Judgment Narayan, J. 1. This is an appeal by the plaintiff in a suit to enforce a mortgage. On 19-7-1932, one Godraj Choudhury, the son of Mt. Govindi, defendant 3 in the present action, executed a mortgage bond in favour of the plaintiff for a principal sum of Rs. 800 hypothecating the properties which have been described In the plaint as the mortgaged property. The executant died sometime after the execution of the mortgage bond and on 12-9-1941, the plaintiff sued for the recovery of the principal amount and the interest payable on the mortgage bond after deducting a sum of Rs. 305, said to have been paid to him after the execution of the mortgage bond. This suit was decreed on compromise on 13-11-1941, the compromise having been entered into between the plaintiff and the present defendant 3. On 18-3-1941, defendant 1 had purchased the mortgaged property in execution or a money decree and this sale was confirmed on 13-11-1941, and was followed by delivery of possession. Later on defendant 1 transferred the mortgaged property to defendant 2 by a registered sale deed dated 10-2-19-12. The present suit was instituted by the plaintiff on 12-7-1945, as against defendant 1 and his transferee, defendant 2. Mt. Govindi was also impleaded as a defendant in this action. 2. Defendants 1 and 2 resisted the plaintiffs claim and the main contention urged by them was that the mortgage bond in question was not a genuine document as it had been executed by Godraj with a view to defeat his creditor Ram-deyal Narsingh Das firm, in whose favour the money decree, in execution of which the properly came to be sold, had been passed. It was contended that no consideration had passed for this document and that the transaction was absolutely a sham transaction. 3. The Courts below have dismissed tlie suit on the finding that the mortgage bond in question was without consideration and that it had been executed with a fraudulent intention. 4. Mr. B. C. De who appeared for the plaintiff appellant before me took serious exception to the way in which the case had been approached by the learned Subordinate Judge and he strenuously urged that the onus had been misplaced by the learned Subordinate Judge. 4. Mr. B. C. De who appeared for the plaintiff appellant before me took serious exception to the way in which the case had been approached by the learned Subordinate Judge and he strenuously urged that the onus had been misplaced by the learned Subordinate Judge. It was further pointed cut by the learned counsel that the Court below bad abruptly come to the conclusion that the mortgage bond was executed with the intention of defeating the decree of Hamdeyal Narsingh Das. The question which I have to determine is whether the judgment of the ]ower appellate Court can be regarded as a judgment according to law so as to be binding on me in second appeal. I cannot but agree with Mr. E. C. De that to put forward the proposition that the onus was on the plaintiff to prove the passing of consideration will not be quite sound. Where it has been admitted or proved that there is an admission of consideration, the onus of proving want of consideration rests on the person asserting that want of consideration. But there arc authorities which say that the position may be somewhat different where a third party is coming forward to deny the consideration. At any rate in a case where fraud and collusion are definitely alleged by a third person, the evidence adduced by the person who is the beneficiary under the document has jto be scrutinized most carefully. As was observed by the Judicial Committee in -- Yellappa Ram-sppa V/s. Tippanna, AIR 1929 PC 8 (A) there should not be an undue stretch of the doctrine of onus jprobandi in such cases. Lord Shaw observed that onus probandi applies to a situation in which the mind of the judge determining the suit is left in doubt as to the point on which side the balance should fall in forming a conclusion. His Lordship further observed that there never is any duty upon the part of the Judge to be blind to facts established before him, or, as in this case, to a whole category of facts extending over a long period of time. Reference was made to the well known decision of the Privy Council in -- Wil-lam Robins V/s. National Trust Co. Reference was made to the well known decision of the Privy Council in -- Wil-lam Robins V/s. National Trust Co. Ltd., AIR 1927 PC 66 (B) and I should like to quote the following passage from the judgment of the Privy Council in this case : "In conducting any inquiry, the determining tribunal, bo it Judge or jury, will often find that the onus is sometimes on the side of one contending party, sometimes on the side of the other, or as it is often expressed, that in certain circumstances the onus shifts. But ouus as a determining factor of the whole case can only arise if the tribunal finds the evidence pro and con so evenly balanced that it ean come to no such conclusion. Then the onus will determine the matter. But if the tribunal, after nearing and welching the evidence, comes to a determinate conclusion, the onus has nothing to do with it, and need not be further considered". 5. The exposition of the law regarding onus is, in my opinion, a complete answer to the contention raised by Mr. De in thin case. There cannot be the least doubt that after considering the entire evidence, the circumstances and the probabilities both the Courts of facts have come in this case to a determinate conclusion. In another recent decision -- Lakshmanna V/s. Vertltateswarlu, AIR 1949 PC 27S (C) the Judicial Committee hss observed as follows : "What is called the burden cf proof on the pleadings should not be confused with the burden of adducing evidence which is described as shifting. The burden of proof on the pleadings liefer shifts, if. always remains constant see -- Pickup V/s. Thames Marine Insurance Co., (1876) 3 QBD 534 (D). These two aspects of the burden of proof are embodied in Sections 101 and 162 respectively of the Indian Evidence Act. Sec.101 : "Whoever desires any Court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist. "When a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, it is said that, burden of proof lies on that person. Sec.102 states : The burden of proof in a suit or proceeding lies on that person who would fail if no evidence at all were given on either side. "When a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, it is said that, burden of proof lies on that person. Sec.102 states : The burden of proof in a suit or proceeding lies on that person who would fail if no evidence at all were given on either side. This section shows that the initial burden of proving a prima facie case in his favour is cast on the plaintiff; when he gives such evidence as will support a prima facie case, the onus shifts on to the defendant to adduce rebutting evidence to meet the case made out by the plaintiff. As the case continues to develop the onus may shift back again to the plaintiff. It is not easy to decide at what particular stage in the course of the evidence the onus shifts from one side to the other. When, after the entire evidence is adduced, the tribunal feels it cannot make up its mind as to which of the versions is true, it will hold that the party on whom the burden lies has not discharged the burden; but if it has on the evidence no difficult" in arr.vins at a definite conclusion, then the burden of proof on the pleadings recedes into the background". 6. I will repeat that in this present case also the Courts below had on the evidence no difficulty in arriving at a definite conclusion and for this simple reason the burden of proof on the pleadings recedes into the background. I am, therefore, inclined to think that the abstract doctrine of burden of proof seems to have been too much stressed into service before me. In more than one case the Judicial Committee has definitely laid down that it is an error to rely on abstract doctrine of proof in all cases. I am, therefore, inclined to think that the abstract doctrine of burden of proof seems to have been too much stressed into service before me. In more than one case the Judicial Committee has definitely laid down that it is an error to rely on abstract doctrine of proof in all cases. In -- Chulhai Lal Dass V/s. Kuldip Singh, AIR, 1931 Pat 266 (E) a Bench of this Court while dealing with a case based on handnote observed as follows : "All that is admitted is the signature and the thumb mark on a document which is not the handnote sued upon, and therefore the onus of proving that the handnote was executed by the defendant is upon the shoulders of the plaintiffs but in any case where evidence on an issue of fact has been given by both sides and that evidence is relevant to the issue it is open to the Court, which is the final judge of fact, to come to a conclusion either way, and it is not for this Court to disturb the finding of fact. In this case the finding of fact is clear." In the present case also the finding of fact is quite clear. Learned counsel for the appellant, however, referred to a decision of this Court in --Padam Kumar V/s. Nanhu Singh, AIR 1916 Pat 27 (P) in which Chamier, C. J. had observed as follows : "I am aware that there has been a difference of opinion on the question whether such an admission may be proved against the purchaser, whether by private treaty or at auction, of the interest of the person making the admission but I sec no reason to alter, the opinion which I have expressed on this point in more than one reported case and which is supported by a number of cases beginning with the case of --Radhanath Banerjee V/s. Jadunath Singh, 7 WR 441 (G). It is for the Court which deals with the facts to say whether the defendant has proved facts sufficient to rebut the admission and to transfer the burden of proof to the other side." 7. It is for the Court which deals with the facts to say whether the defendant has proved facts sufficient to rebut the admission and to transfer the burden of proof to the other side." 7. If it is found in this case, as it must be found, that certain definite conclusions have been arrived at by the Courts of fact, then it will be more or less of academic importance to attempt a decision of the problem as to whether the position of a purchaser by private treaty or at auction of the interest of the person making the admission is no better than his. In this particular case both the Courts have mentioned certain facts and circumstances which could certainly lead any reasonable man to infer that the transaction of mortgage on the foot of which this suit had been instituted was a sham and, colourable transaction. It appears that Godraj, the executant of the mortgage bond, and the plaintiff were residents of one and the same place and they had intimate connections with each other. The holder of the money decree had to execute it several times and almost every execution was resisted by the judgment-debtor. When the property was put up for sale on 16-8-1941 the plaintiff came forward with a petition in which he prayed that the property be sold subject to the mortgage encumbrance. The petition was rejected probably because it had been filed late and thereafter the plaintiff instituted his suit No. 167 of 1941 against the present pro forma defendant 3 because Godraj was dead at the time. The suit was instituted on 12-9-1941, but still the plaintiff did not choose to implead the purchaser in the execution of the money decree. It is true that though the sale had taken place on 18-8-1941, it could not be confirmed before 13-11-1941. But after it had been confirmed it became operative from the very date of the sale that is, from 18-8-1941. There is no reason why the plaintiff should not have been alert and should not have applied for impleading the purchaser as a party defendant before he could ask for a decree being passed on the foot of the mortgage. It is a curious coincidence that on the very date the sale was confirmed the compromise decree was passed. There is no reason why the plaintiff should not have been alert and should not have applied for impleading the purchaser as a party defendant before he could ask for a decree being passed on the foot of the mortgage. It is a curious coincidence that on the very date the sale was confirmed the compromise decree was passed. The sale was confirmed, on 13-11-1941, and on 12-11-1941, the petition of compromise was filed by the plaintiff and Mt. Go-vindi. It has also been pointed out by the Courts below that the compromise petition was filed on. the very first day fixed in the case after the filing, of the plaint. I have examined the order-sheet of the suit and I find that the plaint had been registered and admitted on 12-9-1941, and summons was issued upon the defendant fixing 13-11-1941, lor settlement of issues. The compromise petition was filed one day before 13-11-1941, and on 13-11-1941, the compromise was recorded and the suit decreed in terms of the compromise petition. Certain terms, of this compromise petition are undoubtedly somewhat extraordinary1. The defendant had agreed to-pay the decretal amount within a month from 12-11-1941, and it was further agreed that on her failure to pay the amount within one month the decree would be treated as a final decree. There was no reduction whatsoever in the claim and. the suit was decreed in full. One isolated circumstance may not be sufficient for Courts of fact to conclude that the transaction was sham transaction, but if they have arrived at such conclusion after having considered the entire circumstances and all the relevant facts, their conclusion in this regard cannot be questioned. It further appears that the auction-purchaser Raghu-pat Dubey came forward with a petition on 13-11-1941, for being made a party in the suit but the petition was rejected on the ground that the suit had already been disposed" of in terms of the compromise petition. 8. The Courts below have carefully considered the oral evidence adduced by the plaintiff and they have given good reasons to support their view that the oral evidence produced by the plaintiff for proving payment of consideration is not at all trustworthy. 8. The Courts below have carefully considered the oral evidence adduced by the plaintiff and they have given good reasons to support their view that the oral evidence produced by the plaintiff for proving payment of consideration is not at all trustworthy. In these circumstances I am of opinion that no ground has been made out by the appellant for interference with the decision of the Courts below and, therefore, I would dismiss this appeal with costs.