Judgment :- 1. Defendant, Travancore-Cochin State, is the appellant in this case, The suit is for declaration of plaintiffs' title to the plaint property, for recovery of possession of it from the defendant who has taken possession of it under S. 25 of the Travancore Revenue Recovery Act and for a permanent injunction restraining the defendant from selling the property under that Act. The first plaintiff is the widow and plaintiffs 2 to 4 are the children of one Ayyappan Ummini who is dead. The plaint property belonged to Ummini. Ummini executed a gift deed, Ext. B, in respect of the property in favour of his wife and children on 7.12.1105. Ummini had bid a toddy shop for the years 1106 and 1107 but he failed to deposit the security amount and to execute the necessary agreement. The shop was therefore resold and in the resale Government incurred a loss of Rs. 1053-8-0. For this amount Government attached the property in 1110 under the Revenue Recovery Act, assumed management of it under and S. 25 of the Act and let it on Kuthakappattom. The plaintiffs objected to the attachment contending that Ummini had no right in the property. The objection was overruled and steps were taken for selling the property under the Revenue Recovery Act. It was under these circumstances that the plaintiffs filed this suit for the reliefs mentioned above. 2. The defendant contended the gift deed, Ext. B, was a sham transaction, that it was fraudulently executed by Ummini with the object of defeating the State and that the property was liable to be proceeded against for the amount due to the State from Ummini. It was also contended that the suit was barred by limitation. This last plea was, however, not pressed by the defendant at the time of hearing. The trial court held that Ext. B was a valid gift and that it was not executed for the purpose of defeating the State. The suit was, therefore decreed with costs. 3. The two questions that arise for decision in this appeal are (1) whether the gift deed, Ext. B, took effect and (2) if it took effect, whether it was executed with intent to defeat or delay the creditors of Ummini. So far as the first question is concerned we have only to see whether the gift was accepted by the donees. B, took effect and (2) if it took effect, whether it was executed with intent to defeat or delay the creditors of Ummini. So far as the first question is concerned we have only to see whether the gift was accepted by the donees. Under S. 122 of the Transfer of Property Act a gift is complete when it is accepted by or on behalf of the donee. S. 122 reads: "Gift is the transfer of certain existing movable or immovable property made voluntarily and without consideration, by one person, called the donor, to another, called the donee, and accepted by or on behalf of the donee. Such acceptance must be made during the lifetime of the donor and while he is still capable of giving. If the donee dies before acceptance, the gift is void." There is ample evidence in this case to show that the gift was accepted by the donees. The gift deed is dated 7.12.1105. Under a registered lease deed, Ext. A, dated 1-4-1110 the first plaintiff leased the property to PW. 2. PW. 2 proves Ext. A and swears that he was in possession of the property as per the lease deed. When DW. 3, Provorthicar, was asked whether PW. 2 was not living in the building in the property and taking the yield from the property the answer given by him was that he does not remember. After the expiry of the term of the lease, Ext. A the property was given on lease by the plaintiffs to one Sankaran Ummini under another registered lease deed, Ext. C dated 10.4.1114. PWs.1, 2 and 3 swear to the possession of Sankaran Ummini under that lease deed. Both in Exts. A and C, it was stated that the plaintiffs got the property under the gift deed, Ext. B. After the date of the gift deed mutation was effected in the names of the plaintiffs. It is not disputed that plaintiffs are paying the tax for the property. The building that was in the property on the date of the gift deed was rebuilt by the first plaintiff. PW.1 swears that she rebuilt the house with her own money and that she spent about Rs. 700 for the purpose. PWs. 2 and 3 also swear that the building was rebuilt by the first plaintiff with her own money. The Proverthicar admits as DW. PW.1 swears that she rebuilt the house with her own money and that she spent about Rs. 700 for the purpose. PWs. 2 and 3 also swear that the building was rebuilt by the first plaintiff with her own money. The Proverthicar admits as DW. 3 that the building was repaired after the date of the gift deed. It is clear from those facts that the gift took effect and that the donees were holding the property in their own right. The fact that Ummini was living in the property even after the execution of the right deed does not go to show that the gift did not take effect. Ummini had no other house and it was only natural that he should live with his wife and children. It was argued for the State that there is a provision in the gift deed that the donees should maintain Ummini and that it goes to show that Ummini continued to be the beneficial owner of the property. We do not think that this provision amounts to anything more than the expression of a pious wish. No right in the property is reserved in favour of Ummini under the gift deed. It has been held by this Court that a direction in a gift deed that the donee should maintain the donor till his death will not make the gift a conditional one if the terms of the gift deed show that there has been an absolute transfer of the property in favour of the donee and that such a direction will be regarded only as an expression of pious wish on the part of the donor. (Vide Subramonia Iyer v. Sankara Iyer,1951 KLT 479). 4. The next question for decision is whether the gift, Ext. B, is voidable under S. 53 of the Transfer of Property Act on the ground that it was executed with intent to defeat or delay the creditors of Ummini. Learned Government Pleader relied on certain circumstances to show that Ext. B was executed with intent to defeat the State. According to the learned Government Pleader Ummini was a debtor of the State at the time of executing Ext. B. Ext. B is a voluntary transfer without consideration in favour of the wife and children of Ummini. There was no apparent necessity to execute the gift deed at that time. The property covered by Ext. According to the learned Government Pleader Ummini was a debtor of the State at the time of executing Ext. B. Ext. B is a voluntary transfer without consideration in favour of the wife and children of Ummini. There was no apparent necessity to execute the gift deed at that time. The property covered by Ext. B was the only property that Ummini had. Ummini continued to live in the property even after the date of the gift deed. There was also a provision in the gift deed that the donees should maintain Ummini during his life. The document was registered at Cheppad while the property is situated within the jurisdiction of the Krishnapuram Sub Registrar's Office. These circumstances, according to the learned Government Pleader, go to show that the document was executed fraudulently with the object of defeating the State. 5. Learned counsel for the respondents argued on the other hand, that Ummini had no debts at all at the time of the execution of Ext. B and that, therefore, there was no reason for him to execute a fraudulent document and that the circumstances of the case go to show that Ext. B was a bona fide settlement made by Ummini in favour of his wife and children. It is in evidence that the re-sale of the shop took place on 11.1.1106. There is no evidence in the case as to the date of the first sale. It might have been some time before the date of Ext. B. But the material question for consideration is whether at the time of executing Ext. B Ummini had reason to believe that he might incur a liability to the State. We do not know when he was bound to deposit the security amount and to execute the agreement for conducting the shop. The plaintiff's case is that it was because of the prohibition movement that Ummini refrained from conducting the shop. There is no knowing when this movement was started. If the movement was started before the date of the first sale there was no reason to believe that the shop would fetch a lesser amount on resale. The plaintiff's case is that it was because of the prohibition movement that Ummini refrained from conducting the shop. There is no knowing when this movement was started. If the movement was started before the date of the first sale there was no reason to believe that the shop would fetch a lesser amount on resale. It is only if the movement was started after the first sale that it can be supposed that Ummini would have anticipated that the Government might be put to some loss on resale of the shop and that he might thereby incur a liability to Government. If the movement was started after the date of Ext. B and if it was after the execution of that document that he decided not to conduct the shop it cannot be said that at the time of executing the gift deed he had reason to believe that he might incur a liability to the State. In the absence of any evidence relating to these matters it cannot be held that Ummini knew at the time of executing Ext. B that he would incur a liability to the State and that he executed the gift deed for the purpose of defeating the State. The appellant has no case that at the time of executing the gift deed Ummini had any other liability. It is true that it is not necessary that a person should be actually indebted at the time of making a voluntary transfer in order to bring it under S. 53 of the Transfer of Property Act. If the transfer is made for the purpose of defeating or delaying prospective creditors it will be voidable at the option of such creditors. But the question is whether Ummini knew at the time of executing Ext. B that he was going to incur a liability to the State. As stated already, there is no evidence in the case to support the inference that Ummini had such knowledge at the time of executing the document. If it was owing to events that happened after the execution of the gift deed that Ummini found himself unable to conduct the shop and thereby incurred a liability to the State it cannot be said that his object in executing the gift deed was to defeat or delay the State. 6. If it was owing to events that happened after the execution of the gift deed that Ummini found himself unable to conduct the shop and thereby incurred a liability to the State it cannot be said that his object in executing the gift deed was to defeat or delay the State. 6. Certain circumstances were relied on by learned counsel for the respondents to show that Ext. B was a bona fide transaction and that it was not executed with any fraudulent intention. It is in evidence that Ummini was a consumptive patient. PW. 3 swears to it. DW. 3 Provorthicar also admits it. Ummini had only this one property. There was a debt charged on the property. According to the first plaintiff she discharged this debt by disposing of a property she got in her family partition. Ext. D is the sale deed executed by her and her mother on 27.9.1105. One of the recitals in that sale deed is Rs. 700/- to be paid to one Velumbi Parvathi under a mortgage executed in her favour by the first plaintiff, her mother and others in respect of the property covered by Ext. D and another property. Ext. 3 swears that the mortgage was executed by herself, her mother and Ummini charging the plaint property and the property covered by Ext. D. According to her the money under the mortgage was borrowed for Ummini's case and it was a debt he had to discharge. She also swears that this debt was subsequently discharged by one Geevarghese Chacko who purchased a portion of the property covered by Ext. D. Ext. E is the copy of the order striking off the decree obtained by Velumbi Parvathi. Although the original mortgage deed is not produced in the case there is no reason to disbelieve PW. 3 when she says that the debt discharged by her by the sale of her property was a debt of Ummini charged on the plaint property also. The wording of the recital in Ext. D lends support to this case. PWs.1 and 2 also swears to the fact that there was a debt charged on the plaint property and that the first plaintiff discharged that debt by disposing of her own property. Ext. D sale deed was executed on 27.9.1105. The wording of the recital in Ext. D lends support to this case. PWs.1 and 2 also swears to the fact that there was a debt charged on the plaint property and that the first plaintiff discharged that debt by disposing of her own property. Ext. D sale deed was executed on 27.9.1105. Evidently the first plaintiff was anxious to save the property and the house in which she and her family were living. There was every reason to believe that Ummini who was a consumptive patient would not be able to discharge the debt charged on the property. The house in the property was also in a dilapidated condition and it had to be rebuilt. It was under these circumstances that Ummini executed Ext. B within three months from the date of Ext. D. As already stated, it is admitted by the Provorthicar that the house was repaired after the date of Ext. B. According to the Provorthicar the income from the property in 1105 was only Rs. 5 a year. In the circumstances there is no reason to believe that Ummini executed the gift deed in favour of his wife and children with any ulterior motive. It is only natural that Ummini would have thought it desirable to settle the property in favour of his wife and children in the circumstances in which he was placed. The first plaintiff belongs to Cheppad and she swears that it was while Ummini was in her house at Cheppad that he decided to execute the gift deed and that it was because of that that the document happened to be executed there. Ext. D was executed at Cheppad and Ummini is an attestor in that document. In the circumstances mentioned above we are inclined to take the view that Ext. B is a bona fide transaction and that it was not executed with the object of defeating or delaying the State. 7. Reference may be made in this connection to the following observation of Tekchand, J. in Mohamad Ishac v. Mohomad Usaf (1927 Lahore 420): "In cases where there are debts due at the time of a gratuitous transfer, it will be presumed, as has been pointed out by my learned brother, that the transfer was made with intent to defeat or delay the creditors. But there are no debts due at the time and the transferor runs into indebtedness subsequently, the presumption will be regulated by the peculiar circumstances of each particular case. If, for instance, the transfer was made to ward off the effects of a threatened litigation or in anticipation of the transferor embarking upon a commercial venture or on the eve of his going into trade the intent to defeat or delay future creditors will be presumed. But in other circumstances, the transaction will be presumed to be bonafide and it will lie on the future creditors to prove that the transfer was made with intent to defeat or delay them. In my opinion, a voluntary settlement by a person, who owes no debt at the time, in favour of his children for natural love and affection cannot be set aside merely because some years afterwards it is proved to have the effect of defeating or delaying the subsequent creditors." The learned judge quoted the following passage in Story's Equity Jurisprudence, Vol. I, S. 361 where the learned author has summed up the law on the subject in the words of Chancellor Kent: "Fraud in a voluntary conveyance is an inference of law in so far as it concerns existing debts, but there is no such legal presumption as regards subsequent debts. There must be proof of positive fraud in fact, to vitiate a voluntary conveyance". Reference was also made by the learned judge to the following passage in May's Fraudulent Conveyances and Dispositions of Property: "Where the settler was not indebted at the time, the onus of proving the fraud is thrown on those who impeach the settlement, for fraud is not to be presumed. The mere fact of subsequent indebtedness is not evidence of a fraudulent intent against subsequent creditors." This case was followed by the Lahore High Court in Mt. Bibo v. Sampuran Singh (1936 Lahore 222). In Ebrahim Bhai v. Fulbai (26 Bombay 577) Chandavarkar, J. made the following observation with reference to a gift deed executed under similar circumstances: "It was not the case of a man who had creditors unsatisfied and to defeat whom the voluntary transfer was made, or of a man who, having paid creditors then existing, intended to embark on some new business, and conveyed his property voluntarily for the purpose of screening it from the probable creditors of the business. There having been no indebtedness at the time of its execution, all existing debts having been paid off before its execution, and the consideration being natural love and affection, which the law regards as good, the case falls within the principles laid down by Ranade, J. in Sadashiv v. Trimbak (23 Bombay 146) that "no malafides can be presumed merely from the possibility that the settlement might prejudice the claims of subsequent creditors." In Re Kelleher (1911) 2 I.R.I. it was held that in the absence of any express intention to defraud, a voluntary deed could not be set aside at the instance of a creditor whose debt came into existence after the date of the deed. This case was followed by Wazir Hasan C.J. and Srivastava, J. in Zahir Ahmad Khan v. Debi Dayal (1931 Oudh 134). We have seen that at the time of the execution of the gift deed Ext. B Ummini had no creditors and that there is no evidence in the case to show that he had reason to believe at that time that he would incur a liability to the State. In the circumstances we find no reason to disagree with the finding of the court below that the gift deed, Ext. B, was not executed by Ummini with the object of defeating or delaying the State. We, therefore, confirm the judgment and decree of the learned District judge and dismiss the appeal with costs. Dismissed.