JUDGEMENT : DIXIT, J. In this petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner Shanta Devi challenges the validity of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 (Act No. XXXI of 1950) and of certain orders made thereunder by the Custodian of Evacuee Property Madhya Bharat Government declaring a house purchased by the petitioner from one Manavar Khan to be evacuee property and rejecting an application preferred by the applicant for the confirmation of the sale in her favour. The petitioner seeks the relief that the order of the Custodian be quashed and the house be restored to her. 2. The facts, briefly stated, are that on 16-8-48 the petitioner Shanta Devi purchased from Manavar Khan, who was employed by the Municipal Committee Lashkar as an Overseer, a house belonging to him and situated in Lashkar. The sale transaction was made by a registered sale deed and was for a consideration of Rs. 3600/-. At the time of sale there was in force in the territory of Madhya Bharat comprising of the former Gwalior State an Ordinance "for the management of property left behind by the evacuees in Gwalior State." The title of this Ordinance was "Evacuee Property Management Ordinance Gwalior State, Samvat 2004." Under Section 2 of this Ordinance, an evacuee was defined as "a person who on account of communal feelings has whether temporarily or permanently left Gwalior State for any place situated therein (sic)." The Ordinance did not lay down any procedure for the confirmation by the Custodian appointed under the Ordinance of any transfer of any right or interest in any property by an evacuee. But Section 15 of the Ordinance provided that if any person was in possession of an immovable property of any evacuee with his consent or under a deed duly executed by the evacuee then the person in possession shall not be evicted from the property, if he had made a report to the Custodian. As on the date of the sale, Manavar Khan was in Gwalior State and as he continued to remain in Gwalior State while the Ordinance was in force, it was really not necessary for Shanta Devi or Manavar Khan to make a report of the sale transaction to the Custodian. However, on 20-8-1948 Manavar Khan informed the Custodian about the sale of the house effected by him in favour of the petitioner, Shanta Devi. However, on 20-8-1948 Manavar Khan informed the Custodian about the sale of the house effected by him in favour of the petitioner, Shanta Devi. The Custodian ordered the report made by Manavar Khan to be filed as Manavar Khan not being an evacuee within the meaning of the ordinance, the Custodian could not have entertained the report made by Manavar Khan. The Gwalior State Evacuee Property Management Ordinance was repealed by the Madhya Bharat Evacuee Property Management Ordinance (Ordinance No. 32 of 1948) which came into force on 15-11-48. This Ordinance was replaced by an Act of the Madhya Bharat Legislature which came into force on 19-2-1949 being Act No. XX of 1949 and substantially this Act reproduced the provisions contained in the Ordinance No. 32 of 1948. Clause 3 of Section 2 of the Act defined "an evacuee" as a person "ordinarily residing in or owning property or carrying on business within the territories comprising in the United State, who on account of civil disturbances or the fear of such disturbances leaves or has since 15-8-47 whether temporarily or permanently, (left?) the State for a place outside the State." It might be stated that in both the Ordinance No. 32 of 48 and the Act No. 20 of 1949, it was provided that if an evacuee has transferred any immovable property after the 15-11-47 and before the enforcement of the Ordinance or the Act, the transferee should get the transfer confirmed by the Custodian by an application made to him in that behalf before the 30-4-49. As Manavar Khan continued to remain in Madhya Bharat while Ordinance No. 32 of 48 and the Act No. 20 of 1949 were operative, he could not be treated as an evacuee under the Ordinance or the Act and the petitioner accordingly did not take any step, and was not required to take any step to get the sale of the house by Manavar Khan to her, confirmed by the Custodian. 3. On 18-10-49, the Central Ordinance, namely, "The Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance, 1949 which extended to every Acceding State came into force in Madhya Bharat. By Sec. 55 (2) of this Ordinance, the Madhya Bharat Evacuee Property Management Act, No. 20 of 1949 stood repealed. This Ordinance was replaced by an Act of the Union being Act XXI of 1950 which came into force on 17-4-50. By Sec. 55 (2) of this Ordinance, the Madhya Bharat Evacuee Property Management Act, No. 20 of 1949 stood repealed. This Ordinance was replaced by an Act of the Union being Act XXI of 1950 which came into force on 17-4-50. It appears that soon after the coming into force of this Act, Manavar Khan migrated to Pakistan. He, therefore, became an evacuee as defined in Section 2 (d) of the Act. Thereupon, the Custodian, Madhya Bharat Government after issuing notice to the petitioner and holding an inquiry passed an order on 16-6-50 under Section 7 (1) of the Act declaring the house purchased by Shanta Devi from Manavar Khan to be evacuee property. Shanta Devi, then, appealed against the order of the Custodian declaring the house as evacuee property to the Court of District Judge, Gwalior. The appeal was rejected as incompetent. Thereafter, on 23-12-50, the petitioner applied to the Custodian under Section 40 of the Act for the confirmation of the sale. The Custodian rejected this application as barred by time. Shanta Devi, then, appealed to the Custodian General, Government of India, against the order of the Custodian, Madhya Bharat Government rejecting her application for the confirmation of the sale. The Custodian General rejected the appeal and upheld the order of the Custodian. Subsequently, Shanta Devi preferred a review petition to the Custodian General, which was also rejected on 11-6-51. Thereafter, on 26-9-51 she filed the present petition in this court. 4. The grounds on which the petitioner challenges the validity of the Administration of the Evacuee Property Act, 1950 are not stated in the petition with clarity or precision. But before us Mr. Bhagwandas Gupta learned counsel for the applicant attacked the legislation in question mainly on the ground that the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950, taken as a whole infringes the right to property guaranteed by Article 19 (1) (f) and Article 31 (1) of the Constitution. It is also contended that the sale of the house by Manavar Khan to the petitioner was perfectly legal and valid under the laws operating in Madhya Bharat before the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 was brought into force in Madhya Bharat. It is also contended that the sale of the house by Manavar Khan to the petitioner was perfectly legal and valid under the laws operating in Madhya Bharat before the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 was brought into force in Madhya Bharat. and that before the commencement of the Constitution, the petitioner had become the full owner of the house and had acquired a vested right therein and that as under the Constitution the Parliament is forbidden to pass ex post facto laws so as to withdraw a legally vested right. The impugned Act which has been made retrospective by the definition contained therein of an 'evacuee' and 'evacuee property', and by Section 58 (3) of the Act, affects vested rights and is therefore unconstitutional. It is also urged that Parliament has no power to make a law impairing transfers of property made in Madhya Bharat by evacuees before 26-1-50, as the authority of the Dominion Legislature to legislate for Madhya Bharat in the matter of custody, management, and disposal of any property including evacuee property was excluded before 26-1-50. A faint attempt was also made to challenge the orders of the Custodian on the ground that they were in excess of jurisdiction conferred on the Custodian. 5. The petition is opposed by the non-applicants. In the return filed on their behalf, it is stated that the petitioner having failed to apply within time for the confirmation of the sale in her favour, she cannot now be allowed to seek the remedy under Article 226; that the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 is a valid piece of legislation and that none of the fundamental rights of the petitioner under Article 19 (1)(f) or Art. 31 have been violated in any way by the orders or action of the Custodian or the Custodian General. 6. Before considering the contentions of the applicant, it seems to me necessary to refer to the material provisions and the scheme of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 under which the house purchased by the petitioner was declared evacuee property and her application for the confirmation of the sale was rejected. As the Preamble of the Act says, the object of the Act is to provide for the administration of evacuee property, and for certain matters connected therewith. Section 2 is the definition section. As the Preamble of the Act says, the object of the Act is to provide for the administration of evacuee property, and for certain matters connected therewith. Section 2 is the definition section. Clause (d) (i) of Section 2 defines "evacuee" as any person "who on account of the setting up of the Dominions of India and Pakistan or on account of civil disturbances or the fear of such disturbances, leaves or has, on or after the 1-3-47 left any place in a State for any place outside the territories now forming part of India". Sub-clauses (ii) and (iii) of clause (d) define other categories of evacuees with which we are not concerned in this petition. Clause (e) contains the definition of "intending evacuee." This is not material to the present case. Then clause (f) defines "evacuee property" as any property in which an evacuee has any right or interest (whether personally or as a trustee or as a beneficiary or in any other capacity) and includes any property - (1) which has been obtained by any person from an evacuee after 14-8-1947, by any mode of transfer, unless such transfer has been confirmed by the Custodian, or (2) belonging to any person who after 18-10-1949 has done or does any of the acts specified in clause (e) of Section 2, or in which any such person has any right or interest to the extent of such right or interest. Certain properties are excluded from this definition. But we are not concerned here with these excluded properties. Coming now to Section 7 of the Act, we find that it provides that where the Custodian is of opinion that any property is evacuee property within the meaning of the Act, he may after causing notice thereof to be given in the prescribed manner to the persons interested and after holding such inquiry into the matter as the circumstances of the case permit, pass an order declaring any such property to be evacuee property. Under Section 8, property declared as evacuee property is deemed to be vested in the Custodian for the State. Section 9 gives to the Custodian the power to take possession of evacuee property vested in him, from any person who refuses to surrender the property to him. Under Section 8, property declared as evacuee property is deemed to be vested in the Custodian for the State. Section 9 gives to the Custodian the power to take possession of evacuee property vested in him, from any person who refuses to surrender the property to him. Sec. 10 defines the powers and duties of the Custodian for the purposes of securing, administering, preserving and managing any evacuee property which has vested in him. The Custodian may carry on business, appoint a manager, or require any person to furnish such returns as are necessary, search any building or place where he has reason to believe that any evacuee property or document concerning it is kept, institute or defend legal proceedings, raise loans on the security of the evacuee property, make payments to the members of the family of the evacuee and transfer the property and may even sell it with the prior permission of the Custodian General. Sections 11 to 14 deal with trust properties variations and cancellation of leases and allotments of evacuee properties, payments to Custodian in valid discharge of debts and recouping of expenditure by Custodian. Under Section 15, the Custodian is required to maintain accounts of evacuee property vested in him. Section 16 lays down the procedure for restoration of property in certain cases to an evacuee. Sections 17 and 18 lay down certain consequences of vesting of property in the Custodian. Sections 19 to 23 contain provisions relating to 'intending evacuees'. Sections 24 to 28 which form Chapter V make provisions for appeals, review or revision. It must be noted that an appeal against an original order passed by the Custodian declaring a person an evacuee under sub-clause (1) or sub-clause (ii) of cl. (d) of section or from an order declaring the property an evacuee property under sub-clause 1 of clause (f) of sub-section 2 lies to the Custodian General. When a person is declared to be evacuee within the meaning of Section 2 (d) (iii) or when the property is declared to be an evacuee property within the meaning of Section 2 (f) (2) then an appeal lies to the District Judge nominated in that behalf by the State Government. Section 26 gives the power of review or revision to the Custodian, Additional Custodian or authorised Deputy Custodian. Chapter VI consisting of Sections 29 to 39 provides for penalties and procedure. Section 26 gives the power of review or revision to the Custodian, Additional Custodian or authorised Deputy Custodian. Chapter VI consisting of Sections 29 to 39 provides for penalties and procedure. Then follows Chapter VII which contains sections dealing with miscellaneous matters. The important sections that must be noted are Secs. 40 and 58. Under Section 40, no transfer of any right or interest in any property made in any manner after 14-8-47 by or on behalf of any person whose property is notified or declared to be evacuee property shall be effective so as to confer any rights or remedies on the parties to the transfer or any person claiming under them unless the transfer is confirmed on an application made to the Custodian by the transferor, the transferee or any person claiming under them within the prescribed period. Sec. 58 of the Act repeals the Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance, 1949 and any law corresponding to the Act which was in force in any State immediately before the commencement of the Act. It further provides that the repeal shall not affect the previous operation of that Ordinance or corresponding law and subject thereto anything done or any action taken in the exercise of any power conferred by or under that Ordinance or corresponding law, "shall be deemed to have been done or taken in the exercise of the power conferred, under this Act as if this Act were in force on the day on which such thing was done or action was taken." 7. It is clear from what has been stated above that the object of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 is simply to deal with the custody, management and administration of evacuee property. Under the Act the State or the Custodian does not become the owner of the evacuee property; the title of the evacuee in the property is not destroyed or extinguished. The evacuee is only restrained from exercising his rights as an owner of the property until the Parliament finally decides the ultimate fate of the evacuee property and the rights of the owners of those properties. A transferee of the evacuee property if he fails to get the transfer confirmed by the Custodian, is deprived of the property. But the property vests in the Custodian for the purpose of the Act, that is, for the purpose of custody, management and administration. A transferee of the evacuee property if he fails to get the transfer confirmed by the Custodian, is deprived of the property. But the property vests in the Custodian for the purpose of the Act, that is, for the purpose of custody, management and administration. The necessity for passing such a legislation extending to the whole of India except the States of Assam, West Bengal, Tripura, Manipur, Jammu and Kashmir, is now well known. After the setting up in 1947 of the two Dominions of India and Pakistan, communal disturbances on an unprecedented scale followed and on account of fear of such disturbances, a large number of people migrated from one Dominion to the other leaving behind them properties worth crores of rupees. It, therefore became imperative for the Government to take upon itself the administration and the management of such uncared property. The various Provinces and the States had promulgated different Ordinances dealing with evacuee property. It was however, felt that there should be uniform legislation relating to evacuee property throughout India. By Act No. IV of 1949 the Government of India Act, 1935 was amended and "the custody, management and disposal of the property including agricultural land declared by law to be evacuee property" was added as a subject of legislation in the Concurrent List. On 18-10-49 an Ordinance called the Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance was promulgated which extended to all the Provinces of India (except Assam and West Bengal) and to every Acceding State. The Ordinance was subsequently replaced by the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950, which substantially reproduced the provisions contained in the Ordinance. 8. On 18-10-49 an Ordinance called the Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance was promulgated which extended to all the Provinces of India (except Assam and West Bengal) and to every Acceding State. The Ordinance was subsequently replaced by the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950, which substantially reproduced the provisions contained in the Ordinance. 8. Proceeding now to consider the grounds on which the learned counsel for the petitioner challenges the validity of the Act, in the first place, it is contended that Article 19 (1) (f) guarantees to all citizens the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property and that the law contemplated by Article 31 (1) by which a person may be deprived of his property must be a valid law, that is to say, it is contended, a law which does not offend Article 19 (1) (f); and that inasmuch as the Act in question interferes with the rights of an evacuee and of a transferee from him of holding, possessing and disposing of property and also in certain cases extinguishes the title of a transferee, the Act is not a valid law and that, therefore, it is repugnant to Art. 19 (1) (f) and Article 31 (1), and is unconstitutional. To me it appears that this argument is based on an insufficient appreciation of the nature and scope of fundamental rights relating to property guaranteed by the Constitution. The right to hold, acquire and dispose of property is not absolute. It is subject to the limitations specified in Article 19 (5) and to the provisions contained in Article 31. The Constitution does not prohibit the State from depriving any person of his property or of taking possession of or acquiring the property for public purposes. It is obvious from an examination of the provisions of Article 19 (1) (f) read with clause 5 of that Article and Article 31 that reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right to acquire, hold or dispose of property can be imposed either in the interests of the general public or for the protection of the interests of any Scheduled tribe; (2) that a person may be deprived of his property by authority of law; (3) and that the State may acquire any property or take possession of it for public purposes on payment of compensation. It must be remembered that Article 19 (1) (f) speaks of the general rights of a citizen to acquire, hold and dispose of the property; while Article 31 is concerned with the specific right to the property and prescribes the conditions under which a person may be deprived by the State of his property or his property may be, acquired or taken possession of by the State for public purposes. It is clear that the question of the right of a citizen to hold, acquire or dispose of the property can arise only so long as his property has not been taken away under Article 31. If he has been deprived of his property under Article 31 (1) or if his property has been acquired or taken possession of under Article 31 (2) no question of his acquiring, holding or disposing of that property could possibly arise under Article 19 (1) (f). A citizen cannot clearly maintain that his right to hold, acquire or dispose of his property has been interfered when in fact he has been deprived of that property under Article 31. In 'A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras', AIR 1950 SC 27 it was pointed out by the Supreme Court that the rights conferred by Article 19 (1) (a) to (e) and (g) would be available to the citizen until he was under Article 21 deprived of his life or personal liberty according to procedure established by law. On the same reasoning, it would seem that the right to property guaranteed by Article 19 (1) (f) would be available to the citizen until he is deprived of his property under Article 31 (1) or his property is acquired or taken possession of under Article 31 (2). That Article 19 (1) (f), is operative in the case of only those whose property has not been taken away under Article 31, has been made very clear by the observations of Das, J., in para 74 of the judgment of Supreme Court in - 'Chiranjit Lal v. Union of India', AIR 1951 SC 41 . That Article 19 (1) (f), is operative in the case of only those whose property has not been taken away under Article 31, has been made very clear by the observations of Das, J., in para 74 of the judgment of Supreme Court in - 'Chiranjit Lal v. Union of India', AIR 1951 SC 41 . In - 'Abdul Majid v. P. R. Nayak', AIR 1951 Bom 440 , the Bombay High Court has also taken the view that the rights guaranteed by Article 19 (1) (f) can only be enjoyed provided the citizen is in a position to enjoy those rights and provided those rights can be enjoyed although he has been deprived of his property under Article 31(1) or his property has been acquired or taken possession of under Art. 31 (2). 9. It is thus quite clear that if the petitioner has been deprived of his property under Section 40 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 then Art. 19(1)(f) of the Constitution has no application to his case. The appct. must then show that quite apart from Art. 19 (1) (f) the Act in question is otherwise invalid. Learned Counsel for the applicant says that when tested by the provisions of Article 31 (1) this Act is void. It is not disputed by him that by clause 5 of Article 31, he is precluded from objecting to the Act on the ground that it violates the provisions of Article 31 (2). I find it difficult to see in what way Article 31 (1) assists the applicant. For the purposes of this petition, it is unnecessary to consider the question whether clause (1) of Article 31 should be construed in isolation from the rest of the Article or whether clauses 1 and 2 of Article 31 should be read together, or to determine whether the word 'deprived' as used in clause (1) has the same meaning as compulsory acquisition in clause 2 or whether 'deprivation' referred to in clause 1 must be taken to cover deprivation otherwise than by acquisition or requisitioning of property dealt with in clause 2. On these points, learned Counsel for the petitioner did not address any arguments before us. On these points, learned Counsel for the petitioner did not address any arguments before us. If it is assumed that clauses 1 and 2 of Article 31 must be read together and "deprivation" in clause (1) has the same meaning as compulsory acquisition or taking possession of property mentioned in clause (2) then clearly the petitioner is prohibited by clause 5 of Article 31 from challenging the Act on the ground that it is repugnant to the provisions of Clause (2) and therefore also to the provisions of clause (1); if, on the other hand, clause (1) of Article 31 is construed in isolation from the rest of the Article, and the legislation in question falls under that clause, then the only question that can arise for consideration is whether the deprivation of property complained of is by authority of law, that is, by a valid law passed by the legislature. For, clause (1) of Article 31 only contains a declaration of the fundamental rights of private (sic) in a negative form, namely, that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. In other words this clause implies that a person may be deprived of his property, provided he is so deprived by authority of law. Mr. Bhagwandas Gupta for the applicant challenges the validity of the impugned Act on the ground that it was passed by the Parliament without having legislative competence. I will deal with this objection later on; but apart from this objection, the petitioner has not raised any other objection to show that the Act under which he has been deprived of his property is not a valid law. It is clear, therefore, that Article 31 (1) by itself in no way helps the petitioner. It is only if he shows that the legislation in question is otherwise invalid, that he can question the constitutionality of the Act on the ground that the Act infringes the provisions of Article 31(1). In the present case the petitioner has not been able to show that the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 is not a valid law. That being so, the petitioner's contention that there has been an infringement of his fundamental right under Article 19 (1) (f) or Article 31 (1) cannot be accepted. 10. In the present case the petitioner has not been able to show that the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 is not a valid law. That being so, the petitioner's contention that there has been an infringement of his fundamental right under Article 19 (1) (f) or Article 31 (1) cannot be accepted. 10. I ought to state that it is not the contention of the applicant that even after he has been deprived of his property under Section 40 of the Act, there still remain certain rights of his in the property, which he is entitled to enjoy under Article 19(1)(f). It has also not been suggested to us that so far as an evacuee is concerned, certain rights still remain with him even after the declaration of his property as an evacuee property and even after the Custodian has taken possession of the property and has assumed its management and that the provisions in the Act preventing the evacuee to transfer his property violate Article 19 (1) (f). It is therefore, really not necessary for us to consider whether any of the restrictions imposed by the Act on the exercise of the rights in the property by an evacuee is a reasonable restriction in the interests of the general public. If it were necessary to decide the point, I would be prepared to hold that the restrictions imposed by the Act are reasonable and in the interests of the general public. The Supreme Court has pointed out in - 'Dr. N. B. Khare v. State of Delhi', AIR 1950 SC 211 that in deciding on the reasonableness or otherwise of the restrictions imposed by law the substantive as well as the procedural provisions of the law should be examined. The case of - 'Chintamanrao v. State of Madhya Pradesh', AIR 1951 SC 118 also indicates that if there is a reasonable relation between the provisions of the Act and the purpose the Act has in view, then if those provisions contain any restrictions, they would be reasonable. The case of - 'Chintamanrao v. State of Madhya Pradesh', AIR 1951 SC 118 also indicates that if there is a reasonable relation between the provisions of the Act and the purpose the Act has in view, then if those provisions contain any restrictions, they would be reasonable. On these tests and having regard to the events which happened soon after the partition in 1947 and also taking into consideration the entire scheme of the Act which is to make a provision for the custody, management and the administration of evacuee property until a satisfactory and final settlement takes place between India and the Dominion of Pakistan, it cannot be said that the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 does not satisfy the requirements of Article 19 (5). This is also the view of the Bombay, Madras and Allahabad High Courts. See - 'Abdul Mazid v. P. R. Nayak', AIR 1951 Bom 440 ; - ' MadhBNamazi v. Deputy Custodian of Evacuee Property Madias', AIR 1951 Mad 930 and - 'Asiatic Engineering Co. v. Achhru Ram', AIR 1951 All 746 (FB). 11. The next contention advanced on behalf of the applicant is that the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 is invalid because it is retrospective in its operation. The argument is that the Parliament has no power of enacting laws with retrospective effect and that in any case it is incompetent to extend the retrospective operation of the enactment passed by it, to a period anterior to 26-1-50, when the Constitution came into force and that as by the definition of "evacuee" and "evacuee property" given in the Act and by Section 58 (3) the Act has retrospective effect so as to change the character of past transactions entered upon the faith of the then existing laws, the Act is invalid. There is no doubt that the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950, is meant to be retrospective. But the contention that the retrospective provisions of the Act are not within the competence of the Parliament seems to me utterly untenable. The question turns entirely on the meaning of Arts. 245, 246, and 248 of the Constitution which confer on the Parliament the power to legislate. But the contention that the retrospective provisions of the Act are not within the competence of the Parliament seems to me utterly untenable. The question turns entirely on the meaning of Arts. 245, 246, and 248 of the Constitution which confer on the Parliament the power to legislate. The effect of these Articles is that subject to the provisions of the Constitution the Parliament has power to make laws for the whole or any part of the territory of India with respect of any of the matters enumerated in the "Union List" and the Concurrent List. Parliament has also exclusive power to make any law with respect to any matter not enumerated in the Concurrent List or State List. Under Entry 41 of the Concurrent List, power is given to Parliament to legislate with respect to custody, management and disposal of property including agricultural land, declared by law to be evacuee property. Now the principle that the Parliament and the State Legislatures are, within the statutory limits assigned to them, bodies possessing plenary powers is so well settled as to be free from doubt. From this principle of the supremacy of the Parliament and the State Legislatures within their allotted spheres, it follows that in the absence of express provision to the contrary, the Parliament and any State Legislature can give to their laws otherwise valid, retrospective or prospective operation. There is in our Constitution a limitation on the power of the Legislatures to make retroactive criminal legislation. These limitations are stated in Article 20. But except for this Article, there is no other provision in the Constitution which points to any limitation of the plenary powers of the Parliament and the State Legislatures so long as they keep within the ambit of the subjects of the legislation specifically assigned to them. There is nothing in Articles 245, 246 and 248 to indicate an intention to withhold from the Parliament the same absolute discretion as the British Parliament has with regard to past events as well as present and future, provided of course Parliament confines itself to the specified subjects and legislates within the limitations prescribed by Article 20. It would indeed be a violent straining of the wide words of the power to make laws conferred by Articles 245, 246 and 248 if we were to read into them a prohibition of retroactive laws. It would indeed be a violent straining of the wide words of the power to make laws conferred by Articles 245, 246 and 248 if we were to read into them a prohibition of retroactive laws. To do so would be to add to the Constitution, without express words, the prohibition of retrospective laws over and above the limits set out in Article 20. During the course of his arguments, learned Counsel for the applicant pointed out that if no limitation is imposed on the power of the Parliament to define "evacuee" and "evacuee property" then the Parliament would have the power of declaring any class of citizens as evacuees and any property as evacuee property, even if the citizens and the property so declared have no relation, whatsoever, to the ordinary meaning of the expression 'evacuee'. It was said that in passing the impugned legislation, Parliament has abused its powers and included in the definition of "evacuee" even persons who may leave India not for Pakistan, but for any country other than Pakistan and has by giving the Act retrospective effect endangered the status and property of a large number of citizens for something which they did in the past innocently and on the faith of the then existing laws. I do not think that on any of these grounds the Act can be held to be invalid. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in - 'Gopalan's case', AIR 1950 SC 27 and following that decision by this Court in the case of - 'Ram Dube v. Government of State of Madhya Bharat', AIR 1952 Madh B 57 when the Constitution has given to the Legislature the power to legislate with respect to certain matters in clear and unambiguous terms the Court cannot impose limitations on its exercise on extraneous considerations. It is true that a farreaching power is capable of being abused. It is also true that if such a wide power is given to the Legislature, then there is an obligation on the Legislature to exercise it honestly and sensibly. But the fact that the power may be abused cannot be urged as an argument to show that the power is non-existent. Again, an enactment may be unreasonable, unfair and unjust; but these would be questions of policy which the Court cannot consider in determining whether the legislation is valid or invalid. But the fact that the power may be abused cannot be urged as an argument to show that the power is non-existent. Again, an enactment may be unreasonable, unfair and unjust; but these would be questions of policy which the Court cannot consider in determining whether the legislation is valid or invalid. The remedy for the impropriety of the legislation or for alleged abuse of power by Parliament or for the use of power to promote alleged improper object, lies in the Parliament, in the political field, and not in the Courts. It may be unreasonable, unjust or inexpedient to legislate for the past and to interfere with vested rights; but on the grounds of inexpediency or unreasonableness, a legisture cannot be denied the power, which the Constitution confers, to pass retrospective legislation, if it thinks fit. I am, therefore, unable to accept the contention of the learned Counsel for the applicant that the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950, is invalid because it has retrospective effect. What I have stated above is sufficient to dispose of the additional ground of invalidation urged by the learned "Counsel for the applicant, namely, that as prior to 26-1-50 the Dominion Legislature had no power to legislate with respect to the custody, management and disposal of property declared by law to be evacuee property so far as Madhya Bharat was concerned, the Parliament has under the Constitution no power of retrospective legislation with reference to that subject so as to affect any right in 'evacuee property' vested in a citizen in Madhya Bharat before 26-1-50. The contention is ill-founded. As already stated, under the Constitution and subject to its provisions, Parliament has the power to make laws for the whole or any part of the territory of India with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the Union List and the Concurrent List and that the subject matter of the impugned legislation is one enumerated in the Concurrent List; and further the power of the Parliament to Legislate within the appointed limits is absolute and supreme. The Constitution does not restrict or limit the legislative competence of Parliament so as to make it exercisable only with regard to that part of territory of India or only with regard to those subjects in regard to which the Dominion Legislature had before 26-1-50 the power to legislate. The Constitution does not restrict or limit the legislative competence of Parliament so as to make it exercisable only with regard to that part of territory of India or only with regard to those subjects in regard to which the Dominion Legislature had before 26-1-50 the power to legislate. The question therefore of the power of Parliament to legislate retrospectively or prospectively with respect to a subject, is in no way affected by the powers of the Dominion Legislature under the Government of India Act, 1935. It is to the provisions of the present constitution that we must look for determining the powers of the Parliament. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the applicant relied on a decision of the Rajasthan High Court in - 'Madan Gopal v. Union of India', AIR 1951 Raj 94 (2). In that case the question was of the validity of the imposition of income-tax under the Union Income-tax Act on incomes which accrued in Rajasthan prior to 1-4-1950. One of the questions raised in the case was whether the Parliament had power to make a law imposing income-tax in the Rajasthan territory prior to 26-1-50. The learned Judges of the Rajasthan High Court while thinking that in view of their conclusions on other questions in that case, it was not necessary for them to express any view on the question of the legislative competence of the Parliament, thought it desirable to deal with the question as elaborate arguments were advanced before them. They observed that as the authority of the Dominion Legislature under the Government of India Act, 1935 in the matter of legislation for the purpose of imposition of income-tax was excluded in the Rajasthan before 26-1-50 and as the Government of India Act, 1935 has been repealed by Article 395 of the Constitution, therefore, by virtue of Article 367 and Sec. 6 of General Clauses Act, the previous operation of Section 101 of the Government of India Act, 1935, which dealt with the legislative powers of the Dominion Legislature could not be affected by subsequent legislation. On this reasoning the learned Judges came to the conclusion that under the present Constitution, the Parliament has power to make laws for the imposition of income-tax in Rajasthan from 26-1-50 onward and not retrospectively. On this reasoning the learned Judges came to the conclusion that under the present Constitution, the Parliament has power to make laws for the imposition of income-tax in Rajasthan from 26-1-50 onward and not retrospectively. Without in anyway deciding the point as to the validity of the imposition of income-tax in circumstances such as those present in the Rajasthan case, I must say with all respect to the learned Judges that I find it difficult to see how Section 6 of the General Clauses Act could be invoked in such cases for holding that the effect of the repeal of the Government of India Act, 1935 is to confirm for ever the rights vested in the citizens just before the commencement of the Constitution and to deny to the Parliament and the State Legislatures the power of interfering with those rights by enacting retrospective legislation under the powers conferred on them by Articles 245 and 246 of the Constitution. It appears to me that Sec. 6 of the General Clauses Act which merely lays down one of the general rules of construction of statutes, can have no applicability where the Government of India Act, 1935 is not merely repealed but is substituted by a new Constitution under which the Parliament and the State Legislatures are not prohibited from legislating for the past and of interfering with vested rights. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act would have again no applicability where the Parliament and the State Legislatures with the legislative competence of retrospective Legislation pass an enactment giving it in express terms retrospective effect. The decision of the Rajasthan High Court is also not in point here. It can be distinguished on the ground that before 26-1-50, the Dominion Legislature functioning under the Government of India Act 1935, had the power to legislate for this State with respect to the custody, management and disposal of property declared by law to be evacuee property by virtue of the Instrument of Accession executed by the RajPramukh of Madhya Bharat accepting inter alia all the matters mentioned in the Concurrent List as matters with respect to which the Dominion Legislature may make laws for the State of Madhya Bharat. There is thus no force in the contention of the learned counsel for the applicant that the Parliament cannot make for this state retrospective legislation with respect to the custody, management and disposal of property declared by law to be evacuee property. 12. Learned Counsel for the applicant did not press on us the contention that the orders of the Custodian declaring the house purchased by her to be evacuee property and rejecting her application for the confirmation of the sale were in excess of the jurisdiction conferred by the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 on the Custodian. He conceded that if the Act is held valid he could not on the facts and the circumstances, in which the orders were passed by the Custodian in the present case, challenge them as being those passed by the Custodian without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction. It must be noted that Section 58 (3) of the Act by which anything done or any action taken in the exercise of any power conferred by or under the Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance 1949 is deemed to have been done or taken in the exercise of the powers conferred by or under the Act, in no way helps the petitioner. 'The sale was not confirmed under the Ordinance and indeed there was no occasion for the petitioner to have the sale confirmed under the Ordinance as the property was not declared as an evacuee property under the Ordinance. Likewise, the analogous provisions in Section 55 (3) of the Ordinance by which all actions taken under the Madhya Bharat Evacuee Property Management Act, Samvat 2005 were saved, is also of no assistance to the petitioner. Under the Madhya Bharat Evacuee Property Management Act Sm. 2005 and Madhya Bharat Evacuee Property Management Ordinance Samvat 2005, Manavar Khan the vendor was not an evacuee and consequently no proceedings were taken for the confirmation of the sale in favour of the petitioner. The Madhya Bharat Evacuee Property Management Ordinance Samvat 2005 repealed the Gwalior State Evacuee Property Management Ordinance Samvat 2004 and saved all actions taken under the repealed ordinance. But under the Gwalior State Ordinance also Manavar Khan was not an evacuee. The Gwalior State Ordinance did not contain any provision for the confirmation of a transfer by an evacuee. The Madhya Bharat Evacuee Property Management Ordinance Samvat 2005 repealed the Gwalior State Evacuee Property Management Ordinance Samvat 2004 and saved all actions taken under the repealed ordinance. But under the Gwalior State Ordinance also Manavar Khan was not an evacuee. The Gwalior State Ordinance did not contain any provision for the confirmation of a transfer by an evacuee. That being so, it cannot be maintained that the intimation which Manavar Khan gave to the Custodian under the Gwalior State Ordinance of the sale of the house by him to the petitioner and the order passed by the Custodian "filed the intimation" is in any sense a confirmation of the sale which is saved by the laws referred to above which were subsequently brought into force in Madhya Bharat. 13. On a careful consideration of the various points urged on behalf of the applicant, I am of the opinion that the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 is a valid piece of legislation and the orders passed by the Custodian in exercise of the powers conferred on him under that Act, declaring the house purchased by the applicant from Manavar Khan an evacuee property and rejecting her application for the confirmation of the sale are valid. This application must therefore, be dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, I think there should be no order as to costs of this petition. 14. SHINDE, C.J. :- I entirely agree. Application dismissed.