BAPNA, J.—This is a revision against an order of acquittal. 2. The petitioner filed a complaint against the opposite party Bhonrilal in court of City Magistrate, Jaipur, on 24th September, 1949, on the allegations that the complainant was the pujari of the temples of Shri Sitaramji and Shri Laxmi Narainji situated near Ghat Gate and the accused also lives close by. It was alleged that the accused had enmity towards the complainant and had been telling people that the complainant does not perform sewa pujari properly and had kept a brothel in the temples which had accordingly disgraced him in the eyes of the people. It was also alleged that the accused had on more than one occasion abused him filthily and had threatened to beat him. The complainant wanted the court to take action against the accused under secs. 504, 506, 352 I. P. C. and 108 Cr.P.C. The complaint was passed on to the First Assistant City Magistrate and it appears that in that court the complainant restricted his complaint to a statement by the accused before the Charity Department on the 16th September, 1949, in which besides making a complaint as to the neglect of the complainant in performing sewa puja it was alleged that the doors of the temple remained closed during the day and there addabazi in the temple in as much as one person went there and another came out of it. It was further stated that the complainant had illegal connection with his sons wife. The accused admitted having made the statement in the Charity Department but pleaded that it was true and that he had done so in the interest of the public. 3. The trial court evidence held that the insinuation about irregularity in sewa puja or the existence of adda-bazi was not defamatory but as regards the third insinuation, although the accused had not been able to prove that the accusation was true, yet there were reasonable grounds for the accused to believe it to be true and that in making the statement before that Charity Department he had done so in public interest, and therefore, he was protected by exception 9 of sec. 499 I. P. C. He was accordingly acquitted. 4. 499 I. P. C. He was accordingly acquitted. 4. Learned counsel for the respondent has argued that it would only be in exceptional cases that the High Court would interfere in revision against acquittal where the matter was of general public importance or interference was demanded in the interests of public justice. Reliance was placed on Gova Ladh vs. Devaj Thakarshi and others (1) (A.I R. 1953 Saurashtra, 87.), D. Stephens vs. Nosibolla (2) (A.I.R. 1951 S.C., 196.) and Gulzar Chamar vs. Uggam Chamar and others(3) (A.I.R. 1952 Patna, 242.). 5. Learned counsel for the applicant argued that although the general rule was as above, cases in which private wrongs were being vindicated stood on a different footing, for in those cases the Government would not be interested in filing appeals against acquittals and the only remedy open to the complainant would be to file a revision against the order. Reliance was placed on the observations of Sir Lawrence Jenkins C.J. in Faujdar Thakur vs. Kasi Chowdhury (4) (A.I.R. XLII Cal., 612.) where personal case were held to be an exception to the general rule. That case was followed by the same High Court in Ashutosh Das Gupta vs. Purna Chandra Ghose and another(5) (A.I.R. 1923 Cal., 11). Some High Courts which have accepted that view have, however, not gone beyond setting aside the order of acquittal. They have refused to order a retrial. In Talangare Mammunhi vs. P. Abdul Rahiman(6) (A.I.R. 1949 Mad., 524.) for instance, the court held that in cases of defamation or such cases the High Court would only declare that the order of the lower court was wrong. The Nagpur High Court, however, did order a retrial in Hittu Bansi vs. Sheolal Dinaji and another (7) (A.I.R. 1948 Nag., 243.). 6. In our opinion while as a general rule the High Court will not interfere in revision against orders of acquittal unless there was a gross error of law, and it was necessary to do so in the interest of public justice, cases of defamation and like offences in which the Government cannot be expected to be interested stand on a somewhat different footing and the High Court should interfere if there is any gross error of law or procedure which may have resulted in injustice. 7. 7. In the present case, the finding of the lower court is based on the evidence of certain witnesses that on a particular day the wife of the complainant had come out of the temple and had created a row and was heard and seen shouting that the complainant had misconducted with his daughter-in-law. Learned counsel for the applicants contention is that there is an error of law in the procedure of the trial court in as much as it did not allow the complainant to produce his wife and daughter-in-law as witnesses to contradict the evidence for the accused. It was further contended that the complainants request to have their statements recorded under sec. 540 C.P.C. was wrongly refused. In order to appreciate these arguments it is necessary to mention that the complainant did not mention this specific act of humiliation in the complaint and it had only developed in the course of the statement of the complainant and was alleged to have arisen out of the statement made by the accused before the Charity Department. That statement is Ex. P. 1 on record and seems to have been taken down in the Charity Department with full opportunity to the complainant for cross-examining the accused. Curiously enough, no question was put to the accused as to his source of knowledge, while the accused at the end of his statement did name various witnesses who were acquainted with the conduct of the complainant which was the subject matter of the complaint before the Charity Department. Of the witnesses, produced by the accused in defence, there are several, at least four, who were named as witnesses in support of the allegations against the complainant in the Charity Department. The complainant, therefore, should have known well ahead what he had to prove in his case and leaving aside his wife for the moment the daughter-in-law was an important witness, and the trial court rightly rejected the complainants request to allow her to be produced as a witness after the close of the evidence. As regards the wife of the complainant, while it is true that the complainant could not know what evidence will be led in defence, he was in a position to call her as a witness as an inmate of the temple in support of the imputation made against him. As regards the wife of the complainant, while it is true that the complainant could not know what evidence will be led in defence, he was in a position to call her as a witness as an inmate of the temple in support of the imputation made against him. The complainant, as stated earlier, could have very well known the defence if he had cross-examined the accused on the point when he appeared as a witness in the Charity Department. The complainant himself is to blame if he did not put any more evidence than his own statement to rebut the imputation made against him. Moreover, assuming that the lady was permitted to appear as a witness her statement in favour of her husband would be received with caution and it cannot be said that the finding would be materially affected, for, it would depend more on the credibility of those witnesses as compared to the statements of the complainant and his wife. In the circumstances, we do not see that any illegality was committed by the lower court which requires to be rectified at this stage. 8. Learned counsel for the applicant argued that the evidence of the defence witnesses is hearsay and inadmissible in evidence. This is not quite correct, for, the relevant defence accepted by the lower court is that the accused had reasonable grounds to believe in the truth of the imputation and these grounds were that the accused and the witnesses had heard it from the mouth of the complainants wife herself as to what the accused had done in secrecy, which could only be known to the inmates of the house and particularly the wife. 9. The revision has, therefore, no force, and is here by dismissed.