ORDER : 1. This is defendant's application in revision against the order of restoration passed under O. 9, R. 9, Civil P.C. The plaintiff's suit was dismissed for default on 30th October, 1947. On the same day the plaintiff filed an application for restoration. The Court after taking evidence ordered the case to be restored on payment of Rs. 25/- to the defendant. Against this order the defendant has filed this revision. 2. A preliminary objection has been raised on behalf of the non-applicant that as the defendant accepted the costs allowed by the court, the defendant is estopped from questioning the validity of the order. The general principle of estoppel is that a party cannot be allowed both to approbate and reprobate. He cannot say at one time that a transaction is valid and thereby obtain some advantage and at another time that it is void. This principle is fully explained in - 'Venkatarayudu v. Rama Krishnayya', AIR 1930 Mad 268 (A). In that case Venkatasubtaa Rao, J. made the following observation : "What is the principle underlying these decisions ? When an order shows plainly that it is intended to take effect in its entirety and that several parts of it depend upon each other, a person cannot adopt one part and repudiate another. For instance, if the court directs that the suit shall be restored on the plaintiff paying the costs of the opposing party, there is no intention to benefit the latter except on the terms mentioned in the order itself. If the party receives the costs, his act is tantamount to adopting the order. In other words, payment of costs is, as it were consideration for the suit being restored; so that, the defendant cannot accept the cost and still object to the order." In - 'S. Burden and Co. If the party receives the costs, his act is tantamount to adopting the order. In other words, payment of costs is, as it were consideration for the suit being restored; so that, the defendant cannot accept the cost and still object to the order." In - 'S. Burden and Co. v. Army Canteen Board, India, Simla', AIR 1926 Lah 637 (B), Addison, J. held as follows ; "When an order setting aside an 'ex parte' decree has been passed and the plaintiff accepts costs and his pleader appears in Court thereafter, the plaintiff should be deemed to have accepted the order setting aside decree and the order will not be interfered with in revision." In - 'Banku Chandra v. Marium Begum', AIR 1917 Cal 546 (FB) (C), where the facts were similar to the present case, a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court held that the defendants, after having accepted the money without protest, were precluded from appealing against the order. In - 'Hazarilal v. Gangacharan', 18 Ind Cas 525 (All) (D), the facts were as follows : "A suit was dismissed on the ground of default. The plaintiff appealed. The appellate Court ordered restoration on the condition of the appellant paying Rs. 10/- to the respondent within a week. The money was not paid within a week and the appellate court dismissed the appeal. Subsequently the appellate court set aside its previous order of dismissal on an explanation being given of delay. The pleader of the defendant then accepted the payment of Rs. 10/- and the case was remanded to the first Court." In these circumstances a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court held that the defendant, having accepted the compensation money, was equitably estopped from appealing from the order of remand. In - 'Firm Rup Chand Prithi Chand v. Hardayal Mal', AIR 1927 Lah 55 (E), Addison, J. held that revision should not be allowed against an order setting aside 'ex parte' decree when the applicant in revision has acquiesced in the order. All these decisions go to show that when a party has derived benefit under an order without protest he is estopped from questioning the validity of the order. 3. Mr. Tiwari who appears for the applicant has referred me to a case reported in - 'Federal India Assurance Co. v. Anandrao', AIR 1944 Nag 161 (F). All these decisions go to show that when a party has derived benefit under an order without protest he is estopped from questioning the validity of the order. 3. Mr. Tiwari who appears for the applicant has referred me to a case reported in - 'Federal India Assurance Co. v. Anandrao', AIR 1944 Nag 161 (F). In this case the learned Judge of the Nagpur High Court based his decision on two grounds. One is that the learned counsel for the applicant had not been authorised by the plaintiff to accept the costs and conclude the plaintiff's rights of filing an application for revision. The other ground is that mere mechanical acceptance would not have the effect of concluding the plaintiff's right. In the present case it has not been shown that the counsel for the defendant had not been authorised to accept the cost's. The other ground is explained by the learned Judge of the Nagpur High Court in the following words : "Unless a conscious decision to abandon the plaintiff company's right of filing the application for revision had been taken by Mr. Deshmukh after a full comprehension of all the facts, the mere fact of his receiving costs mechanically, would not have the effect of concluding the plaintiff company." With respect I find it difficult to follow this reasoning. When a counsel accepts costs without protest it will be presumed that he takes the decision after a full comprehension of all the facts. Besides it is not essential that the intention of the person whose declaration, act or omission has induced another to act, or to abstain from, acting, should have been fraudulent, or that he should not have been under a mistake, or misapprehension. The motive or state of knowledge of the representor is immaterial. What the law regards is the position of the person to whom the representation was made. The motive or state of knowledge of the representor is immaterial. What the law regards is the position of the person to whom the representation was made. In - 'Sarat Chunder Dey v. Gopal Chunder Laha', 20 Cal 296 (PC) (G), their Lordships of the Privy Council observed as follows : "In regard to the first of these points, the Section of the Evidence Act by which the question must be determined does not make it a condition of estoppel resulting that the person who by his declaration or act has induced the belief on which another has acted was either committing or seeking to commit a fraud or that he was acting with a full knowledge of the circumstances, and under no mistake or misapprehension." (at page 310). Their Lordships further observed as follow : "What the law and the Indian Statute mainly regard is the position of the person who was induced to act, and the principle on which the law and the statute rest is, that it would be most inequitable and unjust to him that if another by a representation made, or by conduct amounting to a representation, has induced him to act as he would not otherwise have done, the person who made the representation should be allowed to deny or repudiate the effect of his former statement, to the loss and inquiry of the person who acted on it. If the person who made the statement did so without full knowledge, or under error, 'sibi imputet'. It may in the result be unfortunate for him, but it would be unjust, even though he acted under error, to throw the consequences on the person who believed his statement and acted on it as it was intended he should do." (page 311). It may in the result be unfortunate for him, but it would be unjust, even though he acted under error, to throw the consequences on the person who believed his statement and acted on it as it was intended he should do." (page 311). Another significant remark made by their Lordships of the Privy Council in the same case is as follows : "To this statement it appears to their Lordships it may be added that there may be statements made, and which have induced another party to do that from which otherwise he would have abstained, which cannot properly be characterized as "misrepresentations", as for example what occurred in the present case, in which the inference to be drawn from the conduct of Ahmed was either that the Hiba in favour of Arju Bibi was valid in itself, or at all events that he, as the party having an interest to challenge it, had elected to consent to its being treated as valid." (pp. 312-13). This has been followed in - 'L. E. Ralli v. A.H. Forbes', AIR 1922 Pat 258 (H), and in - 'Vaman Ravji v. Nagesh Vishnu', AIR 1940 Bom 216 (I). These decisions clearly indicate that even if the person who made the representation did so without full knowledge and under error it will be unjust to throw the consequences on the person who believed his statement and acted on it, as it was intended, he should do. AIR 1944 Nag 161 (F), therefore, renders no assistance to the applicant. As the costs were accepted without any protest the only presumption that can be drawn is that the defendant acquiesced in the order. Having, therefore, derived the benefit under the order, the defendant cannot be allowed to turn round and object to the order. The preliminary objection, therefore, must be sustained. 4. Consequently the revision is dismissed with costs. Revision dismissed.