JUDGMENT : M.S. Menon, J. This is an appeal from the judgment of Subramonia Iyer, J. in O. P. No. 6 of 1953 denying the petitioner’s prayer for quashing (with incidental reliefs) the order of the Central Road Traffic Board, Trivandrum, dated the 18th January 1953 (Exhibit A). 2. By the said order the Central Road Traffic Board, Trivandrum, declared the permit issued to the petitioner’s bus, No. T. C. T. 1677, invalid and directed that the further continuance of the service in pursuance of that permit should be stopped. The permit concerned is Ext F, issued on the 24th September 1952, and the circumstances in which that permit was issued and the reason for its cancellation are summarised in paragraphs 3 and 4 of Exhibit A as follows:- “The previous Transport Authority sanctioned a permit in favour of Sri R. Venkitaraman, Union Motor Service Ltd., Trivandrum, to operate service between Trivandrum and Kazhakuttam via Kumarapuram, Oollur, Sreekariyam and Kulathur in 6/50 and the Deputy Inspector General of Police as Secretary. Transport Authority, issued a permit on 24-9-1952 condoning the delay and the bus is running under cover of that permit No. PSP 99/52. The new Motor Vehicles Rules came into force on 25-9-52. As per Rule 146 [b] of the old Rules [1950] the applicant eligible to get a permit should within one month of the sanction of the application by the Authority, produce the certificate of registration of the vehicle which he proposes to operate. If he does not do so, he is authorised to produce the certificate of registration before such period as the Transport Authority may specify in this behalf. In this particular case over two years have elapsed since the sanction of the application was accorded. The erstwhile Transport Authority has authorised its Secretary to condone delay up to a maximum period of three months. As pointed out above the delay in this case is about two years and therefore the only authority which can condone the delay is the Transport Authority. The Secretary has exceeded his jurisdiction in condoning the delay and in issuing the permit. The issue is therefore vitiated in law. Since the applicant did not produce the certificate of registration in good time the original sanction to grant a permit in his favour stands revoked and is hereby revoked. The Secretary has exceeded his jurisdiction in condoning the delay and in issuing the permit. The issue is therefore vitiated in law. Since the applicant did not produce the certificate of registration in good time the original sanction to grant a permit in his favour stands revoked and is hereby revoked. Therefore the petition is allowed and the permit issued by the Secretary of the previous Transport Authority [D I. G. of Police] stands cancelled.” 3. The only question that arises for consideration is whether Ex. F was a permit that was invalid for the reason that the Secretary who issued it had no right to issue the same on the date it was issued or whether it was a valid permit which could be cancelled only under the provisions of section 60 of the Travancore-Cochin Motor Vehicles Act, 1125, (Act X of 1125). If the provisions of section 60 were attracted there can be no doubt that they had not been complied with and that the cancellation effected by Ex. A was clearly unsustainable. If on the other hand Ex. F was void ab initio on the ground that it was issued by the Secretary in excess of his authority, no question of a cancellation under Section 60 will arise and the Central Road Traffic Board, Trivandrum, was within its rights in treating the permit, as they have done, as invalid and of no value. , 4. The whole question therefore revolves round the powers of the Secretary to issue Ex. F on the date it was issued, namely, the 24th September 1952. 5. Under Rule 146 (b) of the Travancore-Cochin Motor Vehicles Rules, 1950: “When the applicant is unable to produce the certificate of registration on the date of his application for the permit, owing to the fact that he is not on that date in possession of the vehicle, duly registered, or for some other reason, the applicant shall within one month of the sanction of the application by the Transport Authority or such longer period as the Authority may specify produce the certificate of registration of the vehicle before that authority in order that particulars of registration mark may be entered in the permit. In the event of any applicant failing to produce the certificate of registration within the period specified by the Transport Authority, the Transport Authority may revoke its sanction of the application.” The sanction was accorded in this case in June 1950 and communicated to the petitioner on 16-8-1950. The period of one month specified in the sub-rule extracted above and the extended period of three months mentioned in Ex. II had both expired long prior to the issuing of the permit, on 24-9-1952. According to Rule 131 of the Travancore-Cochin Motor Vehicles Rules, 1950, the duty of the Secretary was to carry into effect the decisions of the Board and in the light of Rule 146 (b) the fact that the sanction accorded in June 1950 had not been formally revoked will not empower him to issue a permit after the expiry of the period provided. The permit granted was hence clearly beyond his powers and could not form the foundation of any rights in favour of the petitioner. 6. That the appellant himself realised that the delay demanded an approach to the Transport Authority itself is clear from the application (Ex. D) he made on the 30th August 1952. It is a curious feature of this case that even though no orders had been passed on that petition, the Secretary, chose to issue a permit on the last day of the existence of the Transport Authority, i. e., the date immediately prior to the date on which the Transport Authority gave place to respondents 1 and 2, the Central Road Traffic Board, Travancore-Cochin State, and the Road Traffic Board for the Trivandrum District. 7. The appellant’s learned counsel had a further argument that the Travancore Cochin Motor Vehicles Rules, 1950, themselves ceased to be operative on 1-4-1951 with the extension of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, (Central Act IV of 1939) to this stage on the ground that those rules had not complied with the requirements of section 133 (3) of that enactment. 7. The appellant’s learned counsel had a further argument that the Travancore Cochin Motor Vehicles Rules, 1950, themselves ceased to be operative on 1-4-1951 with the extension of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, (Central Act IV of 1939) to this stage on the ground that those rules had not complied with the requirements of section 133 (3) of that enactment. Section 133 (3) provides that all rules made under the Act “shall be laid for not less than fourteen days before the Parliament or the State Legislature, as the case may be, as soon as possible after they are made, and shall be subject to such modifications as the Parliament or as the Legislature may make during the session in which they are so laid.” Even if the Travancore-Cochin Motor Vehicles Rules, 1950, were framed under the Central Act, sub-section (3) will not in any way postpone the operation of the rules till such time as they have been laid before the Parliament or the State Legislature. As provided in sub-section. (2) of section 133 all rules made under the Act will come into force on the date, unless some later date is appointed, on which they are published in the official gazette. It is not clear how even if those rules ceased to be operative on the 1st of April 1951 as contended, Ex. F will be anything but an invalid permit issued by an officer not competent to do so. It is not clear how even if those rules ceased to be operative on the 1st of April 1951 as contended, Ex. F will be anything but an invalid permit issued by an officer not competent to do so. It is, however, unnecessary for us to consider this question as the Travancore-Cochin Motor Vehicles Rules, 1950, were framed under section 64 of the Travancore-Cochin Motor Vehicles Act, 1125, (Act X of 1125) a section which did not contain any provision corresponding to section 133- (3) of the Central Act; and the said rules have been specifically saved by the proviso to, section 6 of the Part B States (Laws) Act, 1951 (Central Act III” of 1951) which reads as follows:- “Provided further that, subject to the preceding proviso, anything done or any action taken [including any appointment or delegation made, notification, order, instruction or direction issued, rule, regulation, form, bye-law or scheme framed, certificate obtained, patent, permit of licence granted or registration effected] under any such law shall be deemed to have been done or taken under the corresponding provision of the Act or Ordinance as now extended to that State, and shall continue to be in force accordingly, unless and until superseded by anything done or any action taken under the said Act or Ordinance.” In view of what we have stated above this appeal has to be dismissed and we do so with costs, advocate’s fee Rs. 100/-. Dismissed.