Judgment :- 1. These are appeals presented by the 52nd defendant in O.S. 105 of 1108 on the file of the District Court of Quilon. That was a suit for partition in a Malabar tarwad consisting of 46 members at the time of the action, one of whom was the plaintiff and the others were defendants 1 to 45. The 46th defendant is the wife of the 1st defendant who died pending the suit. Defendants 52 to 57 are their children. The 1st defendant contended, inter alia that there was no undivided tarwad as alleged in the plaint because, by means of an Udampadi of the year 1074 the tarwad got divided into 3 groups, that those three groups were in possession and enjoyment of properties allotted to them separately and that those groups thereafter conducted themselves as though there was no community of property as between them. Defendants 1 to 9 who formed one of the three groups divided as between themselves in the year 1096 and the 1st defendant separated as a single member. The properties in his possession were, therefore, claimed as exclusively belonging to him. Various facts and circumstances were adverted to in the written statement calculated to confirm the case set up by the 1st defendant of the disruption of the family even from the year 1074. Defendants 2 to 5 filed a written statement on the lines of the one filed by the 1st defendant. Defendants 6 to 9,11 to 29 and 32 to 45 filed separate written statements. Only two members, viz. defendants 10 and 31 did not enter appearance, but they formed members of thavazhies or groups who field the aforesaid written statements. 2. The plea of prior partition having been found against and a preliminary decree for partition passed by the lower court, the widow and children of the 1st defendant as his legal representatives appealed to the erst-while Travancore High Court but without success. They, therefore, applied in the court below for the share of the deceased 1st defendant being allotted to them as his heirs under the Nair Act. The Court below disallowed the prayer on the ground that the 1st defendant had not claimed his share in his written statement. A.S. No. 518/24 is against that order. 3. The 1st defendant claimed to have improved the properties in his possession at his expense. The Court below disallowed the prayer on the ground that the 1st defendant had not claimed his share in his written statement. A.S. No. 518/24 is against that order. 3. The 1st defendant claimed to have improved the properties in his possession at his expense. His widow and children prayed in the court below that at the partition the value of the said improvements may be ascertained and given to them. This claim was disallowed by the Court below on the ground that a karnavan of a tarwad effecting improvements upon tarwad properties in his possession is disentitled to claim value therefor. A.S. 561/1124 is against that order. 4. The rule that a member of a Hindu joint family becomes divided in status on his expression of an unequivocal declaration of intention to get severed from the other members will have the effect of creating a division in status as between him and the rest of the members of the family has been applied to Malabar tarwads after compulsory partition was provided by statute. The 1st defendant could, on the date of his written statement, admittedly claim a share and therefore was entitled by a declaration to create a divided status as between himself and the other members of the tarwad. A plaint in a suit for partition has been held sufficient to create a division in status. "If upon a proper construction of a written statement it contains an expression of such a fixed desire to sever, there is no reason why it should not effect a separation in the same manner as a plaint in a partition suit does". Mayne on Hindu Law & Usage, 11th Edn. p. 552. 5. We perused the written statement carefully and we are clearly of opinion that the 1st defendant has therein expressed an unequivocal declaration that he is no more joint with any other members of the tarwad which, according to him, had ceased to exist for over 30 years. This is enough to create a divided status. Upon a proper construction of the written statement no conclusion is possible except that the 1st defendant intended that he should be divided from the rest of the members of the family. 6. This is enough to create a divided status. Upon a proper construction of the written statement no conclusion is possible except that the 1st defendant intended that he should be divided from the rest of the members of the family. 6. The negation of a family, i.e., a plea that a family never existed is different from and will not involve a plea of severance from a family which once existed but was then no more. In the former case no plea of severance can be involved because, severance must be from a family and if no family ever came into being no question of severance can arise. On the other hand in the latter case i.e., where the plea admits that a family existed but denies its continuance on account of an antecedent disruption, a plea of severance is involved, that is to say, the plea would amount to an unequivocal declaration of intention to separate from and not to remain joint with the other members. The result is that even if the version of prior partition is found against, the declaration of intention to be separate remains as it depends entirely upon the volition of the declarant, and if he be a person entitled to claim a share, the consequence of the declaration, namely the cessation of the joint and the creation of a divided status ensues. Thereafter the member can deal with his separate interest though the property has not been divided by metes and bounds. That interest will, if undisposed of, devolve upon his heirs. S. 39 of the Travancore Nair Act, II of 1100, which enacts that: "39. Until partition, no member of the tarwad shall be deemed to have a definite share in Tarwad property liable to be seized in execution or shall such member be deemed to have any alienable or heritable interest therein". means only that no member has an alienable or heritable interest so long as the family continues joint. Disruption of the joint status tantamounts to partition within the meaning of that Section. The contention of learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent that nothing short of actual division would amount to partition cannot be accepted, because, had that been the legislative intent, the expression apt and appropriate to indicate it would have been used instead of the words "definite share in Tarwad property" and "alienable or heritable interest therein". The contention of learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent that nothing short of actual division would amount to partition cannot be accepted, because, had that been the legislative intent, the expression apt and appropriate to indicate it would have been used instead of the words "definite share in Tarwad property" and "alienable or heritable interest therein". If the contention were to be correct, S.39 would have to be redrafted somewhat as follows: "Until allotment of properties at a partition in the Tarwad, no part of the tarwad property is liable to be seized in execution nor shall such member be deemed to have any alienable or heritable part thereof". This being our view, we do not consider whether, as contended on behalf of the appellant, the preliminary decree passed in this case grants shares not merely to those who had claimed but also to those who were competent to claim, including the 1st defendant who was undoubtedly competent. 7. A contention urged by learned counsel for the respondent may now be considered. What is urged is that the 1st defendant not having claimed a share in his written statement he had not become separate in status on account of it. Claiming a separate share is no doubt one way to get divided in status but that is not the only way. A declaration of intention to be separate, if made unequivocally, would create a divided status necessary to sustain a claim to a separate share under the Nair Act unlike under the Hindu Law and such declaration need not be accompanied or followed by a claim for a share to bring about that result which arises from the declaration proprio vigore and is not subject to the consent of or consideration by any one else. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant agreed that it would be sufficient if the partition be effected and a share given on the basis that the division between the 1st defendant and the other members of the tarwad was on the date of the written statement. We hold that the 1st defendant got severed from the other members of the family for purposes of this suit on 30.2.1109 that is, the date on which he filed the written statement. A.S. 518 of 1124 should therefore be and is hereby allowed with costs here and below. 9. We hold that the 1st defendant got severed from the other members of the family for purposes of this suit on 30.2.1109 that is, the date on which he filed the written statement. A.S. 518 of 1124 should therefore be and is hereby allowed with costs here and below. 9. As regards A.S. 561/1124, learned counsel for the appellant stated that he would be content if we give a direction that the equities would be adjusted by the lower court in making the allotment at the partition, that is to say, that the properties allotted to the 1st defendant under the aforesaid arrangement of 1096 which are now in the possession of his widow and children would be allotted to the share of the 1st defendant as far as possible. This appeal is therefore allowed and the order of the court below modified in the manner and to the extent indicated above. Under the circumstances the parties will bear their respective costs in this appeal. Allowed.