Judgment :- 1. The appeal is from a decree granting the redemption of an otti dated 8-3-1112. The plaintiff-respondent executed the said otti in favour of defendants 2, 8 and 9. The deed provided that the mortgagees shall enjoy the property as mortgagees for a period of twenty-seven months and that if the mortgagor did not pay up the mortgage money by the expiration of that period the deed shall be treated as one of sale. No redemption was effected within the specified period and on 5-6-1118, the mortgagees, treating themselves, as absolute owners, sold their right, title and interest to defendant 1, the appellant before this Court. Prior to this sale the mortgagees had got the Revenue authorities to transfer the land registry to their names. The otti deed contained a provision to that effect as well. The suit giving rise this appeal for cancellation of the sale in favour of defendant 1 and for redemption of the otti on payment of the mortgage money and the value of improvements was brought by mortgagor on 11-2-1119. Defendants 1 and 9 resisted the suit on the ground that by virtue of the provisions of the otti deed the mortgagor had forfeited her right of redemption and that the suit was hence not maintainable. The learned District Munsiff of Pathanamthitta before whom the suit was tried repelled the contention and allowed redemption to take place on payment of the mortgage-money and a further sum of Rs. 306 odd towards the value of improvements. Defendant 1 has brought this appeal against the learned Munsiff's judgment and decree. 2. Pending the suit in the lower court defendants 2 to 9 were removed from the array of parties. The plaintiff-mortgagor is therefore the sole respondent to this appeal. 3. Mr. N.K. Narayana Pillai, the learned counsel for the appellant contended before us that the transaction was in truth and substance a sale. It was also argued that even otherwise though normally a provision in a mortgage deed that it shall in certain eventualities work itself out into a sale would be void, in the circumstances the plaint otti came to be executed the said term would not come within the mischief of the rule relating to clogging or fettering the right of redemption. The circumstances relied upon were the following: 4. The circumstances relied upon were the following: 4. The plaintiff had executed a chitty hypothecation deed to the predecessor-in-interest of defendants 2, 8 and 9 over 23 odd acres of puthuval lands she got registered in her name. That was in lieu of the amount raised for payment of the tharavila. That hypothecation bond was put in suit in O. S. 520 of 1099 and pursuant to the decree obtained the hypotheca was proclaimed for sale. It was pending that sale that the plaint otti was executed in respect of 4 odd acres comprised in the hypotheca. The otti amount was fixed at Rs. 1000/- after relinquishing a portion of the amounts due as per the decree. Prior to the execution of the deed the plaintiffs son had made an unsuccessful attempt by means of a fresh suit to get the decree itself set aside. 5. According to Mr. Narayana Pillai the provision in the plaint otti deed that in case redemption was not effected within the specified period of twenty-seven months the deed shall get itself automatically converted into an absolute sale was supported by consideration and it was contended that that circumstance would take the case outside the ambit of the rule relating to clog on redemption. Reliance was placed in support of the argument on certain observations occurring in Padmandbha Pillai v. Umamaheswara Iyer 1948 T.L.R. 556 at page 560. Counsel contended that it was in return for the reduction of the debt that the agreement to limit the time of redemption was introduced in the otti deed. We do not find anything in the otti deed to sustain the argument that the bargain to limit the time of redemption was the result of the said reduction. The sum total of the defaulted subscriptions to the chitty to recover which O. S. No. 520 of 1099 was brought came only to Rs. 500/-. The decree-debt no doubt exceeded Rs. 1200/-, but there is no evidence as to what the annual profits or the value of the otti property came to. The truth would seem to have been that as the suit of the plaintiffs son had failed and the execution sale was soon to take place the mortgagees were in a position to dictate terms to the mortgagor. 1200/-, but there is no evidence as to what the annual profits or the value of the otti property came to. The truth would seem to have been that as the suit of the plaintiffs son had failed and the execution sale was soon to take place the mortgagees were in a position to dictate terms to the mortgagor. We cannot therefore find any basis for the argument that the agreement for limitation of the time of redemption was supported by consideration nor do we understand the observations in the case cited above as meaning to lay down that an agreement that a mortgage shall in case default is made to pay up the mortgage-money within the specified period work itself out into a sale will be valid if supported by consideration. The agreement impugned in that case was not supported by consideration and the observations referred to do no more than point that out as an infirmity, if we may say so, as an additional infirmity. There is good authority for the view that a stipulation in a mortgage, that in default of payment of the mortgage-money on the date fixed the mortgagor shall sell the property to the mortgagee at a fixed price or a price to be settled by an umpire is invalid as a clog on the equity of redemption. See Ghose's Law of Mortgage in India (5th Edition) Vol. I, p. 240 and Mulla's Transfer of Property Act (3rd Edition) p. 399. We cannot therefore see our way to agree that the right of redemption can be controlled by any agreement made as part of the transaction of mortgage. 6. Counsel invited our attention to certain passages in Ashburner on Mortgages, to some passages in the Law of Mortgages by Waldock and to the decision of the House of Lords in G. and C. Kreglinger v. New Patagonia Meat and Cold Storage Company, Limited 1914 Appeal Cases 25, but all these authorities say that a stipulation inconsistent with or repugnant to the right of redemption made as part of the transaction of mortgage will be invalid under all circumstances. There is neither factual basis nor legal authority in support of the contention that the stipulation in the plaint otti did not offend the rule relating to clogging or fettering the right of redemption. There is neither factual basis nor legal authority in support of the contention that the stipulation in the plaint otti did not offend the rule relating to clogging or fettering the right of redemption. When the substance of the bargain is examined the agreement to limit the time of redemption forms part of the terms of the otti transaction and really sought to scotch or kill the right of redemption. 7. The passages in Waldock cited before us only discuss Kreglinger's and allied cases. In Kreglinger's case what was upheld was a collateral contract entered into as a condition for advancing the loan. It is not any such collateral advantage that was bargained for here. In the case in hand there are no two independent contracts. All that we find is a penal clause attached to the contract of mortgage (otti) that in case of non-payment of the mortgage-money within the period specified there shall be a forfeiture of the right of redemption. 8. Properly speaking the other argument that the transaction was really a sale should have been dealt with first. Greater emphasis was however paid at the bar to the argument just disposed of and that was the only aspect presented to the lower court. 9. We shall now consider whether there is any substance in the contention that the deed in question really evidence a sale with a condition of repurchase and not a mortgage by conditional sale. In form the deed is not one of absolute conveyance nor is there a provision for repurchase. The document styles itself an otti; there is mention of a specific sum as debt and the right of redemption is expressly reserved though limited to a specified period. The document further states that for that specified period the executee shall remain in possession and enjoy the property as ottidar. Provision is also made as to how the amount should be realised in case the property is lost or found inadequate for the debt. In that event the executee is given liberty to proceed against the remaining properties in the decree. These circumstances make it in our opinion absolutely clear that the parties intended only to create a mortgage and not anything more. 10. In a mortgage by conditional sale personal liability is not an essential condition. In that event the executee is given liberty to proceed against the remaining properties in the decree. These circumstances make it in our opinion absolutely clear that the parties intended only to create a mortgage and not anything more. 10. In a mortgage by conditional sale personal liability is not an essential condition. The definition of a mortgage by conditional sale in Section 58 (c) of the Transfer of Property Act does not mention a personal covenant to repay. We cannot therefore accept the argument that the absence of a personal covenant in the deed is an indication that the parties intended to create a sale. Every mortgage implies a loan, and every loan, a debt. Mulla's commentaries at page 367 (3rd Edition) may usefully be referred to in this connection. Earlier at pages 355 to 357 the learned commentator discusses the distinction between a mortgage by conditional sale and a sale with a condition of repurchase. Some among the various tests pointed out there as the distinguishing features of a mortgage by conditional sale exist in this case and we have referred to those incidents in the preceding paragraph. Counsel cited before us the following passage from Ashburner (1912) Indian Edition pp. 344-45: "Thus, a conveyance of lands in lieu and satisfaction of a portion, with a proviso for redemption limited in time, was held to be a sale and not a mortgage." 11. The above is virtually a paraphrase of the head-note to the Irish decision in Goodman v. Grierson (2 Ball & Beatty 274-280) as given in Revised Reports, Volume XII, page 82. The decision shows that in that case the trustees of the person entitled to a marriage portion had taken the conveyance, not as a security, but expressly in lieu and satisfaction of the portion of 1,000 pounds. This circumstance, Lord Chancellor Manners (Ireland) said appeared to be decisive to show that the transaction between the parties was not that of a mortgage, but a conditional sale. The grantee of the land subject to the limited power of redemption was not found to have all the remedies of a mortgagee and it was hence held that the conveyance was not a mortgage but a conditional sale. Here the position is the reverse. The debt subsisted and the conveyance was only a security. 12. The grantee of the land subject to the limited power of redemption was not found to have all the remedies of a mortgagee and it was hence held that the conveyance was not a mortgage but a conditional sale. Here the position is the reverse. The debt subsisted and the conveyance was only a security. 12. A further case cited on behalf of the appellant was Tasburgh v. Echlin (1733) 1 English Reports (H. L.) 934. The head-note to the case does certainly support the appellant, but when the decision is read it will be seen that a foreclosure decree had intervened before the mortgagor's action for redemption. The head-note is in these terms: "The proviso in a mortgage is that if the mortgagor fails in the payment of principal money and interest at a time limited, the estate of the mortgagee shall, be absolute and indefeasible, as well in equity as at law. Default is made and many years elapse without any application to redeem. In this case, the mortgagee is considered in the light of a conditional purchaser and no redemption shall be decreed against him." 13. The report of the case contains only the statement of the facts, the arguments of counsel and the conclusion that the decree granting redemption should be reversed, but not the reasons for that conclusion. The case is no authority for holding that the transaction before us in this case is a sale and that no redemption can be decreed. 14. The result is the lower court's decision granting redemption has to be upheld and we accordingly dismiss the appeal with costs. Dismissed.