ORDER H. S. KAMATH, PRESIDENT. - The facts are not in dispute. The applicant "is a manufacturer and does the business of dyeing and colouring yarn of his customers" (Commissioner's appellate order). "He does not dye and colour his own yarn as he has no licence" (Assistant Commissioner's assessment order). Of the yarn brought to him for dyeing by his customers - registered and unregistered dealers - some was of 25 counts and below and the rest of over 25 counts. Sales of "yarn of counts of 25 and below" were tax-free during the period of assessment (1-6-47 to 12-11-47), by virtue of item 18 of the old unamended Schedule II. The departmental officers have held that the applicant effected "sales," when he handed back to his customers the yarn that they had brought to him, after dyeing it according to their instructions. In the "sale price" has been included the amounts recovered by the applicant (a) as dyeing charges, (b) as "sales tax," and (c) as packing charges. The gross turnover thus determined is Rs. 1,24,881 out of which (b) accounts for Rs. 1,068 and (c) for Rs. 3,645. The gross turnover is thus made up very largely of "dyeing charges." Out of these dyeing charges, exemption has been given only in respect of a small sum of Rs. 3,720 representing the charges recovered from registered dealers in respect of dyeing yarn of over 25 counts. This is on the ground that the tax in respect of this yarn, which is not tax-free, will be recoverable ultimately from those registered dealers themselves. 2. The main question for decision in this case is whether a sale has taken place when a dyer, like the applicant, dyes the yarn brought to him by a customer and hands it back to him on payment of certain charges. The case prima facie is not different from what happens, when a job printer carries out a printing job on paper supplied to him by a customer and hands it back to him on payment of his charges. That, strictly in point of principle, the cases are not dissimilar has not been seriously denied by the learned counsel for the State. In support of the department's view, however, he has urged that there is an important distinction between the two cases, which cannot be ignored in practice. That, strictly in point of principle, the cases are not dissimilar has not been seriously denied by the learned counsel for the State. In support of the department's view, however, he has urged that there is an important distinction between the two cases, which cannot be ignored in practice. In the job printer's case, the cost of the printer's ink was of negligible value, the bulk of the printing charges representing the cost of the skill, technique and labour employed by the printer. In the case of the dyer, however, the actual cost of the dyeing materials used represents the bulk of the dyeing charges. (According to the Assessing Officer, this is about 88 per cent. of the total dyeing charges, and accordingly to the State learned counsel it is about 80 per cent. - the comparatively small balance representing the cost of the dyer's skill, technique and labour). 3. We may assume that the estimate made of the relative values of the printer's ink in the one case and of the dyeing materials on the other are correct. Nevertheless, the question that arises is whether just because of this difference in relative values a transfer of property may be considered to have taken place in the latter case. If so, what are the goods in which property has been transferred ? The simple fact is that the customer, who brought grey yarn to the dyer, has got back in its place dyed yarn, that is to say, the grey yarn with a colour given to it by the dyeing materials used. The colour itself has no tangible existence; and it will be doing violence to language to say that the customer has received dye-stuffs of any kind along with his yarn. Here too, as in the job printer's case, what the customer has got back are his own goods with certain impressions of colour made on them by the dyer with the help of his dyeing materials, his tools and his skill. The mere fact that the ratio of the cost of his skill, technique and labour to the cost of the materials employed by him is smaller than the corresponding ratio in the job printer's case cannot lead us to the proposition that there has been a transfer of property in the former and not in the latter. The mere fact that the ratio of the cost of his skill, technique and labour to the cost of the materials employed by him is smaller than the corresponding ratio in the job printer's case cannot lead us to the proposition that there has been a transfer of property in the former and not in the latter. The plain fact is that in neither case have we a contract of sale; what we have is a contract of work. 4. The conclusion reached above is supported by the discussion on the subject in Benjamin's standard work (pages 166 to 168 - Eighth Edition) to which the applicant's learned counsel has called attention. I would quote the following from page 168 :- "Where the employer delivers to a workman either all or the principal materials of a chattel on which the workman agrees to do work, there is a bailment by the employer, and a contract for work and labour, or for work, labour and materials (as the case may be), by the workman. Materials added by the workman, on being affixed to or blended with the employer's materials, thereupon vest in the employer by accession, and not under any contract of sale." 5. In arriving at their decision the departmental officers appears to have been influenced chiefly by the fact that the large amount, represented by the dyeing charges, would escape taxation altogether, if a view contrary to theirs were taken. The applicant apparently bought the dyeing materials tax-free, in his capacity as a registered dealer who was to "manufacture" for resale. No tax was recoverable from his "vendees" in respect of yarn of 25 counts and below. The provisions of the Sales Tax Act would thus be defeated, if the transactions of the applicant with his customers were not to be taxed. This, it would appear, is their simple reasoning; and it is significant that the amount charged to registered dealers, in respect of yarn of over 25 counts has not been taxed, in view of the fact that recovery was possible later from those registered dealers. The solution to the department's difficulties, it seems to me, is however not the one they have applied. The solution to the department's difficulties, it seems to me, is however not the one they have applied. Quite obviously, in the light of the description of the applicant's business given by the Assessing Officer and the Commissioner and reproduced at the beginning of this order, the applicant is not a dealer, as he is not engaged in the business of selling. His registration as a dealer, in so far as his business of dyeing is concerned, is not therefore in order. Cancellation of the registration certificate given to him would automatically make taxable the sales made to him of dyeing materials. 6. So far as the real question for consideration in this case is concerned, I am clear in my mind that it cannot be distinguished from Rajasthan Printing Litho Works Ltd. v. The State ([1951] N.L.J. 613; 3 S.T.C. 62). The transactions taxed are not sales. At my learned colleague agrees with this view, the order of the learned Commissioner is set aside and the application for revision is allowed. M. R. JOSHI, MEMBER, - I agree. Application allowed.