Judgment.- This is a batch of civil revision petitions filed against the decrees and judgments of the learned Judge of the Court of Small Causes, Tiruchirapalli. The facts are: The plaintiffs in this batch of Small Cause Suits are retail dealers in grain, pulses, etc., within the defendant Municipality. They have paid for and obtained from the defendant licences for their retail trade for the year 1944 and 1945. According to the plaintiffs, the Municipality had not clothed itself with the necessary powers, by means of a Gazetted notification, to levy licence fees as the provisions of section 24 of the District Municipalities Act had not been complied with and which is not in dispute before me on account of the subsequent judgment of the High Court in C.R.P.No.251 of 1947. On the footing that the collection of the fees is illegal and that as the same is said to have been recovered under threat of prosecution, the payments were made under coercion and the defendant Municipality is bound in law to refund the amounts collected, the plaintiffs filed the Small Cause Suits for the said relief. On the other hand the defendant Municipality contended th?t the plaintiffs were not entitled to refund as the payments were voluntary. The short point for determination was and is whether the payments made by the plaintiffs was under coercion?‘The lower Court held that the payments were not made under coercion and dismissed the suits. Hence these civil revision petitions are filed by the defeated plaintiffs’ retail dealers. A contract which has been entered into as a result of coercion as defined in section 15 of the Contract Act is voidable at the option of the party coerced under section 19 of that Act. In addition to this, under section 72 of that Act, a person to whom money has been paid, or anything delivered by mistake or coercion, must repay or return it. It is, however, well settled that the term “coercion” in section 72, is used in its general and ordinary sense its meaning not being controlled by the definition given in section 15 of the Act; Kanhaya Lal v. National Bank of India, Ltd.1, Ah Choon v. T.S. Firm2, Adhor Chandra v. Rameshwar Manna3, Venkatadri Appa Rao Bahadur Zamindar Garu v. Timmaraju Venkata Kutumba Rao4, Secretary, Municipal Council, Karanjia v. New East Indian Press Co., Ltd., Bombay5. If it had been intended that the definition of the terms for the purpose of section 72, should be found in section 15, it might have been expected that the definition should find a place in section 2, which is the interpretation clause, and section 15 would not have contained the twelve words with which it concludes. In order that a transaction may be avoided on account of duress or undue influence, it must appear that the consent of the party seeking to avoid the transaction was coerced, that is, that he was actually induced by the duress or undue influence to give his consent and would not have done so otherwise. Thus, the essential elements of duress are (1) coercion, (2) putting a person in such fear that he is bereft of the quality of mind essential to the making of a contract, and (3 that the contract was thereby obtained, In re Nightingale’s estate6. Duress may be exercised by (a) personal violence or a threat thereof, or (b) imprisonment, or threat of imprisonment except where the imprisonment brought about or threatened is for the enforcement of a civil claim, and is made in good faith in accordance with law, or (c) threats of physical injury, or of wrongful imprisonment or prosecution of a husband, wife, child or other near relative, or (d) threats of wrongfully destroying, injuring, seizing or withholding land or other things or (e) any wrongful acts, that compel a person to manifest apparent assent to a transaction without his volition or cause such fear as to preclude him from exercising free will and judgment in entering into a transaction. Whether any of these facts existed is a question of fact and whether the facts alleged are sufficient to constitute duress is a question of law, Makenzie-Hague Co. v. Carbide, etc., Corporation7. The lower Court on the facts was of the opinion that these facts did not exist in the instant case and that the only point urged before me is whether on the facts alleged they are sufficient to constitute coercion in law. The point taken is concluded by authority. v. Carbide, etc., Corporation7. The lower Court on the facts was of the opinion that these facts did not exist in the instant case and that the only point urged before me is whether on the facts alleged they are sufficient to constitute coercion in law. The point taken is concluded by authority. In similar circumstances when a Municipality erroneously believing itself justified in making a demand, makes a demand in common form requiring the assessee either to pay or to show cause for non-payment and warning him that in case of default steps will be taken in distraint to enforce payment and that he has a light of appeal the payment in pursuance of such notice is not sufficient to take it out of the category of voluntary payments. Payment so made without any expression of objection or unwillingness under the erroneous belief that it was unobjectionable, cannot be recovered on the ground of its involuntary character; Municipal Council, Tuticorin v. Ralli Brothers1. This decision has been followed in the subsequent Bench decision in The Chairman, Municipal Council, Rajahmundry v. Myopathy Subba Rao2. These civil revision petitions have therefore got to be and are hereby dismissed with costs. Advocate’s fee Rs.15 in each petition. R.M. ----- Petitions dismissed.