JUDGMENT : Joseph Vithayathil, J. Plaintiff is the appellant. The suit is for damages for breach of contract. The defendants who are two in number were parishners of the St. Bartholomeo Roman Catholic Church, Poovar. The Parishners of that Church are fishermen by profession. They used to give a portion of their daily catch to the Church. The amount so realised by the Church was used for its support and for the benefit of the members of the Parish. The right to collect the share of the church for the year 1125 was auctioned by the Church authorities and was bid by the plaintiff for Rs. 16,000. Thereafter 125 members of the Parish including the defendants executed an udampady Ext. A in favour of the plaintiff on 9.8.1124. It is stated in Ext. A that out of the sum of Rs. 16,000 the plaintiff had already advanced Rs. 1,500. The balance amount of Rs. 14,500 was to be paid by the plaintiff in two instalments on the registered receipt of the first 21 executants of Ext. A. It was stipulated that the executants of the document and the other members of the Parish would give the plaintiff a specified portion of their daily catch in return for the amount advanced by the latter. The quota was fixed on the basis of the fishing materials used for fishing by the respective parishners. The executants of Ext. A agreed to be liable to the plaintiff for damages if any of them or the other parishners failed to give the plaintiff the quota as provided in the document. The plaintiff paid Rs. 12,000 out of the total amount of Rs. 16,000. The defendants and the other parishners paid their respective quota of fish till 20.1.1125. On 20.1.1125 the defendants and some others sent Ext. B notice to the plaintiff stating that they had seceded from the Roman Catholic Church and ceased to be parishners of the St. Bartholomeo Church and that therefore they were not willing to give the plaintiff the quota of fish they used to give. Accordingly the defendants ceased to give the plaintiff from 20.1.1125 the quota of fish they had agreed to give under Ext. A. The suit is brought for damages on that account. Defendants 1 and 2 filed separate written statements. Bartholomeo Church and that therefore they were not willing to give the plaintiff the quota of fish they used to give. Accordingly the defendants ceased to give the plaintiff from 20.1.1125 the quota of fish they had agreed to give under Ext. A. The suit is brought for damages on that account. Defendants 1 and 2 filed separate written statements. Their common contention is that they have seceded from the Roman Catholic Church from 21.1.1125 and have ceased to be members of the St. Bartholomeo Church, that it was only a voluntary contribution that they were giving the church, that neither the church nor the plaintiff can claim the same from them as of right, and that in any case after their secessation from the church they are not liable to pay any such contribution. The 2nd defendant further denied that he signed Ext. A. Both the defendants also contended that they were not using all the fishing materials mentioned in the plaint and that they are not in any event liable to give the quota of fish claimed in the plaint. The lower court found that the 2nd defendant also has signed Ext. A. But that court held that the customary contribution of fish which the parishners used to give the church was of the nature of a voluntary offering and that therefore the defendants are not under a legal obligation to give the same to the plaintiff. It was also held that it was as parishners of the church that the defendants and others had undertaken the liability to give the quota of fish to the plaintiff and that since the defendant have seceded from the church they are no longer liable to pay the same. It was further held that the “defendants have not entered into any agreement directly with him (plaintiff) and that there is no privity of contract between him and the defendants”. Since the church has not, according to the lower court, “entered into some definite commitment on the strength of the promise of the defendants to pay the doles” it was held that the defendants were not liable to pay the plaintiff any amount. The suit was therefore dismissed with costs. The question for consideration in this appeal is whether the defendants are legally bound to pay the plaintiff the quota of fish as stipulated in Ext. The suit was therefore dismissed with costs. The question for consideration in this appeal is whether the defendants are legally bound to pay the plaintiff the quota of fish as stipulated in Ext. A. In this case we are not concerned with the nature of the contributions the defendants and the other parishners used to give to the church. Those contributions might have been of a voluntary nature and perhaps the church would not be entitled to claim the same by means of a civil action. It is however not necessary to consider that question in this case. The present suit is brought by the plaintiff on the basis of an agreement executed in his favour by the defendants and others. It is very strange that the lower court has held that the defendants have not entered into any agreement directly with the plaintiff and that there is no privity of contract between the plaintiff and the defendants. The lower court has found as a mater of fact that both the defendants have signed Ext. A. In Ext. A the defendants have undertaken to pay the plaintiff a specified share of their daily catch of fish and have also agreed to pay damages in case of default. The agreement in Ext. A is to the following effect:- "Other Language" From this it is clear that the defendants have directly entered into an agreement with the plaintiff to pay him a specified share of their daily catch and to pay him damages in case of default. The terms of the agreement admit of no ambiguity. The only further question is whether the agreement is supported by consideration. It is not denied by the defendants that a sum of Rs. 12,000 was paid by the plaintiff out of the total consideration of Rs. 16,000. The amount was paid on registered receipt as provided in Ext. A. It is therefore clear that the agrement is supported consideration. Such being the case Ext. A is a valid contract which can be enforced in a court of law. It is true that the consideration received by the executants of Ext. A was paid to the church to be utilised for the benefit of the church and the parishners thereof. But that fact does not in any way take away the legal obligation of the parties to the contract to abide by the terms thereof. It is true that the consideration received by the executants of Ext. A was paid to the church to be utilised for the benefit of the church and the parishners thereof. But that fact does not in any way take away the legal obligation of the parties to the contract to abide by the terms thereof. The church has not entered into any agreement with the plaintiff. The parish priest is only an attestor to Ext. A. Nowhere is it stated that the church would be liable to the plaintiff if the executants of Ext. A or the other parishners of the church defaulted to pay their quota of fish to the plaintiff. In fact it was originally written in Ext. A that the assets of the church also would be liable to the plaintiff, but that portion was subsequently scored off. From this it is clear that the church refused to make itself liable for damages to the plaintiff in case of default on the part of the parishners to perform the contract entered into by them with the plaintiff. Although the contributions made by the parishners to the church might have been of a voluntary nature, from the moment they agreed to pay the same to the plaintiff and received consideration from him, the contributions lost their voluntary character and assumed the nature of a legal obligation. It is as if the parishners borrowed an amount from the plaintiff for the purpose of making a voluntary contribution to the church and promised the plaintiff to return the amount. So far as the promisee is concerned it is immaterial how the money paid by him was utilised by the promisors. So long as there is a lawful agreement and there is consideration for that agreement, it is a valid contract between the parties which can be enforced in a court of law. It was further argued on behalf of the respondents that they entered into the contract with the plaintiff in their capacity as parishners of the St. Bartholomeo Church and that, since they have ceased to be members of that parish they cannot be held to be liable to the plaintiff for any damages under the contract. In support of this argument it is pointed out that it is specifically stated in Ext. A that the executants thereof are parishners of St. Bartholomeo Church and that, since they have ceased to be members of that parish they cannot be held to be liable to the plaintiff for any damages under the contract. In support of this argument it is pointed out that it is specifically stated in Ext. A that the executants thereof are parishners of St. Bartholomeo church, that it is executed in the presence of the parish priest, that it is as parishners of the church that they were making the contributions to the church and that the amount advanced by the plaintiff was utilised by the church. It is no doubt true that the defendants and the other executants of Ext. A entered into the contract with the plaintiff for the purpose of benefitting the church. But a reading of Ext. A shows that it was not executed by them for and on behalf of the church and as representatives thereof. The executants of the document have undertaken personal liability for damages in case of breach of the contract. It is clearly stated in the document that they and their properties will be liable to the plaintiff for damages in case of default of performance of the contract by them. As stated above, the church and its properties are not made liable for such damages. Therefore, there is no force in the contention that the contract Ext. A was entered into by the executants thereof not in their personal capacity but as representatives of the church. The fact that the defendants have seceded from the church and have ceased to be members of the parish cannot in any way affect the legal obligation incurred by them under Ext. A. If the plaintiff has got a legal right to enforce the contract against the executants thereof, that right cannot be taken away from the plaintiff by the mere fact that some of the executants changed their religion and ceased to be members of the church. If change of religion of the executants of the contract will exonerate them from liability the plaintiff will have no remedy under the contract when all the executants of the document change their religion and cease to be members of the church. In the absence of any provision in Ext. If change of religion of the executants of the contract will exonerate them from liability the plaintiff will have no remedy under the contract when all the executants of the document change their religion and cease to be members of the church. In the absence of any provision in Ext. A to the effect that the executants thereof will be liable to pay the plaintiff their quota of fish only so long as they are parishners of the St. Bortholomeo Church, they cannot put forward the plea that they are not liable to perform their contract by reason of their change of faith. Thus, in any view of the case, we are clearly of opinion that the defendants are legally bound to perform the contract entered into by them with the plaintiff and that they are personally liable to the plaintiff for damages for breach of the contract. The lower court has clearly gone wrong in holding that the defendants are not liable to pay any amount to the plaintiff. It was further argued on behalf of the respondents that the lower court has not recorded a proper finding on issue No. 3. That issue relates to the quantum of damages. As stated above, the liability of the executants of Ext. A to pay damages to the plaintiff is based on the fishing materials (Ettinom) used by them for fishing. In paragraph 8 of the plaint it is alleged that the defendants have the fishing materials mentioned therein. The defendants have denied this in their written statements. The 1st defendant has stated in paragraph 5 of his written statement that he has got only one fishing material, namely “Thattupadi.” A similar contention is raised by the 2nd defendant in paragraphs 10 and 16 of his written statement. Issue 3 raised in the case relating to this contention is “what are the different kinds of Ettinam used by each defendant.” The finding of the lower court on this issue is to the following effect. “This issue relates to the various kinds of fishing materials used by the defendants. They are sworn to by P.W. 1. I believe Pw. 1 and find that issue for the plaintiff.” This clearly is not a proper finding on the issue. The lower court does not find what fishing materials are used by the defendants. Again Pw. 1 does not say anything about this matter. They are sworn to by P.W. 1. I believe Pw. 1 and find that issue for the plaintiff.” This clearly is not a proper finding on the issue. The lower court does not find what fishing materials are used by the defendants. Again Pw. 1 does not say anything about this matter. It is D.W. 2 that swears to it. The defendants also swear to their case as D.W. 1 and Dw. 2. The lower court has not considered their evidence. The finding of the lower court on this issue is very unsatisfactory. This question has therefore to be reconsidered by the lower court and the amount of damages payable by each of the defendants will have to be determined by that court. We therefore set aside the judgment and decree of the lower court and remand the case under O. 41 R. 23 C.P.C. for fresh disposal according to law and in the light of the observations made above. The appellant will get refund of the court fee paid by him for the memorandum of appeal. The other costs of this appeal will be costs in the cause. The appeal is allowed in the manner stated above. Allowed.