JUDGMENT 1. In this case the office pointed out on 1471958 that there was deficiency in court fee paid on the memorandum of appeal to the extent of Rs. 512/8/. The deficiency report was made earlier because on 141958 the appellant was allowed two months time to make good the deficiency. The appellant failed to deposit the necessary deficiency and proposed at one time to pursue the appeal in forma pauperis. But on the last hearing that is, on the 1st September, 1958, his learned Counsel informed that his client had decided not to deposit the court fee nor was he prepared to pursue his suggestion to have the appeal admitted in forma pauperis. Hence since the necessary deficiency in the court fee has not been deposited, the memorandum of appeal has to be rejected and I direct accordingly. The appellant will nevertheless pay the expenses incurred by the respondent in the appeal. 2. After the above appeal had been filed, the respondent filed a cross objection to the decree appealed against under O. 41 R. 22. The question has accordingly arisen as to whether the crossobjection also has to be dismissed, or can the same be continued despite the rejection of the appeal. Order 41, R. 22 has in subrule (4) made provision that where any memorandum of objection has been filed under that rule and the original appeal is withdrawn or dismissed for default the objection may nevertheless be heard and determined after such notice to the other party as the Court thinks fit. 3. Relying on the above provision the respondent has urged that the crossobjection will still need to be heard and determined because according to him the rejection of the appeal for nonpayment of courtfee is in effect its dismissal for default. Subrule (4) has doubtless provided that notwithstanding the dismissal for default of an appeal the crossobjection can be heard and determined by the Court after notice to the other party. There is no controversy also that the ordinary rule is that a crossobjection which owes its existence to the appeal urged by the appellant, falls with the termination of the appeal except as provided in the above subrule. The question which will, therefore arise is whether rejection of an appeal for nonpayment of the necessary courtfee is dismissal for default of the appeal. 4. The question which will, therefore arise is whether rejection of an appeal for nonpayment of the necessary courtfee is dismissal for default of the appeal. 4. The respondent has in support relied on Ayilu Reddi v. Venkata Reddi, AIR 1931 Mad 133 (A), in which the words "dismissed for default" occurring in subrule (4) were given an extended meaning and held to include the case of nonprosecution of an appeal by not paying the deficit court fee asked to be paid by the Court. In that case the memorandum of appeal was found to be deficiently stamped. Accordingly the District Judge asked the appellant to make good the deficiency. The appellant did not do so and ultimately the District Judge rejected the appeal and also dismissed the crossobjection which had been filed before him. On appeal the High Court held that the nonpayment by the appellant of the court fee was tantamount to nonperformance of an act necessary for the further progress of the appeal and the consequent rejection of the appeal was really its dismissal for default. 5. This case no doubt, supported the respondents contention. Subrule (4) of O. XLI R. 22, reads as follows : "(4) Where, in any case in which any respondent has under this rule filed a memorandum of objection, the original appeal is withdrawn or is dismissed for default, the objection so filed may nevertheless be heard and determined after such notice to the other parties as the Court thinks fit." The words used are "is withdrawn or is dismissed for default". Obviously the rejection of an appeal for nonpayment of courtfee cannot be said to be withdrawal of the appeal. Unless the expression "dismissed for default" can be said to include the rejection of an appeal for nonpayment of courtfee the respondent cannot benefit by the subrule. There is nothing either in subrule (4) itself or in any other part of R. 22 to justify the giving of an extended meaning to the words "dismissed for default" so that it may include the case of rejection of an appeal also. There is nothing either in subrule (4) itself or in any other part of R. 22 to justify the giving of an extended meaning to the words "dismissed for default" so that it may include the case of rejection of an appeal also. This has not been contested by the learned Counsel for the respondent also who has, however contended that the nonperformance by an appellant of an act required to be done by him is a default by him, hence the termination of an appeal in those circumstances is actually its dismissal for default; the terminology employed by the Civil Procedure Code in describing the particular order whether as rejection of the appeal or as dismissal for default is of no significance. The Code has as need hardly be pointed out, used two different expressions for indicating the type of order the Court shall make in particular circumstances because something required to be done by an appellant has not been done by him. These are, reject an appeal or dismiss it for default; for example see O. 41 Rr. 3 and 10 and O. 41 Rr. 17 and 18. There does not therefore appear any justification why if the legislature wanted that the words "dismissal for default" should include the case of rejection also if it should have omitted to make that provision. When different words are employed for describing the results in any set of circumstances the usual rule of interpretation is, unless a contrary intention is necessarily implied, that a different effect is intended in each case. Thus in using in R. 22(4) the words dismissed for default, the legislature must be presumed to have provided for those cases only which have been so described in the Code. With due respect I am unable to agree with the view held by the Madras High Court in Ayilu Reddis case (A) referred to above. 6. The appellant invited reference to the case of Avadh Narain Singh v. Badri Prasad Singh, 1943, All WR (C.C.) 159 : (AIR 1944 Oudh 57) (B), decided by the late Chief Court of Avadh in which the Madras decision was not followed, This was a twoJudge decision in which the question, as the one here, was exhaustively examined after reviewing the case law from the various courts. The reasons which persuaded the learned Judges in ejecting the view held in AIR 1931 Mad 133 (A) briefly were that the provision in R. 22(4) of Order XLI which was in the nature of an exception to the general rule has to be construed strictly and not extended beyond its obvious meaning. And since the words used are "dismissed for default" the exception will benefit those cases only which have been thus branded by the Code. Reference may be made to two cases, viz. U Shin v. Maung Tha Gywe. ILR 8 Rang 538 : (AIR 1931 Rang 38) (C), and Kashiram Semi v. Ranglal Motilalshet, AIR 1941 Bom 242 (D), relied upon in the above decision. In the latter case the learned Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court observed : "In my opinion, it is quite clear that if an appeal is rejected for nonpayment of courtfee, crossobjections must fail with the appeal. Subrule (4) of rule 22 provides that when an appeal is withdrawn or dismissed for default, crossobjections may be proceeded with; but where an appeal is rejected, it cannot, in my opinion, be said to be withdrawn or dismissed for default." I entirely agree with the view expressed in the aforesaid three cases. Subrule (4) has clearly provided for those cases only where an appeal is withdrawn or dismissed for default. Rejection of an appeal for nonpayment of courtfee is not dismissal for default of the appeal. The respondent cannot, therefore, successfully urge that the cross objection has notwithstanding the rejection of the appeal to be heard and determined on merits. It, too, must be rejected and I order accordingly. Cross objection rejected.