Judgment Choudhary, J. 1. This is a plaintiffs appeal against the judgment and decree of the first Additional Subordinate Judge, Patna, passed in Title Appeal No. 194/74 of 1948, whereby he dismissed the plaintiffs suit with costs. 2. The plaintiff brought the suit for declaration that the order of eviction passed by the House Controller, Patna, was without jurisdiction and void and not binding on him and for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from enforcing the said order. 3. The house in question is situate in Bankipore, being holding No. 100, Circle No. 10, mahalla Bakerganj. It originally belonged to one Sheodayal Narain who inducted the plaintiff as a tenant in the year 1939. This Seodayal was indebted to several creditors who had obtained decrees against him. In execution of their decrees defendants 2 and 3 purchased this house on 19-1-1940. One Mr. T.M. Conally purchased it on 17-6-1940, and the Traders Co-operative Bank purchased the same on 16-4-1941. Mr. Conally, however, sold the house to defendant No. 1 on 10-6-1943. Subsequently, defendants 2 and 3 brought a suit for declaration of their title and recovery of possession from defendant No. 1 with respect to half of the house impleading all the purchasers as parties to the suit. After litigation in the courts below the case ultimately came up to this Court in second appeal and it was held by this Court that defendants 2 and 3 of this suit (who were the plaintiffs in that suit) has eight annas share in the house and a decree for recovery of possession was passed against defendant No. 1, vide, --Mt. Moti Kuer V/s. S.M. Usman, AIR 1949 Pat 304 (A). This decision was given in May, 1948. During the pendency of that case on 1-6-1945, defendant No. 1 applied to the House Controller for eviction of the plaintiff on two grounds, namely, on the ground of non-payment of rent as well as on the ground of his having required the house for personal necessity. On 4-1-1946, the House Controller passed an order of eviction against the plaintiff on the ground of his not having paid the rent. As the judgment of the House Controller is not on the record, it is not precisely known as to what was his finding with regard to the question of the house being required for personal necessity. On 4-1-1946, the House Controller passed an order of eviction against the plaintiff on the ground of his not having paid the rent. As the judgment of the House Controller is not on the record, it is not precisely known as to what was his finding with regard to the question of the house being required for personal necessity. The plaintiff took out an appeal to the Commissioner who remanded the case for re-hearing on the point as to whether or not the owner of the house required it for his personal necessity. On 28-9-1946, the application of the landlord (defendant No. 1) was rejected by the House Controller and against that order he went up in appeal to the Commissioner. The order dated 28-9-1946, is also not on the record, and, therefore, it is not possible to say precisely as to the grounds on which the House Controller rejected the application of the landlord. On 4-1-1947, the Commissioner again set aside the order of the House Controller and remanded the case for rehearing. On 19-12-1947, the House Controller passed an order for eviction of the plaintiff on the ground of his not having paid the rent and this order was confirmed on appeal by the Commissioner by his order dated 8-2-1948. The plaintiff, therefore, filed the present suit on 19-2-1948, for the relief as already indicated. 4. The trial court held that the order of eviction was ultra vires and without jurisdiction and was not binding on the plaintiff and in that view of the matter it decreed the suit. On appeal by defendant No. 1 the lower appellate court reversed the judgment and decree of the trial court and dismissed the suit of the plaintiff. Against that judgment and decree the plaintiff has come up in appeal to tills Court. 5. Mr. On appeal by defendant No. 1 the lower appellate court reversed the judgment and decree of the trial court and dismissed the suit of the plaintiff. Against that judgment and decree the plaintiff has come up in appeal to tills Court. 5. Mr. Syed Hasan on behalf of the appellant has raised two points, namely, (1) that at the time when the application was made by defendant No. 1 for eviction of the plaintiff non-payment of rent was no ground to entitle the House Controller to evict a tenant, and, therefore, the order of eviction passed on that application was without jurisdiction and (2) that in any view of the matter, as it appears from the decision of this Court in the second appeal referred to above, defendants 2 and 3 were co-sharer landlords with defendant No. 1, and, therefore, an application for eviction by only defendant No. 1 was not maintainable in law. There seems to be, however, no force in either of the two contentions. Under Sub-section (1) of Sec. 4 of the Bihar House and Business Premises Rent Control Order, 1942, a tenant, being in possession of any house on a tenancy from month to month on the date of the commencement of that Order, was not liable to be ejected except for non-payment of rent or breach of the conditions of the tenancy. There is a proviso to Sub-section (1) which, so far as is material for the present enquiry, runs as follows : "Provided that the Controller may, on the application of the landlord and after making such inquiry as he thinks fit, if he is satisfied that the house is reasonably and in good faith required by the landlord for his own occupation or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the house is held by him, direct the tenant to vacate the house on or before such date as may be specified in the order not being less than three months after the date of the order." Mr. Syed Hasan contends that on reading this section it is plain that though the non-payment of rent was a ground for ejecting a tenant from a house, the Controller had no jurisdiction to pass an order of eviction on that ground. That order could be passed only by the civil court. Syed Hasan contends that on reading this section it is plain that though the non-payment of rent was a ground for ejecting a tenant from a house, the Controller had no jurisdiction to pass an order of eviction on that ground. That order could be passed only by the civil court. According to that law, the Controller could pass an order of eviction only in a case where the landlord required the house for his own occupation or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the house was held by him. There is no doubt as to the correctness of this contention. The court of appeal below is wrong in holding that the Controller had every jurisdiction to evict the plaintiff from the house on the ground of non-payment of rent under the Bihar House and Business Promises Rent Control Order, 1942. The controller had no jurisdiction to evict a tenant from a house on the ground of non-payment of rent. But that, however, is of no assistance to the appellant. As it appears from the order of the Commissioner, Mr. Baksi, exhibit 1 (b), Mr. Lee, the previous Commissioner, had remanded the case for re-hearing on two points, namely, "(i) whether the respondent really requires the house for his own use," and (ii) if not, what is the amount of rent due to him up to the end of June, 1946, after setting off the expenses claimed by either party". From this, it appears that prior to the decision of the Commissioner, Mr. Lee, the question whether the landlord really required the house for his own use was not finally or, at any rate, properly, decided by the courts below and the proceeding for eviction which started on 1-6-1945, on an application made by defendant No. 1 was kept alive till it ultimately came to be heard by the Commissioner, Mr. Baksi, on 4-1-1947. Baksi, on 4-1-1947. The learned Commissioner observed that "Under the House Rent Control Order of 1942 the Controller or the Commissioner in his appellate jurisdiction had no power to go into the question of non-payment of rent or to pass an order of eviction even if non-payment of rent was made out", but, in view of the fact that after the institution of that proceeding, the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction Control) Ordinance, 1946, came into operation with effect from October, 1946, which authorised the Controller to evict a tenant on the ground of non-payment of rent, he remanded the case for an enquiry to find out if there was a non-payment of rent. Mr. Syed Hasan has contended that there was no application by the landlord before the Commissioner on the basis of which he could have passed an order directing the Controller to consider if the plaintiff could be evicted on the ground of non-payment of rent. He further contended that the Controller or the Commissioner in his appellate power had no jurisdiction to pass an order of eviction on the ground of non-payment of rent suo motu, that is to say, without an application being made by the landlord. Sub-section (1) of Sec.11 of that Ordinance provides for the eviction of a tenant in possession of any building on a month to month tenancy fdr non-payment of rent & Sub-section (2) of that section provides that a landlord who seeks to evict his tenant under Sub-section (1) shall apply to the Controller for a direction in that behalf. Relying on this Mr. Syed Hasan argued that no application having been made by the landlord after the commencement of this Ordinance, the Commissioner had no jurisdiction to pass an order for eviction on the ground of non-payment of rent. Subsequently, the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947, was passed, the provisions of which, so far as the matter under consideration is concerned are the same as were in the aforesaid Ordinance. In the present case an application filed on 1-6-1945, for eviction on the ground of non-payment of rent as well as on the ground of the owners personal necessity was pending before the Court and there was no necessity for making a fresh application incorporating the same prayers. In the present case an application filed on 1-6-1945, for eviction on the ground of non-payment of rent as well as on the ground of the owners personal necessity was pending before the Court and there was no necessity for making a fresh application incorporating the same prayers. It was enough if a submission was made on behalf of the landlord to the Commissioner that since after the passing of the new Ordinance non-payment of rent is a ground for eviction, his previous application might be considered in that light also. There is no provision that the application must be in writing and even an oral application was s ufficient. But in the present case, however, an application in writing was before the Controller and the Commissioner, and they had, in my opinion, full jurisdiction to evict the tenant on the ground of non-payment of rent since after the enactment of the Ordinance of 1946. As a matter of fact, we find that the Controller has passed an order for eviction on the ground that rent from May, 1945, to November, 1947, was in arrears. It cannot be doubted that the Controller had the right to evict a tenant on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent accruing since after the month of October, 1946, and as there had been a default in payment of rent since after that till November, 1947. the learned Controller was perfectly within his jurisdiction to pass an order for eviction on that ground. 6. In support of his next contention that defendant No. 1, being a co-sharer landlord, could not make an application for eviction, Mr. Syed Hasan has relied on the definition of the word "landlord" given in Sec.2, Clause (d) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947. 6. In support of his next contention that defendant No. 1, being a co-sharer landlord, could not make an application for eviction, Mr. Syed Hasan has relied on the definition of the word "landlord" given in Sec.2, Clause (d) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947. According to this definition, "landlord" includes the person who for the time being is receiving, or is entitled to receive, the rent of a building whether on his own account or on behalf of another, or on account or on behalf or for the benefit, of himself and others, etc." As already indicated, defendants 2 and 3, the other co-sharer, landlord, had filed the suit for recovery of possession as against this defendant No. 1 and a decree was passed in their favour as against defendant No. 1 for recovery of possession to the extent of eight annas share in the house. Therefore, defendant No. 1 is a person who for the time being was receiving, or was entitled to receive the rent of the building and in that view of the matter he was perfectly entitled to make an application for eviction. Thus there is no merit in this contention also. 7 In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Reuben, J. 8 I agree.