Sivathanuvan Thampi v. Pathummal — 1953 DIGILAW 10 (KER)

Judgment :- 1. The appellant in A. S. 588 of 1124, who is the judgment-debtor in O. S. No. 1347 of 1105 on the file of the Kuzhithura District Munsiff's Court, has been discharging the decree-debt by depositing in court the instalments as contemplated by section 9 of the Travancore Debt Relief Act (Act II of 1116 as amended by Act III of 1116). The amount of the decree-debt as due on 31-1-1116 was fixed by the court at 20,300 fanams. 80% of this amount comes to 16,240 fanams. The instalment amounts deposited by the judgment-debtor come to an aggregate of 17,094 fanams. On 9-2-1124 he filed a petition C. M. P. No. 1596 praying for a declaration that the entire decree amount has been discharged with the payment of 16,272 fanams representing the 80% of the debt found due under the decree and for a refund of the excess amount. The position taken up by him is that the amount of the debt fixed at 20,300 fanams by the order of the court, represents the maximum amount of the debt that can be deemed to be payable under the decree on a calculation being made subject to the limitation imposed by section 11 of the Debt Relief Act and that as such he is not liable to pay anything by way of interest on the 80% of the debt which he had already deposited in court. The decree-holder, on the other hand, contended that for getting a discharge of the debt as contemplated by sections 8 and 9 of the Debt Relief Act, the judgment-debtor has to pay the future interest also on the 80% of the debt which he had already deposited. The lower court upheld the decree-holder's contention as correct and accordingly dismissed the judgment-debtor's petition. It is against that order that the judgment-debtor has preferred A. S. No. 588 of 1124. The appeal first came up for hearing before a Division Bench. The lower court upheld the decree-holder's contention as correct and accordingly dismissed the judgment-debtor's petition. It is against that order that the judgment-debtor has preferred A. S. No. 588 of 1124. The appeal first came up for hearing before a Division Bench. On hearing the arguments of the learned advocates on both sides, the Division Bench felt that the question raised in the appeal as to the correct interpretation to be put upon sections 9 and 11 of the Debt Relief Act is an important one and that the decision on this question will determine the fate of a large number of petitions filed under section 9 and pending final orders and also that the decision in Ninan v. Mariam (1947 T. L. R. 476), which is in support of the position taken up by the decree-holder-respondent, requires reconsideration. Accordingly the Division Bench referred the appeal for decision by a Full Bench. The following specific point was also formulated for an authoritative ruling by the Full Bench: "Can future interest on a decree debt sought to be discharged under sections 8 and 9 of the Debt Relief Act exceed the maximum limit prescribed by section 11 of the Act at any stage of the proceedings under sections 8 and 9? Can the operation of section 11 be restricted to the stage of fixing the rate of instalments payable under section 9? Is there any warrant or justification for thus restricting the application of section 11?" 2. The very same question is involved in A.S. No. 91/50 also which is an appeal by the decree-holder in O. S. No. 1084 of 1103 on the file of the Thiruvella District Munsiff's Court. While the decree in that case was being executed in the Chengannoor District Munsiff's Court, the judgment-debtor sought to have the decree debt discharged by making deposits into court of the instalments as required by section 9 of the Debt Relief Act. After depositing a series of instalment amounts, he filed a petition C.M. P. 10165 Gated 27-7-1124 praying for a declaration that more than the amount required for getting a discharge of the decree-debt has already been deposited by him and also for an order for refund of the excess amount standing to his credit. After depositing a series of instalment amounts, he filed a petition C.M. P. 10165 Gated 27-7-1124 praying for a declaration that more than the amount required for getting a discharge of the decree-debt has already been deposited by him and also for an order for refund of the excess amount standing to his credit. He too was taking his stand on section 11 of the Debt Relief Act regarding the maximum amount which he is liable to pay under the decree. The execution court upheld his contention that he is not liable to pay anything by way of interest in excess of the limit fixed by section 11 of the Act and accordingly directed the office to prepare a statement showing the maximum amount due under section 11 and also the total of the deposit made by the judgment-debtor. The view taken by the lower court is challenged by the decree-holder in A. S. 91 of 1950 also. The Division Bench which heard this appeal in the first instance referred this appeal also to be heard and decided by a Full Bench along with A. S. 588 of 1124, in view of the fact that the main question for decision is common to both the appeals. This is how these two appeals have come up before this Full Bench. 3. The answers to the questions formulated in the order of reference will depend upon the construction to be put upon section 11 of the Debt Relief Act, read along with sections 8 and 9. Sections 8 and 11 as also the relevant portions of section 9 may be extracted here: "8. Notwithstanding anything contained in any law, custom, contract, decree or order of court to the contrary, any debt may be discharged by repayment in instalments in the manner and to the extent specified in section 9. 9. Sections 8 and 11 as also the relevant portions of section 9 may be extracted here: "8. Notwithstanding anything contained in any law, custom, contract, decree or order of court to the contrary, any debt may be discharged by repayment in instalments in the manner and to the extent specified in section 9. 9. [1] If eighty per cent of the amount of any debt together with future interest that may accrue thereon is repaid within nine years from the date of the commencement of the Act, the whole debt shall, notwithstanding anything contained in any law, custom, contract, decree or order of Court to the contrary, be deemed to be discharged: Provided that - a] the first instalment is paid within six months from the date of the commencement of the Act, b] subject to the provisions contained in sub-section [3], each of the succeeding instalments is paid within six months of the date of the preceding instalment, and c] except in the case of the last instalment, the amount paid at each instalment is not less than six per cent of the debt subsisting at the commencement of the Act or less than rupees ten, whichever is larger, [2] If, in accordance with the conditions specified in the Proviso to sub-section [1] - a] Seventy five per cent of the amount of any debt together with future interest that may accrue thereon is repaid within six years from the commencement of the Act, or b] seventy per cent of the amount of any debt together with future interest that may accrue thereon is repaid within two years from the date of the commencement of the Act, the whole debt shall be deemed to be discharged. 11. 11. In determining the amount of a decree debt for purposes of payment under sections 8 and 9, notwithstanding anything contained in section 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1100, or any other law, contract, decree or order of court to the contrary, not more than one-half of the principal in the case of money debts and not more than the principal in the case of paddy debts shall be deemed payable towards interest up to the date of the decree and not more than a like amount towards interest from the date of the decree." The language employed in section 11 is such as to indicate that a special limitation was intended to be imposed on the amount of interest accruing on the principal sum up to the date of the decree and also subject to the date of the decree. In the case of a money debt, interest on the principal sum up to the date of the decree cannot exceed one-half of the principal sum and interest subsequent to the date of the decree cannot also exceed a like amount. Such a limitation is to operate notwithstanding anything contained in section 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1100 (Travancore), or any other law, contract, decree or order of court to the contrary. The expression "not more than one-half of the principal in the case of money debts shall be deemed to be payable towards interest" is mandatory in its form, thereby indicating that the limitation imposed is absolute and unqualified. Such a special benefit which the legislature has conferred on the particular class of debtors coming under section 11 of the Debt Relief Act, cannot be nullified or diluted unless the words and expressions used in the section are such as to force or compel an interpretation bound to have such a result. 4. On behalf of the decree-holders-creditors it is argued that the expression "for purposes of payment under sections 8 and 9" used in section 11, is meant to indicate that it is only in the calculation of the amount of the debt due on 31-1-1116 for the purpose of fixing the instalment amounts payable under section 9 that the limit fixed by section 11 in the matter of accrual of interest both before and after the date of the decree is to operate. In Ninan v. Mariam (1947 T. L. R. 476) this position has been accepted as correct. In the course of the judgment in that case the learned judges have observed as follows:- "It appears from the express terms of that section (section 11) that it is intended for settling the amount for purposes of fixing the 6% minimum due for each instalment." To the same effect is the view taken by a Division Bench of this Court in Kalyani Amma v. Amnia Raja (1951 K. L. T. 188). In both these cases it has been ruled that section 11 does not stand as a bar against the accrual of the future interest on the amount of the debt ascertained and fixed as due on 31-1-1116. The construction thus put upon section 11 is not warranted by the language employed in the section. If the Legislature intended the operation of the section to stop with the ascertainment of the debt as due on 31-1-1116, appropriate words to that effect would have been used in the section. But it is significant to note that it is not stated in so many words that it is only for the purpose of ascertaining and fixing the amount of the debt as due on 31-1-1116 and for calculating the instalment amount payable under section 9 that the accrual of interest should be limited to the maximum specified in section 11. The expressions used in the section do not by necessary implication also convey any such restrictive idea. In section 9 of the Act the Legislature has chosen to use clear and definite expressions in enacting the provisions regulating the ascertainment of the debt due on 31-1-1116 as also the fixation of the instalment amounts. In sub-clause (c) of clause (1) of section 9 it is stated that "except in the case of the last instalment the amount paid at each instalment is not less than 6% of the debt subsisting at the commencement of the Act or less than rupees ten whichever is larger." Similar expressions of "debt subsisting at the commencement of the Act" and "instalment" would have been used in section 11 also, if the operation of the latter section also was intended to be confined to the ascertainment of the debt due on 31-1-1116 for the purpose of fixing the instalment amount payable under section. 5. 5. In interpreting the different provisions in the same or similar statutes, it is an accepted rule of guidance that the same or similar words would be generally used by the Legislature in giving expression to the same or similar ideas intended to be conveyed by the different provisions in such statutes. If really the Legislature intended to confine the operation of section 11 merely to the fixation of the amount due on 31-1-1116, it was easy enough to use the expression "in determining the amount of the debt due on 31-1-1116 for the purpose of fixing the instalment payable under section 9," in the place of the expression,'in determining the amount of the decree debt for the purposes of payment under sections 8 and 9", as is now used in the opening portion of section 11. Without thus redrafting the section or reading the new expressions as suggested above into the section as it stands, it is difficult to construe the section in such a way as to limit its operation ' to the stage of ascertaining the debt due on 31-1-1116 and fixing the instalment payment under section 9. It is not the function of the Court to attempt to so redraft the section or to read more words into it and thus to restrict its scope. The court has only to take the section as it stands and to construe it in accordance with the idea legitimately conveyed by the actual expressions used by the Legislature. It cannot be said that the expression "for the purposes of payment under sections 8 and 9" as used in section 11 can have reference only to the calculation and ascertainment of the debt for the fixing of the instalment. No doubt the word "payment" will take in the idea of "payment in instalments" but if the idea of "instalment" alone was meant to be conveyed by the word "payment", the reference to section 8 in section 11 becomes unnecessary and superfluous, because the idea of "payment" in instalments is fully conveyed by the reference to section 9 alone. Section 8 is the section relating to the discharge of the entire debt by part payment as specified in section 9. No doubt the idea of discharge by such payment is repeated in section 9 also. Section 8 is the section relating to the discharge of the entire debt by part payment as specified in section 9. No doubt the idea of discharge by such payment is repeated in section 9 also. Both these sections have been referred to in section 11 for the obvious reason that the payment contemplated by the latter section is the payment towards a complete discharge of the decree-debt. The non-mention of the word "discharge" in section 11 cannot be taken to mean that the section did not contemplate a discharge of the debt. Payments under section 9 are made to secure a discharge of the debt under section 8. The debt is not discharged without such payments being made. Thus the proper and legitimate construction to be put upon the expression "for purposes of payment under sections 8 and 9" would be to understand it as referring to payment resulting in a discharge of the debt under sections 8 and 9, and not merely to a fixation of the instalment for the purpose of payment under section 9. This construction is quite in fitting with the idea of placing a maximum limit in the accrual of future interest in the case of decree-debts, as apparently conveyed by the general and unqualified form in which section 11 is drafted. To construe otherwise would be substituting the word "instalments" for the word "payment" as used in the section. 6. The next aspect to be considered is whether the provision in section 9 regarding payment of future interest on the part payments contemplated by the section is such as to compel the operation of section 11 being restricted to the stage of ascertaining and fixing the debt due on 31-1-1116. The provision regarding payment of such interest is the same under clauses (1) and (2) of section 9, and hence for the purpose of construing that provision clause (1) may be taken into consideration. The provision regarding payment of such interest is the same under clauses (1) and (2) of section 9, and hence for the purpose of construing that provision clause (1) may be taken into consideration. Clause (1) states that "If 80% of the amount of any debt together with future interest that may accrue thereon is repaid within nine years from the date of the commencement of the Act, the whole debt shall, notwithstanding anything contained in any law, contract, decree or order of Court to the contrary, be deemed to be discharged." The provision in this clause regarding payment of interest has been construed in Ninan v. Mariam (1947 T. L. E. 476) and in Kaliyani Amnia v. Amma Raja (1951 K. L. T. 188) as a mandatory provision. In the former case, it has been ruled as follows:- "In every case of discharge by part payment under the Debt Relief Act, future interest has to be paid. That is a condition which cannot be avoided." Similarly in the latter case, it has been ruled that "whatever be the instalments in which the debt has to be paid, it is to carry future interest so that interest is referred to as existing over and above and independent of the debt." With due respect to the learned judges who have participated in these decisions, it has to be pointed out that the view taken by them is not warranted by the relevant provisions of section 9. The interest referred to in clause (1) is only future interest i.e., on 80% of the amount of the debt. If such future interest has inevitably to be paid as a condition precedent to getting a discharge of the debt, the Legislature would have used the word "shall" instead of the word "may" in the expression qualifying future interest. The same object could also have been achieved by completely omitting the words "that may accrue thereon" from clause (1). After omitting these words the clause would read as follows:- "If 80 per cent of the amount of the debt together with future interest is repaid within nine years from the date of the commencement of the Act be deemed to be discharged." If the clause stood like that, there would have been no doubt that in every case of payment under that clause future interest has necessarily to be paid. The insertion of the four words "that may accrue thereon" after the word 'interest' must have been done by the Legislature deliberately and with a purpose. In construing a particular provision in a statute all the words and expressions used by the Legislature have, as far as possible, to be given their due significance and meaning and it will not be proper and legitimate to construe the provision in such a way as to leave certain words and expressions in the provision as unnecessary appendages without any meaning or significance in the particular context. This is a generally accepted rule of interpretation of statutes. Consistent with this rule, one has to see whether there is any difficulty in giving the expression "that may accrue thereon" its due significance in construing clause (1) of section 9. There appears to be no such difficulty at all if the expression is understood in its natural and ordinary sense. It is clear that the expression "interest that, may accrue" has been deliberately inserted in the clause to govern cases where future interest is permitted and is bound to accrue, and not to apply to cases where no such future interest can accrue. In dealing with the expression "may accrue" the view taken in Ninan v. Mariam (1947 T. L. R. 476) is that its use in the relevant clause was deliberate. At the same time it is stated that this expression merely means "interest that may accrue in law, which may vary as to the rate, amount and the amount on which it might accrue." This reasoning is neither convincing nor acceptable. The amount on which interest is to accrue, is specified in section 9 itself as being 80 per cent, 75 per cent or 70 per cent, as the case may be, of the total amount of the debt due on 31-1-1116. Similarly the rate, at which interest can accrue has also been specified by section 12 of the Act which says that interest on any money debt to which the Act applies cannot exceed 4%. Thus it cannot be said that the expression "may accrue" was used in clause (1) of section 9 because of any uncertainty as to the rate of interest or as to the amount of debt on which interest has to accrue. Thus it cannot be said that the expression "may accrue" was used in clause (1) of section 9 because of any uncertainty as to the rate of interest or as to the amount of debt on which interest has to accrue. The more reasonable view to be taken is that the expression has been couched in its present form so that clause (1) of section 9 may be applicable to both the categories of cases viz., (1) where future interest on the 80% of the amount of the debt may accrue and (2) where future interest on such 80 per cent of the debt may not accrue. It is suggested that there may be cases where the contract between the parties does not provide for payment of future interest and that there may be decrees not providing for future interest and that cases of this type will come under the second category. If such cases can come under that category, there is no reason why decree amounts in respect of which future interest has reached the maximum limit prescribed by section 11 should not come under that category. In fact, it is only under section 11 that a maximum limit has been fixed in respect of future interest for the purposes of payment under sections 8 and 9. Thus, if there is any case where future interest will not run on 80% of the debt it will be a decree-debt where the maximum limit of future interest permitted by section 11 has been reached. It has already been found that clause (1) of section 9 is meant to cover such cases also. Such a construction put upon section 9 will harmonise with the general limitation of future interest as provided in section 11 and avoid an apparent conflict between the provisions in these two sections resulting from the construction that the future interest referred to in section 9 has necessarily to accrue on all debts sought to be discharged under the provisions of that section. 7. By restricting the operation of section 11 to the stage, of fixing the amount of the debt due on 31-1-1116, anomalous results may follow at least in some instances. It is possible to conceive of a case where future interest on the amount adjudged by the decree has exceeded a" moiety of the principal sum long prior to 31-1-1116. 7. By restricting the operation of section 11 to the stage, of fixing the amount of the debt due on 31-1-1116, anomalous results may follow at least in some instances. It is possible to conceive of a case where future interest on the amount adjudged by the decree has exceeded a" moiety of the principal sum long prior to 31-1-1116. In such a case, the whole of the interest which had accrued due in excess of such moiety will have to be left out of account in fixing the amount of the debt due on 31-1-1116. If section 11 is not to have any operation during the period subsequent to that date, the result will be that future interest in excess of the moiety of the principal amount will again begin to run from 31-1-1116 onwards. Such an anomaly is obviated by giving the full and unrestricted effect to the limitation imposed by section 11 on the accrual of future interest and by holding that in respect of a debt of this category no future interest will accrue on the 80% of the amount of the debt sought to be paid under clause (1) of section 9. 8. The general scheme of the Debt Relief Act also appears to be in favour of the view that section 11 is intended to confer a special benefit on the debtors over and above the concession allowed by sections 8 and. 9 to get the entire amount of the debt discharged by payment of 80 per cent, 75 per cent or 70 per cent, as the case may be, within the respective periods specified in clauses (1) and (2) of section 9. The reason why such a special and additional concession was thought necessary for decree debts is not far to seek. In the case of ordinary debts, interest that could be awarded by the Court was limited to a moiety of the principal, by virtue of section 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure, (Travancore). But when once the claim is put in a suit interest on such principal amount could accumulate to any extent up to the date of the decree. The aggregate amount adjudged by the decree could also carry future interest not exceeding the amount adjudged. But when once the claim is put in a suit interest on such principal amount could accumulate to any extent up to the date of the decree. The aggregate amount adjudged by the decree could also carry future interest not exceeding the amount adjudged. These adverse circumstances arising out of decree debts appear to have induced the Legislature to enact section 11 conferring a special and additional benefit in favour of judgment-debtors in respect of decree debts alone. By section 12 still another benefit has been conferred on these debtors by reducing the rate of interest and limiting the maximum to 4". Section 11 has not been made as comprehensive and general in its scope as section 12. The special benefit conferred by section 11 has been made available only to those debtors who seek to get their debts discharged by making the concessional payments under sections 8 and 9 and that is the reason why section 11 makes particular reference to payment under sections 8 and 9. If the application of section 11 had not been so restricted, the result would have been a general reduction in respect of all decree-debts and the benefits of such a reduction would have been available to those debtors also who are not inclined to take advantage of the concession allowed by sections 8 and 9 and the decree-holders seeking recovery of the amounts due to them would have had to be satisfied by realising the amounts as reduced by section 11. Similarly, court sales already conducted could have been avoided by the judgment-debtors by depositing in court the amounts specified in section 13 of the Act, and for that purpose treat the decree-debt as reduced under section 11. The Legislature did not obviously want these benefits to be conferred on the judgment-debtors, and that is why the benefit of section 11 has been expressly confined to cases where the debts are discharged under sections 8 and 9. All the same, it cannot be said that the Legislature intended section 9 to control section 11. The Legislature did not obviously want these benefits to be conferred on the judgment-debtors, and that is why the benefit of section 11 has been expressly confined to cases where the debts are discharged under sections 8 and 9. All the same, it cannot be said that the Legislature intended section 9 to control section 11. On the other hand it is clear that section 11, just as section 12, is to control section 9 and that future interest will accrue on the 80%, 75% or 70%, as the case may be, of the amount of the debt specified in section 9, only in cases where future interest allowed under the decree has not already reached the maximum limit of the moiety of the principal as contemplated by section 11. To me it appears that the expression "future interest that may accrue" has been advisedly used in section 9 so that the accumulation of such interest may stop at the limit fixed by section 11 and may not go beyond that limit. 9. Thus, on a consideration of sections 8, 9 and 11 of the Debt Relief Act, in all their relevant aspects, I have come to the definite conclusion that section 11 controls Sections 8 and 9 and that the reference in that section regarding payments under sections 8 and 9 is the payment in discharge of the entire debt under sections 8 and 9 and not merely to indicate instalment payments and that the maximum limit of future interest prescribed by section 11 cannot be exceeded in making payments under section 9 for getting a discharge under section 8. The question referred to the Full Bench is therefore answered in the following terms: - Future interest on a decree-debt sought to be discharged under sections 8 and 9 of the Debt Relief Act cannot exceed the maximum limit prescribed by section 11 at any stage of the proceedings under section 9. The operation of section 11 cannot be restricted to the stage of fixing the instalments payable under section 9 and there is no warrant or justification for thus restricting the application of section 11.. Where future interest has not reached the maximum limit fixed by section 11, such future interest has also to be paid under section 9, until the maximum limit is reached. Where future interest has not reached the maximum limit fixed by section 11, such future interest has also to be paid under section 9, until the maximum limit is reached. Where the maximum limit is reached, the judgment-debtor is entitled to have the entire decree debt discharged with the payment of 80%, 75% or 70%, as the case may be, as contemplated by clauses (1) and (2) of section 9 subject to such limitation in respect of future interest. The decisions to the contrary in Ninan v. Mariam (1947 T. L. R. 476) and Kalyani Amma v. Amma Raja (1951 K. L. T. 188) are incorrect and they are accordingly overruled. 10. A. S. No. 588 of 1124 has to be allowed in view of the above decision on the question referred to the Full Bench. Accordingly that appeal is allowed and the order under appeal is set aside and the case is sent back to the lower court for fresh disposal of the judgment-debtor's application C. M. P. 1596 dated 9 - 2 -1124, after verifying whether the decree-debt has already been discharged with the payment alleged to have been made by him and whether he is entitled to get a refund of the excess amount stated to be available out of the total amounts deposited by him. The parties will bear their respective costs in this appeal. 11. So far as A.S. No. 91/1950 is concerned, the appellant's objection to the lower court's finding that the judgment-debtor is not bound to pay future interest in excess of the limit fixed by section 11 of the Debt Relief Act, is unsustainable. Regarding the other objections to the sustainability of the judgment-debtor's petition for a declaration that the decree debt has been discharged and for a refund to him of the excess amount stated to be available to his credit, no final orders have been passed by the lower court. Such orders can be passed only after verifying as to the correctness of the alleged payments in the light of the statement directed to be prepared by the office. When such final orders are passed by the lower court, the parties aggrieved by the same will have the liberty to seek appropriate reliefs against that order. Subject to these observations, A.S. No. 91 of 1950 is dismissed. When such final orders are passed by the lower court, the parties aggrieved by the same will have the liberty to seek appropriate reliefs against that order. Subject to these observations, A.S. No. 91 of 1950 is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, the parties are directed to suffer their respective costs of this appeal. Govinda Pillai, J. 1A. The facts of the two cases are given in the judgment of my learned brother Sankaran, J. and it is unnecessary to repeat the same. I had also the advantage to go through his judgment; but I regret very much that I cannot agree to the conclusions arrived at by him. The question for consideration is to what extent section 11 of the Debt Belief Act will control the payment of the debt as provided for in sections 8 and 9 far a complete discharge of the liability. Section 11 lays down the procedure to determine the amount of a decree debt for purposes of payment under sections 8 and 9. It says that the determination is to be in such a way so that not more than one-half of the principal in the case of money debts and not more than the principal in the case of paddy debts shall be deemed payable towards interest up to the date of the decree and not more than a like amount towards interest from the date of the decree. Section 9 (1) and (2) lay down that if 80% or 75% or 70% of any debt together with future interest that may accrue thereon is repaid within 9 or 6 ox 2 years respectively from the date of the commencement of the Act, the whole debt shall be deemed to be discharged. 2A. Sections 8 and 9 refer to "any debt" and necessarily that includes decree debts and non-decree debts. So if "any debt" is substituted by its component parts section 9 would read thus:- "If per cent of the amount of any decree-debt or non-decree-debt together with future interest that may accrue thereon is repaid the whole decree debt or non-decree-debt shall be deemed to be discharged". There is no provision as to how a non-decree-debt is to be determined for purposes of payment under sections 8 and 9. But section 11 provides how a decree debt is to be determined for the same purpose. There is no provision as to how a non-decree-debt is to be determined for purposes of payment under sections 8 and 9. But section 11 provides how a decree debt is to be determined for the same purpose. After determination of this under section 11, section 9 has to be applied, that is by taking a certain per centage of the same and paying the same in instalments together with future interest that may accrue thereon. It therefore appears to me that the determination of the decree debt under section 11 for purposes of payment is only for ascertaining the per centage of the debt that has to be paid together with interest that may accrue thereon. This future interests on the percentage of the debt will have therefore nothing to do with the interest directed to be controlled in section 11. 3A. There is yet another indication to show that the amount of decree debt determined under section 11 for purposes of payment, under sections 8 and 9 was only for fixing the debt as it stood on the date of the Debt Relief Act. Sections 8 and 9 refer to repayment of a portion of the debt and then to a discharge of the entire debt. There is no reference to the discharge of the entire debt in section 11. Again section 11 refers to the calculation of interest on the principal sum alone whereas section 9 provides for calculation of interest on ascertain per centage of the debt. The expression "any debt" in section 9 includes the principal and interest. A certain per centage of this is directed to be calculated and the same has to be paid within a certain period with interest that may accrue thereon to get a discharge of the entire debt. If after decree, a moiety of the principal had accrued as interest till the date of the Debt Relief Act, then according to the debtor no future interest is to be paid. But if it is a non-decree-debt and if interest had accrued up to a moiety of the principal, the creditor is allowed future interest on 80, 75 or 70 per cent of the debt according to the period within which it is sought to be discharged. But if it is a non-decree-debt and if interest had accrued up to a moiety of the principal, the creditor is allowed future interest on 80, 75 or 70 per cent of the debt according to the period within which it is sought to be discharged. Thus a creditor who had not obtained a decree stands on a better footing than the one who had obtained the decree, if the position of the judgment debtor is accepted.. It may be said that the creditor gets the interest on the principal before the date of decree also. That may in many cases be much less than the moiety of the principal. I shall illustrate the differential treatment that will be the result if the judgment-debtor's position is accepted. Suppose the principal of a debt is Rs. 1000 and the rate of interest agreed is 6 per cent. If the creditor files a suit and obtains a decree within one year, then the amount to be paid will be Rs. 1060. If on this decree amount interest was allowed to accrue and if such interest had been more than half the principal on the date of the Debt Relief Act, the amount of debt calculated under section 11 will be: Rs. Principal ... ... 1000 Interest till date of decree. 60 Interest after decree ... 500 Total 1560 If the debtor desires to pay this in nine years, the amount that he will hare to pay on the date of the Act would be Rs. 1248. If section 11 is made to govern this then he need not pay any interest on this sum at any time during the period of nine years. Putting a more liberal interpretation on section 11, he may get future interest at 4 per cent on 80 per cent of the principal, i. e., on Rs. 800. On the other hand if no decree had been obtained on the debt and if on the date of the Debt Belief Act interest had exceeded a moiety of the principal, then the amount of debt on the date of the Act will be Rs. 1500 and 80 per cent of the same will be Rs. 1200. This creditor will get 4 per cent on this fraction of the entire debt till it is completely discharged. 1500 and 80 per cent of the same will be Rs. 1200. This creditor will get 4 per cent on this fraction of the entire debt till it is completely discharged. He would then get much more than what the creditor who had obtained the decree would get. There is nothing in the sections of the Debt Relief Act to indicate that after the Act, creditors of the two categories were to be treated in different ways. When once the amount of the debt due on the date of the Debt Relief Act is arrived at, then section 9 has to be strictly applied. A per centage of the debt has to be taken. That is a fixed quantity and no portion of it is called principal or interest. This fixed quantity has to be paid together with future interest that may accrue thereon. 4A. The use of the words "with future interest that may accrue thereon" in section 9 was argued to indicate that future interest may or may not accrue. It was stated that when the maximum interest referred to in section 11 has been reached, then future interest will not accrue and that in order to indicate this, the above words were used. One reason for not accepting this argument is given at pages 479 and 480 of Ninan v. Mariam (1947 T. L. R. 476) thus: "The significance of the expression "may accrue" is often missed in cases of this kind. It merely means interest that may accrue in Law which may vary as regards rate, amount and the amount on which it might accrue. There are ordinary debts in which interest may accrue only on principal and there are decree debts in which interest accrues on the aggregate amount of interest and principal by virtue of section 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Again under the general law a payment made by the debtor is liable to be appropriated first towards interest and the balance towards principal in which case there may come about variations in the interest bearing amounts of the debt. The Debt Relief Act does not purport to introduce any innovation in this part of the general law as regards future interest. The Debt Relief Act does not purport to introduce any innovation in this part of the general law as regards future interest. Hence the deliberate use of the words "may accrue." Another reason is that the parties in their original contract may have agreed not to claim interest and in that case no question of accrual of future interest will arise and so these words must have been deliberately introduced in this section. The use of the word "thereon" is also significant. The percentage of debt taken is that of the sum total of the principal and interest. A doubt might arise as to whether future interest on interest can be calculated. This word clears that doubt. Sanction is given to calculate interest on that per centage no matter whether that includes principal and interest. 5A. Taking all the above matters into consideration, it appears that the interpretation of section 9 with reference to section 11, given by four learned judges of this court in Ninan v. Mariam (1947 T. L. R. 476) and Kalyani Amma v. Amma Raja (1951 K.L.T. 188) is the correct one. I respectfully follow the same. My answer therefore to the reference is that future interest provided for in section 9 on a decree debt sought to be discharged under sections 8 and 9 of the Debt Relief Act can exceed the maximum limit prescribed by section 11 after the date of the said Act, that the operation of section 11 has to be restricted to the stage of fixing the amount of debt for payment in instalments under section 9 and that Ninan v. Mariam (1947 T. L. R. 476) and Kalyani Amma v. Amma Raja (1951 K. L.T. 188) have correctly interpreted the provisions of sections 8, 9 and 11 of the Debt Relief Acts. The result is that A. S. 588 of 1124 will stand dismissed with costs. The order of the lower court in A.S. 91 of 1950 has proceeded on a wrong basis so that it will stand reversed. That case will be remanded to the lower court for reconsideration and disposal in the light of the conclusions arrived at above. Koshi,,C.J.: 1B. I have had in these appeals the advantage of reading the judgments of my learned brothers. That case will be remanded to the lower court for reconsideration and disposal in the light of the conclusions arrived at above. Koshi,,C.J.: 1B. I have had in these appeals the advantage of reading the judgments of my learned brothers. My view is that the questions which the Division Bench formulated for decision by the Full Bench have to be answered as indicated in the judgment of Govinda Pillai, J., and that the appeals should be disposed of accordingly. In concurring with that judgment which affirms the correctness of the decisions in Ninan v. Mariyam 1947 T. L. R. 476 and Kalliyani Amma v. Amma Raja -1951 K.L.T. 188 I am afraid I cannot usefully add much to what Govinda Pillai, J. has said in his judgment or to what Krishna Pillai, J. (Sankarasubba Iyer, J. concurring) said in Ninan v. Mariyam or to what Subramonia Iyer, J. (Kunhi Raman, C. J. concurring) said in Kalliyani Amma v. Amma Raja in support of the view that even in the case of a decree debt the scaled down amount will carry future interest. All that could possibly be said for the said view has been stated in one or other of these judgments and I consider it unnecessary to repeat them here. 2B. While I agree with my learned brother Justice Sankaran that the language of section 11 of the Debt Relief Act is not clear or happy and realise the force of his reasoning in support of the view that section 11 controls section 9 in the matter of discharging a decree debt under the provisions of the said Act, I cannot bring myself to accept that view as correct. To my mind the words "in determining the amount of a decree debt for purposes of payment under sections 8 and 9" taken along with the words "shall be deemed to be payable" clearly indicate that the purpose of section 11 is to determine the quantum of the debt as on 1-2-1116 for the purpose of ascertaining the quantum of the instalment payments. If the legislature intended section 11 to prescribe the top limit beyond which decree debts sought to be discharged under the provisions of the Debt Relief Act could not be recovered I am unable to appreciate why the word "deemed" was introduced into the latter part of the section or why the word "discharge" has not been used in place of the word 'payment' in the opening portion of the section. Section 8 states that any debt may be discharged by repayment in instalments in the manner and to the extent specified in section 9. While we find the words 'discharged' and 'repayment' used in section 8, section 9 (1) and section 9 (2) used the words 'repaid' and 'discharged'. 'Repayment' used in section 8 and 'repaid' used in sections 9 (1) and 9 (2) are used with reference to instalment payments while 'discharged' used in both the sections connote the extinguishment of the debt. For my part I am unable to think that the word'payment' in section 11 is used in the same sense as the word 'discharge' (or its grammatical variations) in sections 8 and 9. In other words 'payment' or 'repayment' with their grammatical variations are used in relation to instalment payments while 'discharge' and its grammatical variations refer to the extinguishment of the debt. 3B. Had the legislature intended section 11 to do service in the manner indicated by Sankaran, J. the word'discharge' would have been used in that section in the place where the word'payment' occurs. Besides if that were the intention'deemed' is otiose. No doubt, this is repeating what I have already said. I consider these considerations as almost decisive of the point. 4B. Mr. Justice Sankaran has laid much store on the words "together with future interest that may accrue thereon" occurring in sections 9 (1) and 9 (2). The word'may' in the above group of words cannot in my opinion turn the construction or meaning of section 11 one way or the other as section 9 refers both to decree debts and to non-decree debts. As suggested during the course of the arguments a bond or a decree may provide that a debt shall bear interest only for a specified period or that interest shall begin to run only after a specified date. As suggested during the course of the arguments a bond or a decree may provide that a debt shall bear interest only for a specified period or that interest shall begin to run only after a specified date. Subsections (3) and (4) of section 31 (Travancore Civil Procedure Code) and sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 34 (Civil Procedure Code, Act V of 1908) may usefully be referred to in this context. 5B. Before concluding I shall also refer to section 9 (4) of the Debt Relief Act. The sub-section states that nothing contained in the section (section 9) shall be deemed to prevent a debtor from claiming the benefits of the section by making payment of any or all the instalments before the due date. To construe section 11 in a sense contrary to what the two previous decisions already referred to lay down and to what Govinda Pillai, J. has indicated would mean that a person seeking to avail of the benefits conferred by the Debt Relief Act stands to gain nothing by discharging the debt otherwise than by instalments. According to that contrary view whether seventy per cent of the debt is paid in a lump on 1-2-1116 or by instalments within two years the amount to be repaid will be the same in a case where on 31-1-1116 the interest accrued was equivalent to the principal amount due. If seventy-five per cent is paid immediately after two years of the Act or by instalments within six years the amount payable would again be the same where on the date of the Act interest had accrued due as in the former case. It is unnecessary to add that the same would be the case when eighty per cent is paid immediately after six years or in instalments extending up to nine years. 6B. With these observations I answer the questions raised on the same lines as Govinda Pillai, J. has answered them. I also agree to the decrees proposed by him. 7B. A. S. No. 588 of 1124 is dismissed with costs. In A. S. No. 91 of 1950 the lower court's order is set aside and the case remitted to the lower court for fresh disposal in the light of the majority decision. A. S. 588 of 1124 dismissed. A. S. 91 of 1950 remanded.