Judgment.- Of these six C.M.As., only two are very material for the purpose of this judgment. One of these two is C.M.A. No. 554 of 1951 which is against the order of the learned Principal Subordinate Judge of Mathurai dismissing the application of the appellant-13th defendant, praying for an order to send for an amount equal to the balance yet due under the decree from the amount in court deposit, being the sums deposited by the Receiver in the suit, to the execution side and for ordering payment of the same to the decree-holder in the suit in satisfaction of the decree. The other is C.M.A. No. 555 of 1951 which is against the order of the same principal Subordinate Judge of Mathurai in E.A. No. 391 of 1951 which was a petition by the same appellant under section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code for recording full satisfaction of the decree. These two applications have been filed in O.S. No. 75 of 1934 and they have been disposed of by a common order, dated 10th September, 1951. Both these petitions were dismissed by the said learned Subordinate Judge with costs to the respondent-decree-holder. The learned Subordinate Judge held that, in the circumstances and for the reasons set out by him in his order, no amount could be sent for at that stage in discharge of the decree in O.S. No. 75 of 1934 as requested by the appellant-13th defendant. The 13th defendant as petitioner in those two applications aggrieved by the said order has now preferred these appeals. The suit O.S. No. 75 of 1934, out of which the appeals before us have arisen, and the prior suits, O.S. No. 114 of 1925 and O.S. No. 91 of 1938 which are all connected, have passed through many vicissitudes during the long period ending with the filing of the present appeals as well as C.M.As. Nos. 559 and 662 of 1951. C.M.A. Nos. 559 and 662 of 1951 and C.M.A. Nos. 213 and 214 of 1950 are also disposed of by this judgment. The entire facts relating to the above suits and the various proceedings that arose therefrom have been somewhat elaborately set out by Subba Rao and Chandra Reddi, JJ., in their judgment in Vairavan Chettiar v. R.M.R. Nagaswami Ayyar & Co.1 We think it unnecessary to traverse the same facts in this judgment. The entire facts relating to the above suits and the various proceedings that arose therefrom have been somewhat elaborately set out by Subba Rao and Chandra Reddi, JJ., in their judgment in Vairavan Chettiar v. R.M.R. Nagaswami Ayyar & Co.1 We think it unnecessary to traverse the same facts in this judgment. It would be sufficient for us to consider the specific points raised by the learned counsel on both the sides in these two appeals and to decide them, in the light of the background facts referred to above. Mr. K.S. Ramabhadra Iyer, appearing for the appellant in both these appeals; has raised in the first instance the contention that when a Receiver is appointed for a particular debt, at the instance of a decree-holder, it is not open to the decree-holder to say that that decree-debt cannot have priority over other claims in respect of the amounts collected by the Receiver during the course of his management of the property in respect of which he was appointed Receiver. It is pointed out by Mr. K.S. Ramabhadra Iyer that the Receiver referred to by him was appointed in I.A. No. 952 of 1939 in O.S. No. 75 of 1934 in respect of the entire properties and not for the half share of the suit properties as contended by the counsel for the respondents. Mr. Ramabhadra Iyer has taken us through the application filed in I.A. No. 952 of 1939 the affidavit of one of the partners of the plaintiff’s firm and also the relevant paragraphs of the order in I.A. No. 952 of 1939 in support of his contention. On a consideration of all these materials referred to by Mr. Ramabhadra Iyer and the appellate decree passed against the half share of the present appellant an 1 his father and reported in a common judgment in Muthia Chettiar v. Rayulu Ayyar, Nagaswami Ayyar & Co.2, we do not think that it is possible for us to agree with the learned counsel for the appellant that the entire amount collected by the Receiver should be available for the satisfaction of the decree outstanding against the appellant. As the appellant and his son Shanmugha were made liable only to the extent of half the decree amount but to pay the full interest and the plaintiff-decree-holder has already-purchased and become entitled to the other half share under the partition decree dated 31st July, 1944, the amount available towards adjustment of the liability of the appellant would only be half the monies collected by the Receiver. Mr. K.S. Ramabhadra Iyer has invited our attention to a series of decisions, namely Maharajah of Pitapuram v. Gokuldoss Govardhandoss3, Paramasivan Pillai v. Ramasami Chettiar4, Arumugham Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar5, Maharaja Sir Rameshwar Singh v.Chunilal1, Ma Joo Tean v. The Collector of Rangoon2, Moideen Kutty v. Doraisami Iyer3 and Ramabhadra Iyer v. Jagannathan4, to substantiate his point that all realisations made by the Receiver should go to the credit of the mortgagee, if he is appointed for the purpose of the suit-debt at the instance of the mortgagee decree-holder. The propositions laid down in these decisions are unexceptionable. But on the facte that have emerged in these two appeals before us, we do not think that the rulings in the decisions cited by the learned counsel have any direct bearing on the case before us. On a careful consideration of all the points urged on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel and the entire circumstances of the case, we think that the appellant in this case will be entitled only to certain limited reliefs. To the grant of these reliefs, the counsel for the respondents can have no objection. In the first place, we think that the entire amount collected by the Receiver prior to 5th October, 1943 which is the date of the plaint for the partition suit filed by the decree-holder should go towards the adjustment of the amount then due under the decree in O.S. No. 75 of 1934. In the second place, the amount collected by the Receiver after 5th October, 1943 upto date will have to be divided into two halves and one half of the amount will go towards the adjustment of the decree in O.S. No. 75 of 1934 and the other half will go to the decree-holder as purchaser of one half of the properties decreed to him under the partition suit. In the third place, no interest will be payable to the decree-holder on the amounts that have come into court and which will be adjusted towards the decree under section 8 of Madras Act IV of 1938 as and from the date when each of such amounts was deposited into Court. Disallowing such interest on such amounts that have come into Court, the lower Court will have to calculate the actual amount that will be due to the decree-holder for principal and interest. In the fourth place, the decree-holder who has purchased certain of the items of properties belonging to the appellant will also be entitled to the amounts collected from those items of properties as from the date of the purchase in O.S. No. 75 of 1934. In the next place, the decree-holder will be allowed to draw all the monies that may be found due to him under the decree, irrespective of the attachments made against the amounts deposited in Court. Mr. Ramabhadra Iyer has also urged another point, namely, that even the Government has no preferential right to take away the amounts due to it in respect of court-fee payable. He has relied upon the decision reported in Ma Joo Tean v. The Collector of Rangoon2, for this proposition. The Government having already withdrawn the monies that were due to it, after resorting to due process of law and the parties not having taken any exception to the same at the time when the monies were ordered to be drawn out by the Government, we do not think that we can at this late stage direct that that amount should be brought back to the Court for being made available to the decree-holder towards satisfaction of the debt due from the appellant. The learned Subordinate Judge has referred to the fact that no final decree has yet been passed in regard to mesne profits payable to the decree-holder and that has formed one of the grounds for refusing the reliefs claimed by the appellant in these appeals. Mr. Ramabhadra Iyer takes exception to this view of the learned Subordinate Judge. But in the view which we have taken as to how exactly the amount collected by the Receiver should be appropriated as set out in para. Mr. Ramabhadra Iyer takes exception to this view of the learned Subordinate Judge. But in the view which we have taken as to how exactly the amount collected by the Receiver should be appropriated as set out in para. 6 above, it is not necessary for us to decide anything about the right of the decree-holder to mesne profits in respect of the property purchased by him. The enquiry into this matter will be proceeded with in the usual course and such reliefs as the decree-holder might be found to be entitled to in that regard will be given by the lower Court, keeping in view, however, that it is not merely the corpus of the properties that has been the subject-matter of the hypothecation but the income as well. In the result, we set aside the orders of the lower Court in all the six C.M.As. and remand all these applications to the lower Court to deal with them according to law in the light of the observations and findings which we have given above, especially in paragraph 6. The lower Court will work out the detailed calculations in regard to the amounts that have to be appropriated towards the decree in O.S. No. 75 of 1934 from out of the collections deposited by the Receiver in Court and also the credits for interests that will have to be given to the decree-holder as well as the appellant, in respect of the various amounts outstanding against the appellant in those amounts that have come into Court by way of deposits made by the Receiver and pass appropriate orders in respect of the same. As for costs, we order that each party should bear his costs in all these appeals. If all the amounts due under the decree in O.S. No. 75 of 1934 have been completely discharged by them, the Receiver will thereafter be discharged, subject to the passing of his accounts. V.P.S. ----- Orders set aside-Case remanded.