ORDER : The assignee decree-holder in O.S. No. 996 of 1101 of the Vaikom Munsiff’s Court is the appellant in both these appeals. The decree is for redemption of a mortgage. In the execution application filed by the assignee decree holder he alleged that the mortgagee committed active waste in the property after the date of the decree by cutting and removing trees therefrom and prayed that the damages on that account be assessed and the amount awarded to him. The 3rd defendant mortgagee also filed a petition to the effect that he has effected improvements in the property after the date of the decree and prayed that the value of the same be assessed and the amount awarded to him. The execution Court allowed the petition of the assignee decree-holder for assessing damages for waste, issued a commission for the purpose and on the basis of the report of the commissioner awarded Rs. 65 chs. 3 cash 4 as damages. With regard to the petition of the 3rd defendant the court held that he was not entitled to claim the value of improvements effected after the date of the decree. 2. From both these orders the 3rd defendant appealed to the District Court. A.S. No. 297 of 1124 was the appeal from the order awarding damages for waste and A.S. No. 338 of 1124 was the appeal from the order rejecting the 3rd defendant’s claim for value of improvements. The District Court held that the 3rd defendant could claim in execution the value of improvements effected by him after the date of the decree. It also held that the trial court went wrong in awarding damages for waste without taking evidence on the question as to whether the destruction of trees was due to any active waste committed by the mortgagee. That court therefore set aside both the orders of the trial court and remained the petitions for fresh enquiry and disposal. C.M. Appeal No. 211 of 1950 is from the order in A.S. No. 297 of 1124 and C.M. Appeal No. 212 of 1950 is from the order in A.S. No. 338 of 1124. 3. That court therefore set aside both the orders of the trial court and remained the petitions for fresh enquiry and disposal. C.M. Appeal No. 211 of 1950 is from the order in A.S. No. 297 of 1124 and C.M. Appeal No. 212 of 1950 is from the order in A.S. No. 338 of 1124. 3. The question raised in C.M. Appeal No. 212 of 1950 is whether in the case of a decree for redemption of a mortgage the mortgagee is entitled to claim in execution the value of improvements effected by him after the date of the decree. The rulings of the erstwhile Travancore High Court on the point are not uniform although the latest decision reported in 1948 T.L.R. 209 (F.B.) is in favour of the view that the mortgagee is not entitled to claim in execution value of improvements effected by him after the date of the decree for redemption. 4. The earliest authoritative ruling of the Travancore High Court on the point is reported in 28 T.L.R. 129 F.B. Varkey Avira Tharakan v. Raman Nilakantan and others. In the case the Full Bench held that the mortgagee is entitled to claim in execution the value of improvements effected by him after the date of the decree. This Full Bench case which was decided in the year 1087 was being followed by the Travancore High Court till recently. 8 T.L.J. 299 (Kunjan Raman v. Kochukunju Raman), 30 T.L.R. 245 (Vasudevan Nambudiri v. Iyppu), 5 T.L.T. 602 (Kesavan v. Nilakantan) 21 T.L.J. 1366 (Iyppu v. Padmanabhan Nair) and 26 T.L.J. 657 (Punnen v. Aiyappan) are cases in which the ruling in 28 T.L.R. 129 was accepted as an authority on the point. In 1943 T.L.R. 822 (Anandan v. Anandan) a Full Bench of the Travancore High Court considered the question whether a trespasser is entitled to claim the value of improvements effected by him after the date of the decree for eviction, and the Full Bench answered the question in the negative. In that case Their Lordships did not question the correctness of the decision in 28 T.L.R. 129 or of the decisions that followed it. They affirmed the correctness of those decisions in so far as they related to the claim of a mortgagee for the value of improvements effected by him after the date of the decree for redemption. In that case Their Lordships did not question the correctness of the decision in 28 T.L.R. 129 or of the decisions that followed it. They affirmed the correctness of those decisions in so far as they related to the claim of a mortgagee for the value of improvements effected by him after the date of the decree for redemption. After these decisions a Division Bench of the Travancore High Court held in 1944 T.L.R. 543 (Kesava Pillai v. Mathai) that a mortgagee is not entitled to claim the value of improvements effected by him after the date of the decree for redemption unless such improvements are essential for the preservation of the mortgaged property or for the normal enjoyment of the same. 5. The question again came for consideration before another Full Bench in 1948 T.L.R. 209 (Parukutty Amma v. Atchuthan). In that case Their Lordships held that a mortgagee who effects improvements in the property after the date of the decree for redemption is not entitled to claim the value thereof in execution but that he can claim it in a separate suit. 6. So far as the law in Cochin is concerned there is an express provision in S. 5 of the Cochin Tenancy Act (XV of 1113) entitling the mortgagee to claim in execution the value of improvements effected by him after the date of the decree for redemption. There is a similar provision in S. 6 of the Malabar Compensation for Tenants’ Improvements Act (I of 1900). 7. In view of the fact that the decisions of the Travancore High Court on the point are not uniform and in view of the importance of the question involved we think it necessary that the matter should be referred to a Full Bench for an authoritative ruling. 8. The question that arises for consideration in C.M.A. No. 211 of 1950 is also of some importance namely, whether in the case of a decree for redemption of a mortgage the decree-holder can claim in execution damages for waste committed by the mortgagee after the date of the decree. Both the lower courts have proceeded on the basis that the decree-holder can claim such damages in execution. Both the lower courts have proceeded on the basis that the decree-holder can claim such damages in execution. In 28 T.L.R. 129 (F.B.) Viraraghava Aiyangar, J. observed that the question in regard to waste committed by the mortgagee after the decree for redemption would be one relating to the “execution or satisfaction of the decree”. That the decree-holder can claim in execution damages for waste committed by the judgment-debtor after the date of the decree has been held in 13 T.L.R. 133 (Narayanan v. Abdurahiman Kunju), 18 T.L.J. 1280 (Kurien v. Mathen) and 21 T.L.J. 989 (Narayana Pillai v. Madhavan). In 18 T.L.J. 1280 it was held that the principle enunciated in 28 T.L.R. 129 and 8 T.L.J. 299 namely, the party in possession has a right to get the value of improvements effected by him after the date of the decree is applicable by analogy to cases of waste also. But in T.L.R. 972 Venkata Rao v. Ramachandra Kammath) it was held that the execution court is not competent to direct an enquiry into damages for waste alleged to have been committed after the date of the decree. This ruling was not followed in 1948 T.L.R. 209 F.B., Parukutty Amma v. Atchuthan. In that case it was held that compensation for waste committed after the date of the decree would come within the scope of the word “discharge” or “satisfaction” and that to the extent to which there is a diminution in value it should be taken to be a discharge or satisfaction of the decree in favour of the defendant. But in a recent decision of this Court reported in 1950 T.C.L.R. 260 (Carlose v. Lekshmikutty Amma) the decision of the Travancore High Court in 1945 T.L.R. 972 was followed and it was held that the liability of a mortgagee-lessor for damages for waste alleged to have been committed after the date of the decree is not enforceable in execution as it is not a matter falling under S. 41 of the Cochin Civil Procedure Code (section 47 of the Indian Civil Procedure Code). To the same effect is a Full Bench decision of the Cochin High Court reported in 18 Cochin 297 (Gopalan Narayana Panikkar v. Ayyappa Kaimal). In view of these conflicting rulings on the point we think it necessary that this question also should be referred to a Full Bench. 9. To the same effect is a Full Bench decision of the Cochin High Court reported in 18 Cochin 297 (Gopalan Narayana Panikkar v. Ayyappa Kaimal). In view of these conflicting rulings on the point we think it necessary that this question also should be referred to a Full Bench. 9. We therefore refer both the C.M. Appeals to a Full Bench. JUDGMENT BY THE FULL BENCH P.K. Subramonia Iyer, J. These two Civil Miscellaneous Appeals presented by the plaintiff decree-holder are before a Full Bench on account of a deference made thereto by a Division Bench of which one of us was a member. 2. Both the appeals are directed against an order of remand made by the District Judge of Alleppey. I say “an order of remand” with a purpose because, though two appeals Nos. 297 and 338 of 1124 on the file of the District Judge were heard by him, he wrote but one judgment reversing two separate orders in execution passed by the Munsiff and remanding both the matters for fresh disposal. 3. The learned Judge passed the following order in A.S. 297 of 1124 on 22.3.1125: “Adjourned for hearing 29-3-1125. The appellant will apply to advance the hearing of A.S. 338 of 1124 which he wants to be heard along with this to the above date in the meanwhile.” This perhaps accounts for the single order that the learned Judge passed. Two Civil Miscellaneous Appeals having been filed before this Court, certified copy of the order was produced only in one. This circumstance having been pointed out as a defect by the office, the matter was placed before a Division Bench, when the omission was explained by a statement dated 20.9.1950 stating the facts as aforesaid and that explanation was accepted by order dated 22.9.1950. 4. The facts may be briefly stated. The decree in execution of which these proceedings arise, was passed by the District Munsiff in O.S. 996 of 1101 on 19.12.1103. It was for redemption of a kanam. The kanam demise comprised three items of property, of which the first is a paramba and trees thereon, the second a chira and trees thereon and the third a house situate on the first item. It was for redemption of a kanam. The kanam demise comprised three items of property, of which the first is a paramba and trees thereon, the second a chira and trees thereon and the third a house situate on the first item. The 3rd defendant was awarded a certain amount by way of value of improvements and he was rendered liable for the dues claimed by the plaintiff before suit as also thereafter until three years from date of the decree or delivery of properties whichever is earlier. There were cross claims under the decree between the plaintiff and the 3rd defendant as regards costs. All the cross claims were ordered to be set-off. 5. These proceedings arise out of E.P. 1615/1118 (Sherthalai Munsiff’s Court, which was transferred to the Munsiff’s Court at Vaikom and numbered there as E.P. 892/1120) filed by the decree-holder on 17.12.1118. In that application the decree-holder alleged active waste by the 3rd defendant by cutting and removing trees for which value had been awarded in the decree as also other trees comprised in the kanam holding apparently belonging and deliverable to the plaintiff for which no compensation had to be paid. It was also alleged that the 3rd defendant defaulted in taking timely and proper care of the building which was thereby rendered useless and that the 3rd defendant was liable therefor. It was prayed that the damages occasioned to the plaintiff on account of the active and permissive waste as aforesaid may be assessed and awarded to him. The 3rd defendant appears to have filed an objection petition which was read by the Munsiff. (See his order) At the instance of the decree-holder the court deputed a Commissioner to inspect the properties and assess the waste. The Commissioner in due course submitted a report. Before orders were passed by the court upon the said claim of the decree-holder, the 3rd defendant filed C.M.P. 7382/1124 dated 12.4.1124 supported by an affidavit of even date explaining the absence of trees as due to their old age and vis major, and claiming compensation for having planted certain trees for the protection and maintenance of the property. It was also stated therein that the decree-holder expressed his intention not to execute the decree as it was unprofitable on account of the depression. On 25.6.1124 the learned Munsiff passed the following order on this C.M.P.:- “Heard Vakils. It was also stated therein that the decree-holder expressed his intention not to execute the decree as it was unprofitable on account of the depression. On 25.6.1124 the learned Munsiff passed the following order on this C.M.P.:- “Heard Vakils. This application to assess the value of improvements effected after decree by the defendant, if any, is opposed by the decree-holder. The execution application was filed on 17.11.1118. The plaintiff took out a commission to assess waste. In all these years the 3rd defendant has not moved his little finger to assess this. Now in 1124 when the case is to be disposed of after waste is determined by commissioner, this petition is moved. There is no bonafides in this application except to delay the delivery. Improvements after decree, if there be any, is discountenanced. Thus I do not see my way to allow this application. Hence this is rejected.” A.S. 338/1124 was against this order. 6. On 27.6.1124 the Munsiff passed the following order upon the execution petition which formed the subject-matter of A.S. 297 of 1124:- “Heard Vakils. Ext. A is the Commission Report for assessing the waste. The Commissioner was examined besides the parties. It is admitted by both sides that some trees have been lost. The defendant would say that it is the act of God while the plaintiff would say that it is wilful. However the commission report is on the whole fair and acceptable with slight modification and I award Rs. 65 Chs. 3 Cash 4 as a rebate for waste. The decree-holder shall deposit the balance forthwith and apply for delivery, failing which the defendant is not liable for any loss. Ordered accordingly.” 7. The learned District Judge, as already stated considered both the appeals together, reversed the orders appealed against and remanded the matters to the Munsiff for consideration and disposal afresh. The ground of the order of remand was the absence of a consideration and decision by the Munsiff of the question as to whether the waste alleged was the result of vis major as contended by the defendant or not and also of the question as to whether the work for which compensation was claimed by the 3rd defendant was one necessary to protect and preserve the property which was the case set up by that defendant. A finding on the above questions which required a consideration of facts was deemed necessary by the learned Judge to adjudicate upon the liability or the immunity of the rights claimed by the parties. The correctness of the order of remand is canvassed in these Civil Miscellaneous Appeals. 8. The claim for compensation that was made by the plaintiff against the 3rd defendant and the immunity from liability as also the claim for compensation for work done, made by the 3rd defendant are as the aforesaid facts would show, really aspects of the same question. The matter is really one and is one of the fact and on a finding thereupon depends the rights and liabilities of the parties. Such a finding is necessary for a proper disposal of the matter. 9. In any judgment, therefore, the order of remand passed by the learned District Judge is correct and ought to be upheld. The Civil Miscellaneous Appeals should therefore be dismissed. Costs will abide and follow the result. 10. In this view it is unnecessary at this stage to consider the various questions mentioned in the order of reference which are complicated and highly controversial. A discussion of these questions at this stage would be merely acadamic and would not lead to any result as no final decision regarding the rights of parties can now be arrived at. The reference to the Full Bench is not of a specific question or questions but of the appeals themselves. 11. Having had the opportunity to read the judgments that my learned brothers are delivering, it has become necessary to add the following to my judgment which I prepared first. 12. Redemption of mortgage is the termination of the relationship between the mortgagor and the mortgagee after determination of the rights and liabilities of the parties, and settlement and adjustment of all the accounts between them, leaving nothing outstanding. A decree for redemption does not purport or operate to bring about a cessation of the relationship of mortgagor and mortgagee which would subsist even after the decree and until the time of actual redemption. (See I.L.R. 56 Allahabad 561 P.C. & I.L.R. 1937 Madras 545 F.B.). The existence of a decree for redemption will not bar a fresh suit for the same relief. (See A.I.R. 1950 Federal Court 1). (See I.L.R. 56 Allahabad 561 P.C. & I.L.R. 1937 Madras 545 F.B.). The existence of a decree for redemption will not bar a fresh suit for the same relief. (See A.I.R. 1950 Federal Court 1). There is, therefore, no merger of the cause of action in the case of a decree for redemption, as in certain other cases where, when a cause of action is put in suit and a decree follows, the decree and that alone would determine the rights of parties and can be looked into or relied upon for that purpose. Quicquid plantatur solo, solo cedit, (Wentw. Off Ext., 14th edn. 145), whatever is affixed to the soil belongs thereto, is a maxim not accepted or applied in this country. (I.L.R. 24 Mad. 47 F.B. 27 Mad. 21). According to the customary law prevalent in Cochin, Travancore and Malabar, a tenant including a mortgagee, is entitled to improve the land, get compensation for unexhausted improvements existing at the time of delivering possession back, and to retain possession thereof until such payment, even without a provision in that behalf but in the absence of a prohibition against effecting improvements. 1951 K.L.T. 7 F.B. at p. 26. This customary right was given statutory recognition in Cochin and Malabar. The statutes even invalidated agreements entered into after a specified date prohibiting the effecting of improvements or preventing a claim for compensation therefor. Madras Act, I of 1887 was the earliest legislation in Malabar and Act II of 1090 in the Cochin State. Act I of 1887 was repealed by Madras Act I of 1900 which was amended by Act II of 1901. There was no legislation in the erstwhile Travancore State. The Transfer of Property Act is now applicable to the Travancore-Cochin State. 13. The said statutes provided for the ascertainment and payment of value of improvements effected even after decree and it was provided that questions relating thereto would be deemed to be among those triable by the court executing the decree within the meaning of the Section of the Code of Civil Procedure providing for the determination of all questions relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree by the court executing it. 14. The procedure to determine and direct payment of value of improvements whenever effected, whether before or after the decree, in proceedings in execution was not, however one inaugurated by the said statutes. 14. The procedure to determine and direct payment of value of improvements whenever effected, whether before or after the decree, in proceedings in execution was not, however one inaugurated by the said statutes. The practice that prevailed in the Presidency of Madras until July 1880 was to reserve the question for execution. The system of holding an enquiry into the matter of value of improvements before decree originated by a Circular Order issued by the High Court dated 14th July 1880. (Weir’s Rules of Practice, page 197. See also Krishna Pattar v. Sreenivasa Pattar, I.L.R. XX Madras 125 at page 126). A similar practice seems to have prevailed in the State of Cochin (see 4 Select Decisions 97) though there also that practice was stopped and the system of ascertaining the improvements even at the trial was introduced. The prior practice of deciding questions of improvements and their value in execution rested on the basis that the question comes within the ambit of the aforesaid provision of the Code of Civil Procedure. The statute which provided for the said matter being deemed to be a question within the meaning of the said provision of the Code of Civil Procedure was therefore no innovation but was merely a statutory recognition of an antecedent practice. 15. Improvements on the property decreed to be delivered may, for various reasons, appreciate or depreciate in number, nature or value by the time of actual delivery. There may be a long lapse of time between the date of the decree and the date of delivery. The Code of Civil Procedure only prohibits a fresh application for execution beyond 12 years of the date of the decree. Applications presented within that period could be prosecuted to termination irrespective of any length of time. The defendant directed to deliver the property with improvements on payment of their value is not entitled to put the decree in execution. In the interval, the relationship of the parties is, as already stated, that of mortgagor and mortgagee with the latter possessing his rights as regards the effecting of improvements, claiming value therefor and of retention of the property till such value is paid. The mortgagee or tenant may even claim value for trees of spontaneous growth during the currency of the mortgage or lease. 16. The mortgagee or tenant may even claim value for trees of spontaneous growth during the currency of the mortgage or lease. 16. These rights are possessed by the mortgagee under the substantive law and he cannot be deprived of them by the law of procedure. “Substantive law is concerned with the ends which the administration of justice seeks. Procedural law deals with the means and instruments by which those ends are to be attained. The latter regulates in respect of the litigation itself; the former determines their conduct and relations in respect of the matters litigated.” Salmond on Jurisprudence, 10th Edn. 1947, p. 476. It is in this view that an enquiry into what are the rights of the parties on the date of actual redemption is made (See 3 Select Decisions 97, a decision of the erstwhile High Court of Cochin of the year 1073, that is long before the first tenancy legislation there). In Krishna Pattar v. Sreenivasa Pattar (I.L.R. XX Madras 124) where the question of the liability of the defendant for waste committed after decree arose, the learned Judges, Subramonia Iyer and Boddam, JJ., held that the question could be considered in execution and supported their view by relying upon the fact that the defendant is entitled to have the value of improvements assessed afresh in proceedings in execution though it had been fixed before decree as was held in Ramunni v. Shanku (I.L.R. X Madras 367). Their Lordships say: “Suppose a mortgagor, having obtained a decree for redemption, does not execute it but allows the property to remain in the hands of the mortgagee for a considerable time and the latter during that period makes more improvements. Surely, his right to the value of those cannot be denied, whether the question arises in execution proceedings or in a seperate suit; nay, according to Ramunni v. Sanku [I.L.R. X Madras 367] even in respect of improvements referred to in a decree which the mortgagor does execute, the mortgagee can in such execution proceedings, claim a re-valuation if he can show that, since the passing of the decree, the value of the improvements has increased. How then can the mortgagor, with any justice, be held to be disentitled to obtain a reduction of the amount mentioned in the decree if he can prove that any part of the improvements assessed therein, has since ceased to exist.” A Full Bench of the Cochin High Court in XVIII C.L.R. 297 held that the question of damages for waste cannot be gone into in execution. The Bombay High Court has held in A.I.R. 1923 Bom. 391 and 1925 Bombay 385 that waste committed after decree can be considered in proceedings in execution. In the erstwhile Travancore High Court there had been decisions either way both in respect of improvements and in respect of waste. (See VIII T.L.J. 299, 28 T.L.R. 129, 27 T.L.J. 1067, 32 T.L.J. 968, 33 T.L.J. 463 F.B., 2 T.L.J. 478 F.B., 30 T.L.R. 245, 18 T.L.J. 1280, 38 T.L.R. 291, 20 T.L.R. 151, 11 T.L.R. 211, 26 T.L.J. 657 and 1948 T.L.R. 209). The High Court of Allahabad held in A.I.R. 1943 Allahabad 109 that waste committed after decree cannot be considered in execution proceedings. This Court in 1949 K.L.T. 130 took the view that the claim for damage for waste committed after decree cannot be viewed as a question relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree which could be considered in proceedings in execution. These references which are merely illustrative and by no means exhaustive indicate the conflict of judicial opinion upon the question. There does not however appear to be any conflict of opinion on the question as to whether if the property of the decree-holder (land with buildings or trees thereon) decreed to be delivered is wasted by the judgment-debtor, such waste could not be assessed in execution, nor does there seem to have been any instance in which, when the deterioration in or disappearance of the property is occasioned by vis major, the defendant has been rendered liable. Again there does not appear to have been also a case in which it has been held that when the mortgagee or tenant in possession has done acts necessary for the preservation of the property after decree for its delivery, the expenditure incurred in that connection cannot be ascertained and awarded to the mortgagee or tenant in execution before depriving the party of possession. In this case, on the facts without determining the cause of the disappearance of certain trees which, according to the decree-holder, is due to the positive act of the defendant, while according to the latter it is due to vis major, and without also further determining whether the trees whose disappearance is complained of, were the trees of the decree-holder or of the judgment debtor, it is not possible to decide the question. Further, the improvement for which value is claimed by the judgment debtor is, as already stated, claimed to be a work done which was necessary to protect the property in which event, though the judgment-debtor may not be entitled to their value as between a landlord and tenant he would surely be entitled to the costs incurred in effecting the improvements if really they were, and had to be, made for protecting and maintaining the property, which is the contention urged on behalf of the judgment-debtor. A finding upon this question of fact would appear also to be essential for a final disposal of the matter. 17. I do not enter into a discussion of the nice, delicate, and difficult questions above indicated or record a decision as in my view, on the facts, they do not fall to be decided in these Civil Miscellaneous Appeals. In my judgment it is now premature to decide those questions as they would arise only after necessary findings upon the facts are recorded. 18. The learned District Judge having in his discretion thought fit to remand the cases to the Munsiff for recording the necessary findings, it appears to me that interference with his order is not justified unless it is found that the learned Judge has not in fact exercised any discretion or, if he has exercised it, such exercise was capricious or opposed to any principle of law. The order of the District Judge does not appear to be open to any such criticism and that being the case even if another view may be possible, nay preferable, that circumstance will not render interference competent. The parties are entitled to have the benefit of a finding on a question of fact recorded by the trial court, and to have that finding considered by the court of first appeal. If the two courts concur, the party in whose favour there is such a concurrent finding, has an obvious advantage. The parties are entitled to have the benefit of a finding on a question of fact recorded by the trial court, and to have that finding considered by the court of first appeal. If the two courts concur, the party in whose favour there is such a concurrent finding, has an obvious advantage. To compel the District Judge to record a finding without the help of a finding by the Munsiff would be to deprive the parties of the aforesaid advantage for which there is hardly any justification. 19. The reference to the Full Bench being of the two Civil Miscellaneous Appeals themselves and not of particular questions, a decision on the questions indicated in the order is not necessary if they are not found to arise on the facts for, if on the facts the questions do not arise, any decision rendered or opinion given may be relegated to the category of obiter dicta. K.A. Gangadhara Menon, J. These appeals arise out of the orders passed in execution of the decree in O.S. 906 of 1101 of the Vaikom Munsiff’s Court. The assignee-decree-holder is the appellant in both the appeals. The suit was for redemption. The decree in the case was passed on 19.12.1103. Under the decree, the plaintiff was allowed to recover possession of the plaint properties from the 3rd defendant on the deposit in court for payment to the 3rd defendant of Fs. 1217 1/2 towards mortgage money. Rs. 197 Chs. 9.5 Cash towards value of plantations and Rs. 224-12-11 towards value of the building. On 17.11.1118, in continuation of a previous execution application dated 12.3.1112 the assignee-decree-holder filed an execution application for recovery of possession of the properties. In it he alleged that the 3rd defendant committed waste in the properties by cutting and removing trees therefrom after the date of the decree and by allowing the building in respect of which value was awarded under the decree, to go into ruin. The assignee-decree-holder therefore prayed that damages so occasioned may be assessed by the issue of a commission and that he may be permitted to recover possession of the properties on deposit of the amounts due after setting off the damages for waste. The assignee-decree-holder therefore prayed that damages so occasioned may be assessed by the issue of a commission and that he may be permitted to recover possession of the properties on deposit of the amounts due after setting off the damages for waste. This application of 1118 which was filed in the Sherthallai Munsiff’s Court while the case was pending there was since transferred to the Vaikom Munsiff’s Court where it was renumbered as E.P. 892/1120. 3rd defendant filed his objections to this execution application on 10.12.1120, stating that he has not committed any waste that the trees were lost by vis major and that he has effected improvements after the decree for which value has to be paid to him before he is evicted from the properties. A commission to assess waste was issued as prayed for by the assignee-decree-holder and the commissioner submitted his report on 18.7.1121. But before any orders were passed in respect of the claim for damages for waste, the third defendant filed C.M.P. No. 7382 of 1124 dated 12.4.1124 reiterating his claim for value of the trees plainted by him after the date of the decree and praying for the issue of a commission for assessing the value of such plantations. The claim of the 3rd defendant for value of improvements effected after the decree was repelled by the execution court by the following order dated 25.6.1124:- “Heard Vakils. This application to assess the value of improvements effected after decree by the defendant, if any, is opposed by the decree-holder. The execution application was filed on 17.11.1118. The plaintiff took out a commission to assess the waste. In all these years the third defendant has not moved his little finger to assess this. Now in 1124 when the case is to be disposed of after waste is determined by a Commissioner this petition is moved. There is no bonafides to the application except to delay the delivery. Improvements after decree ever if there be any is discountenanced. Thus I do not see my way to allow this application. Hence this is rejected.” On 22.7.1124, the learned Munsiff passed the following order on E.P. 892 of 1120:- “Heard Vakils. Ext. A is the Commission Report for assessing the waste. The Commissioner was examined besides the parties. It is admitted by both sides that some trees have been lost. Thus I do not see my way to allow this application. Hence this is rejected.” On 22.7.1124, the learned Munsiff passed the following order on E.P. 892 of 1120:- “Heard Vakils. Ext. A is the Commission Report for assessing the waste. The Commissioner was examined besides the parties. It is admitted by both sides that some trees have been lost. The defendant would say that it is the act of God while the plaintiff would say that it is wilful. However the commission report is on the whole fair and acceptable with slight modification and I award Rs. 65 Chs. 3 Cash 4 as a rebate for waste. The decree-holder shall deposit the balance forthwith and apply for delivery, failing which the defendant is not liable for any loss. Ordered accordingly.” 2. From both the above orders, the 3rd defendant appealed to the District Court in A.S. 297 of 1124 and A.S. 338 of 1124. A.S. 297 of 1124 was the appeal against the order allowing damages for waste and A.S. 338 of 1124 was the appeal from the order rejecting 3rd defendant’s claim for value of improvements effected after the decree. These appeals were heard together. The learned Judge was of the view that both the claims regarding waste committed in the properties after the date of the decree and regarding the value of improvements effected after the decree are questions which could be gone into in execution. He was also of the view that the learned Munsiff was wrong in awarding damages for waste without considering the question as to whether the destruction of the trees was on account of vis major or due to active waste committed by the mortgagee. Therefore, in one judgment, the learned Judge set aside both the orders of the Munsiff and remanded the execution application for fresh disposal. These appeals by the assignee-decree-holder are directed against the above order of remand. C.M.A. 211 of 1950 is directed against the order in A.S. 297 of 1124 and C.M.A. 212 of 1950 is from the order in A.S. 338 of 1124. 3. When these appeals came before a Division Bench in C.M.A. 212 of 1950, the learned advocate for the appellant contended that the mortgagee is not entitled to claim in execution the value of improvements effected in the property after the date of the decree. 3. When these appeals came before a Division Bench in C.M.A. 212 of 1950, the learned advocate for the appellant contended that the mortgagee is not entitled to claim in execution the value of improvements effected in the property after the date of the decree. For this position he relied on the Full Bench decision of the Travancore High Court reported in 1948 T.L.R. 209. “In view of the fact that the decisions of the Travancore High Court on the point are not uniform and in view of the importance of the question involved” the Division Bench thought it necessary that the question should be considered by a Full Bench for an authoritative ruling. In C.M.A. 211 of 1950 the respondent contended that the decree-holder cannot claim in execution damages for waste committed by the mortgagee after the date of the decree and that the decision in 1948 T.L.R. 209 on this point is not correct. In 1948 T.L.R. 209, the Travancore High Court has held that, “Compensation for waste committed after the date of the decree would come within the scope of the words discharge or satisfaction and that to the extent to which there is diminution in value it should be taken to be a discharge or satisfaction of the decree in favour of the defendant.” But in a decision of this Court reported in 1950 T.C.L.R. 260 (Carlose v. Lakshmikutty Amma), the decision of the Travancore High Court reported in 1945 T.L.R. 972 (Venkita Rao v. Ramachandra Kammath) which took a contrary view was followed. In view of the conflicting decisions on the point the Division Bench considered that the question whether in the case of a decree for redemption of a mortgage the decree-holder can claim in execution damages committed by the mortgagee after the date of the decree should also be authoritatively decided by a Full Bench. Since the fate of the two appeals depended mainly on the answers to the above questions the appeals themselves were referred for decision to the Full Bench. It is in this way that these appeals have come before the Full Bench for decision. 4. Since the fate of the two appeals depended mainly on the answers to the above questions the appeals themselves were referred for decision to the Full Bench. It is in this way that these appeals have come before the Full Bench for decision. 4. It goes without saying that the claim of the assignee-decree-holder for damages for waste committed by the mortgagee after the decree as also the claim of the 3rd defendant to the value of improvements effected after the decree will depend primarily on the preliminary question whether these matters could be agitated at all in execution. If they are foreign to the scope of the enquiry contemplated under S. 47 of the Civil Procedure Code, then they have to be shut out on that preliminary ground and no enquiry on the merits of the claims can be allowed at all in execution. We have therefore to see whether the above two questions regarding improvements effected after the date of the decree and of waste committed by the mortgagee after the date of the decree can be gone into in execution. 5. I shall first take up for consideration C.M.A. 212 of 1950 in which the question whether a mortgagee is entitled to claim in execution the value of improvements that he has effected in the property after the date of the decree is raised. The decree in this case was passed on 19.12.1103. It is worth-while to keep in mind the state of the law regarding mortgage suits that was in force in Travancore at the time when the decree was passed. As stated by His Lordship Padmanabha Kukilliya, C.J., in his leading judgment in the case reported in 1948 T.L.R. 209 at page 214:- “A redemption suit and redemption decree in this State differ from a redemption suit and redemption decree outside Travancore. This difference has led to certain anomalous results. There is no provision for foreclosure in the law as prevails in Travancore and when a mortgagor obtains a decree for redemption it is not open to the mortgagee-defendant to ask for foreclosure nor is it open to him to apply to execute the decree against the mortgagor for the amount declared payable by the decree to the mortgagee. There is no provision for foreclosure in the law as prevails in Travancore and when a mortgagor obtains a decree for redemption it is not open to the mortgagee-defendant to ask for foreclosure nor is it open to him to apply to execute the decree against the mortgagor for the amount declared payable by the decree to the mortgagee. The result is unless the mortgagee himself chooses to file a suit for the mortgage amount and the value of his improvements, he has to face the uncertain situation of the mortgagor some day depositing the mortgage amount and the value of improvements and calling for the surrender of the property, or failing to do the same altogether within the period of limitation allowed by law.” Again at page 216:- “So far as this State is concerned as already pointed out there is no provision for sale or foreclosure. And there is no express provision either for the passing of a preliminary decree and a final decree thereafter after taking accounts between the mortgagor and mortgagee. There is thus no counterpart in our Civil Procedure Code to O. XXXIV, R. 7 of the Indian Civil Procedure Code.” The decree in this case is therefore final and could not be deemed to have left open any question to be worked out in execution. 6. It is a well-recognised principle which is beyond question that the execution court must execute the decree as it stands and according to its terms. The court executing the decree cannot add to or alter the terms of the decree. When the rights of the parties have been finally adjudicated under the decree, the causes of action that were put in suit have merged in the decree and it is the decree that governs the rights of the parties and the execution court has merely to execute the decree as it stands. When the rights of the parties have been finally adjudicated under the decree, the causes of action that were put in suit have merged in the decree and it is the decree that governs the rights of the parties and the execution court has merely to execute the decree as it stands. S. 47 of the Civil Procedure Code however provides that: “All questions arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed, or their representatives, and relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree, shall be determined by the Court executing the decree and not by a separate suit.” Therefore the precise point for consideration in this appeal is whether the claim by the mortgagee for value of improvements effected after the decree can be said to be one relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree in the case. If it is so, then the claim has to be investigated and settled by the court executing the decree. However, it is not a question relating to the execution discharge or satisfaction of the decree, then the 3rd defendant cannot be permitted to agitate the matter in execution. As I have already stated the decree in this case has finally determined the rights of the parties put forward at the trial and has allowed the plaintiff to recover possession of the plaint properties on payment of the mortgage money and the value of improvements specified in the decree. The right to the value of improvements effected after the decree now put forward is an altogether new claim quite unconnected with the rights that have been settled under the decree. It is difficult to see how such a claim can in any sense be taken to be one relating to the execution, discharge, or satisfaction of the decree that was passed and is sought to be executed. It is difficult to see how such a claim can in any sense be taken to be one relating to the execution, discharge, or satisfaction of the decree that was passed and is sought to be executed. It has been argued on the authority of the decision of the Federal Court reported in A.I.R. 1950 Federal Court, page 1 (Subba Rao v. Raju) that it is open to the mortgagor to bring in a second action for redemption of the identical mortgage so long as the mortgage subsists and that therefore in such a suit, the mortgagee can claim value of improvements including that effected after the date of the present decree and that further it is equally open to the mortgagee to file a suit for the mortgage money and value of improvements, in which case also, he will be entitled to obtain the entire value of improvements effected till that time. It is therefore argued that there is no justification in denying the mortgagee in the present execution proceedings what he would be entitled to in actions mentioned above. The question is not whether the mortgagee in possession of the property is entitled to effect improvements in spite of the decree and claim the value thereof in other actions. The question really is whether when a decree for redemption is put in execution the mortgagee can put forward in execution any claims to value of improvements other than those that were awarded under the decree. 7. The learned advocate for the respondent relied on the decisions in 21 Cochin Law Reports 64 (Raman v. Damodaran Namburi) and 22 Cochin Law Reports 159 (Raman v. Damodaran Namburi) in support of his position. But it has to be noted that in the Cochin Tenancy Act XV of 1113, there is a specific provision in S. 5, Cl. 7. The learned advocate for the respondent relied on the decisions in 21 Cochin Law Reports 64 (Raman v. Damodaran Namburi) and 22 Cochin Law Reports 159 (Raman v. Damodaran Namburi) in support of his position. But it has to be noted that in the Cochin Tenancy Act XV of 1113, there is a specific provision in S. 5, Cl. (3) that:- “The amount of compensation for improvements made subsequent to the date up to which compensation for improvements was adjudged in the decree and revaluation of an improvement, for which compensation was so adjudged, when and in so far as such re-valuation may be necessary, with reference to the condition of such improvement at the time of eviction as well as any sum of money accruing due to the plaintiff subsequent to the said date for rent, michavaram or otherwise in respect of the tenancy shall be determined by order of the Court executing the decree and the decree shall be varied in accordance with such order.” Sub-cl. (4) of that section further provides that:- “Every matter arising under Sub-s. [3] shall be deemed to be a question relating to the execution of a decree within the meaning of Sub-s. [1] of S. 41 of the Cochin Code of Civil Procedure [Act XXIX of 1111].” The above statutory provisions clearly empower the court to vary the decree and to treat questions regarding value of improvements after decree and other matters referred to therein as questions relating to execution of a decree within the meaning of sub-s. (1) of S. 41 of the Cochin Civil Procedure Code, corresponding to sub-s. (1) of S. 47 of the Indian Civil Procedure Code. There were similar provisions in the earlier Cochin Tenancy Act also (Act II of 1090) that was repealed under Act XV of 1113. It may also be stated that there is a similar provision in S. 6 of the Malabar Compensation for Tenants’ Improvements Act (Act I of 1900). The decisions of the Cochin High Court and those of the Madras High Court under the Malabar Tenancy Act wherein the question of value of improvements after the decree had been gone into in execution will therefore be of no help to us in the decision of the present case. 8. The decisions of the Cochin High Court and those of the Madras High Court under the Malabar Tenancy Act wherein the question of value of improvements after the decree had been gone into in execution will therefore be of no help to us in the decision of the present case. 8. Our attention has been drawn to the decision of the Travancore High Court reported in 28 T.L.R. 129 (Varki Avira Tharakan v. Raman Nilacantan) which is also a Full Bench decision and to the subsequent decisions of the Travancore High Court reported in 8 T.L.J. 299 (Raman v. Raman), 30 T.L.R. 245 (Vasudevan Vasudevan Namboori v. Iype Iype) 21 T.L.J. 1366 (Aypu v. Padmanabhan Nair) and 26 T.L.J. 657 (Punnan v. Aiyappan) which followed the Full Bench decision in 28 T.L.R. 129. As regards improvements effected after the decree the learned Judges who decided the case the 28 T.T.R. 129 took the view that it is unjust to deny the defendants’ compensation for improvements effected by them after the date of the decree, because according to them it would be unreasonable to say that the defendants ought not to have made any improvements after the date of the decree. It appears to me that such considerations of equity are foreign to the determination of the question in hand. So far as the court executing the decree is concerned it has only to see whether the execution sought for is in terms of the decree in the case and whether the questions agitated in execution are those relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree. 9. In considering the corrrectness of the decision in 28 T.L.R. 129. His Lordship Padmanabha Kukilliya, C.J. in 1948 T.L.R. 209 at page 224 observes as follows:- “In considering however whether the Full Bench decision lays down the correct law it becomes necessary to consider what exactly a decree is and what is the scope of S. 238 of the old Civil Procedure Code. According to the definition of the word ‘decree’ it means the formal expression of an adjudication upon any right claimed or defence set up in a Civil Court when such adjudication so far as regards the Court expressing it decides the suit or appeal. According to the definition of the word ‘decree’ it means the formal expression of an adjudication upon any right claimed or defence set up in a Civil Court when such adjudication so far as regards the Court expressing it decides the suit or appeal. Clearly thus a decree can only relate to an adjudication of a claim, an adjudication of a right already set up or a defence already raised. It does not go beyond, and a right or a claim or a defence which was not available to the party when he joined issues cannot strictly speaking come within the scope of the enquiry resulting in a decree. The definition of a decree therefore does not contemplate things that arose as between the parties subsequent to its being passed. So far as the proceedings in the suit are concerned, the decree terminates them except in cases where any particular matter is by the decree itself provided for as being determinable in execution. A direction to determine anything in execution is really a part of the decree, and the direction is carried out as required by the decree itself; and therefore if such a direction is complied with, any proceedings in execution can be considered only as forming part of the enforcement of the decree. We may next turn to S. 238 of the Civil Procedure Code. According to that section the questions to be determined by order of the Court executing the decree and not by separate suit are [a] questions regarding the amount of mesne profits or interest which the decree has made payable in respect of the subject-matter of a suit between the date of the institution and the execution of the decree or the expiration of three years from the date of the decree, [b] any other questions arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed or their representatives, and relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree or to the stay of execution thereof. A claim for revaluation because of increase in value due to any circumstance and the valuation and awarding of compensation for improvements after decree do not certainly come under Cl. [a] of S. 238. As regards Cl. [b] the question must relate to execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree. A claim for revaluation because of increase in value due to any circumstance and the valuation and awarding of compensation for improvements after decree do not certainly come under Cl. [a] of S. 238. As regards Cl. [b] the question must relate to execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree. The claim for additional value does not relate to the execution of the decree merely because the defendant says he has been improving the property after the decree. This difficulty was realised in Varkey Avira Tharakan v. Raman Neelacantan, 28 T.L.R. 129, and that is why Their Lordships say a liberal interpretation should be given to the understanding of S. 238. What is a liberal interpretation? It should not be an interpretation which is really not an interpretation but a grafting into the section of what is not there.” I am in entire agreement with the above view. If the decree directs redemption of the property on payment of a specific sum by way of value of improvements that gives the right to the decree-holder to execute the decree as it stands and recover possession of the property on payment of the amounts directed under the decree. The question of improvements after decree, being an altogether new and independent claim, is not one relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the particular decree put in execution and is therefore beyond the scope of the enquiry contemplated under S. 47 of the Civil Procedure Code. Further, it is also a claim quite inconsistent with the terms of the decree. To justify the consideration of such a question by the court executing the decree the court has to read into the decree something more than what it really awarded. The decree has to be read as allowing not only the value of improvements adjudicated upon and directed to be paid under the decree but also as allowing the value of improvements that may be effected after the date of the decree. In other words, the decree has to be read by adding some more words to it. This is exactly what the law prohibits when it states that the execution court has to execute the decree as it stands. I am therefore clearly of the view that the mortgagee cannot claim in execution value of improvements effected by him after the date of the decree. This is exactly what the law prohibits when it states that the execution court has to execute the decree as it stands. I am therefore clearly of the view that the mortgagee cannot claim in execution value of improvements effected by him after the date of the decree. I think the decision in 1948 T.L.R. 209 lays down the correct law on the point. 10. In this case, what the 3rd defendant claims is the value of 36 tender coconut plants which he says, he has planted in the property after the date of the decree. He put forward this claim in his objection dated 10.12.1120. But he did not care to pursue it. However when he found that the property was about to be delivered over he put in an application for the issue of a commission nearly four years after his objection petition. Obviously his purpose was to delay the delivery of the properties still further. I entirely agree with the learned Munsiff in his view that the 3rd defendant’s application for the issue of a commission at a very late stage in the case is lacking in good faith. But, this apart, he has no right to claim in execution any value of improvements effected by him after the date of the decree. The claim has therefore been rightly repelled by the learned Munsiff. 11. Now let us turn to C.M.A. 211 of 1950. The first question to be considered here is whether the decree-holder can in execution claim damages for waste committed by the mortgagee after the date of the decree. The answer to this question will depend upon our decision on the further question whether the claim for compensation for waste in the property committed after the date of the decree is a matter relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree within the meaning of those words in S. 47 of the Civil Procedure Code. The decree in the case allows the plaintiff to recover possession of the plaint property on payment of the mortgage money and the value of improvements. When the decree awards recovery of possession of the property, it means that the decree-holder is entitled to get the property in the state in which it was when the decree was passed. The decree in the case allows the plaintiff to recover possession of the plaint property on payment of the mortgage money and the value of improvements. When the decree awards recovery of possession of the property, it means that the decree-holder is entitled to get the property in the state in which it was when the decree was passed. The question, therefore, whether when the property was to be delivered over, it continued to be in the same state or has underwent deterioration is undoubtedly one relating to the execution of the decree. The claim of the decree-holder for compensation for such deterioration on account of active waste committed by the defendant is therefore one relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree and has to be gone into by the court executing the decree under S. 47 of the Civil Procedure Code. This very point arose for decision before the Bombay High Court in Hari v. Sakharam (1923) 25 B.L.R. 499 in which Macleod, C.J. observed:- “But we think that the question with regard to the waste committed the judgment-debtor after decree was a question arising between the parties relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree, and must be determined by the court executing the decree, and not by a separate suit. The appellant is entitled under the decree to the property of which possession was directed to be given to him. If the property has depreciated in value or been damaged since the decree, owing to the wilful action of the defendants, it is a question in execution whether the defendants are liable to make to good the loss.” This decision was followed by the same court in (1925) 27 B.L.R. 687 and subsequent cases. The above dictum in 25 B.L.R. 449 was quoted with approval and followed by the Madras High Court in the case reported in I.L.R. 57 Madras 49. On almost the same lines of reasoning the learned Judges who decided the case in 1948 T.L.R. 209 stated at page 233:- “It appears to be clear that in execution the party entitled to obtain possession of the property is fully within his right to say that he must be placed in possession of the property in the manner in which it was directed to be placed by the decree. Any deterioration caused by the wilful negligence or wilful act of the defendant is something that detracts from the decree and therefore compensation on that account should be provided for, and such compensation would come within the scope of the word ‘discharge’ or ‘satisfaction’. To the extent to which there is a diminution in value it should be taken to be a discharge or satisfaction of the decree as loss has to be adjusted against what is payable under the decree to the defendant. It would be a case of restitution in execution.” I think the above decisions contain a correct statement of the law. I am therefore of the view that the question of damages for waste committed by the mortgagee after the date of the decree is one that has to be determined under S. 47 of the Civil Procedure Code by the court executing the decree. The decision in 1950 T.C.L.R. page 260 to the extent to which it is counter to this view is not correct and is accordingly overruled. 12. The execution court awarded compensation for waste to the extent of Rs. 65 Chs. 3 Cash. 4. That court does not, of course, state the reason that necessitated the modification of the amount stated in the commissioner’s report. For this reason, and also for the reason that there is no finding as to the nature of the waste, the learned Judge thinks that the disposal of the matter by the learned Munsiff was not proper. This induced the learned Judge to set aside the order of the learned Munsiff and send back the case to him for proper disposal. But the parties had adduced all the evidence that they wanted to let in in respect of the question in controversy. The case itself is a very old one and the execution application was pending disposal for nearly 7 years at the time of the order of the learned Judge. In these circumstances, the learned Judge ought to have himself determined the questions on the evidence on record instead of remanding the case. 13. It follows that the appellant is entitled to succeed in both the appeals. In these circumstances, the learned Judge ought to have himself determined the questions on the evidence on record instead of remanding the case. 13. It follows that the appellant is entitled to succeed in both the appeals. Accordingly both the appeals are allowed with costs and the order of remand passed by the learned Judge is set aside and the lower appellate court is directed to readmit the two appeals A.S. 297 of 1124 and A.S. 338/1124 to its file and dispose of them in accordance with law and in the light of the foregoing observations. 14. Since I have had the advantage of perusing the judgment proposed by my learned brother Subramonia Iyer, J. I must add that the two main questions which I have dealt with above do undoubtedly arise for consideration in these appeals and that it was for that reason that the appeals were referred to the Full Bench after formulating the questions involved in clear and unambiguous terms for authoritative decision. As I have already stated in para 4 above, if the questions cannot be agitated at all in execution on account of the fact that they are foreign to the scope of the enquiry contemplated in S. 47 of the Civil Procedure Code, then they have to be shut out on that preliminary ground alone without going into the merits of the claims. It will indeed be idle and waste of judicial time if the execution court is called upon to enquire into the merits of claims which that court has no jurisdiction to entertain. It is precisely this question of the jurisdiction of the execution court to go into the claim put forward by the decree-holder as well as that by the third defendant that is agitated in these appeals and I fail to understand how it could legitimately be said that it is unnecessary or even premature for us to consider it here in these appeals. There is no question of the decisions being “academic” or opinion one being “obiter dicta” if they are on matters that really arise for decision in the case. As stated already, I am unhesitatingly of the view that the questions that are raised in the order of reference and have been argued at considerable length at the bar and which I have considered above do clearly arise for decision in these appeals. As stated already, I am unhesitatingly of the view that the questions that are raised in the order of reference and have been argued at considerable length at the bar and which I have considered above do clearly arise for decision in these appeals. The questions may be nice, delicate, complicated and even highly controversial but it is not right to shelve them when they arise for decision in the cases before the Court. When the order of remand passed by the District Judge is confirmed, it clearly means that the District Judge’s decision that the execution court has jurisdiction to go into the questions agitated in the appeals before him is also confirmed as correct. Therefore, the judgment proposed by my learned brother Subramonia Iyer, J. clearly indicates that he is of the view that the execution court has jurisdiction to go into the consideration of the claims set up both by the assignee-decree-holder and by the 3rd defendant. I regret I have to differ from him to the extent to which his opinions expressed directly and by necessary implications in his judgment are against the conclusions that I have arrived at. K. Sankaran, J. I am in complete agreement with the order proposed by learned brother Gangadhara Menon, J., and also with the answers given by him to the two specific questions raised in the order of reference to the Full Bench. The competency of the court executing the decree for recovery of possession of the property involved in a redemption decree, to entertain the defendant’s claim for compensation for improvements effected in the property subsequent to the date of the decree as well as the decree-holder’s claim for damages on account of waste committed in the property after the date of the decree, has to be determined with reference to the jurisdiction conferred on the execution court by S. 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. So far as the execution of such decrees relating to properties situated within the former State of Cochin is concerned, this question does not really arise for consideration in view of the special enabling provision contained in S. 5 of the Tenancy Act (Act XV of 1113). By Cl. So far as the execution of such decrees relating to properties situated within the former State of Cochin is concerned, this question does not really arise for consideration in view of the special enabling provision contained in S. 5 of the Tenancy Act (Act XV of 1113). By Cl. 3 of S. 5 of that Act the court executing the decree has been empowered to entertain the claim of compensation for improvements made subsequent to the date up to which compensation for improvements has been adjudged in the decree, and to determine the amount of such compensation and to award the same also in favour of the defendant by varying the decree to that extent. So long as such a special statutory provision remains in force, it will govern the execution of decrees coming under it. Since there is no such statute conferring any special jurisdiction on the courts executing decrees relating to the properties situated in the former State of Travancore, the execution of such decrees has to be strictly in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. In some of the decisions of the erstwhile Travancore High Court, these provisions were liberally construed and it was held that claims on account of waste committed and on account of improvements effected subsequent to the date of the decree could be entertained by the court executing the decree, while some other decisions took a contrary view. All these decisions were exhaustively reviewed by a Full Bench of the same Court in Parukutty Amma v. Achuthan (1948 T.L.R. 209) and it was ruled that the execution court is not empowered to award compensation for improvements made after the ultimate decree in the case while the question of waste committed in the property after decree could be gone into by the execution court at matter relating to the execution, discharge and satisfaction of the decree. When the present appeals came up for hearing before the Full Bench, the correctness of the decisions in the above case was challenged on behalf of the respondents. 2. Varki Avira Tharakan v. Raman Nilakantan (28 T.L.R. 129) is the leading case in support of the view that the claim of compensation for improvements effected after decree can be entertained in execution. It is a Full Bench decision and it was followed in a series of later decisions of the same court. 2. Varki Avira Tharakan v. Raman Nilakantan (28 T.L.R. 129) is the leading case in support of the view that the claim of compensation for improvements effected after decree can be entertained in execution. It is a Full Bench decision and it was followed in a series of later decisions of the same court. The grounds stated in support of those decisions are the following. The relationship of mortgagor and mortgagee subsists even after the decree for redemption. Until actual redemption the mortgagee who has acquired an interest in the property is entitled to continue improving the property and it will be unjust and inequitable to permit the decree-holder to get the benefit of all such improvements also without payment of any compensation to the mortgagee. The decree-holder may delay the enforcement of his decree for recovery of possession and it will be to the prejudice of the mortgagee-defendant to abstain from effecting improvements on the property during such interval. To me it appears that such equitable and sentimental considerations have no place in the discharge of the duties by the court called upon to execute the decree. The decree has settled and defined the rights and liabilities of the parties to it in respect of the subject-matter of the suit. The duty of the execution court is to take the decree as it stands and to enforce it without being influenced by equitable and sentimental considerations. There is no reason why this wholesome rule should be allowed to be ignored or departed from in the matter of execution of redemption decrees. Sentimental feelings and notions of equity will vary from individual to individual and as such it will be dangerous and may lead to an uncertainty in respect of claims under decrees of courts if the Judges permit themselves to be influenced by such feelings in transgressing the limits of the jurisdiction defined by S. 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in the matter of execution of decrees, and thereby upsetting rights and liabilities already settled. The question whether a mortgagee-defendant, whose rights and liabilities have thus been settled and defined under the decree, deserves further protection or help is a question of public policy for the consideration of the legislature and not of the court. The question whether a mortgagee-defendant, whose rights and liabilities have thus been settled and defined under the decree, deserves further protection or help is a question of public policy for the consideration of the legislature and not of the court. The learned Judges who took part in the Full Bench decision in Varki Avira Tharakan v. Raman Nilakantan (28 T.L.R. 129) were conscious of these aspects of the question, and that appears to be the reasons which induced them to hold that by liberally construing S. 238 of the Code of Civil Procedure which was then in force (corresponding to the present S. 47) the claim for improvements made after decree can be entertained in execution. 3. However liberally one may construe S. 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure there can be no doubt that the jurisdiction of the execution court has to be confined to the consideration of the questions expressly permitted by the section itself. The section says that:- “All questions arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed, or their representatives and relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree, or to the stay of execution thereof, shall be determined by the court executing the decree, and not by a separate a suit.” The decree referred to is undoubtedly the decree that is sought to be executed. Such a decree in a redemption suit where the mortgagee defendant had claimed payment of the full redemption price inclusive of compensation for all his improvements in the mortgaged property, is passed after an adjudication of all his claims. The decree directs the payment to the mortgagee-defendant of the full amount of the redemption price as fixed by the decree as a condition precedent to the recovery of possession of the property by the decree-holder. When the decree-holder deposits the amount in court and seeks recovery of possession of the property can the defendant resist delivery and contend that he must be paid something more towards compensation for his improvements in the property before he is evicted? Can the execution court entertain any such claim as a question relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree sought to be executed? The answer can only be in the negative. Can the execution court entertain any such claim as a question relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree sought to be executed? The answer can only be in the negative. The inevitable result of entertaining a claim of compensation for improvements made after decree, will be to enhance the redemption price already fixed by the decree. Such an enhancement of the amount payable by the decree-holder to the defendant in the case cannot certainly be a question relating to the discharge or satisfaction of the decree. It cannot also be a question relating to the execution of the decree. On the otherhand, it is a question of passing a fresh decree after revising and modifying the decree sought to be executed. The function of the execution court is to accept the decree as it stands and to enforce it. The execution court has no power to revise or modify the decree or to substitute a decree of its own in place of the decree which the decree-holder seeks to execute. On a proper execution petition being presented by the decree-holder the court is bound to execute the decree as it stands except in cases where it is found that the decree is void and destitute of all legal effect or that the decree has become barred by the law of limitation. The execution court will be acting in excess of its jurisdiction if it entertains a claim by the defendant for additional amount of compensation on account of improvements effected after decree. To entertain such a claim would be a virtual denial of the decree-holder’s right to have the decree enforced. The court will also cease to function as an execution court and will be usurping the function of the trial court in the matter of adjudicating upon claims of compensation for improvements. By the time one such claim is adjudicated upon, another claim may be forthcoming in respect of still later improvements and the process may go on for any length of time so much so the execution court may not get any opportunity to perform its normal and legitimate duty of executing the decree. If only the execution court would confine its activities to the discharge of its normal and legitimate duties in the matter of executing the decree as it stands, the litigation would reach its natural termination within a reasonable time. If only the execution court would confine its activities to the discharge of its normal and legitimate duties in the matter of executing the decree as it stands, the litigation would reach its natural termination within a reasonable time. If the parties to a decree have acquired fresh rights and have incurred fresh liabilities subsequent to the date of the decree, they will have to work out such rights and liabilities by resorting to fresh and independent proceedings. The legislature in the former State of Cochin as well as the Madras Legislature desired these matters also to be settled during the course of the execution of the decree already in existence. At the same time they felt convinced that the execution court’s power under the Code of Civil Procedure would not enable such a court to grant any relief to the parties by varying and modifying the terms of the decree. Accordingly special statutory powers in that direction were conferred on the execution court, as per Cl. 3 of S. 5 of the Cochin Tenancy Act (Act XV of 1113) and as per Cl. 3 of S. 6 of the Madras Compensation for Tenants Improvements Act (Act I of 1900). These provisions specially empower the execution court to entertain claims for compensation for improvements made even after decree and award the amount of such additional compensation also and thus to vary the decree sought to be executed. Thus, so far as these redemption decree are concerned, the court executing the decree is allowed to function as a trial court as well for the limited purpose already mentioned. Whether right or wrong, desirable or undesirable, the power is there as conferred by the special statute, and the execution court has to exercise it and to grant the relief contemplated. It is only a matter of procedure. In Cl. 4 of the sections mentioned above, it is stated that every matter arising under Cl. 3 shall be deemed to be a question relating to the execution of the decree. To say the question of passing an order under Cl. 3 varying the terms of the decree must be deemed to be a question relating to the execution of the decree, appears to be a contradiction in terms. Even without recourse to such a fiction the end desired can be achieved by exercising the special power conferred on the execution court by Cl. 3 varying the terms of the decree must be deemed to be a question relating to the execution of the decree, appears to be a contradiction in terms. Even without recourse to such a fiction the end desired can be achieved by exercising the special power conferred on the execution court by Cl. 3 of the section, to vary the decree and then to enforce the decree as varied. But this can be done only in the case of decrees coming under these special statutes. In other cases the execution court cannot in any manner interfere with the decree, but can only execute the decree as it stands and can entertain and determine only the questions relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree, as contemplated by S. 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 4. The question of compensation for waste committed by the mortgagee defendant subsequent to the date of the decree, stands on an entirely different footing. It is not any fresh claim which the execution court is called upon to entertain and adjudicate upon. The claim is one which directly arises under the decree sought to be executed. The decree has created reciprocal obligations on both parties. The decree-holder has to pay the redemption price as fixed by the decree, to the mortgagee-defendant who is to surrender possession of the property in the condition in which it stood at the time of the decree, i.e., the property together with all the items of improvements for which compensation has been awarded under the decree. The disappearance of any of these items on account of the waste committed by the defendant, means, that he is not in a position to hand over possession of the property in the same condition as contemplated by the decree. The decree-holder is entitled to have a reduction in the amount adjudged to be paid to the defendant to the extent of the damages caused to the property as a result of the waste committed by the defendant and the consequent disappearance of some items of improvements taken into account while passing the decree. This is really not a case of awarding any compensation for such waste, but is only an adjustment and satisfaction of the cross claims under the decree. This is really not a case of awarding any compensation for such waste, but is only an adjustment and satisfaction of the cross claims under the decree. It is undoubtedly a question relating to the execution, discharge and satisfaction of the decree, and as such it is perfectly within the competence of the execution court to entertain and decide that question under S. 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In fact it is a question which has to be determined by the Court executing the decree, and cannot be left to be determined in a fresh suit. 5. The Full Bench decision in Parukutty Amma v. Achuthan (1948 T.L.R. 209) on both the questions dealt with above, is correct and that decision is accordingly affirmed. The view taken in Carlose v. Lakshmikutty Amma (1950 T.C.L.R. 260) that the question of waste committed by the mortgagee defendant subsequent to the date of the decree, cannot be determined by the court executing the decree, is incorrect and unsupportable. To that extent the decision in that case is overruled. 6. In view of the answers given above to the two questions of law pointedly referred to the Full Bench, there is no necessity at all to remand the case to the execution court for conducting any enquiry as to the nature and extent of the improvements stated to have been effected after the date of the decree. Since the claim on that account cannot be entertained by the execution court, any enquiry in that direction will be a sheer waste of the time of the court and an unjustifiable delay in the termination of the proceedings in execution. For determining the question of waste, the required evidence has already been recorded and the lower appellate court has only to consider such evidence and to decide whether the finding of the execution court requires modification and, if so, to what extent. Thus I am unable to agree with the view of my learned brother Subramonia Iyer, J., that the District Judge’s remand order has to be upheld. The effect of confirming that order is to hold that the execution court is competent to entertain the claims on account of improvements effected and waste committed after decree. Thus I am unable to agree with the view of my learned brother Subramonia Iyer, J., that the District Judge’s remand order has to be upheld. The effect of confirming that order is to hold that the execution court is competent to entertain the claims on account of improvements effected and waste committed after decree. The reasons which have weighed with my learned brother in coming to such a conclusion are fully set forth in his judgment which I had the privilege to read. I could not persuade myself to be convinced of the acceptability of those reasons. I do not also share my learned Brother’s view that in these appeals it is not necessary to give a decision on the questions raised in the order of reference and that any decision given may be relegated to the category of obiter dicta. When specific questions of law are referred to a Full Bench for decision, the Full Bench is bound to give its verdict on those questions, irrespective of any consideration as to whether the questions, are separately and independently referred or whether the questions, are referred along with the case which gave rise to the order of reference. Where the case is also referred the Full Bench will have to decide the case in the light of the answers to the questions referred and on a consideration of the evidence on record. Even if the questions of law referred to the Full Bench for decision do not strictly arise from the facts of the case, the decision of the Full Bench on those questions can never be relegated to the position of obiter dicta. On the other hand, the decision will have to be accepted as the authoritative ruling of the Full Bench on the questions which it was expressly called upon to decide. The Full Bench will be failing in its duty if it refuses or declines to exercise the jurisdiction conferred on it in respect of that matter by the relevant statutes. Allowed.