RAM LABHAYA Ag. C. J.: This is a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India for Writs of Mandamus and Certiorari. It questions the competency of the order of the State Trans-' port Authority, Assam, dated 21-6-52. (2) The facts leading to the petition are as follows: Tenders were invited for Contract Car­riage (Taxi) Permits in Cachar region. The peti­tioner submitted an application for a permit. The Regional Transport Authority, Cachar, granted one taxi per-nit to the petitioner for a period of 3 years with effect from 15-4-52. The order was duly communicated to the petitioner. In pursu­ance of the terms contained in the order, the petitioner paid the requisite permit fee and a permit was issued in her favour. The petitioner then purchased a vehicle No. ASA 1028 for a sum of Rs. 7000/- and began plying it. On 2-7-52 the petitioner was informed by a letter from the Secretary, State Transport Authority, Assam, that Subhas Chandra Sen, respondent 2, had been granted a permit in her place. In pursuance o£ the appellate order, the Regional Transport Au­thority, Cachar, directed the petitioner to sur­render her permit by a letter dated 16-7-52. (3) The petitioner challenges the order of the appellate authority on the ground that it was passed without any notice to her and, in conse­quence, she had no opportunity to represent her case. The order, therefore, was in excess of the jurisdiction of the Appellate Authority. The pro­cedure it adopted is also challenged as opposed to the fundamental principles of natural justice. (4) The petition is supported by an affidavit. The facts stated in the petition have not been challenged on behalf of the respondents. The order of the Regional Authority granting a permit to the petitioner was admittedly appealable under S. 64, Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. An appear was preferred by respondent 2, Subhas Chandra Sen. In his appeal, Shrimati Suprava Dev Boy, the present petitioner, was placed in the list of res­pondents. The Secretary of the Regional Trans­port Authority, Cachar, was also impleaded. Besides him, there were 6 other respondents, including the present petitioner. (5) The allegations that no notice was sent to the petitioner who was a party to the appeal, and that she was not heard in support of the order of the Regional Authority which was in her favour, are not disputed. Besides him, there were 6 other respondents, including the present petitioner. (5) The allegations that no notice was sent to the petitioner who was a party to the appeal, and that she was not heard in support of the order of the Regional Authority which was in her favour, are not disputed. The only question is^ whether the Appellate Authority was under an obligation to grant a hearing to the present peti­tioner, before substituting Subhas Chandra Sen in place of the petitioner as a grantee of the permit issued to her. (6) Section 64, Motor Vehicles Act provides that a person aggrieved by the refusal of the Provin­cial or a Regional Transport Authority to grant a permit, may 'within the prescribed time and in the prescribed manner, appeal to the prescribed authority who shall give such person and the regional authority an opportunity of being heard. A hearing has thus been provided for. The per­son aggrieved by the order as also the regional authority have both to be heard. This statutory obligation has been placed on the Appellate Authority. The learned advocate for the peti­tioner argues that the provision clearly indicates tint the proceeding is q-;as'-judicial in character. A judicial approach is contemplated and this has been expressly provided for. The nature of the proceeding being judicial or quasi-judicial, an obligation to hear any party who may be adver­sely affected by the appellate order, would be there according to well-recognised principles of natural justice, even though it is not expressly provided for. (7) The Appellate Authority had a judicial function to perform. Its decision could affect the petitioner who was a party to the proceeding. An order in her favour could not have been reversed without hearing her, as Authorities acting judi­cially or in a quasi-judicial manner are bound also by principles of natural justice. She was not heard. There has, therefore, been a failure to follow a well-recognised principle of natural justice. The learned counsel has relied on - 'Natesa Filial v. Central Road Traffic Board, Egmore, Madras', AIR 1952 Mad 39 (A), in support of his contention. She was not heard. There has, therefore, been a failure to follow a well-recognised principle of natural justice. The learned counsel has relied on - 'Natesa Filial v. Central Road Traffic Board, Egmore, Madras', AIR 1952 Mad 39 (A), in support of his contention. In this case, it was held that "The Regional Transport Authority, in the exer­cise of his original jurisdiction, and the Central Road Traffic Board and the Government in dis­charge of their appellate and revisional juris­diction, are bound to act judicially." .The learned Government Advocate does not dis­pute the proposition that the State Transport Authority had a judicial function to perform. It was a quasi-judicial body, and in the exercise of its appellate function, a judicial approach was contemplated. As held by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in - Tarry and Co. Ltd., Dare House, Madras v. Commercial Employees Associa­tion, Madras', AIR 1952 SC 179 (B), if an inferior Tribunal vested with power to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions, adopts a procedure which is contrary to principles of natural justice, its order may be quashed by a Writ of Certiorari. The fact that S. 64, Motor Vehicles Act does not expressly require that a person to whom a permit has been granted, should be heard if his permit is to be cancelled, does not affect the obligation, to observe principles of natural justice in pro­ceedings of a judicial or quasi-judicial character. The Appellate Tribunal in this case, therefore, has' exceeded its jurisdiction in cancelling the petitioner's permit and granting the permit to Subhas1 Chandra Sen, respondent 2, in her absence and without giving her any hearing. The appellate order, therefore, is liable to be quashed, and we order accordingly. We further direct that the ap­pellate authority shall dispose of the appeal after hearing all parties interested in the result of the appeal, including the present petitioner against whom the appeal is directed. The Rule is made absolute. (8) DEKA J.: I agree. Rule made absolute.