ORDER : 1. This is an application in revision by the defendant against the order of the trial Court allowing the amendment of the plaint. The plaintiff filed a suit for declaration of his title in respect of a Tiwaria and a compound and for possession. The plaintiff also applied for a temporary injunction. That temporary injunction was disallowed on the ground that no relief for permanent injunction was claimed. The plaintiff filed an application for the amendment of the plaint. The amendment was allowed by the trial Court. Consequently the defendant has filed this revision. 2. The provisions in respect of amendment of plaints are contained in O. 6, R. 17, Civil P.C. The rule runs as follows : "The Court may at any stage of the proceedings allow either party to after or amend his pleadings in such manner and on such terms as may tie just, and all such amendments shall be made as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties." It is clear from the language of the rule that the powers of the Court to permit amendment of pleadings are very wide. In - 'Ma Shwe Mya v. Maung Mo Hnaung', AIR 1922 PC 249 (A), their Lordships of the Privy Council have laid down the scope of this rule. Their Lordships observed as follows : "All rules of the Court are nothing but provisions intended to secure the proper administration of justice, and it is, therefore, essential that they should be made to serve and be subordinate to that purpose, so that full powers of amendment must be enjoyed and should always be liberally exercised, but nonetheless no power has yet been given to enable one distinct cause of action to be substituted for another, nor to change, by means of amendment, the subject-matter of the suit." This decision clearly points out that powers of amendment must be enjoyed fully and that they should always be liberally exercised. To this general rule, according to their Lordships, the two exceptions are that one cause of action cannot be substituted for another and that the subject-matter of the suit cannot be changed. To this general rule, according to their Lordships, the two exceptions are that one cause of action cannot be substituted for another and that the subject-matter of the suit cannot be changed. The main consideration, which ought to guide the exercise of discretion, is that the rules of procedure are intended to facilitate the task of administering justice, to avoid multiplicity of suits and to further the interests of substantial justice. (Vide - 'Hari Bhajan Das v. Ganpati Das', AIR 1933 Cal 271 (B); - 'Ramaswami Reddi v. Genga Reddi', AIR 1918 Mad 316 (C); - 'Panchaksharam Pillai v. Rangaswami Pillai', AIR 1948 Mad 332 (D) and - 'Ata Husain Khan v. Nawab Baqar Mirza', AIR 1937 Oudh 484 (E)). From this discussion it follows that so long as the subject-matter of the suit is not changed and one cause of action is not substituted for another, amendment should be allowed provided it causes no injustice to the opposite side. 3. In the present case the learned counsel for the applicant has challenged the order of the lower Court on three grounds. His first contention is that Baburam, Radharaman, Vishandatta and Satyanarayan had sued by their next friend Jagdishnarayan. But on the application of Jagdishnarayan amendment has been made in the plaint by which Baburam, Radharaman, Vishandatta and Satyanarayan are now suing by their next friend Mst. Gomtibai, though there is no application by Gomtibai herself. This contention is not borne put by the record. The application dated 10-1-1952 is signed both by Jagadishnarayan and Mst. Gomti. It is, therefore, not correct to say that Mst. Gomti has made no application for the substitution of her name in place of Jagdishnarayan. This contention, therefore, is rejected. 4. The second contention raised by the learned counsel is that the amendment is mala fide. His argument is that the temporary injunction having been disallowed, to ask for permission to add the relief for permanent injunction so that temporary injunction may be granted is mala fide. This argument also has no substance. It is true that originally no relief for permanent injunction was asked for and subsequently temporary injunction was refused. But it does not follow that the action of the plaintiff in amending the plaint so as to add the relief of permanent injunction is necessarily mala fide. This argument also has no substance. It is true that originally no relief for permanent injunction was asked for and subsequently temporary injunction was refused. But it does not follow that the action of the plaintiff in amending the plaint so as to add the relief of permanent injunction is necessarily mala fide. It is possible that the omission of the relief was due to oversight or inadvertence. It cannot be said that the amendment has been sought very late. No definite ground has been taken to show that the act of the plaintiff is mala fide. The only suggestion that was made was that by the amendment it is possible that the defendant may be deprived of his plea of limitation. The learned counsel has not shown how the defendant is likely to be deprived of his plea of limitation. This vague ground, therefore, is not enough to hold that the act of the plaintiff is mala fide. 5. The third ground taken by the learned counsel for the defendant applicant is that the new causes of action have been added and new prayers have been made. I have gone through the application for permission to amend the plaint. I do not see any fresh cause of action added to the plaint. The cause of action is stated in para 5 which has not been sought to be amended. Fresh reliefs have, no doubt, been added. But as already stated O. 6, R. 17, Civil P.C. does not interdiet amendment which adds new reliefs, unless it causes injustice to the other party. It has not been shown that the amendment is likely to cause any injustice to the defendant. This contention, therefore, must be rejected. 6. For the reasons given above the application in revision is dismissed with costs. Revision dismissed.