JUDGMENT : P.K. Subramonia Iyer, J. The following two questions have been referred for decision by a Full Bench:- (1) Where the two conditions contemplated by R. 5 of O. XLVII, C.P.C. are satisfied in respect of an application for review, can it be heard by any Judge or Judges who had not participated in the judgment or order sought to be reviewed? (2) Is the prohibition contained in R. 5 applicable to all the different stages of the hearing of the application for review or is the prohibition limited to the stage of the preliminary hearing of the application when notice may or may not be issued on the application? 2. The facts giving rise to the reference are these:- A.S. 475/1114 on the file of the erstwhile Travancore High Court was disposed of, allowing the appeal in part, by a Division Bench consisting of Mr. Justice K. Sankara Subba Iyer and Mr. Justice C.Madhavan Pillai, on 30.4.1117. The 1st respondent, the State of Travancore presented petition No. 49 on 26.9.1117 and the second respondent presented petition No. 57 on 29.7.1117 for review of the judgment. Both the petitions came up for orders before the same learned Judges on 21.12.1117 when they ordered notices to issue to the opposite party, namely the appellants. The petitions however do not appear to have been posted or come up for hearing before the said learned Judges of whom Mr. Justice Madhavan Pillai retired from service on 20.9.1120 and Mr. Justice Sankaran Subba Iyer retired on 32.12.1123, nor do the petitions appear to have been posted for hearing before any other learned Judge of the erstwhile Travancore High Court at any time. Even after the integration of the two States and the constitution of this High Court for the “United State”, the petitions do not appear to have been posted for some time. They came up before my learned brethren, Mr. Justice Sankaran and Mr. Justice Gangadhara Menon, sitting as a Division Bench, in July 1951 when they made the aforesaid order of reference to a Full Bench. 3. A decision of a Full Bench of the erstwhile Travancore High Court in Raghupathy Ayyan Raghavan Ayyan v. Krishna Sastrigal Sankaranarayana Iyer (LVII T.L.R. 767) over-ruling an earlier decision of the same court in Eravi Thayaru Pandarathil v. Eravi Ayyappan Govindan (XXVIII T.L.J. 927) was relied upon by the petitioners. 3. A decision of a Full Bench of the erstwhile Travancore High Court in Raghupathy Ayyan Raghavan Ayyan v. Krishna Sastrigal Sankaranarayana Iyer (LVII T.L.R. 767) over-ruling an earlier decision of the same court in Eravi Thayaru Pandarathil v. Eravi Ayyappan Govindan (XXVIII T.L.J. 927) was relied upon by the petitioners. The three learned Judges constituting that Full Bench had written separate though concurrent judgments. The grounds depended upon by each of the learned Judges were however different. 4. The number of the Order of the Travancore Code of Civil Procedure relating to review is XLV which corresponds to O. XLVII of the Indian Code. The number and language of the rules in the Order are similar. Mr. Sankara Subba Iyer who wrote the leading Judgment took the view that though R. 2 does not apply to applications for review of judgments in the High Courts, as they are expressly excluded by that Rule, the principle thereof would apply, and applying that principle, he reached conclusion that the two learned Judges who disposed of the case having issued notice upon the applications for review, they could be heard and disposed of by a Bench of Judges to which neither of whom is a party. The learned Chief Justice, Mr. Abraham Varghese, was of the view that R. 5 not having expressly mentioned that the disability of another Judge or Judges not participating in the disposal of the case to hear the review is limited to a period of six months on account of the absence of an expression like “thereafter” or “within the period” following the words “no other Judge or Judges shall hear the same.” The ground for the decision depended upon by the third learned Judge Mr. Justice Ramakrishna Iyer is that R. 2 is applicable to the High Courts as well as to other Courts. The grounds depended upon by the learned Judges in the Full Bench decision not having appealed to my learned brethren, they referred the aforesaid two questions for the decision of a Full Bench of this Court as the question involved is important and of very frequent occurrence. The rulings of the erstwhile Travancore High Court and of the erstwhile Cochin High Court would not be binding upon this Court which is a new Court but would merely be persuasive precedents. 5. The rulings of the erstwhile Travancore High Court and of the erstwhile Cochin High Court would not be binding upon this Court which is a new Court but would merely be persuasive precedents. 5. The answers to the questions referred to the Full Bench depend on the true interpretation of R. 5 of O. XLVII which is as follows:- “Where the Judge or Judges, or any one of the Judges who passed the decree or made the order, a review of which is applied for, continues or continue attached to the Court at the time when the application for a review is presented, and is not or are not precluded by absence or other cause for a period of six months next after the application from considering the decree or order to which the application refers, such Judge or Judges or any of them shall hear the application, and no other Judge or Judges of the Court shall hear the same.” To arrive at a proper conclusion upon this question, it is necessary to advert to the relevant principles regarding the interpretation of statutes, the scheme of the Code of Civil Procedure in general, and of the provisions relating to review in particular. S. 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, which corresponds to S. 623 of the Code of 1882 enacts that:- “Subject as aforesaid, any person considering himself aggrieved - [a] by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed by this Code, but from which no appeal has been preferred, [b] by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed by this Code, or [c] by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order, and the Court may make such order thereon as it thinks fit.” “Subject as aforesaid” in this Section has relation to “such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed referred to in the next preceding S. 113, S. 2, Cl. (16) says that “prescribed” means prescribed by rules. The rules are those contained in the first schedule to the Code of which, O. XLVII consisting of 9 rules, relate to review. R. 1 is as follows:- “1. (16) says that “prescribed” means prescribed by rules. The rules are those contained in the first schedule to the Code of which, O. XLVII consisting of 9 rules, relate to review. R. 1 is as follows:- “1. [1] Any person considering himself aggrieved:- [a] by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred, [b] by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or [c] by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order. [2] A party who is not appealing from a decree or order may apply for a review of judgment notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal by some other party except where the ground of such appeal is common to the applicant and the appellant, or when being respondent, he can present to the appellate Court the case on which he applies for the review.” R. 2 provides that:- “2. An application for review of a decree or order of a Court, not being a High Court, upon some ground other than the discovery of such new and important matter or evidence as is referred to in R. 1 or the existence of a clerical or arithmetical mistake or error apparent on the face of the decree, shall be made only to the Judge who passed the decree or made the order sought to be reviewed; but any such application may, if the Judge who passed the decree or made the order has ordered notice to issue under R. 4, Sub-r. [2], proviso [a], be disposed of by his successor.” In Mulla’s Code of Civil Procedure, 11th edition (1941), the following occurs at page 1237:- “R. 1, Sub-r. [1], provides that the application for review of a decree or order should be made to the Court which passed the decree or order sought to be reviewed. The rule read with the present rule leads to the following propositions:- I. Where a decree is passed by a High Court Judge, the application for review of the decree may be made to that Judge or to his successor in office, whatever be the ground on which review is sought. II [1]. Where a decree is passed by a Judge other than a High Court Judge, the application for review of the decree may be made to the Judge who delivered the judgment or to his successor in office, provided the review is sought on the ground of - [a] the discovery of new and important matter or evidence, or [b] some clerical or arithmetical mistake or error apparent on the face of the decree. [2] x x x x x” R. 5 provides for the hearing of applications for review. R. 3 provides that “the form of preferring appeals shall apply, mutatis mutandis, to applications for review. R. 4 is in the following terms:- “4. [1] Where it appears to the Court that there is not sufficient ground for a review, it shall reject the application. R. 3 provides that “the form of preferring appeals shall apply, mutatis mutandis, to applications for review. R. 4 is in the following terms:- “4. [1] Where it appears to the Court that there is not sufficient ground for a review, it shall reject the application. [2] Where the Court is of opinion that the application for review should be granted, it shall grant the same: Provided that - [a] no such application shall be granted without previous notice to the opposite party, to enable him to appear and be heard in support of the decree or order, a review of which is applied for; and [b] no such application shall be granted on the ground of discovery of new matter or evidence which the applicant alleged was not within his knowledge, or could not be adduced by him when the decree or order was passed or made, without strict proof of such allegation.” 6. In Chajju v. Neki (A.I.R. 1922 Privy Council 112) an appeal against the decree in favour of the plaintiffs in a suit for pre-emption passed by a subordinate Judge was heard by a Division Bench of the Punjab Chief Court consisting Scott-Smith and Leslie Jones, JJ. They reversed the judgment of the subordinate Judge on the ground that the claim for pre-emption made by the plaintiffs was really not on their behalf but on behalf of third parties who had no such right. An additional ground of appeal had been permitted to be raised by them. The plaintiffs applied for review of the judgment of the Division Bench under O. XLVII, R. 1, on the ground that the “learned Judges were misled into holding that the facts found by them disentitled the plaintiffs to a decree.” That application came before another Division Bench of the same Court consisting of Wilberforce, J. who had not taken part in the judgment sought to be reviewed and Scott-Smith, J., who was one of the parties to it. These learned Judges dealt on the merits of the case and were of the opinion that the view taken by the previous Division Bench “proceeded upon an incorrect exposition of the law” and directed the “appeal to go before the Bench for their decision”. These learned Judges dealt on the merits of the case and were of the opinion that the view taken by the previous Division Bench “proceeded upon an incorrect exposition of the law” and directed the “appeal to go before the Bench for their decision”. Accordingly the appeal came up before a third Division Bench consisting of Wilberforce, J. and Le Rossignol, J. They considered certain fresh points and entered judgment adversely to the appellants and dismissed the appeal. Against this decision, the defendant appealed to the Privy Council. Two grounds were urged before Their Lordships, firstly that it was beyond the competence of the Division Bench consisting of Wilberforce, J. and Scott-Smith, J. to hear the application for review and secondly that the ground relied upon for the review was not one of the grounds on which a review was permitted by the Code. On the first point, Their Lordships, after reading R. 5 of O. XLVII, say (at page 114):- “Their Lordships observe that Wilberforce, J. was not one of the Judges who passed the decree or made the order reviewed. They understand that Leslie Jones, J. was precluded by absence from sitting. But the circumstance makes no difference to what is prescribed by R. V. It is clear that Wilberforce, J. was precluded by the language from hearing the application, and this in itself would be a fatal objection to the judgment in review. The Court of Review had to be composed of Scott-Smith, J. alone, a circumstance not without importance for the larger considerations which follow.” On the second point Their Lordships interpreted “or for any other sufficient reason” in R. 1 as meaning a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified immediately previously. 7. It is clear from R. 5 that so long as all or any one or more of the Judges or Judge who passed the decree or made the order, a review of which is applied for, are or is available at the time the application for review comes up for hearing, those Judges or that Judge would alone be competent to deal with the application and this point was decided by the first of the two points decided by Their Lordships in Cahjju’s case. In Messrs Jardine Skinner and Co. In Messrs Jardine Skinner and Co. v. Dhun Kishan Sein & Others (XIII Weekly Reporter, Civil Rulings, p. 82 at page 83) a review had been admitted by the sole remaining Judge of the Bench which heard the case originally and the case directed to be restored to the file. The propriety of the order was canvassed before the Division Bench which took up the case for re-hearing Lock, J., with whose view the other learned Judge sitting with him concurred, said: “Looking at the terms of the law, it appears to me that the Judge or Judges who hear the case originally, if they are in Court when the application comes for hearing are the only Judges who can review the order passed by them, and I therefore think that this contention must be rejected.” In Maharaja Moheshur Sing v. The Bengal Government (VII Moore’s Indian Appeals 283 at page 304) the Judicial Committee stated as follows:- “It must be borne in mind that a review is perfectly distinct from an appeal; it is quite clear from the Regulations, that the primary intention of granting a review was a reconsideration of the same subject by the same Judge, as contradistinguished to an appeal, which is a hearing before another Tribunal. We do not say that there might not be cases in which a review might take place before another and a different Judge; because death or some other unexpected and unavoidable cause might prevent the Judge who made the decision from reviewing it; but we do say that such exceptions are allowable only ex necessitate. We do say that in all practicable cases the same Judge ought to review; and that for the attainment of that object, expedition in presenting a petition for the review is indispensable, and the only practicable course for attaining that end by accelerating the hearing of the review before accident or unexpected events shall have removed the original Judge. Looking at all these circumstances, we should naturally expect to meet in the Regulations upon this subject such provisions as would prevent the evils necessarily incidental to delay and procrastination.” The introduction of the provision limiting the right of review granted by R. 1 in the manner provided for in R. 2 is as a consequence of this pronouncement of Their Lordships. 8. 8. It is a well-known rule that a statute should be construed in aid of the achievement of its objects. In other words, the construction must be such as to facilitate and not such as to frustrate them. The language of R. 5 is not as clear as it could have been. It is contended that the period of six months referred to therein - in some Provinces the period is two months - is not merely the period during which the availability of the Judge or Judges who were parties to the decision sought to be reviewed should be awaited but amounts to an absolute limitation of the period beyond which the application for review cannot be dealt with by any other Judge or Judges. In other words that an application for review has to take the chance of the availability of the Judge or Judges whose decision is sought to be reviewed not merely at the time of its presentation but of their happening to deal with and dispose of it within six months after presenting the application if they continue attached to the court during that period. The acceptance of the argument would lead to the consequence that for no fault of the party applying for review, the application may prove futile if by chance the Judge or Judges who disposed of the case and who were available to dispose of the review during the period mentioned in R. 5 happen not to deal with the application for reasons beyond the control of the party and perhaps of the very Judge or Judges who could have dealt with it. The right to have a review having been granted by Section 114 and R. I of O. XLVII, in order that that right may be taken away, there must be language expressly operating in that manner. R. 5 does not contain words expressing such an intention or making such an intention clear by any necessary implication. The Rule would appear to be based upon the desirability of the party applying for review having the advantage of that application being heard by the Judge or Judges or such of them as would be available to hear that application. It is a rule enacted for the advantage of the applicant for review. The Rule would appear to be based upon the desirability of the party applying for review having the advantage of that application being heard by the Judge or Judges or such of them as would be available to hear that application. It is a rule enacted for the advantage of the applicant for review. There is no reason to deprive him of his right of review having conformed to the conditions prescribed for his obtaining the right by presenting the application for review in the proper form, in the proper time, and before the proper authority. 9. The Code of Civil Procedure provides for the reception, consideration and disposal of causes whether suits, appeals or applications. In the absence of abatement, the proceedings have to be terminated by the Court in one of the various ways provided for their termination, whether the termination be for default or on the merits. A litigant resorts to court for redress and if he does resort to it in the proper manner, it is incumbent upon the court either to give or refuse to grant the relief that he prays for. For this purpose, there ought to be a termination of the proceedings started by him. A perpetual pendency of a matter in Court is not contemplated by the law. Indeed it would be obnoxious and opposed to the very purpose for which the Code of Civil Procedure was enacted. If on account of a lapse of six months when the Judges are competent to deal with the application for review, it ceases to be congnisable by any other Judge or Judges of the High Court, an account of the competent Judge or Judges having retired or died, the result would be the application for review could not be heard and disposed of and if could not be heard and disposed of, it has to be pending and pending for ever. This would hardly be a contingency which would have been intended by the Legislature. In Maharajah Moheshur Singh v. The Bengal Government (cited above) the Privy Council envisaged the situation of Judges who participated in the decision which is the subject matter of review, not being available to consider the application for review, for no fault of the party and in such cases, they considered that out of necessity another Judge or other Judges can consider the application and dispose of it. In Ramaswami v. Kurisu (I.L.R. 13 Mad. 178) a Full Bench of the Madras High Court considered the question as to whether under the provisions of S. 624 of the Code of Civil Procedure the requisite that the application for review must be made to the Judge whose decision is sought to be reviewed signifies not merely that it must be first presented before him to consider whether it is such as to deserve consideration after the issue of notice to the opposite party but also that he must actually hear and decide whether the application shall be granted and the case restored to file. At pages 186 to 188, the learned Judges say:- “S. 624 limits the scope of S. 623 and restricts the remedy provided by it, and unless the intention is clear it ought to be construed so as to advance the remedy. In their ordinary sense, the words “no application shall be made” cannot be taken to mean, “no application shall be finally determined.” Again in form S. 624 contains a direction to the party seeking to obtain a review of judgment, and in substance it must be taken to limit the power of the Court to entertain and deal with the application only to the extent to which the remedy is taken away from the party concerned. To hold otherwise would lead to this anomaly, viz., that after ordering notice and before finally disposing of the application, the Judge who passed the decree might die or be removed from the Court and the party lose his remedy both by way of review and by appeal (which might become barred). It would also contravene the ordinary rule of construction that a provision of law should be so interpreted, if possible, as to avoid injustice to a suitor or as not to leave a Court that is one seized of jurisdiction to entertain an application without power to determine it. It would also contravene the ordinary rule of construction that a provision of law should be so interpreted, if possible, as to avoid injustice to a suitor or as not to leave a Court that is one seized of jurisdiction to entertain an application without power to determine it. It is no doubt true that S. 624 in intended to give legislative sanction to the principles laid down by the Privy Council in Maharajah Moheshur Singh v. The Bengal Government (1) in which it was observed that a review was perfectly distinct from an appeal, that the primary intention of granting a review was a reconsideration of the same subject by the same Judge as contradistinguished from an appeal which is a rehearing before another tribunal, and that review should take place before the same Judge that delivered the judgment except in cases of necessity such as the death or removal of the Judge. Whilst taking these observations as a guide to the construction to be put upon S. 624, regard should also be had to the mode in which legal effect was intended to be given to them by that Section. According to the prior law as interpreted by the Privy Council, a review might take place in case of necessity before another Judge upon all the grounds mentioned in S. 623 without reference to the question whether the Judge who delivered the original judgment ceased to belong to the Court before or after the application for review had been made. But S. 624 contemplates the state of things when the application for review is made and permits or forbids a review according as the Judge who passed the original decree is or is not then attached to the same Court. Though the intention is clear not to provide even for a case of necessity before the Court acquires jurisdiction to deal with the application, yet it may well be that the exercise of jurisdiction which once vests in a Court, notwithstanding a subsequent change of Judges is regarded as a case of necessity.” At the time when the question arose, the provision in the Code to the effect that if a Judge who decided the case issues notice upon an application for the review, then his successor could hear it, did not exist and that was the reason for raising the question. By the time the Full Bench disposed of the case, that provision had been inserted by Amendment Act, VII/1088. S. 59 of the Amendment Act inserted clause (c) in section 626 which by a subsequent amendment was taken over to S. 624. This provision now finds a place in R. 2 of O. XLVII. 10. The principles that should govern the consideration of the question have been laid down by Their Lordships very clearly, if I may say so with respect, in the above extract. I am in complete agreement with the views expressed by the Full Bench in the above extract which, I consider, are the principles governing the case in hand. 11. A court having jurisdiction in respect of a proceeding properly presented before it, will continue to retain that jurisdiction until the matter is disposed of, even if at the time of disposal, it would be beyond the competence of the court to accept a similar proceeding for the first time. To hold that no other Judge or Judges than those who participated in the disposal of the appeal can hear the application for review would be to say that the court before which the application was properly presented ceased to have jurisdiction to dispose of it on account of the retirement of the Judges who disposed of the appeal. In Venugopala v. Krishnaswami (1943 Federal Court 24) the Federal Court of India stated at page 27:- “This principle that a statute should not be so interpreted as to take away an action which has been well-commenced has been affirmed in various cases in differing circumstances............ It must have been well-known to both branches of the Legislature that strong and distinct words would be necessary to defeat a vested right to continue an action which has been well-commenced.” (Cf. 1876 1 Ch. D. 48 and see also 27 Mad. 538 and 32 All. 140). These observations were made in a case where the question arose as to whether a litigation started in court in the Presidency of Madras in respect of certain properties situate in Burma could be continued by the courts in that Province subsequent to the separation of Burma from British India of which at the time of the suit it formed a part. 12. 12. Applying the above principles, the true construction of R. 5 would be this:- The Judge or Judges or any one of the Judges who passed the decree or made the order, if available to hear the application for review at any stage of it, such Judge or Judges would alone be competent to do so in any of the first or the second stage, the first stage when the application is presented and the question of the necessity to hear the other side is considered and the second stage, after the notice as required by R. 3 and if the Judge is of the opinion that the application for review should be granted. If the Judge or Judges happen to continue to be available at the second stage when the petition is heard after notice to the opposite party, that Judge or Judges alone, and no other Judge or Judges of the Court, would be competent to hear the same. If at the second stage the application for review is granted, the case will be restored to the original number and it will be as if it had not been disposed of. Any Judge or Judges competent to hear the case can hear and dispose of it. That right is not confined to the Judge or Judges who dealt with the case on the former occasion. The period of six months is introduced in the rule not in any manner to injuriously affect or curtail the right of the applicant but to benefit him by enabling him to have the advantage of the application for review being heard by the Judge or Judges who disposed of the case. If the Judge or Judges who passed the decree or made the order are attached to the Court at the time of presentation of the application and would be available to deal with it within six months there from then they are the only persons competent to deal with the application. If however notwithstanding the fact that the Judge or the Judges though attached to the Court at the time of presentation and also for six months therefrom, would be precluded by absence or other like causes from dealing with the application then, any other Judge or Judges of the court may hear the same even during the period of six months. In matters like this it is desirable that the practice of the court, if not directly opposed to any positive provision of law, should be followed. So far as this Court is considered there were various cases disposed of by Mr. Justice Govinda Menon, a review of which had been applied for. He being on long leave, those applications were kept pending for a period of six months from the date of their presentation to see if he would be available to deal with them and after the expiry of six months those petitions were dealt with and disposed of by other Judges of this Court. 13. I was able to ascertain by reference to the law reports that the two learned Judges who could hear these petitions for review met together on various occasions after Karkatakam 1117. Whether these petitions were set down for hearing before them and if so why they were not dealt with or were not so set down, I have not been able to ascertain. There was a period of about 3 years when both the learned Judges functioned as Judges of the High Court and a further period of about the same duration when one of them functioned and could himself have dealt with the matter. It is much to be regretted that these two petitions for review remained unattended to by the erstwhile Travancore High Court. The parties seeking relief were not at fault in this matter. They had a right to apply for review and they exercised it by properly presenting applications in that behalf. It was for the Court to have dealt with and disposed of them. If now they are to be told that the Court has ceased to have jurisdiction to deal with the matter on account of the retirement of the Judges who could have dealt with it when they were in office, it would be a case of denying justice by delaying it and of violating yet another well established principle that no act or omission of the court should prejudice a party. 14. This case serves to bring home to all entrusted with the duty of administering justice the necessity to bestow attention upon and scrutinise the nature of the causes and to arrange to have them dealt with and disposed of according to their urgency. 15. 14. This case serves to bring home to all entrusted with the duty of administering justice the necessity to bestow attention upon and scrutinise the nature of the causes and to arrange to have them dealt with and disposed of according to their urgency. 15. I would therefore answer the questions referred to the Full Bench as follows:- Question No. 1:- I answer in the affirmative. I am of the opinion that the prohibition against a Judge or Judges who had not participated in the judgment or order sought to be reviewed from hearing an application for review is limited to a case where the Judge or Judges who passed the decree or made the order is or are available to hear the same when it comes up for hearing. If they would be available within six months from the date of presentation of the application for review, no other Judge or Judges can hear it. Question No. 2:- My answer is that if the Judge or Judges or any one of the Judges who passed the decree or made the order would be available to hear the application for review, they and they alone would be entitled to hear it whether in the first or the second stage. Here again if six months expired after the date of presentation of the application for review which has not been dealt with by the Judge or Judges who participated in the disposal of the case, it is competent, after the expiry of that period, for any other Judge or Judges to deal with the matter if, at the time the application comes up for hearing, the Judge or Judges or any one of the Judges who passed the decree or made the order is or are not available to hear it. 16. On one point I wish to reserve my opinion. The questions referred to the Full Bench assume that in this case the learned Judges whose decision is sought to be reviewed were not prevented by “other cause for a period of six months next after the application, from considering the decree or order to which the application refers” within the meaning of R. 5 of O. XLVII, Civil Procedure Code. Whether the failure to constitute a Bench of the competent Judge or Judges for the purpose or the failure to post the case for hearing or even the failure to deal with the applications after posting them would be “other cause” within the meaning of the rule is a matter for consideration but is not here considered as being beyond the scope of the reference to the Full Bench, the learned Judges making the reference having assumed it without deciding it. I would be inclined to regard these as “other cause” should that be necessary and happens to be the only way to give a party free from default to have his cause properly presented before Court the benefit of its consideration by court. I however express no definite opinion on the matter but though it is safer to make this reservation so as to avoid it being understood by implication that I am of the view which may be taken to be involved in the assumption on which the questions are framed and referred. Sankaran, J. I have carefully read through the judgment of my learned brother Subramonia Iyer, J., answering the two points referred to the Full Bench for the decision. But I have not been able to fully agree with the answers in the form and to the extent as formulated by my learned brother. Hence it has become necessary for me to independently consider those questions and to formulate my own answers regarding the same. 2. Before proceeding to examine the questions themselves the scope and the limitation of the reference order itself have to be made clear. The two questions which have been referred to this Full Bench for decision are general in their nature and have been shaped in an abstract form. Even though these questions arose in the course of the consideration of the facts relating to the history of Review Petitions Nos. 49 and 57 of 1117, those facts can have no relevancy or significance in the decision of the two questions raised before this Full Bench. Even though the questions are two in number, the second question is really an amplification of the first. The two questions together seek for an answer as to the true construction or interpretation to be put upon R. 5 of O. 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Even though the questions are two in number, the second question is really an amplification of the first. The two questions together seek for an answer as to the true construction or interpretation to be put upon R. 5 of O. 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The rule as it stands is to govern applications for review in respect of which the two conditions specified in the rule are satisfied. Those conditions are (1) that the Judge or Judges or any one of the Judges who passed the decree or made the order sought to be reviewed continues or continue attached to the Court at the time when the application for review is presented and (2) that such Judge or Judges or any one of them is not or are not precluded by absence or other cause for a period of six months next after the application for review from considering the decree or order to which application refers. This Full Bench is called upon to state as to what would be the fate of a review application which satisfies both these conditions. This is made clear from the expression “Where the two conditions contemplated by R. 5 of the O.47 are satisfied in respect of an application for review” as used at the commencement of the first question referred. The use of such an expression in the question does not and cannot lead to the inference that it has been finally decided by the referring Bench that the two conditions contemplated by R. 5 are fully satisfied in respect of Review Petitions Nos. 49 and 57 of 1117 which lead to the reference. Even if the statements and observations made in the reference order while dealing with the facts relating to the particular petitions are capable of an inference in favour of such a view, it is obvious that such statements and observations cannot amount to any final decision. With the answers to the questions referred to the Full Bench Review Petitions Nos. 49 and 57 of 1117 will necessarily go before a Division Bench and it will be for that Bench to finally decide whether in respect of these petitions the two conditions contemplated by R. 5 of O. 47 are fully satisfied or not, after a due consideration of all the relevant facts and circumstances. 3. 49 and 57 of 1117 will necessarily go before a Division Bench and it will be for that Bench to finally decide whether in respect of these petitions the two conditions contemplated by R. 5 of O. 47 are fully satisfied or not, after a due consideration of all the relevant facts and circumstances. 3. This Full Bench is not called upon to state as to when and under what circumstances these two conditions can be deemed to have been satisfied. It is also not possible to prescribe any general standard or rule to govern that matter in respect of all applications for review. This is particularly so in respect of the second condition contemplated by R. 5. All that can be said is that in order to satisfy this condition it has to be made out that the Judge or Judges concerned was or were not precluded by absence or other cause for a period of six months next after the application for review from considering the decree or order to which the application refers. From the mere fact of the non-disposal of the application for review within the said period of six months it cannot be presumed that the Judge or the Judges concerned was or were precluded or prevented by absence or other cause from dealing with that application. To presume so would be to nullify or to ignore R. 5 altogether and to proceed as if no such rule exists in the Code. The proper approach will be to examine and ascertain whether as a matter of fact the Judge or Judges concerned was or were precluded, by absence or other cause, from dealing with the application within the period of six months. 4. The absence of the Judge or Judges precluding or preventing the hearing of the application during the period prescribed by R. 5 can easily be known and understood. But the question as to what would amount to “other cause” precluding or preventing the Judge or Judges during the relevant period from considering the decree or order sought to be reviewed, may lead to some difficulty. The facts and circumstances which would amount to “other cause” as contemplated by R. 5 would be different in the case of different applications. The facts and circumstances which would amount to “other cause” as contemplated by R. 5 would be different in the case of different applications. Such facts and circumstances in relation to each application for review have to be considered on their on merits for coming to a proper decision as to whether they would amount to “other cause” in the full significance of the term as used in R. 5, which precluded or prevented the Judge or Judges from hearing the application within the period specified in the rule. This Full Bench is not called upon to decide that question in respect of R.P. 49 and 57 of 1117 because those petitions have not been placed before the Bench for decision and also because the consideration of such question is beyond the scope of the specific points referred to this Full Bench. The facts and circumstances necessary for a proper decision of the question are also not before this Bench. Under such circumstances it is unnecessary and even improper to express any opinion as to whether the failure to dispose of the two applications referred to above was due to the fault of the Court or whether the failure was due to the fault of the parties concerned or whether the facts and circumstances which lead up to such a failure would amount to “other cause” as contemplated by R. 5. The opinion expressed by this Full Bench on these points will not also be binding on the Division Bench before which these applications will go for final decision after this Full Bench has answered the specific questions referred to it. Hence I propose to confine my discussion within the limits permitted by the specific points referred to this Full Bench. 5. As already stated by me, the answers to the two questions referred to the Full Bench will be furnished by a true and correct interpretation of R. 5 of the O. XLVII of the Code of Civil Procedure. Hence I propose to confine my discussion within the limits permitted by the specific points referred to this Full Bench. 5. As already stated by me, the answers to the two questions referred to the Full Bench will be furnished by a true and correct interpretation of R. 5 of the O. XLVII of the Code of Civil Procedure. R. 5 runs as follows:- “Where the Judge or Judges, or any one of the Judges, who passed the decree or made the order, a review of which is applied for, continues or continue attached to the Court at the time when the application for a review is presented, and is not or are not precluded by absence or other cause for a period of six months next after the application from considering the decree or order to which the application refers, such Judge or Judges or any of them shall hear the application, and no other Judge or Judges of the Court shall hear the same.” The language employed in the rule is simple and clear and there appears to be nothing ambiguous about it. By a straight reading and understanding of the rule, the only meaning gatherable from it is that an application for review, which satisfies both the conditions mentioned in the rule, can be heard and disposed of by the Judge or Judges or any one of them referred to in the earlier part of the rule and that any other Judge or Judges shall have no jurisdiction to hear the application. Even though the language employed in the rule is so simple and clear, this rule has received judicial interpretation in such a manner as to considerably limit its scope. In Raghava Iyen v. Sankaranarayana Iyer (57 Travancore Law Reports 767) it was ruled by a Full Bench of the erstwhile Travancore High Court that R. 5 of O. 45, C.P.C. (corresponding to R. 5 of O. 47 of the Indian Code) does not prohibit the hearing of a review application by any other Judge or Judges even though the Judge or Judges or any of the Judges who passed the decree or made the order was or were attached to the Court and could have heard it within a period of six months after the application was presented. It was also held that if the Judge or Judges or any one of the Judges who passed the decree or made the order sought to be reviewed, has or have issued notice on the application for review, any other Judge or Judges will have jurisdiction to hear the application at the next stage. It is the construction thus put upon R. 5 by the learned Judges who participated in the Full Bench decision quoted above that has been responsible for the present reference. With all respect to those learned Judges it has to be pointed out that in construing R. 5 they have not give due weight to the restrictions imposed by the rule in the matter of hearing and disposing of applications for review. The very word “review” in relation to a decree or order connotes the idea of a reconsideration of the subject matter by the very same tribunal who passed the decree or made the order. The right to ask for such a review is conferred on the party by the special statutory provisions contained in the Civil Procedure Code. This right is conferred only in exceptional cases and under exceptional circumstances. Naturally therefore the right thus conferred by the statute has been curtailed by the several limitations imposed by the other relevant provisions in the Code itself. S. 114 which has granted this right of review states that the right is subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed by the rules specified in the Code. The rules thus contemplated are the rules contained in O. 47 of the Code. The more important of the conditions and limitations regulating the admission and disposal of applications for review are contained in Rr. 1 to 5 of O. 47. In the face of these provisions, it will be wrong to assume that a party has an unquestionable right to have his application for review heard and decided on its merits by any Judge of the Court concerned, irrespective of the restrictions and limitations imposed by these provisions. It is the same statute that has granted the right of review that has imposed these restrictions and limitations also, and as such the provisions imposing such restrictions and limitations have as much potency as the provision granting the right of review. It is the same statute that has granted the right of review that has imposed these restrictions and limitations also, and as such the provisions imposing such restrictions and limitations have as much potency as the provision granting the right of review. In dealing with the scope of an application for review the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council has observed as follows in Maharjah Moheshur Singh v. The Bengal Government (7 M.I.A. 283 at 304): “It must be borne in mind that a review is perfectly distinct from an appeal; it is quite clear from the Regulations, that the primary intention of granting a review was a reconsideration of the same subject by the same Judge, as contradistinguished to an appeal, which is a hearing before another Tribunal. We do not say that there might not be cases in which a review might take place before another and different Judge because death or some other unexpected and unavoidable cause might prevent the Judge who made the decision from reviewing it; but we do say that such exceptions are allowable only ex necessitate. We do say that in all practicable cases the same Judge ought to review; and that for the attainment of that object, expedition in presenting a petition for the review is indispensable and the only practicable course for attaining that end is by accelerating the hearing of the review before accident or unexpected events shall have removed the original Judge. Looking at all these circumstances, we should naturally expect to meet in the Regulations upon this subject such provisions as would prevent the evils necessarily incidental to delay and procrastination.” It is clear from this passage that exceptions to the general rule that the review must be by the same Tribunal who passed the decree or made the order sought to be reviewed are permissible only ex necessitate. The framers of the Civil Procedure Code have contemplated such exceptional cases and they have made the necessary provisions in Rr. 2 and 5 of O. 47 to meet such cases. It is provided in R. 2 that where the Judge who passed the decree or made the order has issued notice on the application for review it will be competent for his successor to hear and dispose of that application. This Rule is expressly made inapplicable to the High Court. 2 and 5 of O. 47 to meet such cases. It is provided in R. 2 that where the Judge who passed the decree or made the order has issued notice on the application for review it will be competent for his successor to hear and dispose of that application. This Rule is expressly made inapplicable to the High Court. No such provision excluding the High Court from the scope and operation of this Rule was contained in R. 2 of O. 45 of the Travancore Code. All the same it was ruled by a Full Bench of the Travancore High Court that R. 2 of O. 45 of the Travancore Code was not applicable to the High Court. Even if it be held otherwise, it is clear that R. 2 is only an enabling provision. It is R. 5 that really governs applications for review of decrees passed or orders made by Judges of a multimember Court like the High Court. It is clear from the Rule that the idea underlying it is that it must be made possible for an application for review to be speedily disposed of by the same Judge or Judges or any one of them who passed the decree or made the order which is the subject-matter of the review. The Rule contemplates that such a disposal should take place within a period of six months from the date of presentation of the application for review. The Rule prohibits the hearing of the application by any other Judge or Judges, only where the two conditions necessary for the disposal of the application within the period of six months prescribed by the Rule are satisfied. The necessary implication is that the prohibition will not operate where these conditions are not satisfied. Thus it cannot be said that the provision would work undue hardship on the party by his being left to take the chance of his application being heard and disposed of within the prescribed period of six months. He can avoid all possible hardships by being vigilant in the prompt discharge of his duties and responsibilities in the matter of facilitating the hearing and disposal of the application within the prescribed time limit. He can avoid all possible hardships by being vigilant in the prompt discharge of his duties and responsibilities in the matter of facilitating the hearing and disposal of the application within the prescribed time limit. If in spite of him and for reasons beyond his control the application has not been disposed of within that period, it will be open to him to contend that the conditions contemplated by R. 5 have not been satisfied and that therefore the prohibition contained in the latter part of the Rule will not apply to the application in question. But where the two conditions are fully satisfied the prohibition contained in the Rule must necessarily operate and the application for review cannot be taken out of such prohibition on the ground that the enforcement of the prohibition would work hardship on the party. Such equitable considerations are entirely out of place in construing and in giving effect to a statutory provision which is clear on the face of it. Where the language used in the statute is plain and the meaning is clear, there is no scope for any interpretation. So far as R. 5 is concerned, I do not think that there is any room for complaint that it is not as clear as it could have been. The conditions to be satisfied for the application of this Rule are expressly stated to be (1) that the Judge or Judges or any one of them, who passed the decree or made the order sought to be reviewed, continues or continue to be attached to the Court at the time when the application for review is presented and (2) that such Judge or Judges is not or are not precluded by absence or other cause for a period of six months next after the application from considering the decree or order to which the application refers. After laying down these conditions, the Rule proceeds to state that where those conditions are satisfied, the Judge or Judges already referred to shall hear the application and that no other Judge or Judges of the Court shall hear the same. The period of six months mentioned in the Rule is to govern the two conditions specified therein and when such conditions are satisfied the Judge or Judges referred to in the earlier part of the Rule can alone hear the application for review. The period of six months mentioned in the Rule is to govern the two conditions specified therein and when such conditions are satisfied the Judge or Judges referred to in the earlier part of the Rule can alone hear the application for review. They can hear the application within the said period of six months or at any time thereafter. The mandate is that such Judge or Judges alone shall hear the application. Equally strong is the mandate that no other Judge or Judges of the Court shall hear such application. The prohibition is absolute. There is no justification for limiting the operative force of this prohibition to six month’s period referred to in R. 5. To do so would be to read more words into the Rule and to nullify the effect of the Rule altogether. It is certainly beyond the limit of the Court’s powers of interpretation to thus amend or modify the Rule so as to convey an entirely different meaning than the one which the legislature wanted to convey by the Rule as framed by it. It is the function of the legislature to so amend or modify the Rule when it is deemed necessary. In the guise of interpretation, Courts cannot usurp the function that is entirely within the jurisdiction of the legislature. In Jones v. Smart (1785 I.T.R. 44) Buller, J., has observed as follows: “We are bound to make the Act of Parliament as they have made it; a causus omissus can in no case be supplied by a Court of law, for that would be to make laws.” Then again there is the observation of Lord Mersey in Thompson v. Goold (1910) 79 L.J.K.B. 905) that : “It is a strong thing to read into an Act of Parliament words which are not there, and in the absence of clear necessity it is a wrong thing to do.” It is thus clear that the Court is bound to construe R. 5 as it stands without adding more words to it. The expression ‘no other Judge or Judges of the Court shall hear the same’ contained in the latter part of R. 5 is a mandate amounting to an absolute prohibition of hearing the application in question by such other Judge or Judges at any stage whatever. The expression ‘no other Judge or Judges of the Court shall hear the same’ contained in the latter part of R. 5 is a mandate amounting to an absolute prohibition of hearing the application in question by such other Judge or Judges at any stage whatever. If the intention of the legislature was to limit such prohibition to any particular stage, words to that effect would certainly have found a place in the Code itself. The absence of any such words in the Rule to restrict or limit the operative force in any manner or to any extent can only lead to the inference that the prohibition was meant to be absolute. It is equally clear that the hearing contemplated by R. 5 refers to the hearing of the application for review at both the stages through which the application may have to pass. Hearing necessarily means hearing arguments regarding the merits of the application. If on such a hearing at the first stage of the application the Judge or Judges having jurisdiction to hear the same is or are satisfied that there appears to be a prima facie case for consideration, a rule may be issued calling upon the other side to show cause why the application should not be admitted. If on the other hand, it is found that no such prima facie case is made out, the application may be rejected then and there and the matter will end there. If a rule is issued, then the application will enter upon the second stage when both sides are to be heard on the merits of the application and also on its sustainability. There is nothing in R. 5 to indicate that the hearing contemplated by the rule is confined to any one of these stages. In view of the ordinary meaning of the word ‘hearing’ it has to be taken that the word ‘hearing’ as used in R. 5 is intended to apply to the hearing of the review application at both the stages. That the Rule intended to apply to the second stage also is clear from the expressions used in S. 379 of Act VIII of 1859. It is this Section which was subsequently re-enacted as S. 627 in the Code of the year 1882 and later on as R. 5 of O. 47 in the Code of 1908. That the Rule intended to apply to the second stage also is clear from the expressions used in S. 379 of Act VIII of 1859. It is this Section which was subsequently re-enacted as S. 627 in the Code of the year 1882 and later on as R. 5 of O. 47 in the Code of 1908. Instead of the word ‘hearing’ as used in the latter Sections, the following expressions had been used in S. 379 of Act VIII of 1859 to convey the same idea: “It shall not be competent to any other Judges of the Court to enter upon the consideration on the merits of the application and to record an order or opinion thereon.” The idea conveyed by this expression is sought to be achieved by the expression “no other Judge or Judges of the Court shall hear the same” as used in R. 5 and it is put in the form of a strong mandate. Thus there can be no doubt that the prohibition contained in the Rule is to apply to the second and the final stage also of the hearing of an application for review. 6. Since the mandate contained in R. 5 has been issued in such a clear and strong language, the duty of the Court is merely to give effect to that mandate irrespective of all considerations as to the consequences resulting from the adoption of such a course. It is not for the Court to speculate on the wisdom of the policy underlying the enactment of such a Rule. It may be that the rigour of the Rule would work hardship in respect of certain applications for review. Similarly it might appear that the six month’s period arbitrarily fixed in R. 5 is too short and that it may not always be possible to get a final disposal of the application for review on its merits within that period. But no such equitable considerations can justify the evasion of the effect of a clear provision in a statute by attempting to construe the provision in a manner calculated to relieve the supposed hardship to the party concerned. In this connection it is worthwhile to quote the observation made by the Privy Council while dealing with a similar matter in Nagendranath v. Suresh (A.I.R. 1932 P.C. 165). In this connection it is worthwhile to quote the observation made by the Privy Council while dealing with a similar matter in Nagendranath v. Suresh (A.I.R. 1932 P.C. 165). There it was observed as follows: “The fixation of periods of limitation must always be to some extent arbitrary, and may frequently result in hardship. But in construing such provisions equitable considerations are out of place, and the strict grammatical meaning of the words is the only safe guide.” In dealing with the question of construing statutes on equitable grounds, it was ruled by the Madras High Court in Nagabhushanam Tedepalli v. Siram Ramachandra Rao (A.I.R. 1923 Madras 241) that where the provisions in a statute are imperative Courts would not be justified in disregarding them on equitable grounds. R. 5 of O. 47 of the Civil Procedure Code had itself come up for the consideration of the Privy Council in Chajju v. Neki (A.I.R. 1922 P.C. 112). In that case the decree passed by a Division Bench consisting of Scott Smith and Leslie Jones, JJ., was reviewed by a different Bench consisting of Scott Smith and Wilberforce, JJ. When the application for review came up before the latter Bench, Leslie Jones, J., was precluded by absence from sitting. On a consideration of the provision contained in R. 5, it was ruled by the Privy Council that “it is clear that Wilberforce, J., was precluded by the language from hearing the application, and this in itself would be fatal objection to the judgment in review.” The judgment in review was accordingly set aside. The strong expression “this in itself would be a fatal objection to the judgment in review” used by the Privy Council clearly indicates that not even the slightest deviation from the express directions contained in R. 5 is permissible. 7. One argument advanced to justify the interpretation of R. 5 as containing only an enabling provision and not an absolute prohibition, is that to hold that other Judge or Judges will have no jurisdiction to hear an application for review in cases where the two conditions contemplated by the Rule are satisfied would have the result of leaving the application pending for ever and that such an obnoxious situation of a perpetual pendency of a proceeding properly commenced is not contemplated by law. The situation thus envisaged is imaginary and not real. The situation thus envisaged is imaginary and not real. The passing of a final order after a hearing and consideration of the application on its merits, is not the only mode by which the application could be disposed of and the proceedings commenced by the presentation of that application duly terminated. Where there is an abatement of such a proceeding, it would automatically come to an end with such abatement. Similarly a dismissal for default would also result in a termination of the proceedings. Such terminations of proceedings without any hearing and consideration of the application on its merits are proper in the eye of law and are warranted by the provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure. The prohibition contained in R. 5 is only of the hearing of the application under the conditions stated, i.e., of the hearing and the consideration of the application on its merits. But this does not mean that the application could not or should not be otherwise disposed of. When the application comes up before other Judge or Judges, as referred to in R. 5, it will be perfectly open to him or them to dismiss it on the ground of want of jurisdiction to hear and consider it on its merits. It will be a proper disposal in accordance with law and it will result in a due termination of the proceedings commenced on the presentation of the application for review. Thus it cannot be said that a strict interpretation of R. 5 may result in a perpetual pendency of an application for review in some instances. 8. Then there is the argument that a Court when once it is seized of jurisdiction to entertain an application will continue to have jurisdiction to determine that application and that a statute should not be so interpreted as to take away an action which has been well commenced. The decision in Ramasami v. Kurisu (I.L.R. 13 Madras 178) by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court and the decision of the Federal Court in Venugopala v. Krishnasami (A.I.R. 1943 F.C. 24) are relied on in support of this position. The Madras case was concerned with the interpretation of S. 624 of the Code of Civil Procedure of the year 1882. That Section laid down the condition governing the presentation of an application for review before a Subordinate Judge. The Madras case was concerned with the interpretation of S. 624 of the Code of Civil Procedure of the year 1882. That Section laid down the condition governing the presentation of an application for review before a Subordinate Judge. It was expressly stated in the Section that it applied only to Courts other than the High Court. The Section as it stood did not provide for the contingency where the Judge before whom the application was properly presented leaves office after issuing notice on the application but before finally disposing it. In construing that Section it was held in Ramasami v. Kurisu that under the particular situation stated the successor Judge had jurisdiction to deal with the application. Such jurisdiction is now expressly conferred on a Subordinate Judge by the latter part of R. 2 of O. 47. This Rule and the interpretation of it cannot apply to the High Court in view of the special provision contained in R. 5 governing applications for review presented before the High Court. The general principles enunciated in Ramasami v. Kurisu do not also stand in the way of a literal and strict interpretation of R. 5. Such principles are meant to govern cases where there are no express statutory provisions limiting and restricting the jurisdiction of a Court to deal with a particular matter. This is obvious from the reservation made in stating the general principles in that case. In the course of that judgment it was observed as follows: “A provision of law should be so interpreted, if possible, so as to avoid injustice to a suitor, or as not to leave a Court that is once seized of jurisdiction to entertain application without power to determine it.” The expression ‘if possible’ has been deliberately used to indicate that the general proposition stated in the passage quoted is not to govern cases where there are express provisions to the contrary in the statute coming up for construction. The ruling of the Federal Court in Venugopal v. Krishnaswami is also subject to a similar reservation. The question there was whether a British Indian Court in which a suit had been properly instituted had jurisdiction after the separation of Burma from India, to proceed with the suit in respect of the plaint items which happened to be situated in Burma. The question there was whether a British Indian Court in which a suit had been properly instituted had jurisdiction after the separation of Burma from India, to proceed with the suit in respect of the plaint items which happened to be situated in Burma. The question was answered in the affirmative and the reason stated is that in the Constitution Act under which the separation of Burma was effected, there was no provision ousting the jurisdiction of the British Indian Court to proceed with pending actions. It was held that “a right to continue a duly instituted suit is in the nature of a vested right and it cannot be taken away except by a clear indication of intention to that effect.” This ruling also is of no help in the matter of construing R. 5 of O. 47, Code of Civil Procedure, which imposes a prohibition in clear and express terms. It is not also correct to say that this Rule takes away or abridges any vested right, viz., the right of a party to have a decree or order reviewed. The creation of this right itself is under S. 114 of the Code and the very same Section states that the right is to be exercised subject to the conditions and limitations prescribed by the Rules. It is only a qualified and restricted right. R. 5 has only enunciated some of these conditions and limitations which qualify the right of review even from its inception. In no sense can it be said that R. 5 takes away any vested right. Thus there can be no justification for construing out this Rule and for nullifying its force and effect. Such a construction put upon on this Rule by the decision in Raghava Iyen v. Sankaranarayana Iyer (57 Travancore Law Reports 767) cannot therefore be accepted as correct. There is no question of overruling that decision because it has no force as a binding precedent so far as this Court is concerned. It is sufficient for this Court to dissent from that decision and to state that it does not lay down correct law. 9. There is no question of overruling that decision because it has no force as a binding precedent so far as this Court is concerned. It is sufficient for this Court to dissent from that decision and to state that it does not lay down correct law. 9. The questions referred to the Full Bench are therefore answered as follows: (1) Where the two conditions contemplated by R. 5 of O. 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure are satisfied in respect of an application for review, it cannot be heard by any Judge or Judges who had not participated in the judgment, decree or order sought to be reviewed. (2) The prohibition contained in R. 5 is absolute and it is not limited to the first stage of the hearing of the application when a rule may or may not be issued calling upon the other side to show cause why the application should not be admitted. The prohibition applies to all the different stages of the hearing and consideration of the application for review. Whether the two conditions contemplated by the Rule are satisfied or not in respect of any particular application for review, is a question of fact which has to be decided after a due consideration of all the relevant circumstances pertaining to that application. It is not possible to lay down as a general proposition, as to what would amount to “other cause” in the full force and significance of the term as used in R. 5, which can be deemed to have precluded or prevented the Judge or Judges or any of them who had passed the decree or made the order, from hearing the application for review within the prescribed period of six months. Gangadhara Menon, J:- I have carefully read the judgments proposed by my learned brothers Sankaran, J. and Subramonia Iyer, J. I regret I am unable to agree with Subramonia Iyer, J. The right of review is a creature of the statute and the nature and extent of that right are therefore governed by the provisions of the statute. The relevant provisions are contained in S. 114 and in O. XLVII of the Indian Civil Procedure Code (corresponding to S. 88 and O. XLV if the Travancore Civil Procedure Code that was in force till recently). The relevant provisions are contained in S. 114 and in O. XLVII of the Indian Civil Procedure Code (corresponding to S. 88 and O. XLV if the Travancore Civil Procedure Code that was in force till recently). S. 114 of the Civil Procedure Code makes it clear that the right of review provided therein is “subject to the conditions and limitations prescribed” i.e., prescribed by the Rule in O. XLVII. It is therefore obvious that the right of review of a decree or order is circumscribed by the conditions and limitations imposed by the provisions of the Rules contained in O. XLVII. We are concerned here with one of these Rules namely, R.5 of O. XLVII. This Rule provides: “Where the Judge or Judges, or any one of the Judges, who passed the decree or made the order, a review of which is applied for, continues or continue attached to the Court at the time when the application for review is presented, and is not or are not precluded by absence or other cause for a period of six months next after the application from considering the decree or order to which the application refers, such Judge or Judges or any of them shall hear the application, and no other Judge or Judges of the Court shall hear the same.” The answer to the two questions referred to the Full Bench for decision will depend on the meaning to be attached to the Rule on a proper construction thereof. The exact import of this Rule has therefore to be considered. I do not share the view that the language of R. 5 is not clear. I think that the language of the rule is clear and explicit. The earlier part of the rule envisages two conditions and states that where the two conditions exist the Judge or Judges or any one of the Judges who passed the decree or order shall hear the application. The latter part of the rule makes it imperative that no other Judge or Judges of the Court hall hear the same. The earlier part of the rule envisages two conditions and states that where the two conditions exist the Judge or Judges or any one of the Judges who passed the decree or order shall hear the application. The latter part of the rule makes it imperative that no other Judge or Judges of the Court hall hear the same. The two conditions are:- (1) that the Judge or Judges or any one of the Judges who passed the decree or order sought to be reviewed continues or continue attached to the court at the time when the application for the review is presented, and (2) that such Judge or Judges or any one of the Judge is or are not precluded by absence or other cause for a period of six months next after the application from considering the decree or order to which the application refers. 2. The fundamental concept of a review as distinguished from an appeal is that it seeks for a reconsideration of the same subject by the same Judge or Judges. It is apparent from the way in which R. 5 of O. XLVII is worded that this idea was clearly kept in view. But the Judge or Judges who passed the decree or order may not be attached to the court at all at the time when the application for review is presented. Therefore the principle that the very same Judge or Judges who passed the decree or order should hear the application for review had to be relaxed by limiting it to applications presented when the Judge or Judges or any one of them who passed the decree or order continues or continue attached to the court. This is what is intended by Cl. 1 of the rule. There is the further possibility of the Judge or Judges or any one of them who passed the decree or order and who continues or continue attached to the court being precluded by absence or other sufficient cause from hearing the application. This is what is intended by Cl. 1 of the rule. There is the further possibility of the Judge or Judges or any one of them who passed the decree or order and who continues or continue attached to the court being precluded by absence or other sufficient cause from hearing the application. Therefore the principle that the same Judge or Judges who passed the decree or order should hear the application had again to be relaxed by limiting it to applications for review which the continuing Judge or Judges or any one of them is not or are not precluded from absence or other causes, for a period of six months next after the application from considering. This is what is intended by the second clause of the R. 5. With the reservations thus envisaged the rule provides that such applications for review shall be heard by the Judge or Judges or any one of them that passed the decree or order, and prohibits the other Judge or Judges of the court from hearing the same. 3. Therefore where the two conditions mentioned in the rule exist the Judge or Judges or any one of them who passed the decree or order alone can hear the application and the other Judges of the Court are prohibited from hearing it. In other words the jurisdiction to hear such applications vests exclusively in the Judge or Judges or any one of them that passed the decree or order and the other Judges of the court have no jurisdiction to hear them. It follows that the latter have jurisdiction to hear only those review applications that do not come within the purview of R. 5. It seems to me that the words used in the rule are clear and unambiguous and if construed in their ordinary sense, I do not think that they are capable of any other meaning. 4. It follows that the latter have jurisdiction to hear only those review applications that do not come within the purview of R. 5. It seems to me that the words used in the rule are clear and unambiguous and if construed in their ordinary sense, I do not think that they are capable of any other meaning. 4. My learned brother Subramonia Iyer, J. thinks that if the rule is construed thus, “it would lead to the consequence that for no fault of the party applying for review, the application may prove futile if by chance the Judge or Judges who disposed of the case and who were available to dispose of the review during the period mentioned in R. 5 happen not to deal with the application for reasons beyond the control of the party and perhaps of the very Judge or Judges who could have dealt with it.” It appears to me that there is no foundation for any such apprehension. The reasons that my learned brother refers to may very well come within the meaning of the words “other cause” used in the second clause in R. 5 and if they do the application will fall outside the ambit of R. 5 and the other Judge or Judges of the court will have jurisdiction to deal with it. But the question what would constitute “other cause” within the meaning of that expression in R. 5 is beyond the scope of this reference and therefore it is unnecessary to consider it here. However even if any hardship may result that is no reason not to give effect to the provisions of the statute if the intention as expressed by the words used therein is clear. “Where the language of an Act is clear and explicit, we must give effect to it, whatever may be the consequences, for in that case the words of the statute speak the intention of the Legislature”. (1831, 2 D & Cl. (H.L.) 480, 489). As observed by Jervis, C.J., in Abley v. Dale (1850, 20 L.J. C.P. 33, 35) if the precise words used are plain and unambiguous, we are bound to construe them in their ordinary sense, even though it does lead to an absurdity or manifest injustice. (1831, 2 D & Cl. (H.L.) 480, 489). As observed by Jervis, C.J., in Abley v. Dale (1850, 20 L.J. C.P. 33, 35) if the precise words used are plain and unambiguous, we are bound to construe them in their ordinary sense, even though it does lead to an absurdity or manifest injustice. Words may be modified or varied where their import is doubtful or obscure that we assume the functions of legislators when we depart from the ordinary meaning of the precise words used, merely because we see, or fancy we see, an absurdity or manifest injustice from an adherence to their literal meaning.” In a more recent case Finnemore, J., says: “The mere fact that the result of a statute may be unjust or absurd does not entitle this Court to refuse to give it effect.” (1949), 2 K.B.1 at p. 7.) 5. I am therefore clearly of the view that where the two conditions contemplated by R. 5 of O. XLVII C.P.C. are satisfied the Judge or Judges who passed the decree or order alone can hear the application for review and the other Judges of the court have no jurisdiction to hear them. 6. There is nothing in R. 5 to indicate that the prohibition contained therein is limited to the first stage of the hearing of the application for review. Therefore the hearing contemplated in the rule includes the hearing at both the stages of the application. 7. I am therefore in entire agreement with the conclusions of Sankaran, (J). I agree to the answers proposed by him to the questions referred to the Full Bench.