Judgment Misra, J. 1. This appeal on behalf of the plaintiff arises out of a suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession in respect of lands comprised in three plots of khata No. 37 in village Hassanpur. The plaintiffs case is that her husband purchased the land of Khata No. 37 from the defendants 3 to 5 who were original raiyats in respect of that Khata. In the year 1938, defendants 6 and 7, who are landlords, instituted a rent suit against the original raiyats for arrears of rent and got a decree. In execution of that decree, being Execution Case No. 825 of 1941, this Khata was sold and purchased by defendants 1 and 2. The plaintiffs husband was even recognised by the landlord, and yet he was not impleaded in the suit, and as such the decree obtained by the landlord had "the effect of a money decree, & likewise the sale following the foot (sic) of that decree, was a money sale and did not affect the right, title and interest of the plaintiff. The defendants, however, pleaded that the plaintiffs husband was never recognised as a tenant, as also that the decree obtained by the landlord in Rent Suit No. 97 of 1938, was a rent decree and not a money decree, The sale held in execution of the decree was also a rent sale and as such the plaintiff had no right to claim the relief she had asked for. It may be mentioned here that the purchase of the land from the original raiyats by the plaintiffs husband took place on the 14th of July, 1924. The courts below decided against the plaintiff holding that the plaintiffs husband was not recognised by the landlord and the decree obtained by him in the rent suit in question was a rent decree, and so was the sale also held in execution thereof a rent sale, and as such the plaintiffs suit was dismissed. 2. Mr. The courts below decided against the plaintiff holding that the plaintiffs husband was not recognised by the landlord and the decree obtained by him in the rent suit in question was a rent decree, and so was the sale also held in execution thereof a rent sale, and as such the plaintiffs suit was dismissed. 2. Mr. B. C. De appearing on behalf of the appellant in this court has raised two questions of law, one of which is that the omission to make the plaintiffs husband a party to the suit gave to the decree obtained the character of money decree and not that of rent decree, bcause according to the amendment of the Bihar Tenancy Act, which came into force on the 10th of December 1938, the purchase of the plaintiffs husband would be automatically recognised by the landlord, and it is thus clear that although the suit was instituted on the 9th of September, 1938, before the amendment came into force, the property was sold on the 28th of May, 1942 in an execution case started in 1941, and therefore, the sale held would have the effect of a money sale. He cited the case of -- Damodar V/s. Mahangu, AIR 1952 Pat 93 (A), in support of this contention. I think there is no controversy with regard-to the proposition of law propounded by the learned counsel in support of the appeal. But the crucial point to decide is whether the plaintiffs husband acquired a good title so as to claim automatic recognition from the landlord on the date that the sale was held. Looking to Sec.26, B. T. Act after the amendment of 1934 and prior to the amendment of 1938, it is no doubt true that Sec.26N made it clear that a purchaser who acquired title to a holding prior to 1923 would acquire an indefeasible title and his purchase would be automatically recognised by the landlord. In the present case if the purchase was one by the plaintiffs husband prior to 1923, there can be no doubt that if he was not impleaded in the execution proceedings or in the suit, the decree obtained and the sale held would have the effect of a money decree and money sale. Mr. In the present case if the purchase was one by the plaintiffs husband prior to 1923, there can be no doubt that if he was not impleaded in the execution proceedings or in the suit, the decree obtained and the sale held would have the effect of a money decree and money sale. Mr. De, however, contends that although the purchase by the plaintiffs husband was made in the year 1924, under the amendment of the 10th of December 1938, the plaintiffs husband acquired a good title and automatic recognition. I am afraid this contention of the learned Advocate has lost sight of Sec.26B of the Act which runs as follows: "If a person, who became entitled to an occupancy holding or a portion thereof by transfer at any time before the date of the commencement of the Bihar Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1938, has not given to the landlord notice of the transfer nor paid the landlords transfer fee payable under the law in force immediately before the date of the commencement of the said Act, he may at any time after the said date give notice of the transfer to the Collector in the prescribed form, and pay to the Collector the prescribed fee for the service of the notice on the landlord and the landlords registration fee prescribed by Sec.12 as if such holding or portion were a permanent tenure or a portion of a permanent tenure, together with the costs necessary for its transmission to the landlord, and the collector shall cause the notice to be served on, and the landlords registration fee to be transmitted to the landlord named in the notice in the prescribed manner, and such transfer shall thereupon be binding in the same manner and to the same extent as a transfer made after the date of the commencement of the said Act; Provided that if the transfer was made before the first day of January, 1923, it shall be binding on the landlord, and no notice shall be necessary and no landlords registration fee shall be payable." It is clear from this that the Legislature gave an option to a person who purchased an occupancy holding or a portion thereof at any time prior to 1938, and has not automatically recognised under Sec.26N as it was prior to the amendment of 1938, he would be governed by Sec.26B minus the proviso. His case, therefore, is not one of automatic recognition but conditional recognition necessitating the fulfilment of the requirement of the law as laid down in Sec.26B of the Act. Mr. De on a fuller consi-deration of the matter appreciated the difficulty, and I am satisfied on a consideration of the section that Mr. Des client admittedly not having fulfilled the conditions of Section 26B up to the date of the sale cannot take advantage of any purchase made by him in 1924. He has no locus standi unless he has paid the landlords transfer fee as required by that section. This contention, therefore, fails. 3. The next point urged is that the plaintiff brought a rent suit in respect of two khatas being khata Nos. 37 and 11 and obtained a decree, in execution of which she purchased the holding. Such a decree, therefore, would have the effect of a money decree. The decree, however, obtained by the landlord is not on the record of this case, nor have we got any other document except the suit register, sale certificate and the fact that there were two execution cases. The courts below held against the plaintiff on the ground that the suit register indicated that there were two khatas with separate rentals mentioned therein for which the suit was instituted, and likewise there were two execution cases. They also relied upon the fact, in particular, of two execution cases on which they mainly based their finding that the decree obtained was a rent decree. I am afraid a clear analysis of the entries in the suit register would not support the findings of the courts below upon the character of the decree obtained. It is no doubt true that column 15 of the suit register mentions khatas 37 and 11 with separate rentals, but it is also clear from column 27 that Execution Case No. 184 of 1941 was dismissed for default. It is Execution case No. 825 of 1941 which led to a sale which ultimately was confirmed and the execution case was dismissed on full satisfaction. From this, if anything, the position remains very doubtful as to how the execution was levied, whether there were two separate execution cases or only one execution case in respect of both. It is Execution case No. 825 of 1941 which led to a sale which ultimately was confirmed and the execution case was dismissed on full satisfaction. From this, if anything, the position remains very doubtful as to how the execution was levied, whether there were two separate execution cases or only one execution case in respect of both. The view of the courts below that there were two execution cases leading to the inference that two cases were started in respect of two holdings also is not supported by column 27 of the suit register. If, therefore, the matter had rested here, Mr. Lalnarayan Sinha could only rely upon the presumption in favour of the landlord that all the procedure of a rent decree and rent sale was followed, and as such it must be inferred that the sale held in execution of the decree was a rent sale. By itself possibly it might have left the position rather obscure, but fortunately the sale certificate which is on the record of the case which has not been referred to by the courts below puts the position beyond doubt. The sale certificate clearly states that the auction purchaser purchased Khata No. 37 only in respect of which a sale certificate was granted meaning thereby that there was certainly an independant sale in respect of khata No. 37 and evidently it must have been for the arrears due in respect of that khata. Mr. De, however, has urged on the footing of the cases reported in --Hriday Nath Das V/s. Krishna Prasad, 11 Cal. W.N. 497 (B), and -- Bipradas Dey V/s. Bajaram Bandopadhya 13 Cal. W.N. 650 (C), that if there is a single suit in respect of two khatas, the decree passed must be deemed to have the effect of a money decree and not a rent decree. Mr. W.N. 497 (B), and -- Bipradas Dey V/s. Bajaram Bandopadhya 13 Cal. W.N. 650 (C), that if there is a single suit in respect of two khatas, the decree passed must be deemed to have the effect of a money decree and not a rent decree. Mr. Lal Narayan Sinha, however, has invited my attention to the case of --Profulla Nath V/s. Satya Bhusan, reported in AIR 1929 P.C. 171 (D), which is a decision of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee where the view of law expressed in the above two cases came in for consideration, and their Lordships held that the reasoning on which these two decisions rested could not be supported, and they laid down the law on the point different from what their Lordships of the Calcutta High Court stated in 11 Cal W N 497 (B) & 13 Cal. W. N. 650 (C). The relevant passage runs thus: "It appears to have been the view of the High Court following other decisions in India to the like effect that such a suit can never result in a decree or decrees to sell the tenures separately so as to give the purchaser power to annul the incumbrances on each separate tenure. Their Lordships are inclined to think that this goes too far. If the original suit can be brought against a holder in respect of all his separate holdings, there appears to be nothing in the Code of Civil Procedure or in the Bengal Tenancy Act to prevent the consequent decrees and orders from being so moulded as to enable their provisions to apply distributively to the separate holdings in respect of which the suit is brought. It would be a misfortune to find a system of procedure so rigid as to lead to an illogical and inconvenient result; and their Lordships are not prepared to hold that this defect exists. But obviously if the original suit is brought in respect of separate tenures the plaintiff must see that the subsequent process takes such a form that the tenures are in fact sold separately, so that each may be redeemed separately by the incumbrancers of such separate part pursuant to Sec.170." 4. But obviously if the original suit is brought in respect of separate tenures the plaintiff must see that the subsequent process takes such a form that the tenures are in fact sold separately, so that each may be redeemed separately by the incumbrancers of such separate part pursuant to Sec.170." 4. It is no doubt true that the point for consideration arose in the above case in connections with the right of the holder of the interest of an undertenure holder; but the point for consideration was whether the decree obtained in respect of more than one tenure by the landlord would have the effect of a rent decree so as to give him the right to annul all the incumbrances created in respect of that tenure. Their Lordships of the Judicial Committee modified the general view which seemed to prevail in various courts in India that there must be one suit in respect of one holding in which alone a rent decree could be passed. In view, therefore, of this decision, I am afraid I cannot act upon the view of law taken in 11 Cal. W. N. 497 (B) and 13 Cal. W. N. 650 (C). The only point that remains for consideration is whether in the present case it can legitimately be inferred that although there was one suit and one decree, whether the decree was of a distributive character, and, whether that distributiveness was maintained by the landlord in the subsequent proceedings ultimately resulting in the sale of the holding. I have already referred to the sale certificate which is in the clearest possible terms to the effect that the distributiveness was maintained, because there was also sale in respect of khata No. 37. In view of this document, this contention also raised on behalf of the appellant must fail. The appeal, therefore, must be dismissed with costs.