JUDGMENT : 1. It is plaintiff's second appeal against the decision of the District Judge, Bhopal in First Appeal No.96 of 1951, dismissing the suit for pre-emption of a sale of a house. 2. It is not necessary to state the facts and the pleas of the parties which are abundantly, clear from the judgments of the two Courts below. It is enough to state that in both the Courts the issues for decision were whether the house was sold for Rs.3,500 instead of Rs.4,500; whether the plaintiff had waived his right to pre-empt; whether the plaintiff was estopped by his conduct, from claiming preemption. Both the Courts below found these issues against the plaintiff who now comes up to this Court in appeal. 3. It is contended that the right of pre-emption could not be extinguished without a notice under S.14, Bhopal Pre-emption Act, and therefore, the findings, that the plaintiff had waived his right or was estopped from enforcing it for pre-emption were incorrect; that the finding on the question of waiver, by the plaintiff, was vitiated on the ground of misapprehension of evidence; that the evidence on the question of estoppel against the plaintiff was not properly examined and the finding thereon was vitiated by misapprehension and misappreciation of the evidence and lastly that the finding on the payment of the price of the sale was also so vitiated. 4. Taking up the first contention, the question is whether in the absence of a notice as required under S.14, Bhopal Pre-emption Act, being given by the intending vendor to the prospective pre-emptor, the vendor or the vendee could not plead or prove waiver or estoppel against the plaintiff. Sections 14 and 15, Bhopal Pre-emption Act, have to be read together. The former section provides for a notice by the intending vendor to the possible pre-emptor while the latter section provides for notice by the intending, pre-emptor to the vendor. It must appear that under S.14 it is laid down that: "When any person proposes to sell etc.......any immovable property in respect of which any person has any right of pre-emption, he may give a notice to all such persons." In the latter part of the section the procedure for giving such notice is laid down. Section 15 then lays down what the intending pre-emptor has then to do in reply to the notice which he receives. Section 15 then lays down what the intending pre-emptor has then to do in reply to the notice which he receives. In my opinion, the giving of notice by the intending vendor to the possible pre-emptor is optional in view of the use of the word "may," a departure from S.19, Punjab Pre-emption Act, from which it appears that the section has taken. It is clear that if a notice is given it shall be given through the Civil Court. The effect of giving such notice together with the absence of any such action by the intending pre-emptor as laid down under S.15, Bhopal Pre-emption Act, is that the latter's right shall be extinguished. This is the mode in which the Act lays down how the right of pre-emption is extinguished. It is, however, nowhere laid down in the Act that such right will not be extinguished by any other mode or conduct of the parties under the principles of law as found in the general law of the land, e.g., by waiver by the claimant or estoppel against him. In short, the Bhopal Pre-emption Act only lays down a specific mode for extinguishing the right which, however, does not come in the way of the application of the general law as found in the Evidence Act or in Equity. 5. I feel myself supported in this view by the latest decision of a Full Bench of the ex-High Court of Bhopal, which is in Urdu and was brought to my notice. In Mohammad Assan v. Abdul Hamid Khan, civil Appeal No.40 of 1946 d/-29-4-1947, which was originally heard by a Single Judge (Ansari, J.) the question which was referred to a Full Bench was as follows : "Whether the provisions of Ss.14 and 15 of the Bhopal Pre-emption Act override the provisions of estoppel under the Evidence Act in all cases and no help can be taken from the said provisions in pre-emption suits." The Bench answered the question as follows : "The provisions of Ss.14 and 15 do not override all cases of estoppel. The effect of these provisions (Bhopal Pre-emption Act) is limited to the notice to be given by the vendor to the pre-emptor." To my mind, therefore, it is clear that apart from the mode of extinguishing the right of pre-emption as specifically laid down in the Bhopal Pre-emption Act, the vendor or the vendee can plead and prove either waiver by the pre-emptor or estoppel against him. 6. The next question for decision is whether the finding on the point of waiver by the plaintiff was vitiated as contended. The learned District Judge who dealt with this point does not seem to have discussed the evidence and he merely observed that it was proved in the case that the plaintiff had once waived his right so much so that he procured the present purchaser for the benefit of the owner of the house. This was not the proper way of examining the question of fact by a Court which is entitled to examine the findings of a lower Court even on such questions. 7. It was urged that waiver would arise only when a definite contract with a definite person for a definite sum is made and the person having a particular right clearly refuses to act on such contract i.e., to enforce the right and not merely on an expression of intention to make a contract. In Ram Rathi v. Mt. Dhiraji, AIR 1947 Oudh 81, it is held that : "Waiver and acquiescence on the part of the pre-emptor may be inferred from the circumstances, and there need not be an offer and refusal or express consent to the sale." In this view then, in my opinion, from the evidence of Abbas Beg (D.W.1), Ibrahim (D.W.2), Shriram (D.W.3) read with that of Karamat (D.W.5) and Mithulal (D.W.6), it is perfectly clear that the plaintiff by his conduct and even by his representation to Mithulal (D.W.6) and Abbas Beg (D.W.1) clearly waived his right to pre-empt the sale it must appear that onus to prove the fact of waiver by the plaintiff lay on the defendants and after their evidence it was for the plaintiff to rebut it. The plaintiff has not gone into the witness-box in spite of the fact that factual allegations were made against him and were supported by defendant's evidence. The plaintiff has not gone into the witness-box in spite of the fact that factual allegations were made against him and were supported by defendant's evidence. Their Lordships of the Privy Council in Gurbahhsh Singh v. Gurdial Singh, AIR 1927 PC 230 , at pages 233 and 234 where the party did not examine herself into the witness-box in support of or in denial of factual allegations against her when she had personal knowledge, observed that: "If her story were true, it was her bounden duty to give evidence in the suit, telling the whole facts in support of her and her alleged son's case; but she did not." "In any view her non-appearance as a witness, she being present in Court would be the strongest possible circumstance going to discredit the truth of her case." "The true object to be achieved by a Court of justice can only be furthered with propriety by the testimony of the party who personally knowing the whole circumstance of the case can dispel the suspicions attaching to it. The story can then be subjected in all its particulars to cross-examination." The same principle has been followed in Joban Das v. Gangaram, AIR 1949 Him. P. 7, where it is observed that: "It is the bounden duty of a party (the plaintiff) personally knowing the whole circumstances to give evidence. His non-appearance as witness would be the strongest possible circumstance to discredit the truth of the case." It would appear that the plaintiff did not go into the witness-box to contradict the evidence of as many as six witnesses on the side of the defendants and the inference drawn by the trial Court is perfectly correct and the conclusion that the plaintiff had waived his right of pre-emption is unassailable. 8. The next question whether the plaintiff was also estopped by his conduct from enforcing his right to pre-empt. The learned District Judge, as I have already pointed out, did not discuss the evidence on record but has jumped at the conclusion and merely accepted the finding of the trial Court. An attempt was made to take this Court through the evidence and to point out certain discrepancies in the testimony of Mithulal (P.W.6), Shriram (D.W.3) and Karamat (D.W.5). The learned District Judge, as I have already pointed out, did not discuss the evidence on record but has jumped at the conclusion and merely accepted the finding of the trial Court. An attempt was made to take this Court through the evidence and to point out certain discrepancies in the testimony of Mithulal (P.W.6), Shriram (D.W.3) and Karamat (D.W.5). If there are any discrepancies worth the name, they are immaterial being as regards the place where the talks took place and on the fact of higgling over the price and the payor (sic) of the amount of earnest. In my opinion, the case of the defendants is fully established in spite of these discrepancies and this Court refuses to be influenced by the absence of discussion of evidence by the District Judge. Here again it must be remembered that an adverse inference is liable to be drawn against the plaintiff because of his absence from the witness-box. 9. The last question raised is in respect of the payment of the amount of Rs.4,500 as the price of the house under the sale sought to be preempted. The learned District Judge has fully discussed the evidence on this point which is a mere question of fact and in view of the concurrent finding of both the Courts below this Court cannot accede to the request to go through the evidence again. 10. The result is that the decision of the Court below is correct and there is no substance in the appeal. It is, therefore, dismissed with costs and the appellant is ordered to pay the costs of the respondents in this Court. The decree of the lower appellate Court, dismissing the suit together with the order for costs therein as also in the suit, is affirmed. Counsel's fees will be up to the maximum, if certified in time. A decree be drawn accordingly. Appeal dismissed.