JUDGMENT : K.T. Koshi, J. This appeal is against a conviction and sentence for causing grievous hurt. The appellant took his trial before the learned Sessions Judge of Kottayam for an alleged commission of the offence of murder. The prosecution case was that the appellant caused the death of one Sukumaran, an employee under him, by fisting him with his hand in the region of the abdomen. The learned Judge found that while the fisting was true the medical opinion as to the cause of death was so indefinite and uncertain that it would be unsafe to fasten criminal responsibility for murder on the appellant. The learned Judge however held that the appellant’s act amounted to causing grievous hurt punishable under S. 325 I.P.C. and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 1000/-. On default to pay the fine the appellant is to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a further period of six months. Out of the fine if realised an amount of Rs. 500/- is directed to be paid to the widow and children of the deceased Sukumaran as compensation. The appeal is against the said conviction and sentence. 2. The learned Judge has set out the facts of the case as follows in paragraph 2 of his judgment. (Omitted) x x x x 3. Before referring to the evidence as to the occurrence we may state the medical evidence in the case consisted of the testimony of P.Ws. 9, 14 and the expert opinion given by the Medical Superintendent of the Trivandrum General Hospital after a study of the relevant documents. Pw. 9 was then the Assistant Surgeon of the Kanjirappally Government Hospital and he conducted the autopsy. Pw. 14 District Medical Officer, Kottayam was present at that time. As indicated earlier medical opinion gave no certain guide as to the cause of death. While death as the result of violence is not ruled out by that evidence it showed that cynanide poison might as well have been the cause. The learned Judge therefore rightly held that the person who caused violence could not be held to be liable for anything more than causing hurt. The question as to whether that hurt was one which could be designated as “grevious” naturally came up for discussion by the Judge after fixing the offender. The learned Judge therefore rightly held that the person who caused violence could not be held to be liable for anything more than causing hurt. The question as to whether that hurt was one which could be designated as “grevious” naturally came up for discussion by the Judge after fixing the offender. The doubt as to the cause of death was caused by the presence of traces of cynanide in the stomach contents detected by the chemical examiner. As to how those traces happened to be present is a mystery to all those who had anything to do with the case and it will be futile to attempt to unravel it. 4. What we have to decide here is whether the prosecution has proved beyond doubt that the appellant fisted the deceased Sukumaran in his abdominal region as alleged and if so what offence that would constitute. Though as may as four eye-witnesses were examined to prove the occurrence the testimony of two such witnesses namely Pws. 4 and 6 has been dismissed by the learned Judge as unreliable and he has chosen to believe only the remaining two namely Pws. 1 and 2. Admittedly those two witnesses were co-workers of the deceased. On his own showing the appellant had on that fateful evening at about 6 P.M. called the deceased to his room, reprimanded him severely for his misconduct and gave a slap on his face on account of his anger and sorrow. The prosecution case varies from that in that it was not any slap on the face that the appellant gave to the deceased but as many as three fistings on the abdomen. Pws. 1 and 2 swear that they saw it. Even the appellant has admitted that Pw. 1 was present in the adjoining room at the time he called the deceased to his room. His case however would seem to be that Pw. 2 was not there. The names of these two witnesses occur in the first information statement which Pw. 3 gave before the Kanjirappally Police Station within an hour and a half of the occurrence. The Police Station is three miles away from the place of occurrence. Pw. 3 is a brother-in-law of the deceased and he came to the spot knowing that Sukumaran had died. The information he had about the occurrence was what he learned from these two witnesses. The Police Station is three miles away from the place of occurrence. Pw. 3 is a brother-in-law of the deceased and he came to the spot knowing that Sukumaran had died. The information he had about the occurrence was what he learned from these two witnesses. The learned Judge has submitted their evidence to a very minute and critical examination before he made up his mind to place reliance upon their testimony. Two things which make us accept his view regarding the credibility of these witnesses are (i) that the first information mentions that the appellant had fisted Sukumaran in the region of his stomach, and (ii) that the post-mortem examination revealed that Sukumaran had not only one external injury in that region but far more serious internal injuries also consequent on violence being applied to that part of his body. Ext. F is the post-mortem certificate and it describes the external injury thus: A contusion 1" x 1/2" on the left side of the abdomen 4" above the umbilicus and 3/4" outside the middle line with a linear superficial abrasion 1/2” long at its centre. The internal injuries noticed are (1) a contusion 2 1/2" x 2" on the anterior superior surface of the stomach close to the grater curvature a little to the left of the middle line and (2) a contusion 3 1/2" x 2 1/2" and 1/8" deep on the inferior surface of the left lobe of the liver, 3 1/4" from the middle line and close to the anterior margin. The presence of these internal injuries on Sukumaran’s body and the reference in the first information statement that the appellant fisted him in the region of the stomach go a long way to induce us to agree with the lower court that Pws. 1 and 2 were speaking the truth when they said they saw the appellant give two or three fists to Sukumaran. Pw. 3 could have known about it only from these witnesses and that gains material corroboration from the post-mortem certificate. In these circumstances we have little hesitation in agreeing with the lower court that the violence the appellant inflicted on the deceased was two or three fistings in the abdominal region and not a slap on the face as contended for on his behalf. In these circumstances we have little hesitation in agreeing with the lower court that the violence the appellant inflicted on the deceased was two or three fistings in the abdominal region and not a slap on the face as contended for on his behalf. Though the Police arrived on the spot immediately the crime was reported they saw no mark whatever of the face of the deceased and nor does the post-mortem certificate lend any support to the defence case. That the appellant caused hurt to deceased Sukumaran in the manner alleged by the prosecution is therefore proved beyond any reasonable doubt and we accordingly confirm the learned Judge’s finding in that respect. 5. The next question is whether the hurt inflicted falls under S. 321 or under S. 322. In a sense the question is only of acadamic value. The learned Judge while finding that the accused inflicted grievous hurt on the deceased has awarded only a sentence which he could have legitimately passed in respect of a conviction under S. 323 I.P.C. for voluntarily causing hurt. No doubt the maximum punishment prescribed for that offence has been passed against the appellant. 6. In order to determine whether the hurt caused is grievous the extent of the hurt and the intention of the offender have to be taken into account. According to the prosecution and the learned Judge the physical requirement was satisfied as the hurt was one which endangered life (8th clause to S. 320 I.P.C.). The mental element is a matter of inference from proved facts and circumstances. The learned Judge has relied upon the observation in Narayan Pasi (1875) 24 W.R. (Cr.) for his conclusion that the hurt caused by the appellant was such as could be designated as grievous. That decision states that wherever a violent blow is inflicted upon the body it would be wrong to say that there was absolutely nothing to show that the party intended a grievous hurt. The explanation to S. 322 so far relevant states that a person is not said voluntarily to cause grievous hurt except when he both causes grievous hurt, and intends or knows himself to be likely to cause grievous hurt. The learned Judge has approached the question from the correct view point but the decision of the question is by no means easy. The learned Judge has approached the question from the correct view point but the decision of the question is by no means easy. However we cannot say that the Judge was wrong in thinking that the medical evidence satisfied the physical requirement of a hurt endangering life. If the hurt was not so serious as to endanger life doubt as to the cause of death could not and would not have arisen. Nor are we, regard being had to the part of the body chosen for inflicting violence and the severe internal injuries that violence left behind, prepared to say that the learned Judge’s opinion that the mental requirement has also been satisfied is not right. The requirement of the explanation will be satisfied if the offender had the knowledge that by his act he was likely to cause grievous hurt. We find it difficult to accede to the argument that the appellant who caused such violence to the deceased as to leave the internal injuries noticed in the post-mortem certificate could not have had such knowledge. In any view we are unable to say that the Judge’s decision on the point is wrong and that would suffice for our present purpose, for even if he were wrong the punishment awarded is one that could have been awarded for an offence under S. 323. Assuming that the offence is one what would only fall under S. 323 we cannot agree that the master who took law into his own hands and used such violence to the person of his servant as to cause the injuries noticed in the post-mortem certificate should be let off with a mere fine. At the same time we must state that even when the argument concluded we felt there was no justification to enhance the sentence as applied for by the State in Criminal Revision Petition No. 7 of 1952 and we then and there dismissed it. The sentence awarded is by no means severe. The appeal fails and it is dismissed. Dismissed. There is absolutely no ground to grant leave for appeal as asked far and we dismiss the prayer.