The petitioner Shri Abdul Waned tiled this .Civil revision petition against Shri Sukdev Wasti and it was against the decree and judgment of the District Judge in misc. civil appeal No. 50 of 1961 dated 15-12-1961 by which he dismissed the appeal filed by the petitioner against the order of the munsiff, Agartala directing the detention of the petitioner and another in civil prison for violation of the interim injunction passed by him in T, S. No. 87 of 1959. The plaintiff Shri Sukdev Wasti had died on 12-1-1960 and his heirs namely his widow, his son Bhagabati Prasad Wasti and his two daughters had come in record as 'his legal representatives on 3-2-60 and the order complained against in this petition was passed against the petitioner by the munsiff on 10-6-1961 at the instance of the legal representatives of the deceased plain­tiff. The civil misc. appeal before the District Judge was filed by the petitioner against Shri Bhagabati Prasad Wasti, the son of the deceased Sukdev Wasti. But in the revision petition filed on 27-1-1962 in this Court, the petitioner impleaded the deceased Sukdev Wasti himself as the sole respondent. On 10-5-1962, he has come forward with a petition for amendment of the memo of the revision peti­tion by striking out the name of Sukdev Wasti and by adding his legal representatives as the respondents stating that from the return made by the process peon it appeared that Sukdev Wasti was dead. The legal representatives af Sukdev Wasti on whom notices were served of this petition have now come forward and they seriously oppose the amendment and state that the revision petition filed against a person who was dead two years before the filing was a nullity and that it cannot be amended by substitut­ing the names of the heirs. (2) I think the contention of the legal representatives is well founded. The petitioner knew even on 3-2-60 when 1he matter was pending before the munsiff that Sukdev Wasti was dead and that his legal representatives had come on record. He knew that the very order complained of by him was obtained by the legal representatives. ri« filed the appeal before the District Judge against on» of the legal representatives. The petitioner knew even on 3-2-60 when 1he matter was pending before the munsiff that Sukdev Wasti was dead and that his legal representatives had come on record. He knew that the very order complained of by him was obtained by the legal representatives. ri« filed the appeal before the District Judge against on» of the legal representatives. That being the case, his pre­sent statement that it appeared from the process server's return that Sukdev Wasti was dead trying to snow thereby that he knew of the death only from the process server's return cannot be accepted. A revision petition filed against a dead person is a nullity and no question of substituting the names of the legal representatives in place of the deceased person arises at all. Order XXII, C.P.C., will not apply to such a case. It is only when the revision petition is filed against a living person that it can be stated that such a petition is before Court and a revision petition against a dead person is void and of no legal effect. If the memo of the revision petition is sought to be amended, it will mean even if- amended, that a fresh revision petition is filed on the date of the amendment against the legal representatives of the deceased person. In order to allow any such amendment which will amount to permission to file a fresh revision petition against the legal representatives, the amendment petition has to be brought within the period of limitation namely 90 days from the date of the decree or order of the lower Court. In the present case, I find that the judgment of the District Judge was dated 15-12-1961 and the copy of the same was delivered to the petitioner on 28-12-1961. Thus the present application for- amendment filed on 10-5-1952 makes it hopelessly barred by limitation. (3) In such a case, Section 5 of the Limitation Act may apply. But no application under the said section for condonation of the delay has been brought by the petitioner. I find that the process server's return showing that Shri Sukdev Wasti was dead was itself received on Z1-4-1S6Z and it was made known to the petitioner's counsel on 25-4-1952 as seen from his initials in the order-sheet. But no application under the said section for condonation of the delay has been brought by the petitioner. I find that the process server's return showing that Shri Sukdev Wasti was dead was itself received on Z1-4-1S6Z and it was made known to the petitioner's counsel on 25-4-1952 as seen from his initials in the order-sheet. Still there has been further delay till 10-5-1962 to file this application and Section 5 of the Limitation Act will not therefore apply as no cause has been shown for the subsequent delay also. Moreover, the question of any condonation of such delay will arise only if Sukdev Wasti had died after the decree or order complained against and ml in a case where to the knowledge of the petitioner, Sukdev Wasti had died even on 12-1-1950 when the matter was pending before the munsiff. Thus no question of condona­tion of the delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act also arises in the present case. (4) The decision "Hindusthan General Insurance Society Ltd. v. Kedarnarayan", AIR 195S Madh B 76 relates to a case where one Ksdarnarsyan who had obtained a decrees against the appellant therein had died after the decree but before the institution of the appeal. Even in such a case, the Madhya Bharat High Court refused to substitute the legal representatives of the deceased stating that such substitution in an appeal was permissible where the respondent was alive at the date of institution and that an appeal filed against a sole respondent who was deal on the date of institution was a nullity and the Court had no jurisdiction to substitute the heirs unjer Order XXII, rule 4 C.P.C. or add their names in exercise of ths powers conferred by Order 1, Rule 10 C.P.C. The decisions "Bai Pani Vankar v. Madhabhai Galabhai", AIR .1953 Bon 353, "Rampratap v. Gouri Shanker", AIR 1924 Bom 108, "Sudhir Kumar v. Amritlal", ILR (1946) 2 Cal 611 an« "Parmeswara Iyer v. Krishna Iyer", AIR 1953 Trarto. 4/3, all of which took'the sams view have been referred to l» the said decision. (5) A contrary view has been taken in "A Gopal Krishnayya v. A. Lakshtnan Rao", AIR 1925 Mad 1210 (FB). 4/3, all of which took'the sams view have been referred to l» the said decision. (5) A contrary view has been taken in "A Gopal Krishnayya v. A. Lakshtnan Rao", AIR 1925 Mad 1210 (FB). In that case, it was held that the Court has jurisdiction under Section 153, C. P. C. to permit the cause title to be amended when an appeal was filed against the respondent who was already dead. But the said view has been dissented from in the decision AIR 1953 Bom 356 . I am unable to see how Section 153 C.P.C. can be applied at all in such a case. Section 153 refers to the amendment of any defect or error in any proceeding in a suit or in an appeal. When the proceeding is instituted against a dead person, It is a nullity and has no legal effect and hence there is no proceeding at all pending before Court. It is only in a proceeding before Court that an amendment can he made under Section 153 C.P.C. (6) As pointed out already, the present case is not one in which the respondent died after the order was passed by the lower Court and the fact of death was well known to the petitioner. The present case goes far beyond any of the cases which I have cited. In the present case, no question of substitution of the legal representatives can arise at all. The petition for substitution is dismissed. The revision which has been filed against a dead person is also dismissed. Petition dismissed.