JUDGMENT : 1. This second appeal by the defendant is directed against an order of remand passed by the first appellate court and arises out of a suit filed by the respondents plaintiffs on the basis of a 'Bahikhata' account which the appellant defendant did not admit to be genuine. There were six issues framed in this case by the trial court; and, on the ground that the plaintiff had not been able to prove his dues against the defendant, the suit was dismissed by the trial court An appeal was filed to the District Judge, Miorena, and the learned District Judge came to the conclusion that certain issues were wrongly framed and wrongly decided, that application for interrogatories was wrongly rejected and it should now be allowed, and, that material evidence in the case had not at all been considered by the trial court. After reframing certain issues and after issuing necessary directions for the trial court for a proper approach to the case, the learned District Judge remanded the case back for retrial allowing an opportunity to the parties to adduce fresh evidence if necessary. Against this order of remand, the defendant has filed this second appeal. 2. A preliminary objection has been taken on behalf of the respondents as to the competency of this appeal. It is urged on their behalf by Mr. Patankar that the order from which this appeal has been preferred is not one which comes within the purview of O.41 Rule 23 of the Civil Procedure Code and that therefore no appeal lies to this court from that order. Strictly speaking, the objection taken on behalf of the respondents is well founded, for the order does not in point of fact conform to the provisions of O.41, R.23 which contemplates an order of remand being passed in a case in which the trial court disposed of a suit upon a preliminary point. Mr. Ramrup Tiwari, learned counsel for the appellant on the other hand, contends that the lower appellate court should have dealt with the appeal on merits and if it was of opinion that further evidence was necessary on any point, it should have acted under O.41, R.25. He places reliance on - 'Kalu Dalpat v. Narain Dagadu', AIR 1927 Bom 111 : 100 Ind Cas 578. Mr. He places reliance on - 'Kalu Dalpat v. Narain Dagadu', AIR 1927 Bom 111 : 100 Ind Cas 578. Mr. Tewari also contends that the District Judge has ordered the stamp on appeal to be refunded. This under Section 13 of the Indian Court Fees Act could be done only in the case of remand under Order 41, R.23. The learned counsel, therefore, argues that the remand in this case was intended to be one under O.41, R.23 and the appeal is competent. He also urges that an order passed by the appellate court in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is an appealable order even though it may not come within the scope of O.41 R.23. A large number of cases have been cited by both the parties in support of their respective contentions. 3. It is well settled now that the power of remand under Section 107, Civil Procedure Code is limited to the case described in O.41, R.23. But nothing in that section restricts in any manner the application of the principle of inherent power recognised by Section 151 of the Code. The powers of the appellate court as regards remand are thus not restricted to the case specified in O.41, R.23, but the court, by reason of its inherent jurisdiction, recognised and prescribed in the Code, may order a remand in cases other than the case specified in O.41, R.23, if it be necessary for the ends of justice. - 'Ghuznavi v. The Allahabad Bank Ltd.', 44 Cal 929 (FB). 4. If the Code recognises the power of an appellate court to direct a remand in circumstances other than those specified in O.41, R.23, the question arises, whether an order passed by the appellate court in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is an appealable order? 5. There are two sets of decisions in the reports. In one set, which is the earlier one, it is laid down that though an order passed by the Court of appeal below might not be in strict accord with the provision of O.41, R.23 read with O.32, R.1(u), if the order of the appellate court purported to be an order under O.41, R.23 an appeal would lie from such order. It was added that an order passed by the appellate court in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction was an appealable order though it may not come within the scope of O.41, R.23. As an illustration of this set reference may be made to - Agent, Bengal Nagpur Rly. v. Beharilal Dutta', 52 Cal 783: 29 Cal WN 614: AIR 1925 Cal 716; - 'Umesh Narain v. Secy. of State', AIR 1925 Cal 1157; - 'Mohammad Ali v. Karam Ali', AIR 1935 Cal 134; - 'Mt. Sahebji v. Mohammad Sarwar Khan', AIR 1928 Lah 116; - 'Gopal Singh v. Mangal Singh', AIR 1928 Lah 341 and - 'Radha Lal v. Fateh Mohummed', AIR 1937 Lah 454. 6. In the other series of cases it is laid down that there can be no appeal from an order of remand unless it falls under O.41, R.23, or unless it can be said to amount to a decree within the meaning of Section 2(2). It was added that an order of remand which does not fall within the purview of O.41, R.23 cannot be deemed to be one under it simply because the judge purported to act in accordance with its provisions. The rights conferred are of substance and cannot be enlarged or whittled down by what judges do or purport to do. Where the remand order has not covered the whole of the subject matter of the suit, an order directing refund of the whole of the court fees paid on appeal is wrong, as this could be done only in the case of a remand under O.41, R.23. The mere order of the lower appellate court that stamp on appeal be refunded cannot be taken to be an indication as to the law under which the appellate court below intended to make, the order of remand. Hence, it has been laid down that even if the judge has ordered refund of stamp on appeal, if the order of remand does not fall under O.41, R.23 no appeal lies. Hence, it has been laid down that even if the judge has ordered refund of stamp on appeal, if the order of remand does not fall under O.41, R.23 no appeal lies. As an illus-tration of the latter class reference may he made to - 'Chandrika Prasad Singh v. Mithu Rai', 6 Pat 380; AIR 1927 Pat 296: 103 Ind Cas 722; - 'Halima Khatun v. Abdul Majeed', AIR 1935 Pat 49; - 'Sheolal Balmakund v. Jugal Kishore', ILR (1940) Nag 538: AIR 1940 Nag 349: 1940 Nag LJ 350: 191 Ind Cas 566; - 'Pradyat Kumar Tagore v. Jyotish Chandra', AIR 1942 Pat 195: 197 Ind Cas 13; - 'Baldeo Singh v. Niras Singh', AIR 1946 Pat 272: 222 Ind Cas 210; - 'Jagdish Singh v. Kateshar Singh', AIR 1945 Oudh 133; - Ashfaq Hussain v. Moharram Ali', AIR 1948 Oudh 220 and - Jahangeer Khan v. State of Rajasthan', AIR 1951 Raj 108 . It will be seen that since 1940, the trend of the decisions has definitely been in favour of the latter view. - 'Sheolal Balmukund v. Jugal Kishore', ILR (1950) Nag 538, is the leading case on the subject and the latter cases upon which the respondent relies do little more than follow the 'ratio decidendi' of Stone C.J. and Vivian Bose, J., (as he then was) in - 'Sheolal Balmukund's case'. I need hardly emphasize the elementary principle that no appeal can lie unless the right has been expressly conferred by statute and further that a court cannot override an express provision of law under colour of its inherent powers. In this view of the matter, I respectfully concur with the view expressed in - 'Sheolal's case' and also in other reported cases after the year 1940. 7. In the case before me the suit was disposed of on merits by the trial court. It was not disposed of on a preliminary ground. The order of remand of the lower appellate court was under its inherent jurisdiction, and not under O.41 R.23. Hence I hold that it was not appealable. 8. 7. In the case before me the suit was disposed of on merits by the trial court. It was not disposed of on a preliminary ground. The order of remand of the lower appellate court was under its inherent jurisdiction, and not under O.41 R.23. Hence I hold that it was not appealable. 8. Once it is conceded that the lower appellate Court had inherent jurisdiction to remand the case, this appeal cannot be converted into a revision unless it is shown that some illegality or material irregularity has occurred in the exercise of inherent jurisdiction within the meaning of sub-section (c) of S.115, Civil P.C. No such point has been taken in arguments before me, and I do not think that the present is a fit case in which I should be inclined to interfere in revision. 9. I, therefore, dismiss the appeal with costs.