ORDER : The facts of the case and the contentions of the parties are given in the first paragraph of my previous order dated the 29th June 1951 extracted below: "The petition is by a tenant of the building No. 498 in the 12th Ward of the Ernakulam Municipality to quash the proceedings of the Government in a rent control case allowing his eviction. The 1st Counter-Petitioner is the owner of the building and she had filed R.C.P. 57 of 1124 before the Rent Controller of Ernakulam for evicting the petitioner. This was partly allowed and so the landlady and the tenant filed appeals before the District Magistrate, Trichur who was the appellate authority. By a joint order on these appeals, the appellate authority ordered on 29.12.1950 that there were no grounds for ordering the eviction. On this the 1st Counter-Petitioner put in a revision petition on 24.1.1951 before the Government of Travancore-Cochin to revise the decision of the District Magistrate. By the proceedings dated 8.6.1951 the Government allowed the revision petition and thereby conferred on the landlady the right to evict the tenant. The landlady is now taking steps to get recovery of possession of the building. It was stated in this petition that the Government order was wrong and invalid, as on the face of the records the conclusion arrived at was not possible. There was also no finding by any of the tribunals which tried the case that there had been acts of waste which were likely to impair materially the value or utility of the building in question. In the absence of such a finding neither the provisions of clause 9 of the Travancore-Cochin (Lease and Rent) Control Order of 1950 nor those of S. 9 of the Cochin Buildings (Lease and Rent) Control Act XXIV of 1124 nor those of S. 7 of the Proclamation IV of 1122 could be attracted to confer jurisdiction, on the deciding authorities to order eviction. It was also contended that the Travancore-Cochin Buildings (Lease and Rent) Control Order 1950 was ultra vires and invalid, that in any event the said order would not govern the proceedings in this case, that the Government had therefore absolutely no authority to interfere with the order of the District Magistrate, that a tribunal constituted under clause 16 of the said Order could not adjudicate the civil rights of the parties and that for these reasons also the Government's order was to be quashed. The petitioner then stated that he had invested a large amount in the trade which he was conducting there and that he was not to be evicted in any event. The first counter-petitioner is the landlady and the second counter-petitioner the State. No rejoinder to the averments in the affidavit of the petitioner had been made by or on behalf of the State so that it has to be taken that all the facts mentioned in the affidavit are admitted by the State. The first counter-petitioner has filed a counter-affidavit. She stated that the petitioner began to use the building contrary to the purpose for which it was let out, that by his negligent conduct, the building once caught fire, that it caused material and permanent damage to the building, that though the Rent Controller ordered eviction the appellate authority reversed the same, that the Government in the revision proceedings had passed a proper order, that the Rent Control Order was not ultra vires, that the petitioner was only having a trade in which his investment could not exceed Rs. 2000/- and that he was not entitled to any relief." 2. This petition was once allowed by me on the ground that the Government had no jurisdiction to entertain a revision petition for there was no provision for the same in Act XXIV of 1124 (Cochin), under which the proceedings were originally started. But, on appeal by the present respondent on the ground that clause 16 of the Rent Control Order had conferred such powers on the Government and that the Travancore-Cochin Buildings (Lease and Rent Control Order) 1950 and S. 13 of Act V of 1950 were to govern the present proceedings, the case was sent back for fresh disposal. It was heard on the 30th March 1953. It was heard on the 30th March 1953. On going through the records the same day I found that S. 22 of the Act V of 1950 provided for an appeal to Government. It was a revisional jurisdiction that was exercised. I, therefore, passed an order the next day to post the petition again for argument on this question. It came up for argument on 14.9.1953 and both sides presented their case on the specific question mentioned above. 3. Mr. Mahalinga Iyer began his argument stating that though clause 28 of the Rent Control Order provided for the continuance of all proceedings started under Act XXIV of 1124 and pending at the commencement of this Order, the said Rule was ultra vires, for Act V of 1950 had not provided for the repeal of Act XXIV of 1124 and the executive authority by framing the rules under the Act would not repeal another Act passed by the legislature. He was not allowed to proceed in this direction for he had submitted before the Division Bench that the previous order was passed overlooking the provision in clause 28 of the Rent Control Order. 4. The next argument of the petitioner's learned Advocate was that the rules were ultra vires of Act V of 1950. His argument was based on the ground that the Government by an executive order under powers conferred by S. 13 of Act V of 1950 had constituted tribunals to hear and determine the civil disputes between the parties and that such delegated legislation was opposed to common law. The rules were, therefore, stated to have been passed without any jurisdiction on the part of the Government. It is true that the rules in question were framed by the Government in exercise of the powers conferred under S. 13 of the Act to control the rent for residential or non-residential accommodation. With the powers thus conferred, the Government had constituted two tribunals one, the Rent Controller with original jurisdiction and the other, the District Magistrate with appellate jurisdiction. With the powers thus conferred, the Government had constituted two tribunals one, the Rent Controller with original jurisdiction and the other, the District Magistrate with appellate jurisdiction. Over and above this, there is R. 16 by which the Government assumes the revisional jurisdiction on the application of any aggrieved party or on their own motion at any time within six months of the decision of the appellate authority to correct a material irregularity in the procedure or if the decision of the appellate authority is vitiated by any mistake of fact or was due to any misrepresentation or fraud on the part of any of the parties or if the decision was otherwise unjust. The power of the legislature to delegate legislative powers to the executive had come up for consideration before the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court on a reference made by the President. That decision is reported in page 332 in AIR 1951, Supreme Court. (In re. Art. 143, Constitution of India etc.) the Majority view was that the legislature had such powers of delegation of course within definite and defined limits. The views of his Lordship Fazl Ali, J., at page 361 is instructive and I quote the same below:- "Before I conclude, I wish to make a few general observations here on the subject of "delegated legislation" and its limits using the expression once again in the popular sense. This form of legislation has become a present-day necessity, and it has come to stay - it is both inevitable and indispensable. The legislature has now to make so many laws that it has no time to devote to all the legislative details, and sometimes the subject on which it has to legislate is of such a technical nature that all it can do is to state the broad principles and leave the details to be worked out by those who are more familiar with the subject. Again, when complex schemes of reform are to be the subject of legislation, it is difficult to bring out a self-contained and complete Act straightway, since it is not possible to foresee all the contingencies and envisage all the local requirements for which provision is to be made. Thus, some degree of flexibility becomes necessary, so as to permit constant adaptation to unknown future conditions without the necessity of having to amend the law again and again. Thus, some degree of flexibility becomes necessary, so as to permit constant adaptation to unknown future conditions without the necessity of having to amend the law again and again. The advantage of such a course is that it enables the delegate authority to consult interests likely to be affected by a particular law, make actual experiments when necessary, and utilise the result of its investigations and experiments in the best way possible. There may also arise emergencies and urgent situations requiring prompt action and the entrustment of large powers to authorities who have to deal with the various situations as they arise. There are examples in the Statute books of England and other countries, of laws, a reference to which will be sufficient to justify the need for delegated legislation. The British Gold Standard (Amendment) Act, 1931, empowered the Treasury to make and from time to time vary orders authorising the taking of such measures in relation to Exchanges and otherwise as they may consider expedient for meeting difficulties arising in connection with the suspension of the Gold Standard. The National Economy Act, 1931 of England, empowered "His Majesty to make Orders in Council effecting, economics in respect of the services specified in the schedule" and provided that the Minister designated in any such Order might make regulations for giving effect to the Order. The Food-stuffs (Prevention of Exploitation) Act, 1931, authorised the Board of Trade to take exceptional measures for preventing or remedying shortages in certain articles of food and drink. It is obvious that to achieve the objects which were intended to be achieved by these Acts, they could not have been in any other way than that in which they were framed. I have referred to these instances to show that the complexity of modern administration and the expansion of the functions of the State to the economic and social sphere have rendered it necessary to resort to new forms of legislation and to give wide powers to various authorities on suitable occasions. But while emphasizing that delegation is in these days inevitable, one should not omit to refer to the dangers attendant upon the injudicious exercise of the power of delegation by the legislation. But while emphasizing that delegation is in these days inevitable, one should not omit to refer to the dangers attendant upon the injudicious exercise of the power of delegation by the legislation. The dangers involved in defining the delegated power so loosely that the area it is intended to cover cannot be clearly ascertained and in giving wide delegated powers to executive authorities and at the same time depriving a citizen of protection by the Courts against harsh and unreasonable exercise of powers are too obvious to require elaborate discussion". 5. But, in order that such delegation might be effective the legislature will have to indicate the lines on which the executive is to proceed. What S. 13 laid down was that the Government, so far as it appears to them is necessary or expedient for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community, may by notified order provide for regulating the letting and sub-letting of any accommodation or class of accommodation, whether residential or non-residential, whether furnished or unfurnished and whether with or without board, and in particular, (i) for controlling the rents for such accommodation (either generally or when let to specified persons or class of persons or in specified circumstances); (ii) and for preventing the eviction of tenants and sub-tenants from such accommodation in specified circumstances. 6. The matters that are to be attended to are summarised in this section. There must be a authority to carry out the instruction contained in that section and the rules can, therefore be framed adopting the ways and means for carrying out the primary objects mentioned above. Necessarily, therefore, there must be an officer to attend to this and that is all that is provided for by appointing a Rent Controller. The Rent Controller's jurisdiction is mentioned in S. 13, and it is only for the working out of those powers that rules are framed. He may go wrong and in that case S. 22 of the Act provided for an appeal to Government from any decision made by an officer of the Government in exercise of the powers conferred on such officer by or under Chapter II. It may not be always possible for the Government to hear those appeals and so they were allowed under S. 15 of the Act do delegate that power to another officer or authority subordinate to Government. It may not be always possible for the Government to hear those appeals and so they were allowed under S. 15 of the Act do delegate that power to another officer or authority subordinate to Government. That is also perfectly within the provision made in the Act. So, the argument that all the rules are ultra vires cannot be accepted. But R. 16 of the Rent Control Order had allowed the Government a right of revision. It is definitely mentioned in the Act that an order passed by the officer appointed by the Government to carry out the function mentioned in S. 13 was appealable and that the Government were to be the appellate authority. But the Government were allowed to delegate their powers to an officer subordinate to them. What was provided, therefore was an original order and an appellate order. There the matter would stand and under the Act no other authority had any right to deal with this matter. 7. Mr. Achutha Menon, the learned Advocate for the respondent had stated that this right of Government to hear the appeal had been delegated to the District Magistrate under S. 15. No doubt S. 15 allows the same and if such officer exercises the powers of the appellate court, then that decision would be final. But the argument proceeded on the wording of S. 15 and it was stated that the Government could reserve with themselves a revisional jurisdiction and delegate their powers to hear the appeal to a subordinate authority. This argument was based on the wording of S. 15, which reads thus: "The Government may by order direct that any power which is conferred upon the Government under this Chapter shall in such circumstances and under such conditions, if any, as may be specified in the direction be exercised or discharged by any officer or authority subordinate to the Government". From the words, "under such conditions" it was vehemently argued that, while delegating the appellate power to the District Magistrate such delegation was made on the condition that the right to revise the decision of the appellate authority was retained by the Government I am unable to appreciate this argument. 8. An original decision and an appellate decision were alone contemplated in Chapter II of Act V/1950. 8. An original decision and an appellate decision were alone contemplated in Chapter II of Act V/1950. There was no jurisdiction to say that an appeal to Government is equivalent to an appeal to the District Magistrate plus a revision to the Government. The Act contemplates only two tribunals, whereas the rules provide for three tribunals and I feel that the provision in R. 16 is ultra vires and the Government had no such powers under the Act to make that provision. Being so, the order passed in revision by Government was without jurisdiction and the said order has to be quashed. I would, therefore, allow this petition and issue a writ of certiorari quashing the proceedings and order of Government referred to in the petition. The petitioner will get his costs from the counter-petitioners, who will contribute equally.