Judgement BOSE J.: This is a habeas corpus petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution. 2. The petitioner was detained on 16-10-1951 under the Preventive Detention Act of 1950 as amended in 1951. Her detention was actually longer than this but the earlier detentions were under a different set of orders which are not relevant to the present matter. The present detention is based on an order of the District Magistrate, Thana, and merely says that the petitioner be detained, without specifying any period. The order of confirmation was passed on 4-1-1952 and there again no period was specified. The petitioner s case is that as no period was specified in the order her period of detention expired on 31-3-1952 because of the amending Act of 1951; or at the outside on 30-9-1952 because of Act 34 of 1952 which effected a further amendment. 3. The reply on behalf of the State of Bombay is that the Preventive Detention Act of 1950 was again amended by Act 61 of 1952 and that the effect of this amendment was to carry the petitioner s defention on to 31-3-1953 because of S. 11-A which was added to the original Act of 1950. 4. The petitioner counters by saying that the new Act does not apply to cases in which the order of detention is not silent about its duration and so S. 11-A does not serve to extend the period of her detention. She relies on the following portion of S. 11-A (2): ". . . . . . . . every detention order which has been confirmed under S. 11 before the commencement of the Preventive Detention (Second Amendment) Act, 1952, shall, "unless a shorter period is specified in the order , continue to remain in force until the 1st day of April 1953. ........ . " The petitioner concedes that no shorter period is specified in her order of detention but contends that as her detention would have expired either on 31-3-1952 or 30-9-1952, one of those two dates must now be read into the order and when that is done we have an order which specifies a shorter period, therefore S. 11-A(2) does not serve to extend her detention. 5. We are unable to accept this contention. The Section is clear and unless a shorter period is specified in the order , S. 11-A (2) applies. 5. We are unable to accept this contention. The Section is clear and unless a shorter period is specified in the order , S. 11-A (2) applies. We cannot add the words "or must be deemed to have been specified by reason of the expiry of the earlier Act" into the Section We hold therefore, that S. 11-A (2) validly extended the period of detention till 1-4-1953. 6. The petitioner s next point is based on Arts. 14 and 22 (7) (b) of the Constitution. It arises in this way. Section 3 (1) (a), Preventive Detention Act of 1950, classifies grounds of permissible detention into three categories. Article 22 (7)(b) empowers Parliament to prescribe the maximum period for which any person may "in any class or classes of cases" be detained. The petitioner argues that this permits only one maximum for each class and that if different maxima are provided for "equals" within a class it offends not only Art. 22 (7) (b) but also Art. 14 as interpreted by the decisions of this Court. She next argues that S. 11-A, now introduced by the second amending Act of 1952 (Act 61 of 1952), does just that and so is ultra vires . Her point is put as follows : 7. Sub-Section (1) of S. 11-A states that the maximum period for which any person may be detained in pursuance of any detention order which has been confirmed under S. 11 shall be twelve months from the date of detention. But sub-s. (2) qualifies this by dividing detentions into two classes: (a) those in which the detention was confirmed before 30-9-1952 and (b) those in which the confirmation was after that date, and it provides that in the former case, unless a shorter period is specified in the order , the detention shall continue either till 1-4-1953 or for twelve months from the date of detention, Whichever expires later. This, she says, introduces a fresh classification which divides detentions into those before the Act and those after. That, she says, is ultra vires , first, because it introduces a discriminatory classification in the class to which she belongs under S. 3 of the Act and, second, because it entails discrimination even in the fresh class into which she has been thrown by the new sub-division made by the second amending Act of 1952. 8. That, she says, is ultra vires , first, because it introduces a discriminatory classification in the class to which she belongs under S. 3 of the Act and, second, because it entails discrimination even in the fresh class into which she has been thrown by the new sub-division made by the second amending Act of 1952. 8. As regards the first point, the ratio decidendi in - Shamrao V. Parulekar v. District Magistrate, Thana Bombay , 1952 SCR 683 at PP. 691 and 693, applies here. In that case, detentions were divided into those which had already been considered by an Advisory Board and those which had not. This was upheld. The dividing line here is different, namely a certain date, but the principle is the same and its reasonableness is apparent from a consideration of the various amendments which have been made from time to time. 9. The life of the Act of 1950, which was the principal Act, was extended till 1-10-l952 by S. 2 of the amending Act (Act 34 of 1952), and the effect of S. 3 was to prolong the life of all detentions in force on 14-3-1952. (Provided they had been confirmed before that date) for so long as the principal Act was in force. At that date this meant till 1-10-1952. But the second amending Act of 1952 extended the life of the principal Act till 31-12-l954. Therefore, in the absence of S. 11-A all those detentions would have been extended till that date. But S. 11-A modified that and put 1-4-1953 as the latest date for these old detentions. It, therefore, conferred a benefit and cannot be deemed unreasonable. Sub-Section (3) of S. 11-A shows that that was the object. 10. But the petitioner attacked the provisions on the ground of discrimination. She said that even assuming the new classification of detentions into those before and after 30-9-1952 to be good, S. 11-A is nevertheless discriminatory because it discriminates amongst those in her class, namely those whose detentions were made and confirmed before the 30th of September. She put it in this way. 11. Taking the case of her own detention, she pointed out that, if S, 11-A is good, it will continue till 1-4-1953, that is to say, her detention will have been for a period of 171/2 months from 16-l0-1951 till 1-4-1953. She put it in this way. 11. Taking the case of her own detention, she pointed out that, if S, 11-A is good, it will continue till 1-4-1953, that is to say, her detention will have been for a period of 171/2 months from 16-l0-1951 till 1-4-1953. On the other hand, a person detained after her on, say, 1-9-1952, would also be due for release on 1-4-1953 and so would have had only six months detention. 12. This, in our opinion, is not discrimination within the meaning of Art. 14. A maximum can be fixed, either by specifying a particular period, such as twelve months, or by setting outside limit, and it is inevitable in such a case that the length of detention will vary in each individual case. Those taken into detention at a later date are bound to be detained for a shorter time. Goverment is not bound to detain everybody for the same length of time. It, has a disceretion. Moreover, the appropriate Government has been left power to revoke or modify the detention order at any earlier time. This point was consider in - Shamrao V. Parulekar v. District Magistrate, Thana, Bombay , 1952 SCR 683 at pp. 691 and 693, and was decided against the detenu. 13. The petitioner endeavoured to have her application reopened on the merits contending again that the grounds of detention are vague. She relies on - Shamrao V. Parulekar v. The State of Bombay , Petn. No. 86 of 1952, where another detenu was released by another Bench of this Court in circumstances which, according to her, are very similar. We are unable to allow this as her petition has already been rejected on the merits. She wall only allowed to appear on constitutional points. We understand that in the other petition this fact was not brought to the notice of the Court. 14. The application is dismissed Application dismissed. For Citation : AIR 1953 SC 52