Judgment Das, J. 1. This second appeal by the plaintiff raises the question whether an order of the Commissioner, dated the 2nd of November 1950, in an appeal preferred under Sec.18 of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947, was without jurisdiction. 2. The question has arisen on the following facts. The respondent is the owner landlord of a double-storied house bearing holding No. 124, Circle No. 4, standing on the Sinha Library Road in the town of Patna. The appellant occupied three rooms on the ground-floor of the house. On the 17th of July 1948, the respondent applied to the Controller, under Sub-section (3) of Sec.11 of the aforesaid Act, for an order of eviction against the appellant on the ground that he required the rooms in question reasonably and in good faith for his own occupation. For convenience this ground has been described as the ground of personal necessity. This application was dismissed by the Controller on the 23rd of December 1948. There was an appeal under Sec.18 of the Act, and the Additional Commissioner of Patna Division upheld the order of the Controller on the 13th of May 1949, and rejected the appeal. On the 31st of October 1949, the respondent again applied to the Controller for an order of eviction against the appellant on three grounds, (a) non-payment of rent, (b) breach of a condition of the tenancy, and (c) personal necessity in accordance with the provisions of Sub-section (3) referred to above. By his order dated the 16th of May 1949, the Controller allowed the application on the ground that there was a breach of a condition of the tenancy, which gave the landlord the right to ask for eviction of the tenant. The learned Controller negatived the plea of nonpayment of rent. On the plea of personal necessity, the learned Controller held that his previous decision created the bar of res judicata. There was then an appeal to the Commissioner by the present appellant against the order of eviction passed by the controller. This appeal was disposed of by the learned Commissioner by his order dated the 2nd of November 1950. The learned Commissioner upheld the contention of the appellant that there was no breach of the condition of the tenancy, which would give the landlord the right to ask for an eviction of the tenant. This appeal was disposed of by the learned Commissioner by his order dated the 2nd of November 1950. The learned Commissioner upheld the contention of the appellant that there was no breach of the condition of the tenancy, which would give the landlord the right to ask for an eviction of the tenant. He, however, held that the learned Controller was wrong in his view that his previous decision on the plea of personal necessity created the bar of res judicata, and he expressed the view that personal necessity might change from time to time and would depend on the circumstances existing at the time. The operative portion of the order of the learned Commissioner was expressed in the following terms: "I would, therefore, remand the case for further enquiry and decision by the Controller on the point of personal necessity." We are told that the Controller then decided the case afresh, passed an order of eviction against which the appellant appealed unsuccessfully. 3 The present appellant then brought a suit for a declaration that the order of the Commissioner was without jurisdiction. The suit was dismissed by the learned Munsif. An appeal against the decision of the learned Munsif was dismissed by the learned Subordinate Judge. 4. As I have already stated, the principal question for decision is if the order of the Commissioner dated the 2nd of November 1950 was without jurisdiction. In order to appreciate the points urged on behalf of the appellant in support of the contention that the order of the Commissioner was without jurisdiction, it is necessary to read some sections of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act. 1947, Sec.11 deals with the eviction of tenants. It mentions the grounds on which a tenant in possession of any building is liable to be evicted. Sub-section (3) (a) states: "A landlord may apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the land- lord in possession of a building if he requires it reasonably and in good faith for his own occupation or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the building is held by him;" Sec.18 provides for an appeal against the order of the Controller, Section 18 reads: "18. (1) Any person aggrieved by an order passed by the Controller may, within fifteen days from the date of receipt of such order by him, prefer an appeal in writing to the Commissioner of the Division. (2) On such appeal being preferred, the Commissioner shall send for the records of the case from the Controller and after examining such record and, if necessary, after making such further inquiry as he thinks fit either personally or through the Controller shall decide the appeal. (3) The decision of the Commissioner and subject only to such decision, an order of the Controller shall be final, and shall not be liable to be questioned in any Court of law, whether in a suit or other proceedings by way of Appeal or revision." I may state here that Sec.18 was further amended in March 1951 by Bihar Act V of 1951. I am reading the section as it stood on the day on which the learned Commissioner disposed of the appeal filed by the present appellant. Sec.22 of the Act states that Controller shall summarily reject any application which raises substantially the same issues as have been heard and finally decided in a former proceeding under the Act between the same parties or between the parties under whom they or any of them claim. Sec.23 lays down that no suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding shall lie against any person for anything which is in good faith done or intended to be done in pursuance of any order made or deemed to have been made under the Act. 5. Learned Counsel for the appellant has placed great reliance on Sub-sections (2) and (3) of Sec.18 of the Act. The first point he has urged in support of his contention that the order of the Commissioner was without jurisdiction is the following. He has pointed out that the Controller found against the respondent on the pleas of non-payment of rent and personal necessity, though he passed an order of eviction on the third ground of a breach of a condition of the tenancy; and the present respondent did not prefer any appeal against the findings of the Controller on the two pleas of non-payment of rent and personal necessity. The point urged by learned Counsel is that the findings of the Controller on those points became final by reason of the provisions of Sub-section (3) of Sec.18 and Sec.22 and it was not open to the Commissioner to go behind those findings. Learned Counsel has referred to certain decisions where, dealing with the Code of Civil Procedure, it was pointed out that, though the provisions of that Code gave a right of appeal only from a decree as defined in the Code, it was justifiable, and even necessary, to read in the provisions of the Code an implication in favour of suitable exceptions; & a party in whose favour a decree was passed might, nevertheless, have a right of appeal against a finding adverse to him Hara Chandra V/s. Bhola Nath, 39 Cal W N 567. In my opinion, an answer to the argument of learned Counsel for the appellant is furnished by the words of Sec.18 itself. Sub-section (1) of Sec.18 allows an appeal to any person aggrieved by an order passed by the Controller. I emphasise the word "order" in the sub-section. The Section does not speak of an appeal against a finding; it speaks of an appeal against an order. Again Sub-section (3) states that an order of the Controller shall be final subject to the decision of the Commissioner. Sub-section (3) does not state that an adverse finding of the Controller shall be final as between the parties. As to Sec.22 which enacts the principle of res judicata, the point to remember is that the issue in the two proceedings must be substantially the same; in cases based on recurring causes of action, such as personal necessity the change in circumstances may change the issue. 6. In the case before us, the order of the Controller was wholly in favour of the respondent. The respondent had asked for an order of eviction of any one of the three grounds. The Controller accepted one of the grounds and gave the order of eviction which the respondent asked for. 6. In the case before us, the order of the Controller was wholly in favour of the respondent. The respondent had asked for an order of eviction of any one of the three grounds. The Controller accepted one of the grounds and gave the order of eviction which the respondent asked for. In these circumstances, it is impossible to accept the contention that it was obligatory on the respondent to prefer an appeal to the Commissioner against certain adverse findings, or that if he did not prefer an appeal against certain adverse findings, they became final as between the parties, or that those findings precluded the Commissioner from deciding the appeal in the way he thought fit. The first point urged on behalf of the appellant must, therefore, be overruled. 7. Learned Counsel for the appellant has submitted that the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947, is a self-contained Act, and it would be wrong to import the provisions of other Acts, such as the Transfer of Property Act or the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, into the said Act. Learned Counsel has placed reliance on certain observations made in Brij Raj Krishna V/s. S.K. Shaw, 1951 S C R 145. If the principle underlying some of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure could be invoked in aid of the respondent, it was open to the respondent to support the order of eviction on a ground decided against him. But leaving aside the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, I think that the words of Sub-section (1) and Sub-section (3) of Sec.18 of the Act negative the contention of learned Counsel for the appellant, and Sec.22 did not preclude the Commissioner from re-opening the issue of personal necessity. 8. Next, learned Counsel has contended that the only jurisdiction which the Commissioner possessed was to decide the appeal; he had no jurisdiction to pass an order of remand. It is pointed out that under Sub-section (2) of Sec.18 of the Act the Commissioner had merely the power to decide the appeal. It is contended that the power to decide the appeal meant two powers only; (a) the power to allow the appeal, and (b) power to dismiss the appeal. It is pointed out that under Sub-section (2) of Sec.18 of the Act the Commissioner had merely the power to decide the appeal. It is contended that the power to decide the appeal meant two powers only; (a) the power to allow the appeal, and (b) power to dismiss the appeal. It is further contended, on the words of Sub-section (2), that the final decision must be that of the Commissioner and he had no power to ask the Controller to give a fresh decision. 9. In my opinion, the argument of learned Counsel for the appellant is based on a misconception as to the distinction between the existence of jurisdiction and the exercise of jurisdiction. Learned Counsel for the appellant cannot dispute, nor has he disputed, that the Commissioner had jurisdiction to hoar the appeal which the appellant had filed against the order of eviction passed by the Controller. The contention of learned Counsel for the appellant is that the Commissioner had jurisdiction to hear the appeal, but the order which he passed was a wrong order, as it was not in consonance with the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Sec.18 of the Act. The distinction between existence of jurisdiction and exercise of jurisdiction was very clearly brought oat in a Full Bench case of this Court, Ramranbijaya Prasad Singh V/s. Ramkamal Upadhya, 26 Pat 748 (FB), in which the leading judgment was given by my, learned brother. It was pointed out there that a different question arose when it was suggested that a court in the exercise of the jurisdiction which it possessed had not acted according to the mode prescribed by the statute. It was stated that if such a question was raised, it related obviously not to the existence of jurisdiction but to the exercise of it in an irregular or illegal manner. Assuming, therefore, that the learned Commissioner passed an order which was not quite legal, cither because he went wrong on the plea of res judicata or because he misconstrued Sub-section (2) of Sec.18, it does not by any means follow that his order was without jurisdiction. 10. There is another way of looking at the question. It is true that Sub-section (2) does not in express terms give the power of remand. 10. There is another way of looking at the question. It is true that Sub-section (2) does not in express terms give the power of remand. Learned Counsel for the appellant has drawn our attention to Sec.107, Code of Civil Procedure, which expressly gives the appellate Court a power to remand a case. Learned Counsel has also referred us to various rules in Order 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure. His contention is that, in the absence of express provisions, Sub-section (2) of Sec.18 of the Act must be construed as excluding the power of remand. The words of Sub-section (2) must, I think, be construed in their ordinary grammatical sense, in consonance with reason and commonsense. Sub-section (2) states that the Commissioner shall, after examining the record and, if necessary, after making such further enquiry as he thinks fit, either personally or through the Controller, decide the appeal. The important words are "decide the appeal". It cannot be said that in the case before us the Commissioner failed to decide the appeal; in effect he set aside the order of eviction and sent the case back to the Controller for a fresh decision on the plea of personal necessity. I do not understand why it should be inferred from the words of Sub-section (2) of Sec.18 that an order of remand is not one of the ways of deciding an appeal and why the Commissioner should be restricted to two kinds of orders only, namely, only allowing the appeal or dismissing the appeal. There was some argument before us that the commissioner could not delegate his power to the Controller and the final decision had to be made by the Commissioner. I do not see how any question of delegation at all arises in this case. The Commissioner had decided the appeal and he had not delegated the power to decide the appeal to anybody; nor had he failed to give his own decision in the appeal. All that he had done was to decide the appeal in a particular way, namely, by setting aside the order of eviction and sending the case back for a fresh decision by the Controller. In my opinion, the order of the Commissioner was not in violation of the terms of Sub-section (2) of Section 18 of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947. 11. In my opinion, the order of the Commissioner was not in violation of the terms of Sub-section (2) of Section 18 of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947. 11. Learned Counsel for the appellant placed reliance on a decision of the Madras High Court in N.K. Sagu Abdul Khadir V/s. A.K. Murthy, AIR 1948 Mad 235. The facts of that case were entirely different. There the learned Chief Judge of the Court of Small Causes, who was the appellate authority under the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, dismissed an appeal and then set aside the order he had previously passed on the ground that there was sufficient cause for non-appearance of the appellant. In those circumstances it was pointed out that where the rules of procedure made under the Act had been followed and service which those rules required was effected, the appellate authority had no jurisdiction to set aside his order because he was later impressed and accepted that the respondent did not know of the date or of the fact of the hearing of the appeal. It was pointed out that the material provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure had not been made applicable to the proceedings under the Control Act; and, in the absence of incorporation of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure in the rules of procedure for the tribunals under the Control Act, there was no justification for the application of the principles of those provisions. In the case before us, the learned Commissioner did not incorporate or import into the Control Act the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure; he merely decided the appeal in the way he thought fit. 12. For the reasons given above, it is clear to me that the contention of learned Counsel for the appellant that the order of the Commissioner dated the 2nd November 1950, was without jurisdiction is not tenable. The Courts below were right in dismissing the suit which the appellant had brought. Accordingly, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Ramaswami, J. 13 I agree.