JUDGMENT & ORDER : The applicants Panna Lal and Bishan Dayal have been convicted by the Additional District Magistrate of Ouna for an offence under S.7(1), Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 and sentenced to imprisonment till the rising of the Court and to pay a fine of Rs.500 each. The learned Sessions Judge of Guna maintained the conviction and sentence in an appeal preferred by the accused persons against their convictions and sentences. 2. The charge against the applicants was that on 30-1-51, they sold to one Ram Narayan a pair of dhoti for Rs.16/- that is, in excess of the control price Rs.13-2-9 and thus contravened the provisions of Cl.15, Madhya Bharat Cotton Textile (Control) Order, 1948, issued under the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act of 1946. 3. The main contention of Mr. Dey the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the applicants is that in this case the fact that the control price of the dhoti alleged to have been sold by the applicant was Rs.13-2-9, has not at all been proved by the prosecution. It is said that the notification of the Textile Commissioner under Cl.12, Cotton Textile Control Order by which the maximum price of Dhotis of the type alleged to have been sold by the applicant was fixed at Rs.13-2-9 has not been proved. In my opinion, this contention is well-founded and must be accepted. 4. The Madhya Bharat Cotton Textile Control Order 1946 is an order issued under S.3(1), Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946. Clause 15 of the Textile Control Order provides in sub-Cl.(1) that no manufacturer shall sell or offer to sell any cloth or yarn at a price higher than the maximum price specified in this behalf under Cl.13 which is as follows: "The Textile Commissioner may by notification in the Madhya Bharat Government Gazette specify: (a) The maximum price ex-factory, wholesale and retail at which any class or specification of cloth or yarn or cloth or yarn of any particular origin may be sold." 5. Section 7(1), Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act prescribes the penalty for contravention of orders made under S.3(1) of the Act. Section 7(1), Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act prescribes the penalty for contravention of orders made under S.3(1) of the Act. It is thus clear that when a person is charged under S.7 of the Act for having contravened Cl.15, Madhya Bharat Cotton Textile (Control) Order for selling cloth in excess of the maximum price notified by the Textile Commissioner, one of the essential ingredients of the crime that has to be proved is the maximum price notified by the Textile Commissioner. This fact has to be proved in accordance with the provisions of the Evidence Act. In the present case, the maximum price of the dhotis has not been admitted by the accused. Nor is it a fact in regard to the existence of which a presumption can be drawn under the Evidence Act. The notification issued by the Textile Commissioner specifying the maximum price was also not produced and proved. That being so, it cannot clearly be held that the maximum price of the dhoti said to have been sold by the applicant Ram Narayan was Rs.13-2-9. 6. The learned Government Advocate frankly admits that the notification of the Textile Commissioner was not produced and proved in this case. But he contends relying on - Public Prosecutor v. Illur Thippayya', AIR 1949 Mad 459, that the notification issued by the Textile Commissioner being an 'order' is within the definition of "Indian Law" given in Cl.27(a) of S.3, General Clauses Act and that, therefore, under S.57, Evidence Act the Court can take judicial notice of the notification. In my view this contention must be rejected. It has already been held by a Divi-sion Beach of this Court in - 'Criminal Appeal No.37 of 1951, the State v. Baehu Lal', where the accused was charged with the same offence as here, that judicial notice cannot be taken of a notification issued by the Textile Commissioner under Cl.13, Cotton Textile Order specifying the maximum price of the cloth. The decision in - 'AIR 1949 Mad 459' has no applicability to the present case. It appears from the report of the case that in the Madras case the question at issue was of the proof of certain orders made by the Government under S.3(1), Essential Supplies Act and not of the proof of any notification issued by the competent authority under any of those orders. It appears from the report of the case that in the Madras case the question at issue was of the proof of certain orders made by the Government under S.3(1), Essential Supplies Act and not of the proof of any notification issued by the competent authority under any of those orders. It was held in the Madras case that an order issued by the Government under S.3(1), Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act 1946 was an "Indian Law" as defined by the General Clauses Act in S.3, Cl.(27a). *There can be no doubt that an order made under S.3(1), Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act 1946 falls within the definition of "Indian Law" given in S.3 Cl.(27a), General Clauses Act. But here the question is not of the proof of the Madhya Bharat Textile Control Order but of the proof of a notification issued by the Textile Commissioner under Cl.15 of that Order. Such a notification is clearly an executive order and cannot be said to be included in the definition given in the General Clauses Act of the words "Indian Law". The word 'order' which occurs in S.3 Cl.(27a), General Clauses Act has to be construed in the context in which it is used. "Law, ordinance, order, bye-law, rule or regulation passed or made at any time by any competent legislature, authority, or person in India", mean legislative provisions. The difference between law, ordinance, order, bye-law, rule or regulation is based on the difference between the authorities passing or making them. In the strict sense of the word a law is made by the legislature; an Ordinance is issued by the President, the Governor or the Raj Pramukh as the case may be; an order is made by a competent authority; a bye-law is passed by a statutory authority competent in that behalf. Again, rules and regulations have been defined in Cls.(46) and (47) of S.3, General Clauses Act. It is thus clear that the word "order" is used in S.3(27a), General Clauses Act in the sense of a Legislative Order and not an executive order. This view about the meaning of the word 'order' as used in S.3 Cl.(27a) is in accord with the view taken by the Bombay High Court in - 'Shripad Amrit v. Harsiddhbhai Divatia', AIR 1948 Bom 20. *Now S.3, Cl.(29) -Ed. 7. This view about the meaning of the word 'order' as used in S.3 Cl.(27a) is in accord with the view taken by the Bombay High Court in - 'Shripad Amrit v. Harsiddhbhai Divatia', AIR 1948 Bom 20. *Now S.3, Cl.(29) -Ed. 7. It must also be noted that under the last paragraph of the explanation to S.57 a Court may refuse to take judicial notice of any fact unless and until the person who desires that judicial notice of the fact may be taken, produces any such book or document as the Court may consider necessary to enable it to do so. In the present case the notification, a mere production of which would have been sufficient to prove it under S.78, Evidence Act, was never produced before the trial Magistrate. In these circumstances I think the Courts below were not justified in taking it for granted that the maximum price of the dhotis alleged to have been sold by the applicants to Ram Narayan was Rs,13-2-9. 8. For the above reasons I accept the revision petition and set aside the convictions and sentences imposed on each of the applicants. The amount of fine, if already paid by the applicant, shall be refunded to them.