ORDER The appellant is a dealer in imported goods and also in goods other than imported. For the periods notes below, he was assessed on the date noted against each to payment of tax similarly noted :- S. Period of Date of Tax assessed. No. assessment assessment. 1. 1 - 6 - 1947 to 12 - 11 - 1947 20 - 7 - 1948 Rs. 118-10-0 2. 13 - 11 - 1947 to 31 - 10 - 1948 26 - 4 - 1950 " 316-2-6 3. 1 - 11 - 1948 to 21 - 10 - 1949 21 - 2 - 1951 " 438-8-0 --------------- 10 - 7 - 1951 On 28th July, 1951, he made an application to the Sales Tax Officer for refund of the entire amount of tax paid by him for all the three periods. In making the application he relied on the High Court's judgment in Ayodhyaprasad v. The State ([1951] 2 S.T.C. 44; I.L.R. 1951 Nag. 188) delivered on 12th September, 1950. According to this judgment, "there is no liability by an importer to pay tax if the sale price of imported goods is less than Rs. 5,000 and the turnover does not exceed Rs. 25,000". From a report which the Sales Tax Officer submitted to the Assistant Commissioner on 19th September, 1951, it is clear that during every one of the three years 1946-47, 1947-48 and 1948-49 the sale price of imported goods sold by the appellant was below Rs. 5,000 and similarly the turnover was below Rs. 25,000. The only point for consideration (in this appeal which is against the Commissioner's order rejecting the application for refund) is whether the appellant could claim and be granted the benefit of a legal decision given in a case to which he was no party. 2. At this stage it is necessary to distinguish between the claims for refund in respect of the three periods. Claims for refund are permissible under Section 13 of the Act, the proviso to which prescribes a time-limit within which such claims should be lodged. The time allowed is twelve months from the date of the order of assessment or six months from the date on which the order is finalised, as a result of appeal, revision, review or reference. Claims for refund are permissible under Section 13 of the Act, the proviso to which prescribes a time-limit within which such claims should be lodged. The time allowed is twelve months from the date of the order of assessment or six months from the date on which the order is finalised, as a result of appeal, revision, review or reference. In this case, none of the three orders of assessment formed the subject of appeal, revision, review or reference; that being so, the claim for refund of the assessment made for the first two periods is clearly time-barred under Section 13. In regard to the assessment for the third period, the order was passed on 21st February, 1951, but was communicated on 10th July, 1951, the case in the mean-while being was apparently kept pending for consideration of the effects on it (as on other cases of the kind) of the High Court's judgment in Ayodhyaprasad v. The State ([1951] 2 S.T.C. 44; I.L.R. 1951 Nag. 188). The claim for refund having been lodged on 28th July, 1951, it was within the time-limit prescribed, so far as the assessment for the third period was concerned. 3. The learned counsel for the State has cited a Privy Council ruling, Commissioner of Income-tax v. Tribune Trust ([1948] 16 I.T.R. 214; A.I.R. 1948 P.C. 102), in support of the view that the benefit of the High Court's decision given in a totally different case cannot be granted to the appellant. That view is undoubtedly correct. In the case cited, the same assessee, it was held, could not claim for other years the benefit of a decision he had obtained in his own favour for a certain year when he had failed to avail himself of the remedies provided by the law in regard to the assessment of those other years (that assessment having been made prior to the favourable decision.) The position, if anything, would be far less favourable for a totally different assessee. And, therefore, in the present case the Commissioner was justified in rejecting the claim for refund made after limitation had expired, nor was he under any obligation to reopen the case in review suo motu or otherwise. The Privy Council's decision, however, cannot in my view justify the action of the Commissioner in rejecting outright the claim for refund made in respect of the assessment for the third period. The Privy Council's decision, however, cannot in my view justify the action of the Commissioner in rejecting outright the claim for refund made in respect of the assessment for the third period. That claim was lodged within time and deserved examination on merits. Such examination should certainly take into account the legal position created by the High Court's decision. 4. The position then briefly is that the learned Commissioner's order is upheld in so far as the claim for refund of the assessment made for the first two periods is concerned; but in regard to the third period, the case is remanded to him for examining on merits the claim made by the appellant. Ordered accordingly.