A. AHMADJI BHAI v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH — 1952 DIGILAW 89 (BOM)

ORDER This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. The petitioner is a dealer in petrol and lubricants at Raipur. In April, 1948, he started selling "High Speed Diesel Oil." Between April, 1948, and the 20th October, 1949, the petitioner paid sales tax thereon amounting to Rs. 1,841-13-0 at the rate of 0-0-6 per rupee. In October, 1949, he was informed by Messrs. Burma Shell Co., Calcutta, through whom he receives supplies of diesel oil, that he was liable to pay thereon 12 1/2 per cent. tax under the Central Provinces and Berar Sales of Motor Spirit and Lubricants Taxation Act, 1938. He therefore, started crediting the tax at the aforesaid rate in the Government Treasury at Raipur. On 5th March, 1952, the petitioner received a notice from the District Excise Officer, Raipur, demanding payment from him of the sum of Rs. 7,597-8-0 on account of the tax leviable in respect of the sales made by the petitioner during the years 1948, 1949, 1950. According to the petitioner he is not liable to pay the amount and that the provisions of the Act of 1938 do not apply to the sale of diesel oil. On behalf of the petitioner the liability of the petitioner was challenged on three grounds. They are :- (i) that "diesel oil" is not "motor spirit" as defined in Section 2(c) of the Central Provinces and Berar Sales of Motor Spirit and Lubricants Taxation Act, 1938; (ii) that the aforesaid Act must be deemed to have been repealed by the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947; and (iii) that the petitioner having already paid the sales tax on the sales made by him during the period mentioned in the notice, the demand of the tax under the Act of 1938 was not legal. During the course of the arguments the learned Advocate-General stated on behalf of the State Government that the Government would give the petitioner due credit for the sales tax already received by them and that the amount specified in the demand made by the District Excise Officer would be pro tanto reduced. In view of this statement the learned counsel for the petitioner stated that he did not wish to press the third point. We would therefore confine our decision to the first and second points. In view of this statement the learned counsel for the petitioner stated that he did not wish to press the third point. We would therefore confine our decision to the first and second points. The definition of "motor spirit" in Section 2(c) of the Act of 1938 is as follows :- "'motor spirit' means any inflammable hydrocarbon (including any mixture of hydrocarbons or any liquid containing hydrocarbon) which is ordinarily used for providing reasonable efficient motive power for any form of motor vehicle." According to the learned counsel a fuel oil cannot be regarded as motor spirit unless it is shown that it is "ordinarily" used for providing motive power for each and every kind of motor vehicle. He conceded that diesel oil is ordinarily used for running certain special types of vehicles including motor buses and trucks but he said that that was not sufficient to bring the oil within the definition of "motor spirit". He would have us give the adjective "any" the meaning "each and every". Admitting that the word "any" is capable of being used to mean "no matter what" he says that where, as here, there is an ambiguity the interpretation must be made in a manner beneficial to the petitioner as the law in question is a fiscal statute. In support of his contention that "any" is given the meaning "each and every" in the construction of a provision of a fiscal statute he refers to the decision in the Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras v. Arunachalam Chettiar ((1923) 47 Mad. 660). There the learned Judges were dealing with a reference under Section 66(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1922. In this connection they had to consider whether the meaning of the word "any" occurring in Section 10 meant "each" as contended for on behalf of the State, or "each and every" as contended for an behalf of the assessee. The learned Judges looking at the Act as a whole construed the word to mean "each and every" as in their opinion such a construction was more rational. He then referred to Craies on Statute Law, pages 109-110, where two cases are cited in which, there being a doubt, a construction beneficial to the public was adopted in construing provisions of fiscal statutes. He also referred to Empress Mills, Nagpur v. Municipal Committee, Wardha ((1950) I.L.R. 1950 Nag. He then referred to Craies on Statute Law, pages 109-110, where two cases are cited in which, there being a doubt, a construction beneficial to the public was adopted in construing provisions of fiscal statutes. He also referred to Empress Mills, Nagpur v. Municipal Committee, Wardha ((1950) I.L.R. 1950 Nag. 403), and the cases collected at page 291 of Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes. These cases leave no doubt that, in the first place, every provision of law has to be looked at as a whole and construed in the light of the other provisions of that law, and that if, thereafter, there appears to be a doubt as to its meaning, that meaning should be given which is beneficial to the public. Regarding the Act as a whole, bearing in mind its intent and purpose and reading the adjective "any" in its context, we are clear that the only rational meaning to be attached to it is "no matter what" and that it is impossible to give it the meaning "each and every". If it is interpreted to mean "each and every" then the startling result would be chargeable under Section 3 to pay any duty under the Act. For, the special type of motor vehicles which ordinarily use "diesel oil" do not ordinarily - and perhaps cannot - use "petrol" (which is the commonest type of motor spirit in use). Since one category of motor vehicles is excluded, "petrol" must fall outside the definition of "motor spirit". We cannot interpret the word in such a way as it would make nonsense of the whole law. We were told by the learned counsel for the petitioner that though aviation spirit was formerly included in the definition of "motor spirit" it was taxed as such and that the definition was amended later when it was found that aviation spirit does not strictly fall within it. How this fact helps the petitioner is not quite clear to us. Aviation spirit cannot, admittedly, be used for running any kind of motor vehicle whatsoever because of its volatility and low flash-point. It could not, therefore, fall within the original definition of "motor spirit". Such is not the case with "diesel oil" as it can be ordinarily used for running certain types of buses and motor trucks. The first objection made on behalf of the petitioner is therefore ill-founded. It could not, therefore, fall within the original definition of "motor spirit". Such is not the case with "diesel oil" as it can be ordinarily used for running certain types of buses and motor trucks. The first objection made on behalf of the petitioner is therefore ill-founded. Coming to the other point we are clear that the petitioner's second contention is equally ill-founded. We accept the position that each of the two Acts purports to levy tax on the sale of commodities, that of 1938 on certain specified kinds of commodities and that of 1947 on all commodities generally. The former is a particular statute while the latter is a general statute. No doubt the ordinary principle is that where two Acts are inconsistent or repugnant the later will be read as having impliedly repealed the earlier. But the Court leans against implying a repeal unless the two Acts are so plainly repugnant to each other that effect cannot be given to both at the same time. Then again there is a maxim generalia specialibus non derogant, i.e., general provisions will not abrogate special provisions. In our opinion there is no such inconsistency between the two Acts that the first must be deemed to have been repealed by the second. No doubt, under the Act of 1938, as amended by the Act of 1947, a duty of 12 1/2 per cent. is leviable on the sale of motor spirit, while, if there were no exemption for motor spirit in Schedule II of the Sales Tax Act, 1947, this commodity would have had to pay a tax of 6 pies in the rupee on its sale. Ignoring the exemption what can be said is that the same commodity is being taxed twice. Though is case of ambiguity the Courts would lean against interpreting statutes in such a way as to render the same thing being taxed twice the learned counsel for the petitioner concedes that it is within the competence of the Legislature to tax the same commodity twice. Here, there is no ambiguity. The Act of 1938 purports to tax motor spirits and lubricants while that of 1947, goods of all kinds - subject to such exemptions as may be made in Schedule II thereof. There is no ambiguity about the legislative intent in either of the enactments. Here, there is no ambiguity. The Act of 1938 purports to tax motor spirits and lubricants while that of 1947, goods of all kinds - subject to such exemptions as may be made in Schedule II thereof. There is no ambiguity about the legislative intent in either of the enactments. The two can well stand together and so the duty of the Court is to give effect to each of them. It is however argued that having enacted a general law rendering the sale of commodities of every type except those commodities specified in Schedules I and II at the rate of 6 pies in the rupee, every law rendering sale of a commodity chargeable with any other duty ipso facto stands repealed. Whatever may be the position of a law which renders commodities which are not included in Schedule II taxable we are clear that those which are included in this Schedule II taxable we are clear that those which are included in this Schedule will be subject to those other laws which govern them as these commodities are specifically excluded from the operation of the Sales Tax Act in the matter of taxation. Further, a reading of entry No. 30 in Schedule II which runs thus "30. Motor spirit and lubricants as defined in the Central Provinces and Berar Sales of Motor Spirit and Lubricants Taxation Act, 1938 (XIV of 1938)" makes it clear that the Legislature, by referring to the definitions of "motor spirit" and "lubricants" in the Act of 1938 unambiguously indicated its intention of keeping that Act alive. The suggestion of the learned counsel that the reference to the definitions is just by way of describing the commodities meant to be exempted does not, in our view, merit consideration on account of the wording of the entry itself. There is thus nothing from which we could infer any intention on the part of the Legislature to repeal the Act of 1938 but on the contrary, it is beyond doubt that the Legislature intended to keep that Act alive. The Legislature has done all that is necessary to effectuate that intention. It is therefore unnecessary to consider the authorities cited by the learned counsel to show that a statute can be repealed by implication. The Legislature has done all that is necessary to effectuate that intention. It is therefore unnecessary to consider the authorities cited by the learned counsel to show that a statute can be repealed by implication. We are satisfied that the petitioner is liable to pay the tax as found due under the Act of 1938 but is entitled to be given credit in respect of the tax paid by him under the Sales Tax Act. The Advocate-General having assured us that he will be given such credit we dismiss the petition. We however make no order as to costs as in the demand made against the petitioner credit was not offered to be given in respect of the sales tax already recovered from him. Petition dismissed.