Judgment Reuben, J. 1. This appeal by the plaintiffs raises a point of limitation. It arises out of a suit for declaration of title to and confirmation of possession of a holding of 2 bighas 5 katnas 8 dhurs in village Bharathi in tauzi No. 6424, of which the proprietor is the defendant second party, and, in the alternative, for recovery of possession thereof. The plaintiffs-appellants are two brothers who, in 1921, purchased the holding from the original tenants, the defendants third party, by a registered sale deed, so that under Sec.26B of the Bihar Tenancy Act the sale is binding on the landlord proprietor. The landlord proprietor, nevertheless, in the year 1941, sued the original tenants, defendants third party, for arrears of rent in respect of the holding and got a decree. In that suit, plaintiff No. 1 was impleaded as a defendant. The landlord decree-holder then put the decree into execution and purchased the holding at an auction sale held on the 14th of June 1944. He took delivery of possession over the holding on the 7th of May 1945 and settled it with the defendants first party. The Munsif, holding that plaintiff No. 2 not being a party to the rent decree is not bound by it, decreed the suit to the extent of his eight annas share of the holding. His decision has been reversed and the suit dismissed in appeal by the Subordinate Judge, Darbhanga, on the ground that the suit was barred, under Article 11 of the Schedule to the Indian Limitation Act, inasmuch as it was brought more than one year after an order passed in the rent execution case rejecting an objection under Order XXI Rule 58 of the Code of Civil Procedure filed by the two plaintiffs. This decision has been upheld by Shearer, J., who considered himself bound by the decision of a Division Bench of this Court reported in SUBEDAR SINGH V/s. RAMPRIT PANDE, 11 Pat L T 28, although he felt doubtful of its correctness. 2. The objection under Order XXI Rule 58 was rejected by the executing Court on the ground that under Sec.170 of the Bihar Tenancy Act it was not maintainable. 2. The objection under Order XXI Rule 58 was rejected by the executing Court on the ground that under Sec.170 of the Bihar Tenancy Act it was not maintainable. Sub-section (1) of Sec.170 of the Bihar Tenancy Act provides that: "rules 58, 63 (both inclusive) and 89 of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, shall not apply to a tenure or holding or portion of a holding attached in execution of a decree for arrears due in respect of the tenure or holding." Here, it is not denied that the defendant second party is the landlord of the holding in suit, nor that the rent of the holding was in arrears. Nor is it denied that the decree obtained by him was a decree for arrears of the rent of the holding. In these circumstances, it is well-settled that an application under Order XXI, rule 58 will not lie AMRITA LAL V/s. NEMAI CHAND, 28 Cal 382 (FB); RAMESHWAR SINGH V/s. RAJO CHOWDH-RAIN, 7 Pat L T 625; RAMESHWAR SINGH V/s. PURAN GRANDER, 7 Pat L T 717; DWARKA SINGH V/s. NEMA SINGH, 10 Pat L T 118; DEO-NANDAN PRASAD V. PIRTHI NARAYAN, 11 Pat 790; SURPAT SINGH V/s. SHITAL SINGH, 15 Pat 614; and HARIHAR PRASAD V/s. PRASAD MAH-TON, AIR 1950 Pat 565 . The leading case on the subject is the Full Bench decision in AMRITA LAL BOSES CASE" where the question referred to the Full Bench was: "Whether Sec.170 of the Bengal Tenancy Act bars a claim under Sec.278 of the Code of Civil Procedure to a tenure or holding attached in execution of a decree for arrears due thereon, in all cases, or whether the operation is confined to claims to the tenure or holding and does not extend to claims based on the ground that the property claimed does not form part of the tenure or holding attached." The majority of the Full Bench, decided that it bars such a claim in all cases. The dissenting Judge, Banerjee, J., drew a distinction between the class of cases in which the bar operates and the class in , which it does not in words which have often been cited and will bear a fresh repetition: "Upon, a claim under Sec.278 of the Code of Civil Procedure being preferred, it, therefore, lies upon the party opposing the claim to show that the claim is barred by Sec.170. He can show that by showing that, upon the claimants own case, Sec.170 applies to it, and bars the application of Sec.278. That will be the case where the claim is of this nature, namely, that the claimant admits that the tenure or holding attached is held under the decree-holder, that arrears of rent are due thereon, and that the decree is in respect of such arrears, but contends that the decree ought not to be allowed to be executed by the attachment and sale of the tenure, because it was obtained against a wrong person, but the claimant was the person entitled to the tenure of holding, and that, unless and until the landlord sues him and obtains a decree against him, the tenure or holding cannot be sold. Where that is the nature off the claim, Sec.170 will bar the claim upon the claimants own case. But where the claim is of this nature, namely, that the tenure or holding attached, or rather, I should say the land said to constitute the tenure or holding attached, was not held by the claimant under the decree-holder, but was held by, him under an independent right, and that the decree for arrears is, consequently, not a decree for arrears due in respect of such land, there the decree-holder cannot say that, upon the claimants own showing Sec.170 is a bar to the claim being entertained nor can it be said that the case is one of a tenure or holding attached in execution of a decree for arrears due thereon as the decree sought to be enforced would go to show." The case with which we are concerned clearly falls within the first class regarding which Banerjee, J., agreed that the bar of Sec.170 will operate. It is not necessary for us to consider here whether the opinion of Banerjee, J., regarding the other class should be preferred to the view expressed by the majority of the Full Bench. It is not necessary for us to consider here whether the opinion of Banerjee, J., regarding the other class should be preferred to the view expressed by the majority of the Full Bench. 3. From what I have said, it will appear that the Executing Court rightly refused to entertain the objection under Order XXI, Rule 58 on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to entertain it. The question is whether such an order operates under Article 11 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act to cut down to one year the ordinary period of limitation for the institution of a suit for declaration of title to and recovery of possession of immovable property, 4. The relevant portion of Article 11 is as follows: "Description of suit : By a person, against whom any of the following orders has been made to establish the right which he claims to the property comprised in the order: (1) Order under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, on a claim preferred to, or an objection made to the attachment of, property attached in execution of a decree. * * * Period of Limitation: One year, Time from which period begins to run: The date of the order." The corresponding provision in the Limitation Act of 1877 was as follows: "Description of suit: By a person against whom an order is passed under Sections 280, 281, 282 or 335 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to establish his right to, or to the present possession of, the property comprised in the order. Period of limitation : One year. Time from which period begins to run : The date of the Order." 5. Sections 280, 281 and 282 of the Civil Procedure Code of 1877 correspond to Rules 60, 61 and 62 respectively of the present Code. We are not concerned here with Sec.335, provision for which is now made in Article 11-A of the Schedule to the Limitation Act. Sections 280 and 281 provide for the release of the property from attachment or for disallowing the objection, as the case may be, on an investigation of the objection. Sec.282 provides that, if the Court is satisfied that the property is subject to a mortgage or lien in favour of some person not in possession, it may continue the attachment, subject to such mortgage or lien. Sec.282 provides that, if the Court is satisfied that the property is subject to a mortgage or lien in favour of some person not in possession, it may continue the attachment, subject to such mortgage or lien. Another possible order which the Court had power to pass on an objection was to dismiss it without investigation if it considered that the objection was designedly or unnecessarily delayed. This was contained in Sec.278 corresponding to Rule 58 of Order XXI. It is noticeable that in Article 11 of the Limitation Act of 1877 the limitation of one year was restricted to cases in which an order was passed under the three specific sections mentioned excluding Sec.278. In the present Article 11, no specification is made, and the Article would include an order of dismissal under Order XXI, Rule 58. It is noticeable further that the difference between Article 11 in 1877 and in the present Limitation Act is identical with the difference between Sec.283 of the Code of 1877 and Order XXI, Rule 63 of the present Code. Under Sec.283, "an order under Sec.280, 281 or 282" shall be conclusive, subject to the result of such suit, if any, as may be instituted by "the party against whom" the order is passed, whereas Order XXI, Rule 63 of the present Code provides that, where a claim or objection is preferred, "that party against whom an order is made may institute a suit to establish the right which he claims to the property in dispute", and subject to the rent of such suit, if any, the order shall be conclusive. 6. It was held by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in M. VENKATARATNAM V/s. RANGANAYAKAMMA, 41 Mad. 985 (FB), that the change in Article 11 was deliberately made in order to widen its scope in accordance with the general policy of the Legislature to secure the speedy decision of questions of title raised at auction-sales. 6. It was held by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in M. VENKATARATNAM V/s. RANGANAYAKAMMA, 41 Mad. 985 (FB), that the change in Article 11 was deliberately made in order to widen its scope in accordance with the general policy of the Legislature to secure the speedy decision of questions of title raised at auction-sales. The Full Bench accordingly held that an order refusing to investigate a claim on the ground that there was a delay in filing it is an order passed against the claimant within the meaning of Order XXI, Rule 63 and attracts the operation of Article 11 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, it does not follow from the change however, that every order which results in the disposal of a claim without a decision of the claim in favour of the climant will be an order "against" the climant within the meaning of Order XXI, Rule 63 and Article 11 of the Limitation Act. In LAKSHMI AMMAL V/s. KADIRESAN CHETTIAR, 63 Ind Cas 431 (Mad), for instance, a Dvision Bench of the Madras High Court dealt with a case in which the Executing Court, finding that it had no jurisdiction to proceed with the execution, dismissed the claim by the order : "Sale stopped. The claim cannot be investigated by this Court. Petition dismissed." Both their Lordships agreed that this was not an order negativing the right set up by the claimant. It was merely an order declining to adjudicate the claim either for or against him. It, therefore did not attract the operation of Order XXI, Rule 63. Similarly, in ABDUL KADIR SAHIB V/s. SOMASUNDARAM CHETTIAR, 45 Mad 827, it was held that Article 11 does not apply to a case in which a claim was dismissed on the ground that the execution sale had already been concluded, Schwabe, C. J., to whom the case came on a difference of opinion between Spencer and Krishnan, JJ., observed that the District Munsiff dismissed the application not on the ground of delay or anything of that kind, but on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to hear it. Rightly or wrongly the District Munsiff simply said: I will not hear you." In SIVASANKARA MENON V/s. CHALAKATTILNATUVILEPURAKKAL KUPPAN. Rightly or wrongly the District Munsiff simply said: I will not hear you." In SIVASANKARA MENON V/s. CHALAKATTILNATUVILEPURAKKAL KUPPAN. 112 Ind Cas 619 (Mad) another Division Bench of the Madras High Court held that, where a party by mistake filed a claim petition in a Court which had no jurisdiction to entertain it and, on his withdrawing the claim, his petition was dismissed, there was no order within the meaning of Order XXI, Rule 63. CHETANLAL V/s. LALJI, AIR 1937 Nag 170, was another such case in which the executing Court summarily rejected the claim on the ground that the execution had already been transferred to another Court, Vivian Bose, J., (as he then was), while holding that the order did not attract the operation of Article 11 of the Limitation Act, observed : "If an application is rejected on that ground then it cannot have been rejected under Order XXI, Rule 63, for there is then a refusal to entertain the application at all, and consequently a refusal to pass an order under that rule." According to his Lordship, for Article 11 to apply there must be an order within the meaning of Order XXI, Rule 63, a view supported by the close correspondence between Sec.283 of the Code of 1877 and Order XXI, Rule 63 of the present Code on the one hand, and Article 11 of the Limitation Act of 1877 and the present Limitation Act on the other. The case reported in SASTHI CHARAN V/s. GOPAL CHANDRA, AIR 1937 Cal 390 is interesting because the claim under Order XXI, Rule 58 was filed before a Court having jurisdiction to entertain it. Subsectuent to the filing of the claim, the property was sold and the claim was dismissed for default sometime later. It was argued before their Lordships that the order of dismissal was an order against the claimant within the meaning of Article 11. Their Lordships repelled the argument holding that, at the time when he passed the order, the Munsiff had no Jurisdiction to entertain such a claim and therefore his order of dismissal for default was without jurisdiction. It was argued before their Lordships that the order of dismissal was an order against the claimant within the meaning of Article 11. Their Lordships repelled the argument holding that, at the time when he passed the order, the Munsiff had no Jurisdiction to entertain such a claim and therefore his order of dismissal for default was without jurisdiction. (6-A) In SUBEDAR SINGH V/s. RAMPRIT PANDE, 11 Pat L T 28, the decision the correctness of which has been doubted by Shearer, J., a Division Bench of this Court held as barred by Article 11 a suit brought more than a year after the rejection of an objection under Order XXI, Rule 58 relating to the suit property on the ground that it was not maintainable by reason of Sec.170 of the Bihar Tenancy Act. The decision was referred to by Wort, J., in SRIKRISHNA SAHU V/s. DHIRJA MAHTO, 150 Ind Cas 40 (Pat) in a case in which the point did not arise for decision because his Lordship found that the claim under Order XXI, Rule 58 had been duly entertained and dismissed on its merits. His Lordship went on to observe that, assuming that the executing Court declined Jurisdiction, as was contended before him, the decision in the CASE OP SUBEDAR SINGH, was an authority that Article 11 would apply to the subsequent suit. It appears that his Lordship felt that the decision goes too far. I say this because his Lordship then referred to the decision in ABDUL KADIR SAHIS CASE, 45 Mad 827 and observed : "..... the mere fact that a person by mistake makes an application in a matter to which Order XXI, Rule 58, clearly does not apply, in no way brings the matter within the mischief of Article 11 of the Limitation Act; in other words if he has a right of action, the mere fact that by mistake he makes the application to which I have referred in no way alters the period of Limitation which is rightly applicable to the particular cause of action which is the subject-matter of his action." 7. The CASE OP SUBEDAR SINGH was noticed again in MUKHRAM PANDE V/s. ARJUN MISSER, 13 Pat 765, in which Khaja Mohammad Noor and Luby, JJ., held that where a claim under Order XXI, Rule 58 was rejected as not entertainable on the ground that the claimant had no interest in the property on the date of the attachment, the order did not come within the purview of Order XXI, Rule 63. Khaja Mohammad Noor, J., who delivered the leading Judgment, distinguished the case of Subedar Singh as having been decided on its own facts, and went on to refer with approval to the decision in LAKSHMI AMMALS CASE. (7) It would appear from what I have said that these three learned Judges of this Court shared the view expressed in the Madras, Nagpur and Calcutta decisions to which I have referred. Shearer, J., also, by the doubt which he has expressed regarding the decision in SUBEDAR SINGHS CASE, 11 Pat L T 28, has shown his inclination to take the same view. I have therefore, examined the CASE OF SUBEDAR SINGH, with some care and would say with respect that it is not inconsistent with that view. It is true that in that case, as in the present one, the plaintiffs were purchasers of an interest in an agricultural holding governed by the Bihar Tenancy Act. The nature of the objection under Order XXI, Rule 58 filed by them, however, was different. Whereas, in the present case, the plaintiffs in their petition under Order XXI, Rule 58, did not challenge that the decree under execution was a decree for arrears of the rent of the holding in question, in that case, the nature of the decree was challenged and the claim was put forward that the decree was a money decree. Such an objection is entertainable. (Vide MAHARAJ SINGH V/s. A. N. BOSE, 25 Pat 199.) The point was decided against the objectors and the decision was clearly one within the Jurisdiction of the Executing Court. Whether the decision was correct was not considered by their Lordships Who observed: "It may be that the Court took a wrong view and that as a matter of fact the decree under execution was a mere money decree and not a rent decree; but an erroneous order does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court making the order. Whether the decision was correct was not considered by their Lordships Who observed: "It may be that the Court took a wrong view and that as a matter of fact the decree under execution was a mere money decree and not a rent decree; but an erroneous order does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court making the order. It only entitles the party to come to the Civil Court to have the error rectified." It appears from this that their Lordships acted on the objectors case that the decree under execution was a money decree. They proceeded on the basis that at the most there was an erroneous decision by the Executing Court and that the objectors remedy was by coming to the Civil Court to have the error rectified. According to this view, the executing Court had the jurisdiction to entertain the objection and to grant the relief asked for. It is possible in such circumstances to regard the order refusing the relief as an order "against" them within the meaning of Order XXI, Rule 63 and Article 11 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act. They were entitled to be heard by the Court on the merits of their objection but the Court refused to hear them. Here, on the contrary, it was not the case of the plaintiffs in their objection that the decree under execution was other than a decree for arrears of the rent of the holding. Therefore an objection under Order XXI, Rule 58 was not maintainable and the Munsiff rightly refused to entertain one. In the words of Schwabe, C.J., he merely said: "I will not hear you", and there was no order on an objection preferred under Order XXI, Rule 58. The petition not being maintainable and not having been entertained, it should be taken than there was no petition before the Munsiff and that his order was not an order on such a petition. Further, I doubt whether the order passed by the Munsiff can properly be described as being an order "against" the objectors. The Court toad no jurisdiction to entertain their petition and merely told them so. For these reasons I think that Article 11 has no application to the present suit and it will be governed by the ordinary rule of limitation. The Court toad no jurisdiction to entertain their petition and merely told them so. For these reasons I think that Article 11 has no application to the present suit and it will be governed by the ordinary rule of limitation. 8 I would accordingly allow this appeal, set aside the appellate decree and restore the decree of the Munsiff. As success is evenly divided between the parties, they will bear their own costs throughout Lakshmikanta Jha, J. 9 I agree.