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1952 DIGILAW 76 (GAU)

Lamabam Ibomacha Singh v. Laisram Ongbi Sanachoubi Devi w/o Porom Singh

1952-06-16

LAKSHMI NARAIN

body1952
JUDGMENT :- The petitioners Lamabam Ibomacha Singh and Lamabam Madhu Singh plaintiffs in civil suit No. 365 of 1900 of the Munsiffs Court, have come to this court on the revision side against the decree of the District Judge D/-24-9-51 passed in appeal in favour of the defendant by dismissing plaintiffs above suit which was decided by the Munsiff on 26-2-51. 2. The facts of the case are as follows : One Leiren Singh died issueless and without leaving any widow about 10 years ago. The plaintiffs are his fathers brothers sons. The defendant respondent is the daughter of Lakshmi Devi (Mother of Leiren Singh) by her another husband whom she married after the death of Leiren Singhs father. It is alleged by the plaintiffs that with their permission the defendant was allowed to stay in the inkhol in dispute after the death of Leiren Singh which is under patta No. 90/576. I. W. T. It is said that after a few years i.e. in 1950 she posed as an owner of the inkhol and tried to have it mutated in her favour by means of mutation case No. 58 of 1950-51 of the Sub Deputy Collector, I.W.T. An objection having been raised in these proceedings by the plaintiffs, they were directed to have the title adjudicated by a Civil Court. The present suit is the outcome of that direction. The cause of action is alleged by the plaintiffs to have accrued on 30-7-50 when defendant tried to have the suit land mutated in her favour in the Revenue Office. The defendant has denied the plaintiffs claim on the ground that she was living with Leiren Singh her step-brother from her birth and that she redeemed the inkhol which was mortgaged by Leiren Singh. This was done in the life of Leiren Singh by her as the latter was penniless; and also that she has been paying land revenue and enjoying the property as an heir to her stepbrother Leiren Singh since his death. It is not disputed that the property is not ancestral. It is also admitted that the defendant is not full sister of Leiren Singh but his half sister from other side. 3. The following issues were framed by the learned Munsiff in this case : "1. Has the pltff. any cause of action? 2. Is the suit barred by limitation? 3. Are the pltffs. It is also admitted that the defendant is not full sister of Leiren Singh but his half sister from other side. 3. The following issues were framed by the learned Munsiff in this case : "1. Has the pltff. any cause of action? 2. Is the suit barred by limitation? 3. Are the pltffs. and the defdt. heirs to deceased Leiren Singh, the late owner of the said land? If so their order of succession? 4. Was the land ever mortgaged by Leiren Singh to Lamabam Iboton Singh? Was it redeemed by the defdt? If so, the legal effect on the title? 5. Was the land ever given by Leiren Singh to the defdt.? 6. On what right the defdt. has been residing in the Inkhol? How long? 7. Who performed the Sradha of the pattadar Leiren Singh? Its effect on the law of inheritance? 8. To what relief, if any, the pltffs. are entitled?" 4. The learned District Judge on appeal made the case simpler and found the following 4 points for determination in this case : "1. Whether the suit is barred by limitation. 2. Whether the defdt.-applt. is the heiress of the last full owner, if so whether she is excluded by the plffs-respdts. 3. Who performed the funeral rites of the last pattadar Leiren Singh; whether the performer of the funeral rites is entitled to get the suit land. 4. Whether the defdt.-applt. is possessing the land with the permission of the pltffs-respdt." 5. As for Limitation. The allegation of the plaintiffs that Leiren Singh died about 10 years ago before the suit was brought, is not denied by the defendant. This suit was brought on 4-8-50 after the following order passed by the Revenue Officer in mutation proceedings, mentioned earlier in this judgment, "The defendants (i.e. the present plaintiffs) may however take shelter of the Civil Court if they feel aggrieved", and so also after coming in force of the Indian Limitation Act which was extended to this State by means of the Merged States (Laws) Act, 1949. The learned District Judge has waived the operation of the Indian Limitation Act on the ground that the cause of action for this suit having been arisen much earlier when the Limitation Act came in force, the period of limitation for bringing the present suit, therefore, is governed by the law then existing. The learned District Judge has waived the operation of the Indian Limitation Act on the ground that the cause of action for this suit having been arisen much earlier when the Limitation Act came in force, the period of limitation for bringing the present suit, therefore, is governed by the law then existing. I find that there was no such law prescribing period of limitation for such suits at all in this State. I dont agree with the learned District Judge in the presumption he has tried to draw from Darbar Resolution No. 3 of 12-9-28 that the period of limitation for all suits was 3 years. The above Darbar Resolution only deals with the limitation for bringing of suits by minors on attaining their majority. It has got nothing to do for prescribing general limitation of 3 years for all kinds of suits. 6. Even if it be not admitted for arguments sake that the cause of action for the present suit arose from the date on which the defendant sought to mutate the inkhol in her favour as argued on behalf of the plaintiffs that from that date alone it can be said that she openly refuted title and occupied the inkhol as her own adversely to them, the period of limitation would be 12 years as contained in Art. 123 of the Limitation Act. Section 6 of Merged States (Laws) Act 1949 says, "that the repeal by S. 5 of the Act shall not affect the previous operation of any such law." But there was no law for limitation at all of such suits as discussed above. The limitation for this suit is, therefore, to be controlled by the Indian Limitation Act. 7. Whether the defendant is the heiress of Leiren Singh the last full owner : The last full owner of the suit land was Leiren Singh. The defendant Snajaoubi alias Snamacha Devi is the daughter of Lakshi Devi wife of Thambow Singh father of Leiren Singh and was born to her after she had lost all rights in her husband Leiren Singhs fathers property by remarrying another husband. The defendant Snajoubi is not the daughter of Thambow Singh. Born of a mother who had lost all her rights in her previous husbands property by remarriage, she cannot have any right in Leiren Singhs property. The defendant Snajoubi is not the daughter of Thambow Singh. Born of a mother who had lost all her rights in her previous husbands property by remarriage, she cannot have any right in Leiren Singhs property. If she (defendant) can claim any right to Leiren Singhs ancestral property, it is through her relationship to his father Thambow Singh and whom she can approach only through her mother, when she (defendant) was not his (Thambow Singhs) daughter, her mother having lost all rights on her husbands (Leiren Singhs father Thambow Singhs) property after her remarriage with the father of defendant No. 2. On the analogy of EKOBA PARASHRAM v. KASHIRAM TOTARAM, 46 Bom 716 : 66 Ind Cas 341 : AIR 1922 Bom 27 (1) cited in commentary of S. 43 on page 93 of Hindu Law by Mullah that "that half brothers referred to here are sons of same father by different mothers. Sons of the same mother by a different father are not entitled to succeed as brothers" it can be at once said that the defendant is not entitled to succeed to her brothers property when she was not the daughter of her step-brothers father having been born of the mother from a different father. Half sisters as such are not mentioned in para 11 chapter VI on Inheritance of the codified Manipur Customs also. The defendant as such is no heir to Leiren Singhs property. 8. I need not discuss in detail as to who performed the Shradha ceremony of Leiren Singh - the plaintiff or the defendant- as that is not material to the case. All that can be said is that the plaintiffs evidence on this point appears, on the face of it, more reliable than that of the defendant and on that score it can be safely concluded that the Shradha ceremony of Leiren Singh was performed by the plaintiff. But anyway performance of Shradha ceremony of the last holder does not by itself create any legal title to the property of the deceased. 9. I quite agree with the finding arrived at by the learned Munsiff that there is no reliable evidence to prove that the mortgage money of the disputed inkhol was paid by the defendant from her pocket irrespective of Leiren Singh as a mortgagee. She cant step into the shoes of the mortgagee. 9. I quite agree with the finding arrived at by the learned Munsiff that there is no reliable evidence to prove that the mortgage money of the disputed inkhol was paid by the defendant from her pocket irrespective of Leiren Singh as a mortgagee. She cant step into the shoes of the mortgagee. Under the circumstances, it is to be taken to have been paid as a representative of Leiren Singh. 10. The defendants possession of the inkhol in dispute : That the possession of the defendant was permissive can well be gathered by the circumstances and evidence adduced in the case. A permissive possession never ripens into an adverse one. It was only when the defendant went for getting the mutation in her name that it can be said to be adverse. Even if it be taken for granted that it began after the death of Leiren Singh, the period of limitation for bringing the suit had not yet expired. 11. I have also to remark that personal observation and opinions are no good when there is no proof of such results on the record. 12. In view of the above findings this revision petition is allowed. The decree passed by the District Judge in appeal is reversed, with the result that the decree passed by the trial court (Munsiff) in this case is upheld. Costs of this petition will be borne by the respondent-defendant. Pleaders fee will be assessed as Rs. 25/-. Revision allowed.