Judgment :- The 3rd defendant who is the legal representative of the deceased second defendant in O. S. 492 / 119 on the file of the Ettumanur Munsiff's Court is the petitioner and the plaintiff and the 1st defendant are respondents 1 and 2 respectively. The revision is directed against the order of that court rejecting the petitioner's application for review of judgment passed in the case on 21-1-1123. 2. The facts briefly are as follows: One Mathai Thommen who was the owner of the land specified in the schedule to the plaint on which existed a building, created successive encumbrances thereon by way of hypothecation on 5-4-1095, 8-7-1095 and 9-9-1099, the first of which was in favour of the 2nd defendant. The second and third deeds contained other properties and provisions for discharge of the liability under the first. The details of those transactions are unnecessary for the case. Mathai Thommen bequeathed his properties including the hypotheca in the said transactions to the plaintiff and his mother. They as legatees assigned the properties in the plaint to the 1st defendant directing him to discharge all the three encumbrances with a provision for indemnity against any loss consequent on the 1st defendant's default in their discharge, which liability was made a charge on the properties. The 1st defendant not having discharged any of the encumbrances the 2nd defendant and the other hypothecatees filed O. S. 514/1106, O.S. 176/1113 and O.S. 694/1118 to realise their dues respectively. All the three suits ended in decrees and in execution of the decree obtained by the 2nd defendant, there was a court auction sale at which the decree-holder himself purchased the properties and reduced them to possession through court in the year 1118. This suit (O. S. 492 / 1119) is consequent upon the proceedings in the aforesaid three suits. 3. The plaint alleged that neither the plaintiff nor his mother who, as charge holders under the clause of indemnity contained in the sale deed given by them to the 1st defendant were subsequent encumbrancers to the hypothecation enforced by the 2nd defendant in O. S. 514/1106 had a right to redeem the plaintiff and were therefore necessary parties to that suit and not having been impleaded their right of redemption was in tact. Redemption was therefore sought of that encumbrance. Redemption was therefore sought of that encumbrance. No payment had however to he made as the price of redemption because it was alleged that the 2nd defendant had, after getting possession of the properties through court as purchaser, demolished a building that there was in it whose value was in excess of what was due to him. The result was, the plaint alleged, that the 2nd defendant had to pay the value of the building to the extent of such excess which was estimated at a certain amount in the plaint. The further consequence was that the second defendant rendered himself liable to pay the plaintiff mesne profits at the specified rate claimed in the plaint from the date on which the building was demolished, which act operated to discharge his encumbrance and rendered his possession thereafter tortious. The 1st defendant was ex parte. The 2nd defendant filed a written statement repudiating all the allegations and claims made against him and contending, inter alia, that the plaintiff has no cause of action, the suit is not maintainable in law, and that the claim is in any event barred by limitation. The issues relating to these pleas last mentioned were taken up first for disposal by the Munsiff. He decided them in favour of the 2nd defendant and dismissed the suit. The first defendant's appeal (A. S. 332/1121) to the District Judge of Kottayam succeeded. The Judge was of the opinion that the suit was maintainable and that therefore the other issues including the one relating to limitation, which would depend upon certain facts to be ascertained and found, had to be tried afresh by the Munsiff and the matter finally disposed of. 4. Meanwhile the plaintiff had applied for an amendment of the plaint which was allowed by the court overruling the objections of the 2nd defendant. The 1st defendant had not been notified about the amendment. On the day fixed for the written statement of the 2nd defendant on the amendment of the plaint, no further written statement having been filed, he was declared exparte. That order was set aside on his application. The 3rd defendant afterwards filed an additional written statement. 5. The 1st defendant had not been notified about the amendment. On the day fixed for the written statement of the 2nd defendant on the amendment of the plaint, no further written statement having been filed, he was declared exparte. That order was set aside on his application. The 3rd defendant afterwards filed an additional written statement. 5. The records were received by the Munsiff after remind of the case by the District Judge on 25-11-1122 and he posted the case to 2-1-1123 for return of the summons to the 1st defendant which the plaintiff was directed to apply for. On that date the 1st defendant did not appear and presumbly on the impression that the posting that day Was of the whole case and for disposal, a decree was passed exparte as sued for as the 2nd defendant also did not appear. 6. The 305th rule of the Travancore Civil Courts Guide obliges the court to post a case for disposal after receipt of records on remand by the appellate Court. Such a posting there was not in fact, though the posting on 21-1-1123 was, by misapprehension, supposed to be such. On 21-2-1123 the 3rd defendant filed C. M. A. 46/1123 in the High Court against the order of remand passed by the District Judge. The High Court allowed the C. M. A. on 4-7-1123 and held that the Munsiff should consider the entire case and all the points therein including the maintainability of the suit afresh. 7. Mean while, on 30-1-1123 the 3rd defendant applied under Order IX rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure to set aside the exparte decree. The application was dismissed for default and the application to restore it was rejected. C. R. P. 473/1124 in the High Court was presented by the 3rd defendant against that order which shared the same fate as it was dismissed by order dated 14-7-1950. 8. On 15-11-1123 the 3rd defendant applied to the Munsiff for posting the case for trial and disposal, as the decree passed had been superseded by the order of the High Court modifying the order of remand passed by the District Judge on the basis of which the decree was passed without considering all the questions, particularly the one relating to the maintainability of the suit. The Munsiff dismissed the petition by order dated 11-12-1123 and the C. M. A 33/1124 presented before the District Judge was also dismissed by order dated 16-1-1950. 9. On 18-8-1950 the 3rd defendant applied to the Munsiff stating the aforesaid facts and praying for a review of judgment. The order dismissing his application on 5-10-1950 is the subject matter of this revision. 10. It is clear from the above facts that though the 3rd defendant and his father placed their case before court, they had not had the advantage of a consideration thereof by it. They are not at fault for that situation except in the matter of non-appearance on the day fixed for the disposal of their application to set aside the exparte decree under Order IX rule 13 of the C. P. C. 11. The judgment in the case which was passed on 21-1-1123 was based on the order of remand made by the District Judge which confined the consideration of the Munsiff to some among the Various questions arising in the case. The questions going to the root of the whole matter namely whether the plaintiff has a cause of action and the suit is maintainable were found in favour of the plaintiff by the judge who did not leave it open for further consideration by the Munsiff. The result was that the decree was passed on the basis of the decision of the judge who held that the suit was maintainable and that the plaintiff had a cause of action. This decision of the District Judge was reversed by the High Court in C. M. A. 46/1123. The C. M. A. before the High Court was presented, as already stated, on 21-2-1123, that is, a month after the decree was passed by the Munsiff on the basis of the remand order of the District Judge. An appeal against the order of remand is permitted by the Code of Civil Procedure and the final order passed in appeal will govern the parties. The circumstance that before such an appeal is filed the trial court acts upon the order of remand appealed against and passes a decree, will not prevent the appeal against the order of remand or the operation or effectiveness of the judgment passed in such appeal. The circumstance that before such an appeal is filed the trial court acts upon the order of remand appealed against and passes a decree, will not prevent the appeal against the order of remand or the operation or effectiveness of the judgment passed in such appeal. The proceedings in the trial court in such a case after remand would be subordinate and dependant proceedings liable to be superseded by the reversal of the order of remand which was the subject matter of the appeal before the superior tribunal. This principle is well-established. Reference may be made to the opinion of Edge C.J., in Rameshar Sing v. Sheodin Sing (12 All. 510 F. B.). Two more Full Bench decisions of the Allahabad High Court in Kanhaiyalal v. Tirbeni Sahai (I. L.R. 36 All. 532) and Uman Kunwari v. Jerbandhan (I. L.R. 30 All. 479) take the same view. The High Courts of Bombay, Lahore, Madras, Nagpur, and Patna have also taken the same view. (See Basawant Mallappa v. Kaliappa Virbhadrappa (A.I..R.1938 Bom. 222), Gurmukh Sing v. Shiv Ram (I. L. R.17 Lah. 53), Lekshmi v. Marudevi (I. L. R. 37 Mad. 29), Madharao v. Ekanathrao (I.L.R.1947 Nag. 412), and Wahindunnissa v. Dip Narain (F. B.) A.I.R. 1916 Pat. 370). These decisions were referred to and followed by Viswanatha Sastri, J., in the Madras High Court in A. I. R. 1951 Mad. 218 (1950 (2) M. L. J. 379) differing from the decision of Mack, J., of the same court in Venkatrama Aiyar v. Unnamalai Ammal (A.I.R. 1949 Mad. 377 (1948 (2) M.L.J. 404). The decision of Viswanatha Sastri, J., was approved and that of Mack, J., overruled by a Division Bench in A.I. R. 1951 Mad. 883. The result is that the decree of the Munsiff dated 21-1-1123 which was sought to be reviewed did not exist as it had been superseded by the order of the High Court allowing C. M. A. 46/1123. The existing of a judgment is essential for review. A court cannot review a judgment which has been superseded and which therefore does not in law exist. The court below is therefore right in dismissing the application for review but not for the reasons mentioned by it and the revision challenging that order should be dismissed. 12. That however does not appear to be a proper termination of these proceedings. The court below is therefore right in dismissing the application for review but not for the reasons mentioned by it and the revision challenging that order should be dismissed. 12. That however does not appear to be a proper termination of these proceedings. The trial court was apprised of the fact that the order of remand passed by the District Judge on which the Munsiff based his decree was set aside by the High Court and the court was invited to take up the case for trial and disposal. This is the purport of the application presented by the 3rd defendant before the Munsiff on 15-11-1123. The Munsiff dismissed it and the District Judge in appeal in C. M. A. 33/1124 was not prepared to give it a different treatment. The orders passed by the Munsiff and the District Judge upon this application cannot be supported. It is true that the 3rd defendant has not filed a revision to this Court against those orders but the fact that those orders were passed has been brought to the notice of the Court and the High Court is entitled, if not bound, to revise those orders suo mote and set them aside as such a course is called for in the interests of justice. Justice Vivian Bose (of the Nagpur High Court, as he then was) observed in Percy Wood v. Mrs. Samuel (A. I. R. 1943 Nag. 333) at page 334, as follows: "Also under S. 115, Civil Procedure Code it is not necessary for a party to apply. Any person can bring an irregularity to the notice of the court. It is true that a court will very seldom act unless the aggrieved party comes before it but its power to do so is undoubted. In my opinion, a general and very important principle is involved here and as the lower court's order is without jurisdiction I would be entitled to act suo motu. Therefore the objection taken in respect of the applicant's right to come here is without force." In Somasundaram Pillai v. Muthumanicka Nadar (A.I.R. 1932 Mad.714) Ananthakrishna Iyer, J. observed (at p. 716) : " I think that I must regularise the whole proceedings by my exercising my powers of revision directly against the order passed by the learned District Munsiff on 5th November 1927. It is clear the High Court is entitled - in a proper case - to interfere in revision even without an application to it by the party interested. That was made clear as early as Andrew Anthony V. Dupant [I. L. R. 4 Mad. 217] in a decision passed by Sir Charles Turner, C. J. and Indersley, J. The learned judges observed as follows: "The High Court can interfere under S. 622 of the Code without an application made to it by a party to the suit." In Narain v. Ram Lekhan (A.I.R. 1934 All. 368), Sulaiman, C. J., sitting with another learned judge, observed (at p. 369) : "Under S. 115 Civil Procedure Code the High Court can interfere of its own accord when the fact of material irregularity is brought to its notice." Another Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court consisting of Mukerji and Young, JJ. in Mt Jaimala v. Collector of Saharappur (A.I. R. 1934 All. 4) held that the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court need not be invoked by a party; it may be exercised by the High Court of its own accord. In Naoomal Tourmal v. Tarachand Sobhraj A. I. R. 1933 Sind. 200) Mehta A. J. C. stated thus at Page 202: "A revision application stands on different footing. It is a matter between a higher court and a lower court; in fact revisional powers may in certain cases be exercised without an appeal or an application by any of the parties concerned. If then the record of a case has been sent for by a higher court from an inferior court for the purpose of rectifying some obvious mistake it would be absurd to say that, before the rectification takes place, if any of the parties happens to die and his legal representatives are rot brought on the record in due time, the matter abates and rectification cannot be made." In Lalta Devi v. Balkishan (A.I. R. 1933 Lahore 327) Tapp J. said at page 327: "It does not follow however that because the defendants have no right of appeal against the order they cannot come up to this Court in revision as Section 115 Civil Procedure Code does not require that there should be an application or that such application need necessarily be made by an aggrieved party." (See also Mt. Bibi Marim v. Surajmal, A. I. R. 1936 Patna 591). The High Court of Travancore in Govindan Narayanan v. Vasudevan Neelakantan Numburi (X T. L. J. 172 at 174) held that:- "Section 568 of the C. P. C. which provides for revision by the High Court, is very wide in its terms. This court can, of its own motion, call for any record for the purpose of satisfaction itself as to the legality of any judgment, decree or order passed in any case, and it is not necessary for the exercise of its powers of revision that it should be put in motion by the party aggrieved." 13. The records called for in connection with this C. R. P. reveal that the Munsiff and the District Judge refused the prayer made by the 3rd defendant for taking up the case on to file and dispose of it pursuant to the order passed by the High Court in C. M. A. 46/1123. The court was bound to do so even without an application and refusal to accede to the request of the 3rd defendant when what was requested should have been done by the court even without such a request, can in no view be justified or supported. The decree passed in O. S. 492/1119 on 21-1-1123 having been superseded by the order of the High Court, the suit is still pending trial and disposal and the court is bound to try and dispose of it. 14. Even the decree passed on 21-1-1123 was not justified on its date because the mandatory provision contained in the Civil Courts Guide for posting the case for disposal, as already stated, had not been complied with. The court was under a misapprehension that 21-1-1123 was the date fixed under the provisions of the Civil Courts Guide after remand, whereas really that date was fixed only for the return of the summons to the 1st defendant. The passing of the decree exparte against the 2nd defendant on that date was a mistake of the court for which the party is not responsible and when that mistake is pointed out to the court, it is up to it to rectify the error, restore the suit to file, try and dispose of it in the usual course and according to law. An application for review of judgment would be the appropriate remedy in such a case, the reason for the review being an error apparent on the face of the record or mistake of the court. The party applying for review not being responsible for the error, the period of limitation fixed for an application for review cannot and ought not to be applied. This question arose in the Cochin High Court in Parukutty Amma v. Ichikutty Amma (XVIII C. L. R. 185) where an appeal pending in one District Court was transferred to another in which it was disposed of without notifying the transfer as required by Article 330 of the Cochin Civil Rules of Practice. Not being aware of the posting of the case in the transferee court, one of the parties failed to appear and the appeal was disposed of in the absence of that party. An application for review was made by that party which was resisted on various grounds including two, one as regards the maintainability of the application itself and the other as regards its being barred by time. After an elaborate discussion of the whole question the learned judges reached the conclusion that the application for review was maintainable and should be granted. As regards the plea of limitation, the learned judges observed at page 197: "It must have been by the mistaken impression of the court that the party has had due notice of the transfer and the posting that the appeal was disposed of, on the ground of default. If the court had known the true fact, it would have adjourned the case and directed the giving of such notice. As the prejudicial conclusion of the case was brought about by such error and mistake on the part of the court, it would be fair and equitable for the court to rectify its error. Thus the real ground to support the present application would be either a mistake or error apparent on the face of the record within the contemplation of Section 584 C. P. C. or a mistake or error of the court which calls for rectification by the court itself in order to meet the ends of justice and therefore, for the exercise of its inherent powers for the purpose. In either view, there would be no bar of limitation for the petition and the lower court should have allowed it." I am in full agreement with the said decision if I may say so with respect and I hold that if the decree dated 21-1-1123 be regarded as still subsisting notwithstanding the order of the High Court in C, M. A. 46/23 the application for review is sustainable and that it is not barred by limitation. I say this because it was contended on behalf of the respondent that in the application for review exclusion is claimed of the period taken up by the prior proceedings for setting aside the exparte decree under Order IX rule 13 and that there is no prayer made for condonation of the delay in making the application. The court below is therefore not right in having dismissed the application for review on the basis that the decree and judgment dated 21-1-1123 existed even after the order of the High Court in C. M. A. 46/1123. 15. My view however is, as already stated, that the result of the order of the High Court is to supersede the said decree of the Munsiff dated 21-1-1123 and there was no judgment for review and for that reason the application should have been dismissed. 16. In the extraordinary and compelling circumstances obtained in this case I consider that in the interests of justice I should exercise the High Court's jurisdiction in revision and set aside the orders passed by the Munsiff on the petition of the 3rd defendant to take up the case for trial and disposal, and that passed by the District Judge in C. M. A. 33/1124 rejecting that request. The Munsiff is directed to take up the case O. S. 492/1119 for trial and dispose of it according to law. I make no order for costs in this revision.