Judgment.- The plaintiff is the appellant. He sued for the recovery of a sum of Rs. 1,099-10-0. Though decreed in the trial Court, the suit was dismissed on appeal by the Subordinate Judge of Kumbakonam. The suit was instituted in the following circumstances: The respondent herein, a landholder, obtained a decree against one of his tenants one Balasubramania Padayachi, for arrears of rent in S.S. No. 28 of 1937 on the file of the Revenue Divisional Officer, Kumbakonam, and, in execution thereof brought the tenant’s holding to sale. The property was purchased by the appellant on 5th July, 1943. Within 30 days of the sale, the judgment-debtor instituted proceedings under section 131 of the Madras Estates Land Act for setting aside the sale. This application was opposed by the appellant, who was the auction-purchaser, mainly on two grounds. The first was that the applicant did not comply with the requirements of section 131 of the Madras Estates Land Act and the second was that the applicant had no subsisting interest in the property to enable him to maintain the application, the property having been purchased by third parties in execution of a money decree against him long before and the transfer having been recognised by the landholder. These objections prevailed with the Sub-Collector, Kumbakonam, who heard the application with the result that the petition was dismissed. Thereupon the appellant obtained the usual sale certificate and also possession of the property through Court on 2nd September, 1943. Subsequently, the appellant attached the surplus sale proceeds in execution of a decree, which he obtained against the above mentioned Balasubramania Padayachi. When a claim was preferred by the widow of the purchaser in execution of the money decree to the surplus sale proceeds on the ground that the property in dispute belonged to her husband by virtue of the earlier sale, the appellant objected to the same and contended that the sale proceeds belonged to his judgment-debtor. The executing Court agreed with his objection and dismissed the claim petition with the consequence that he could proceed against the surplus sale proceeds in execution of his decree. The executing Court agreed with his objection and dismissed the claim petition with the consequence that he could proceed against the surplus sale proceeds in execution of his decree. Sometime thereafter, one Venkatarama Ayyar, who acquired interest in the suit properties by a series of transactions filed a suit O.S. No. 237 of 1944, alleging that the property in question was purchased by his predecessorin-interest in execution of a money decree and the transfer having been recognised by the landholder the judgment-debtor Balasubramania Padayachi had no subsisting interest in the property and therefore the subsequent sale had no effect at all and would not, in any way, prejudice the purchase of these properties by his predecessor-in-interest. In spite of the opposition by the present appellant, the suit was decreed and, in execution of the decree, he was dispossessed. It may be mentioned here that one of the grounds of the judgment in Venkatarama Aiyar’s suit was the statement of the appellant that, on the date when the property was brought to sale in execution of the decree in S.S. No. 28 of 1937, the judgment-debtor had no saleable interest in the property, the title therein having long before passed to the purchaser of the same earlier in execution of another decree and the transfer having been recognised by the landholder. It is as a result of his having lost possession of the property that the present suit came to be laid. The plaint claim was made up of Rs. 750 being the purchase money which he paid, Rs. 115-7-0 being the costs in O.S. No. 237 of 1944 and Rs. 100 being the costs incurred by him and the balance as interest at 6 per cent. per annum on the amounts due to him. The contention put forward by the plaintiff in the plaint was that, as the sale was void ab initio and that nothing was purchased by him at the Court auction, the defendant was bound to make good the purchase money, which he deposited into Court. per annum on the amounts due to him. The contention put forward by the plaintiff in the plaint was that, as the sale was void ab initio and that nothing was purchased by him at the Court auction, the defendant was bound to make good the purchase money, which he deposited into Court. The suit was resisted on various grounds, the chief of them being that the purchasers at the Court auction in execution of the decree in O.S. No. 193 of 1933 did not comply with the procedure laid down in sections 145 and 147 of the Madras Estates Land Act with the result that his judgment-debtor continued to be the registered pattadar and, consequently, the defendant could validly bring the properties to sale, without impleading the previous auction-purchasers and that, secondly the plaintiff was estopped from questioning the validity of the sale, having adopted the same on two earlier occasions. The trial Court decreed the suit, agreeing with the contentions put forward on behalf of the plaintiff that the sale was ab initio void, as, at the time of the Court auction, the judgment-debtor had no subsisting interest in the property and that there was nothing which the plaintiff could purchase at that sale and that the plaintiff was not estopped from contending that the sale was void. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge reversed the judgment of the trial Court. His view was that the non-compliance by the purchasers in the earlier Court auction with the procedure laid down in sections 145 and 147 enabled the landholder to bring the property to sale validly and the failure to bring on record the transferees did not affect the legality of the sale. He was also of the opinion that the plaintiff was precluded from attacking the validity of the sale, having regard to the attitude adopted by him both with regard to the application for setting aside the sale and the attachment of the surplus sale proceeds. The correctness of this decision is questioned in this second appeal on both the points by Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar, the learned Counsel for the appellant. It is argued for the appellant that the lower appellate Court erred in not giving a definite finding on the question, whether the landholder had recognised the transfer. I entirely agree with Mr. The correctness of this decision is questioned in this second appeal on both the points by Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar, the learned Counsel for the appellant. It is argued for the appellant that the lower appellate Court erred in not giving a definite finding on the question, whether the landholder had recognised the transfer. I entirely agree with Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar that the lower appellate Court took an erroneous view of the law and failed to consider that point and if my decision is to rest on this, I would have to call upon the lower appellate Court to go into that matter and give a finding. But in the view I take of the other point, it looks to me to be unnecessary to adopt the course indicated above. The second appeal can be disposed of on the other ground of decision adopted by the lower appellate Court. As I have already stated above, the lower appellate Court took the view that the plaintiff was precluded from contending that the sale was not valid. Mr. Venkatarama Ayyar, the learned counsel for the respondent, supports the judgment of the lower appellate Court on this aspect of the case by citing to me certain decisions, which I will refer to presently. Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar canvasses the finding of the lower appellate Court on this point and contends that there can be no question of any estoppel in a case like this. The rule of estoppel is embodied in section 115 of the Evidence Act. Section 115 runs thus: “When one person has, by his declaration, act or omission, intentionally caused or permitted another person to believe a thing to be true and to act upon such belief, neither he nor his representative shall be allowed in any suit or proceeding between himself and such person, or his representative, to deny the truth of that thing. Illustration: A intentionally and falsely leads B to believe that certain land belongs to A, and thereby induces B to buy and pay for it. The land afterwards becomes the property of A and A seeks to set aside the sale on the ground that at the time of the sale he had no title. He must not be allowed to prove his want of title.” Based on this section, the contention of Mr. The land afterwards becomes the property of A and A seeks to set aside the sale on the ground that at the time of the sale he had no title. He must not be allowed to prove his want of title.” Based on this section, the contention of Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar is that there was no declaration, act or omission attributable to the plaintiff, acting upon which the defendant was, in any way, prejudiced. It is not necessary for me to consider the soundness of the proposition put forward by Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar. The plaintiff was non-suited in the lower appellate Court which invoked the rule against approbate and reprobate in support of its judgment. The doctrine is tersely stated by Scrutton, Lord Justice, in Verachures Creameries v. Hull and Netherlands Steamship Co.1. What happened there was this. Certain goods were delivered by the owners to the forwarding agents for forwarding them to a customer in Manchester. Before the goods were actually delivered to the customer the owners directed the agents not to deliver them to the customer. Despite this, the agents delivered the goods to the customer. The owners thereupon invoiced the goods to the customer and also sued him for recovery of the amount. The owners, having failed to get satisfaction of the decree, wanted to proceed against the agents. The question was whether the owners could proceed against the agents also having elected first to proceed against the customer. The Court of appeal held that the owners could not proceed against the agents. Dealing with the argument put forward on behalf of the owners that it was not easy to see why the act of the owners should enure to the benefit of the agents, who were no parties to the action for goods sold and delivered and who have in no way altered their position in consequence of any election involved in bringing that action, Scrutton, Lord Justice, summed up the position thus: “A plaintiff is not permitted to ‘approbate and reprobate.' The phrase is apparently borrowed from the Scotch Law, where it is used to express the principle embodied in our doctrine of election, viz., that no party can accept and reject the same instrument, Ker v. Wauchope1, Douglas Menzies v. Umphelby2. The doctrine of election is not however confined to instruments. The doctrine of election is not however confined to instruments. A person cannot say at one time that a transaction is valid and thereby obtain some advantage to which he could only be entitled on the footing that it is valid, and then turn round and say that it is void for purpose of securing some other advantage. This is to approbate and reprobate the transaction.” This principle was applied to the case of a sale in our Court by Burn, J., in Sreeramulu v. Venkatanarasimham3. There a person, who had a decree against a father and his three sons, first objected to the sale of the son’s share in the joint family properties by the Official Receiver in the insolvency of the father. He then allowed the sale and also took part in it. After the sale was concluded, he protested against it, but later on, he not only withdrew his protest but received his share of the sale proceeds from the Official Receiver’s sale. Having done all this, he sought to bring to sale the son’s share in the joint family property in execution of his decree. Where the matter came up finally before this Court, it was decided by Burn, J., that having approved of the sale as seen from the various acts of his, he was precluded from contending subsequently that the sale was void. Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar, the learned counsel fox the appellant sough to distinguish those decisions on the ground that in this case it is not the appellant that is repudiating the sale but it is the decree of the Court that has resulted in rendering the sale void and depriving the appellant of the possession of the property. His argument is that the interposition of a decree makes all the difference and the decisions cited by Mr. Venkatarama Ayyar have no application to this case. I do not think I can agree. No doubt it is the decree that has deprived the appellant of the property. His argument is that the interposition of a decree makes all the difference and the decisions cited by Mr. Venkatarama Ayyar have no application to this case. I do not think I can agree. No doubt it is the decree that has deprived the appellant of the property. But it cannot be overlooked that the appellant was fully aware of the situation, viz., that the judgment-debtor at the time of the sale had no subsisting interest, he having lost all his interest long before the property was brought to sale and the transfer having been recognised by the landholder as can be seen from his assertion in the proceedings for setting aside the sale and yet he deliberately chose to stand by it and obtained an advantage for himself. The decree in question was only the result of facts and circumstances which rendered the sale ab initio void of which the appellant was fully aware. Having adopted the sale as a valid one with full knowledge that the sale was a void one and that he purchased nothing at that sale, for his own purpose, and thereby obtained an advantage he cannot turn round and say that he must be put back in the same position in which he was prior to the sale, merely because it turns out later on that the course followed by him was to his disadvantage. It was next urged by Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar that the rule against approbate and reprobate is nothing but another form of estoppel and can have no application to a case like this. He referred me to a passage in the law of Estoppel by representation by Spencer Bower at page 214. The passage runs thus:- “The basic principle underlying all these cases is that where A dealing with B, is confronted with two alternative and mutually exclusive courses of action in relation to such dealing, between which he may make his election and A therefore so conducts himself as reasonably to induce B to believe that he is intending definitely to adopt the one course, and definitely to reject or relinquish the other, and in such belief alters his position to his detriment, A is precluded, as against B, from afterwards resorting to the course which he has thus deliberately declared his intention of rejecting. This principle is in some of the authorities enunciated, without the actual use of the word ‘estoppel’, as if it were part of the doctrine of ‘election’ or ‘waiver’ or is expressed in the form of the rule against ‘approbation and reprobation’.” What is argued by Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar, is that the rule against approbate and reprobate or the rule of election would arise only in cases, where two remedies are open, but if a party has only one remedy, it cannot be said that he could elect a remedy. He contended Further that the cause of action, so far as his client was concerned was the deprivation of possession of the property and, so long as his possession was not disturbed, he had no cause of action to sue the decree-holder for refund of the amount, which he deposited under the void sale. I do not think I agree with him. In this case, at the time when he opposed the application for setting aside the sale, two remedies were open to him. One was to have the sale set aside and get back his money and the other was to stand by the sale and take the consequences. Under Order 21, rule 91, Civil Procedure Code, the auction-purchaser can have a sale set aside in certain circumstances. That rule is in the following words: “The purchaser at any such sale in execution of a decree may apply to the Court to set aside the sale on the ground that the judgment-debtor had no saleable interest in the property sold.” The question is whether this provision of law is applicable to sales held under the Madras Estates Land Act. Section 192, sub-rule (1) of the Madras Estates Land Act, lays down that the Provincial Government may from time to time make rules consistent with this Act declaring that any provision of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, shall not apply to suits, applications, appeals or other proceedings under this Act in any civil or revenue court or to any specified classes of such suits, applications, appeals or proceedings or to applications or other proceedings before the tribunal constituted under section 185-A or shall apply to them subject to modifications and additions specified in the rules. It is clear from this section and that unless any of the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code are specifically excluded, they will have application to suits, applications or appeals or other proceedings under the Madras Estates Land Act. Since Order 21, rule 91, is not one of the provisions that has been excluded, an auctionpurchaser is entitled to resort to this provision of law and to have the sale set aside on the ground that the judgment-debtor had no saleable interest in the property sold. If so, in this case the auction-purchaser, that is, the appellant could pursue this remedy and get back his money. Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar seeks to get over this by arguing that since this provision is repugnant to the provisions of section 131 of the Madras Estates Land Act, the remedy under Order 21, rule 91, is not available to an auction-purchaser like the present appellant. I do not think there is any force in this contention. Section 131 of the Madras Estates Land Act provides only for setting aside a sale by a judgment-debtor and does not contemplate an application by the auctionpurchaser for that purpose. So, there is no repugnancy between Order 21, rule 91 and section 131 of the Madras Estates Land Act which, in my opinion, corresponds to Order 21, rule 89, the former contemplating an application by the auctionpurchaser and the latter an application by the judgment-debtor. It is thus clear that there were two remedies open to the auction-purchaser (1) to repudiate the sale, have it set aside and get back the amount, which he deposited and (2) to adopt it and get whatever advantage he could therefrom. Despite his knowledge about the nature of the sale, he chose to affirm it and stand by it. It is thus clear that there were two remedies open to the auction-purchaser (1) to repudiate the sale, have it set aside and get back the amount, which he deposited and (2) to adopt it and get whatever advantage he could therefrom. Despite his knowledge about the nature of the sale, he chose to affirm it and stand by it. In view of the fact that, in this case the auction-purchaser could avail himself of Order 21, rule 91, having known the defects in the sale before its confirmation, it is unnecessary for me to consider the question whether a purchaser at an auction sale, which turns out to be ab initio void has to wait till he is deprived of the possession of the property -and has no remedy to repudiate the sale and claim a refund of the purchase money before that, in spite of his knowledge that no title passed to him in the property since the judgment-debtor had none at the time of the sale. My conclusion is that a person, who adopts a sale with full knowledge that nothing was purchased by him at the sale by reason of the judgment-debtor having ceased to have any interest therein and derives some benefit, thereby is precluded from subsequently contending that the sale was void and that he should get a refund of the purchase money. To such a person, the doctrine that a person cannot approbate and reprobate is applicable. In the result, the second appeal fails and is dismissed. No costs in this Court. Leave granted. K.C. ----- Appeal dismissed.