sub-cl. (1) will not be the notice mentioned in Cl. 5. The files of the District Collector and the Tahsildar produced before us relating to the acquisition proceedings would show that a notice contemplated under S. 9(1) had been sent from the Collector's office to the Tahsildar on 14th February 1952 and that the Tahsildar caused the same to be published in the locality at Colachel, seven miles away from Thuckaley, the same day. It was admitted and it is seen from the records that the Tahsildar took possession of the properties only on 1st March 1952. This was after the expiry of fifteen days from the date of the publication of the notice, for in 1952, February had twentynine days. We do not overlook the observations made by the superior revenue officials in one of the letters where it was mentioned that the Tahsildar was hasty in taking possession before the expiry of fifteen days after the publication of the notice. Evidently that officer was not in full possession of the facts. It was true that the notice mentioned in C1.5 of S. 9 was published only in the Gazette dated 26th February 1952. But it is not that notice that is referred to in S.17 Cl. (1). Thus, as could be understood from the records, there was no irregularity in this matter also. 15. The above were the irregularities on which the petitioner's learned counsel had advanced his arguments. There was no scope for any such criticism so that we take it that, as regards the observance of the several provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, neither the Government nor its officers had committed any irregularity. 16. This leads us to the next question whether the acquisition itself was for any public purpose. There was no scope for any such criticism so that we take it that, as regards the observance of the several provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, neither the Government nor its officers had committed any irregularity. 16. This leads us to the next question whether the acquisition itself was for any public purpose. There was a suggestion made by the learned Advocate General that since S. 6(3) of the Land Acquisition Act laid down that the declaration under S. 6(1) shall be conclusive evidence that the land was needed for a public purpose, the Courts are not competent to go into the question whether the acquisition was for that purpose. He also stated that the decision of the Government to acquire the land was by an administrative act so that the Courts were not to interfere in such matters and to issue any writ for quashing the proceedings. He had referred us to the decisions in Province of Bombay v. Khushaldas, A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 222, where it was held that when the executive authority had to form an opinion about an objective matter as a preliminary step to the exercise of a certain power conferred on it, the determination of the objective fact and the exercise of the power based thereon are alike matters of an administrative character and are not amenable to the writ of certiorari. This case, though decided after the Constitution of India came into force, was not one arising under any of the provisions of the Constitution. The building dealt with in that case had been requisitioned by the Government of Bombay in 1948 under S. 3 of the Bombay Land Requisition Ordinance (V of 1947). It was with reference to the law in force in 1948 that this case was decided without any reference to the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution. Art. 19(1)(f) allows all citizens to have the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property. This was restricted only by Cl. 5 of Art. 19. That clause laid down that nothing in sub-cl. (d), (e) and (f) of Cl. Art. 19(1)(f) allows all citizens to have the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property. This was restricted only by Cl. 5 of Art. 19. That clause laid down that nothing in sub-cl. (d), (e) and (f) of Cl. (1) shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes or prevents the State from making any law imposing reasonable restrictions on the exercise of any of the rights conferred by the said sub-clauses either in the interests of the general public or for the protection of the interests of any Scheduled Tribe. Thus when the existing law prescribed restrictions on the enjoyment of the right conferred by Art. 19(1)(f), it is the duty of the Court to consider whether those restrictions are reasonable or not. The Supreme Court has in Gopalan v. The State of Madras, A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 27 laid down that it was competent for the courts to go into the question whether the restrictions were reasonable or not. Applying this principle, their Lordships held in that case that S.14 of the Preventive Detention Act (IV of 1950) passed by the Central Legislature was ultra vires as that section prohibited the Courts to go into certain matters relating to preventive detention. The same principle has been laid down in Khare v. The State of Delhi, A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 211. A Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Jeshingbhai v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1950 Born. 363 has held that the jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a writ of certiorari or other writs against executive authorities is not merely confined to the writs which it issued in the past, but power has been conferred upon it by the Constitution of India to issue directions, orders or writs for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III which dealt with fundamental rights. The Supreme Court of the United States has laid down in Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U.S. 439, that, in considering the application of the 14th Amendment to cases of expropriation of private property, the question as to what would constitute a public use is a judicial one. The Supreme Court of the United States has laid down in Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U.S. 439, that, in considering the application of the 14th Amendment to cases of expropriation of private property, the question as to what would constitute a public use is a judicial one. In a recent case the Allahabad High Court had held that the High Court had power to interfere even in the case of administrative orders which are made in defiance of mandatory provisions of law or without any jurisdiction (Vide Rama Charan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1952 All. L.J. 319). 17. Besides Art. 31 of the Constitution impliedly authorises the court to go into the question whether the land of a citizen acquired by the State was for a public purpose or not. Art. 31(1) lays down that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. Cl. 2 then provides for the essential requisites to be provided for in the law sanctioning compulsory acquisition for a public purpose. Mukkerjea, J. in Chiranjit Lal v. Union of India, 1950 S.C.R. 869, at 902, considered the implications in this clause and mentioned thus: "It is a right inherent in every sovereign to take and appropriate private property belonging to individual citizens for public use. This right, which is described as eminent domain in American Law, is like the power of taxation, an off-spring of political necessity, and it is supposed to be based upon an implied reservation by Government that private property acquired by its citizens under its protection may be taken or its use controlled for public benefit irrespective of the wishes of the owner. Art. 31[2] of the Constitution prescribes a two-fold limit within which such superior right of the State should be exercised. One limitation imposed upon acquisition or taking possession of private property which is implied in the clause is that such taking must be for public purpose. The other condition is that no property can be taken, unless the law which authorises such appropriation contains a provision for payment of compensation in the manner laid down in the clause." Necessarily therefore, the High Court will have to go into the question whether the acquisition was for a public purpose when the proceedings taken by the State are impeached as against the guaranteed fundamental rights in the Constitution. Following the decision of the Judicial Committee of Privy Council in Luchmeswara Singh v. Chairman, Darbhanga Municipality, I.L.R. 18 Cal. 99, the Madras High Court in Ponnai v. Secretary of State, A.I.R. 1926 Mad. 1099 had held that if the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act are not strictly complied with, but are made a cloak for attempting to obtain a transfer of an indefeasible title under the guise of a public purpose, the proceedings do not operate towards the creation of a valid title to the land in Government. This view expressed in that decision stands, though another principle on a different matter had been overruled by a later Full Bench decision of the same Court in Suryanarayana v. Madras Province, A.I.R. 1945 Mad. 394. If the compulsory acquisition is not for a public purpose, it is bad in law. Inspite of Cl. 3 of S. 6, the question whether the acquisition was for a public purpose is justiciable. 18. Before considering the question whether the acquisition was for a public purpose, it is necessary to find out the meaning of those words. A Bench of five judges of the Allahabad High Court had to consider this aspect of the case in Surayapal Singh v. U.P. Government, A.I.R. 1951 All. 674. There was a full discussion of this matter and the opinion of the learned judges, with which we are in full agreement, is recorded at pages 681, 682 and 683 of that report thus: "There has been much discussion before us as to the meaning of the words "public purpose" as used in the Constitution. The case mainly relied on by Sri. P.R. Das is that of Hamabai Framjee Petit v. Secretary of State 42 I.A. 44. In that case the Govt. of Bombay had, under a lease and sanad (granted, respectively in 1854 & 1839) a right, subject to giving notice and paying compensation, to resume possession of the land granted if they desired to use it for a public purpose. The Government gave notice of their intention to resume possession with the object of using the land for the provision of residences to be let at moderate rates to Govt. officials, but the applts. declined to give up possession. Suitable accommodation for such officers was difficult to obtain in Bombay, but it was not contended that it was impossible. The Government gave notice of their intention to resume possession with the object of using the land for the provision of residences to be let at moderate rates to Govt. officials, but the applts. declined to give up possession. Suitable accommodation for such officers was difficult to obtain in Bombay, but it was not contended that it was impossible. The Judicial Committee in dismissing the appeal refd. with approval to the view of Batchelor, J., who had said: "General definitions are, I think, rather to be avoided where the avoidance is possible and I make no attempt to define precisely the extent of the phrase 'public purposes,' in the lease; it is enough to say that, in my opinion, the phrase, whatever it may mean must include a purpose, that is an object or aim, in which the general interest of the community as opposed to the particular interest of the individuals, is directly and vitally concerned," and learned counsel placed great reliance on the words "general interest of the community, his contention being that the acquisition effected by the impugned Act cannot be said to be for the general interest of the community when [according to him] a substantial part of the community will inevitably be made to suffer as a consequence thereof. He also drew our attention to an observation of Fazl Ali, J. in the case of Province of Bombay v. K.S. Advani, 1950 S.C.R. 621, where that learned judge said: "Indeed it appears to me that in a large majority of cases no inquiry should be necessary as the existence of a public purpose would be self-evident or obvious and a mere reference to the purpose will make anyone say: This is of course a public purpose." The suggestion of learned counsel was that the existence of a public purpose must be so obvious that there can be no possibility of a difference of opinion on the point and that, as this was not the case in the present instance, the conclusion must be drawn that the existence of a public purpose had not been established. It is sufficient, we think, to point out that the learned judge in the observation which we have quoted expressly recognises the possibility of there being cases in which the existence of a public purpose would not be self-evident or obvious. It is sufficient, we think, to point out that the learned judge in the observation which we have quoted expressly recognises the possibility of there being cases in which the existence of a public purpose would not be self-evident or obvious. Emphasis was also laid on the distinction which has been drawn in the United States between public purpose or public use on the one hand and public benefit and public policy on the other, and it has been strongly urged before us that the acquisition of property effected by the impugned Act is not for a public purpose but is merely in implementation of the declared policy of a political party. We have been refd. to a large number of decisions of the S.C. of the United States and to the works of distd. American authors such as Cooley, Willis and Weaver, with reference both to the meaning of the expression public purpose [or public use] in the United States, and to the distinction which has in some instances been drawn between such purpose or use and public policy. We do not, however, think that it is necessary to refer to these authorities in detail, for it is to be observed that in all the cases to which our attention has been directed the acquisition was of a restricted area for a specific limited purpose, such as the acquisition of land for the purpose of the construction of a road, a rly. harbour, reservoir, town site and the like, and the question which had to be consd. in every case was whether that limited purpose was a public purpose or use. That is not the question with which this Court is confronted. There is no question here of the acquisition of a restricted area for a limited purpose. The impugned Act provides for the acquisition and vesting [in the first instance] in the State of approximately 4,13,00,000 acres of land at present belonging to some 20,00,000 persons as part of a comprehensive scheme of land reform. It is, we think, abundantly clear that the circumstances in which property is proposed to be acquired under the present Act differ so widely from those which existed in the cases cited to us, that the latter can furnish no conclusive answer to the problem with which we are concerned. It is, we think, abundantly clear that the circumstances in which property is proposed to be acquired under the present Act differ so widely from those which existed in the cases cited to us, that the latter can furnish no conclusive answer to the problem with which we are concerned. We must, we think, arrive at a conclusion as to the proper interpretation of the expression'public purpose' as used in the Constitution on a consideration not only of such principles as are to be derived from the decided cases but of the principles set forth in the Constitution itself. Hambai Framjee Petit's case, 41 I.A. 44, is the only English or Indian authority to which we have been refd. and from the decision in that case three conclusions can, we think, be reached: first the phrase 'public purpose' must include an object or aim in which the general interest of the community, as opposed to the particular interest of individuals, is directly and vitally concerned; secondly, it is not necessary that the property acquired, when in the form of land, should be made available to the public at large: it is enough if the purpose is one in which the general interest of the community is concerned, and thirdly, the fact that the object or aim of the particular scheme may be achieved in some other way does not necessarily negative the existence of a public purpose. The decision in the United States' Courts, if we may say so with respect, are not easy to reconcile. So eminent a jurist as Dr. Cooley has expressed himself as being'somewhat at sea' when endeavouring to define, in the light of the judicial decisions what constitutes a public purpose, and his conclusions he states in these words [Constitutional Limitations, Edn. 8, Vol. 2, p. 1131]: "The reason of the case and the settled practice of free Govts. must be our guides in determining what is or is not to be regarded a public use; and that only can be considered such where the Govt. is supplying its own needs, or is furnishing facilities for its citizens in regard to those matters of public necessity, convenience, or welfare, which, on account of their peculiar character and the difficulty - perhaps impossibility - of making provision for them otherwise, it is alike proper, useful, and needful for the Govt. is supplying its own needs, or is furnishing facilities for its citizens in regard to those matters of public necessity, convenience, or welfare, which, on account of their peculiar character and the difficulty - perhaps impossibility - of making provision for them otherwise, it is alike proper, useful, and needful for the Govt. to provide," and elsewhere [at p. 1138] the learned author points out that: "accepting as correct the decisions which have been made, it must be conceded that the term'public use, as employed in the law of eminent domain, has a meaning much controlled by the necessity and somewhat different from that which it bears generally." We may also quote a passage from Willis in which, in our opinion, the author well summarises the present position under United States Law. At pp. 817 & 818 of his work'Constitutional Law of the United States' the learned author says: 'What is a public use ? On this question there have been two view points. One may be called the older viewpoint and the other the newer view point. According to the older viewpoint, in order to have a public use, there must be the use by the public. This is perhaps still the majority viewpoint, and it is supported by a great number of cases ' According to the newer viewpoint there is a public use if the thing taken is useful to the public. This makes public use for eminent domain practically synonymous with public purpose for taxations and somewhat like social interest for police power Under this rule it is not necessary for the benefit to be for the whole community, but it must be for a considerable number.' Now is there to be found in the Constitution of India anything to guide the Cts. as to the meaning to be attributed to the expression'public purpose' when used therein? We think there is. Chap. 4 contains what are described as directive principles of State policy, and although those principles are not enforceable by any Ct. Art. 37 specifically lays down that they are nevertheless fundamental in the governance of the country and that'it shall be the duty of the State to apply these principles in making laws. If then we examine the directive principles we find that Art. 39, Cls. Art. 37 specifically lays down that they are nevertheless fundamental in the governance of the country and that'it shall be the duty of the State to apply these principles in making laws. If then we examine the directive principles we find that Art. 39, Cls. [b] & [c} provide: [b] that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community are so distributed as best to sub-serve the common good; [c] that the operation of the economic system does not result in the concentration of wealth and means of production to the common detriment.' Art. 40 says that: 'The State shall take steps to organise village panchayats and endow them with such powers and authority as may be necessary to enable them to function as units of self-government.' Art. 43 says that: "The State shall endeavour to secure by suitable legislation to all workers, agricultural, industrial or otherwise, work, a living wage, conditions of work ensuring a decent standard of life and full enjoyment of leisure and social and cultural opportunities and, in particular the State shall endeavour to promote cottage industries on an individual or co-operative basis in rural areas.' And Art. 48 that: The State shall endeavour to organise agricultural and animal husbandry on modern and scientific lines The distinction to which we have already refd. which has been drawn in some American cases between public purpose and public policy may, we think, be well founded if by public policy is meant no more than the policy of the political party which then holds office. But the distinction ceases, in our opinion, if by public policy is meant State policy or the policy solemnly laid down in the Constitution, the principles of which are declared to be fundamental to the governance of the country. In our opinion, a law made for the purpose of securing an aim declared in the Constitution to be a matter of State policy is for a public purpose." 19. Bearing in mind the principles laid down there we have to examine whether the acquisition in this case is for a public purpose. The properties are acquired for the utilisation on the land for the housing scheme at Colachel. Bearing in mind the principles laid down there we have to examine whether the acquisition in this case is for a public purpose. The properties are acquired for the utilisation on the land for the housing scheme at Colachel. The files of the Government Secretariat called for and examined would show that this was mainly to give accommodation to the fisher folk at Colachel where they are now living in huts under insanitary surroundings. Though this will not benefit the general public, it cannot be said, that it would not benefit a portion of the public. There was the older and stricter view that unless the property acquired was dedicated for the use of the public at large or a considerable section thereof, it would not be a public use. Vide Nichols on Eminent Domain, 1950 Edn., Vol. III, Page 430. But the modern and more liberal view, is that it is not an essential condition of public use that the property should be transferred to public ownership or for public use and that it would be sufficient if the public derives advantage from the scheme. According to this latter view, it is no objection to the validity of an acquisition that it is in favour of a private corporation or of individuals, provided the acquisition that it is in favour of a private corporation or of individuals, provided the acquisition results in public advantage. Vide page 435 of the same book. This is the principle adopted in Fall Brook Irrigation District v. Braddley,164 U.S. 112, Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361, Strikly v. Highland Boy Mining Company, 200 U.S. 527 and Mt. Vernon Cotton Company v. Alabana Power Company, 240 U.S. 30. It is not essential therefore that the entire community or even a considerable portion should directly enjoy or participate in an improvement in order to constitute a public use. Vide also Rindgo v. Los Angels, 262 U.S. 700. Therefore public use is considered to be a benefit and it is not considered essential that the entire community or even a considerable portion thereof should directly enjoy or participate in any improvement in order that it constituted a public use. This view was adopted by the Madras High Court in a recent decision on writ petitions Nos. 215, 76, 74, 72 and 78 of 1951 of that High Court. This view was adopted by the Madras High Court in a recent decision on writ petitions Nos. 215, 76, 74, 72 and 78 of 1951 of that High Court. Though it is only a section of the community that would be benefitted by this scheme proposed to be started by Government, it is a public purpose. The acquisition is, therefore, for a public purpose as envisaged in Art. 31(2) of the Constitution and S.6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act. 20. The remaining question for consideration is whether the action of the Government is vitiated by fraud and mala fides. The petitioner in O.P. No. 14 of 1952 has stated that the Government was led to acquire this land because of the machination of the Catholic parish priest at Colachel. It was stated that as soon as he demanded surrender of possession of the property, the priest moved the Government in 1943 to acquire this land for the use of the fishermen. It was admitted that there was such a petition and that petition was dismissed. Again Shri Simon the president of the Co-operative Society which was stated to have been started at the instance and control of the parish priest applied for the acquisition of the identical property in 1949. His petition was dismissed on 15.7.1949 and an endorsement was given to him to that effect on 21.7.1949. Shri Simon then applied for a reconsideration of this decision by a letter dated 19th July 1949, followed by another letter dated 23rd July 1949. On 8th August 1949, the Government passed an order declining to interfere with the decision already passed. Then it was that the housing scheme was sanctioned on 17th October 1949, though in the affidavit it was stated that it was sanctioned only in 1950. On 18th October 1949, a memo was sent to the Tahsildar, Kalkulam Taluk, to ascertain whether there were suitable Poramboke lands for the purpose and if not to find out suitable sites. Meanwhile Shri. Simon sent a letter to the Registrar of the Co-operative Societies expressing that the society of which he was the president was willing to undertake to construct houses for the fishermen. The letter was evidently addressed to the Registrar, because the Government had appointed a special officer from the Co-operative Department to attend to these works. Meanwhile Shri. Simon sent a letter to the Registrar of the Co-operative Societies expressing that the society of which he was the president was willing to undertake to construct houses for the fishermen. The letter was evidently addressed to the Registrar, because the Government had appointed a special officer from the Co-operative Department to attend to these works. This letter was forwarded by the Registrar to the Government on 27th October 1949. Subsequently on 15th July 1950, Shri. Simon wrote to Government pressing for the acquisition and undertaking to pay even the compensation money by the society. On 23rd August 1950, the special officer appointed by the Government inspected the sites in Colachel in the company of Shri Simon and intimated to Government the desirability of acquiring the properties in question. On 19th September 1950, Shri. Simon wrote to the Minister Shri. A.J. John to speed up the acquisition proceedings. On 23rd January 1951, the special officers' letter to Government showed that Shri. Simon agreed with him that these sites were suitable. On 12th January 1951, the Government communicated their sanction for the housing scheme for Kalkulam Taluk and wrote to the Secretary to the Revenue Board to take steps to implement the same. Then on 4th May, 6th June and 3rd August 1951, petitions were sent by the petitioner in O.P. No. 14 of 1951 to Government objecting to the acquisition. He was heard by the Minister concerned. On 17th October 1951, orders were passed on the same. Twenty cents out of the land were excluded and directions were given to acquire the remaining extent. On 31st October 1951, the petitioner filed a review application and that was dismissed on 17th December 1951. On 21st December 1951, the declaration was published by the Government in the Gazette. On 9th June 1952 the parish priest filed an affidavit and a petition in the eviction suit (O.S. No. 163 of 1122) that the suit might be struck off the file as the Government had passed orders to acquire the land in question. It is from these circumstances that the petitioner wanted to argue that the whole acquisition proceedings were engineered by the parish priest because of the persistent demand for surrender of possession of the properties included in the mortgage deed. It is from these circumstances that the petitioner wanted to argue that the whole acquisition proceedings were engineered by the parish priest because of the persistent demand for surrender of possession of the properties included in the mortgage deed. It is true that this petitioner had obtained a decree for redemption of the property and that the defendant did not if possible, want to surrender. Even if the defendant was actuated by such motives, that had nothing to do with Government, for unless the Government was a party to the fraud alleged, there is nothing to invalidate the acquisition proceedings. It was true that the Government had declined to interfere in 1943 and 1949 on the petitions filed by the parish priest and Shri. Simon for the acquisition of this land for the use of the fishermen. The Government had then no scheme for providing house sites for the fishermen at Colachel. It was only after such a scheme was sanctioned and which scheme was in accordance with the directive principles enunciated in the Constitution that steps were taken to acquire the land. We do not however, ignore a letter dated 22nd February 1952 sent under instructions by the Advocate for the petitioner in O.P.No.14 of 1952 to Government in which it was mentioned that the Ministers who were responsible in passing orders for the acquisition belonged to the Catholic faith thereby suggesting that the present acquisition was intended to benefit the Roman Catholics. We are not prepared to accept that suggestion for, from the records, we see that the Government was not in any way influenced by such considerations. It was then argued that this acquisition would not benefit all the fishermen in Colachel but only those fishermen who were Roman Catholics. There was nothing in the files produced before us to show that the Government had any intention to discriminate one set of fishermen from another, even though they were the followers of different religions. From the affidavit filed on behalf of the Government it was apparent that their object was only to entrust the construction of the houses to the third counter-petitioner-co¬operative society and not to give over the land entirely to that society. From the affidavit filed on behalf of the Government it was apparent that their object was only to entrust the construction of the houses to the third counter-petitioner-co¬operative society and not to give over the land entirely to that society. In one of the letters sent by the special officer touching upon this matter, it had also been mentioned that the Hindu fishermen could also be benefitted by this scheme if they joined the co-operative society as members. The petitioner in O.P. No. 17 of 1951 had no special grounds to allege in this matter except to state that he was put to this trouble because his property was lying near the property of the petitioner in O.P. No. 14 of 1952. There is therefore nothing to show that the Government was in any way actuated by mala fide motives or that they were misled in passing orders for the acquisition of the land. There is therefore no reason for interference by this Court in regard to this petition and the connected petition, O.P. No. 17 of 1952. Both the petitions are dismissed with costs. Advocate's fee will be Rupees Two Hundred in each case. Dismissed.