Ram Labhaya J.-This appeal arises out of a probate proceeding. Anandiram Sut, plaintiff, applied for the probate of a will said to have been executed by Kinaram Sub, deceased, who, according to the allegations in the petition for probate, died on 4th Ashar 1355 B. S. The case of Anandi-ram, respondent, was that Kinaram, deceased, bequeathed his property of the value of Ss. 233 (according to Collector's assessment) to him by a will duly executed. He claims to be the executor and the sole legatee. The claim was resisted by Kabiram. The main plea raised by him was that the will had not been executed by Kinaram, deceased. He was not at Kayapani where the will was said to have been executed. It was also pleaded that he did not possess testamentary capacity at the time. On behalf of Anandiram, respondent, two witnesses were examined. He himself also appeared in the witness box. No evidence was led on behalf of Kabiram, appellant. Of the two witnesses examined by Anandiram, one was an attesting witness whose attestation of it was indicated by a mark. The learned Subordinate Judge on a consideration of evidence has come to the conclusion that the will was duly executed and attested and the testator was in the full possession of his senses at the time of its execution. He therefore ordered a probate of the will to issue. Kabiram has appealed. [2] The learned counsel for the appellant has contended in the first place that due execution of the will has not been proved. We have gone through the evidence and we agree with the learned Subordinate Judge that the evidence led on behalf of Anandiram establishes the fact that Kinaram, deceasedi did execute the will in the presence of witnesses who attested the document. The Goanbura an attesting witness and the scribe are both disinterested persons. There is no reason why their testimony on the point should be discarded particularly in the absence of rebuttal. [3] The learned counsel has also argued that so far as attestation is concerned it should be by a witness who can sign. The attesting witnesses, if they cannot sign, cannot validly attest a will. This contention is based on a comparison between the language used in cl. (a), of S 63, Succession Act, and cl. (c) of that; section. In cl. The attesting witnesses, if they cannot sign, cannot validly attest a will. This contention is based on a comparison between the language used in cl. (a), of S 63, Succession Act, and cl. (c) of that; section. In cl. (a), it is provided that "the testator shall sign or shall affix his mark to the will, or it shall be signed by some other person in his presence and by his direction." Clause (c) provides that "the will shall be attested by two or more witnesses, each of whom has seen the be stator sign or affix his mark to the will or has seen some other person sign the will, in the presence and by the direction of the testator, or has received from the testator a personal acknowledgment of his signature or mark or of the signature of such other person ; and each of the witnesses shall sign the will in the presence of the testator, but it shall not be necessary that more than one witness be present at the same time and no particular form of attes­tation shall be necessary." It is contended that the requirement of cl. (c) is that witnesses shall sign the will and that putting a mark or a thumb impression is not permitted by the language of cl. (c). In support of this contention, The learned counsel relied on Nitya, Gopal Sircar v. Nagendra Nath, 11 cal. 429 It may be noticed that this case was decided under the old Act (Act X 10] of 1865). Till that time the word 'sign' had not bean defined anywhere. After that decision the word 'sign' has been de3ned in the General Clauses Act of 1897 and the definition has been made to include a mark also in the case of an illiterate witness. In view of this change in the law made subsequent to that decision, it has been held in Annu Bhujanga v. Rama, Bliujanga, A. I. R (24) 1937 Bom. 389, that even in ol. (c) of S. 63 the word 'sign' would include a mark. It is, therefore, not absolutely necessary that the attesting witnesses should sign. Placing of a mark by an attesting witness would not invalidate the document or the attestation. [4] In Maikoo Lai v. Santoo, 58 ALL. 1064 F.B. the same view was taken. 389, that even in ol. (c) of S. 63 the word 'sign' would include a mark. It is, therefore, not absolutely necessary that the attesting witnesses should sign. Placing of a mark by an attesting witness would not invalidate the document or the attestation. [4] In Maikoo Lai v. Santoo, 58 ALL. 1064 F.B. the same view was taken. We are in respectful agreement with the view taken in these cases and hold that if an illiterate attesting witness can validly attest the will by placing his mark or thumb impression on it, placing of a mark or thumb impression would, in such circum­stances, meet the requirements of law in view of the definition of the word 'sign' as given in the General Clauses Act. [5] Besides, the attestation of the will by one illiterate witness by means of a mark would not 'invalidate the will in this case as at least 3 literate attesting witnesses of the document have been proved to have signed the will. The attesta­tion by these 3 witnesses has been proved by evidence led on plaintiffs' behalf. Even if is assumed for purposes of argument that attesta­tion by signature is necessary and that the illiterate Goanbura did not properly attest the document the will remains a duly attested docu­ment. Its due attestation has been proved by the same witnesses who have proved its execution. [6l The last contention raised by Mr. Goswami is that in this case the petition for probate was dismissed for default. An application for its restoration was put in within time. The applica­tion for restoration was also dismissed in default in October 1949 Another application for its res­toration was put in 2 days after, on 3Ist October 1949. This application was restored on 28th January 1950 on Kabirarn agreeing to its restora­tion on payment of costs. A sum of Ks. 18 was paid to him as costs before restoration. On 18th March 1950 the suit (application) was also restored with the consent of Kabiram and on pay­ment of costs. It is now contended that both, the application for restoration of' the original petition for probate and the second application (which had also been dismissed in default) were allowed illegally. 18 was paid to him as costs before restoration. On 18th March 1950 the suit (application) was also restored with the consent of Kabiram and on pay­ment of costs. It is now contended that both, the application for restoration of' the original petition for probate and the second application (which had also been dismissed in default) were allowed illegally. The contention is that when the application for restoration of the application by which restoration of the probate application had been asked for, was put in, the time for the application of the restoration of the probate petition had expired. That application could not be treated as an application for restoration of the probate petition and the application for restoration which had been dismissed for default could not be restored as the provisions of O. 9 E 9, Civil P. C., did not apply to applications. " [7] We do not think, this contention should prevail. The second application for restoration was for the restoration of the application made for the restoration of the probate petition. This application is, no doubt not covered by the pro­visions of 0. 9, R 9. The rule applies in terms to suits and nut to applications. But a possible view of the matter may be that O. 9 R. 9 read with S. 141, Civil P. C., should cover this appli­cation. We are however, inclined to the view that the application could be entertained by the Court below in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction under S. 151, Civil P. C. A Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court, in a ease reported in Ganesh Prasad v. Bhagelu Bam, 47 ALL,. 878, held that "an application to restore to the file of pending Cases an application, which has been dismissed for default, for the restoration of a suit dismissed for default is entertain able, if under no other provision of the Code of Civil Procedure, then under S. 151 of the Code." An application cannot be proceeded with if it is not prosecuted. It has to be dismissed for default. Such a dismissal can only be in the exercise of inherent jurisdiction of the Court, if O 9 is not applied to applications. If the dismissal for default is possible under S. 151, the restoration of the application should also be possible in the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction. It has to be dismissed for default. Such a dismissal can only be in the exercise of inherent jurisdiction of the Court, if O 9 is not applied to applications. If the dismissal for default is possible under S. 151, the restoration of the application should also be possible in the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction. The second application for restoration, therefore, was com­petent. The Court had the jurisdiction to restore the application which had been dismissed in default. It was restored and then it was open to the Court to restore the petition for probate. This was also restored. The orders of restoration, therefore, are not illegal or contrary to law. We notice also that on both the 'occasions, the appellant himself agreed to the restoration. He also realised costs. This conduct on his part estopps him from urging at this stage of the litigation that the restoration of the one or the other was not justified on facts. [8] For reasons given above, this appeal must fail and is dismissed. We make no order as to costs. [9] Deka J.-I agree. Appeal dismissed.