Judgment :- 1. This is a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution for the issue of a writ of certiorari, mandamus or other direction to respondents 1 and 2 calling up the records connected with certain orders passed by them suspending a stage carriage permit granted to the petitioner and for quashing those orders. The 1st respondent is the Central Road Traffic Board (C. R. T. B.) of the Travancore-Cochin State and the 2nd respondent is the Road (R. T. B), Kottayam. The petitioner and his deceased brother K.L. Sebastian were doing business as a firm called K.L. Kuriakose & Bros. A permit was granted to this firm under the Travancore-Cochin Motor Vehicles Act (Act X of 1125) by the Transport Authority of the State for running a bus on the Arakulam-Palai route. The 3rd respondent namely, the United Motor Union Ltd., Palai, objected to the granting of this permit and also preferred an appeal to Government from the order of the Transport Authority granting the permit. The appeal was dismissed by Government on 20-2-1952. The Indian Motor Vehicles Act came into force in this State on 16-9-1952. Before the permit could be issued the petitioner's brother Sebastian died. The permit was ultimately issued by the R. T. B. Kottayam on 27-6-1953. From the order issuing the permit the third respondent filed an appeal before the C.R.T.B. on 30-6-1953. One of the grounds urged in the appeal was that after the death of one of the partners the firm ceased to exist and that this fact was fraudulently suppressed by the petitioner at the time of obtaining the permit. The C.R T. B. passed an order on 8-7-1953 requesting the R.T.B. Kottayam to direct the petitioner not to put the vehicle on road until the appeal was disposed of or the stay was vacated. Ex. A is the copy of that order. In pursuance to this direction the R. T. B. Kottayam issued a memo to the petitioner on 11-7-1953 asking him to stop the service of the vehicle. Ex.B is the memo. The petitioner's case is that the order of the C.R.T. B. is one passed without jurisdiction. He prays that order and the order of the R.T.B.Kottayam giving effect to it may be quashed by this court in exercise of the powers vested in it under Article 226 of the Constitution. 2. Ex.B is the memo. The petitioner's case is that the order of the C.R.T. B. is one passed without jurisdiction. He prays that order and the order of the R.T.B.Kottayam giving effect to it may be quashed by this court in exercise of the powers vested in it under Article 226 of the Constitution. 2. The following grounds were urged in support of the petition. (1). No appeal lies to the C. R. T. B from an order of the R. T. B. issuing a permit. An appeal lies only from an order granting a permit, the issuing of the permit being only the " implementing of the order granting the permit. The C.R.T. B. had therefore no jurisdiction to issue a stay order. (2) Section 60 of the Act which empowers the Transport Authority which granted a permit to suspend it for any of the reasons mentioned in the section does not apply to this case since the C. R. T. B. which suspended the permit is, not the Transport Authority which granted it. According to the petitioner the R. T. B. only communicated the order of suspension issued by the C.R.T. B. Again under sub-section (2) of section 60 the Transport Authority which suspends a permit is bound to give to the holder of the permit in writing its reasons for suspending the permit. If the R.T.B. Kottayam, is regarded as the Transport Authority that suspended the permit it has not given its reasons for suspending the permit. The memo, Ex. B, only says that the permit is suspended by the C. R.T. B. (3) the C. R. T. B. has nor power to suspend a permit issued by the R.T.B. The powers and functions of the C. R. T. B. are specified in section 44 Sub-section (3) of the Act. The power conferred on the C. R. T. B. under sub-section (4) of that section to issue directions to the R. T. B. can be exercised only for the purpose of exercising and discharging the powers and functions specified in sub-section (3). The power conferred on the C. R. T. B. under sub-section (4) of that section to issue directions to the R. T. B. can be exercised only for the purpose of exercising and discharging the powers and functions specified in sub-section (3). (4) Rule 158 of the rules passed under the Motor Vehicles Act authorising the C. R. T. B. to call for reports and records from the R. T. B. and to pass such orders as it may deem fit does not confer jurisdiction on the C. R. T. B. to revise orders passed by the R. T. B. It is argued that under that rule the C. R. T. B. call only call for proceedings pending before the R. T. B. and dispose of the same. Reliance was placed on the decision of the Madras High Court in Vedachala v. C. R. T. Board (A. I. R. 1948 Mad 454). On these grounds it was argued that the order of the C. R. T B. suspending the permit is one passed without jurisdiction. 3. The petition was opposed by all the respondents. Learned counsel for the third respondent opposed the petition of the following grounds: (1) The order passed by the C. R.T.B. which is sought to be quashed is only an ex-parate interim order which is liable to be vacated by the C. R. T. B. itself and that an application will not lie for the issue of a writ in respect of such an order. (2) The permit was granted in this case not by the R.T.B. Kottayam but by the transport Authority under the Travancore-Cochin Motor Vehicles Act and it cannot, therefore, be said that the Transport Authority which can suspend the permit under section 60 of the Act is the R. T. B. Kottayam. It was submitted that the petitioner himself moved the C. R. T. B. for the issue of the permit in this case. (3) The actual order suspending the permit was issued by the R. T. B. although it was under directions from the. C. R. T. B. In that view also, the matter would come under section 60 of the Act. (4). The failure on the part of the R. T. B. to give its reasons for suspending the permit cannot affect its jurisdiction to suspend the same. (5). C. R. T. B. In that view also, the matter would come under section 60 of the Act. (4). The failure on the part of the R. T. B. to give its reasons for suspending the permit cannot affect its jurisdiction to suspend the same. (5). Rule 158 empowers the C. R. T. B. to pass an order suspending a permit issued by the R.T. B. (6) The order dated 27-6-1953 issuing the permit has to be regarded as one granting a new permit to a person other than the one to whom the permit was originally granted. The permit was granted to the firm consisting of the petitioner and his brother, Sebastian. After the death of Sebastian the firm ceased to exist. The issue of the permit cannot be said to be to the firm to whom it was granted. It was therefore argued that the order issuing the permit is virtually an order granting a new permit and is, therefore, appealable under section 64 of the Act. 4. I do not think it necessary for the disposal of this petition to consider all the arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioner and the respondents. I think that this petition should be dismissed for the simple reason that the order passed by the C. R. T. B. is only an interim order. I do not think that the extraordinary jurisdiction vested in this court under Art. 226 of the Constitution to issue writs can be invoked for the purpose of setting aside such interim orders unless there are very special circumstances justifying the exercise of that jurisdiction. Reference may be made to Ferris' Law of Extraordinary Legal Remedies (1926 Edition) page 184. This is what the learned author says about the practice in America: "It is a general practice in this country, absent statute, to issue the writ only for the purpose of reviewing final judicial determinations of inferior courts and will not, therefore, issue to review an interlocutory order. If such order is erroneous, it may be corrected pending the proceedings." Reference may also be made to 'High Prerogative Writs' by Chaudhuri (1950 Edition) Vol. I, page 320 where the learned author deals with the characteristics of judicial acts in respect of which writs will issue. If such order is erroneous, it may be corrected pending the proceedings." Reference may also be made to 'High Prerogative Writs' by Chaudhuri (1950 Edition) Vol. I, page 320 where the learned author deals with the characteristics of judicial acts in respect of which writs will issue. The learned author says: "The last characteristic of the judicial act is that there is a decision or adjudication by the tribunal or authority which disposes of the whole matter by a finding upon the facts in dispute on an application of the law of the land to the facts so found. Such decision or adjudication is final unless and until it is set aside by the dissatisfied party according to the prescribed procedure or under the common law remedy of writ." The operative portion of the order of the C. R. T. B. in this case is to the following effect: "The Road Traffic Board, Kottayam is therefore requested to direct the respondent not to put the vehicle on road till the appeal is disposed of or this stay is vacated." The petitioner can move the C.R.T. B. itself to vacate the stay on the ground that the appeal is not maintainable or for any other reason. No final order has been passed by the C.R.T. B. in the matter. There is nothing to prevent it from vacating the interim stay even before a writ is issued from this court. There are also no special circumstances in this case justifying the exercise of the extraordinary power of this court for affording relief to the petitioner. 5. I may also refer in this connection to the following observations of His Lordship Chandrasekhara Iyer, J. in Veerappa v. Raman & Raman Ltd. (A.I.R. 1952 S.C.192) regarding the jurisdiction of the High Court in the matter of issuing writs in respect of orders passed by Transport Authorities under the Motor Vehicles Act. 5. I may also refer in this connection to the following observations of His Lordship Chandrasekhara Iyer, J. in Veerappa v. Raman & Raman Ltd. (A.I.R. 1952 S.C.192) regarding the jurisdiction of the High Court in the matter of issuing writs in respect of orders passed by Transport Authorities under the Motor Vehicles Act. His Lordship says: "Such writs as are referred to in Art. 226 are obviously intended to enable the High Court to issue them in grave cases where the subordinate tribunals or bodies or officers act wholly without jurisdiction or in' excess of it, or in violation of the principles of natural justice, or refuse to exercise a jurisdiction vested in them, or there is an error apparent on the face of the record, and such act, omission, error or excess has resulted in manifest injustice. However extensive the jurisdiction may be, it seems to us that it is not so wide or large as to enable the High Court to convert itself into a Court of appeal and examine for itself the correctness of the decisions impugned and decide what is the proper view to be taken or the order to be made." His Lordship proceeds:- "The Motor Vehicles Act is a statute which creates new rights and liabilities and prescribes an elaborate procedure for their regulation. No one is entitled to a permit as of right even if he satisfies all the prescribed conditions. The grant of a permit is entirely within the discretion of the transport authorities and naturally depends on several circumstances which have to be taken into account." After referring to the powers of the different authorities under the Motor Vehicles Act His Lordship observes thus: "Thus we have before as a complete and precise scheme for regulating the issue of permits, providing what matters are to be taken into consideration as relevant, and prescribing appeals and revisions from subordinate bodies to higher authorities. The remedies for the redress of grievances or the correction of errors are found in the statute itself and it is to these remedies that resort must generally be had." In the light of these observations I do not think I shall be justified in issuing a writ in this case. The remedies for the redress of grievances or the correction of errors are found in the statute itself and it is to these remedies that resort must generally be had." In the light of these observations I do not think I shall be justified in issuing a writ in this case. The remedy of the petitioner is obviously to seek to get the interim stay vacated by the C.R.T.B. itself and not to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court at this stage. The petition has to be rejected on this ground alone. It is therefore not necessary to discuss the other points argued by learned Counsel for the petitioner and the respondents. 6. The petition is dismissed with costs. Dismissed.