Judgment.- The second defendant in O.S. No. 314 of 1946 on the file of the District Munsif, Eluru, is the appellant. The respondents herein obtained a decre against the first defendant and the second defendant in the above suit. There was no personal liability against the latter and the decree-holders could only proceed against the properties of the first defendant in the hands of the second defendant, if any. The judgment in the above suit left open the question whether there were any assets of the first defendant in the hands of the second defendant. The decree-holders filed an application for transmission of the decree to the Court of the District Munsif, Narasaraopet, on the allegation that the properties sought to be proceeded against were situate within the jurisdiction of the latter Court. The second defendant (as judgment-debtor) opposed this application on the plea that there were no properties of the first defendant in his hands situate within the jurisdiction of the Court of the District Munsif, Narasaraopet. This objection was overruled by the District Munsif in a short order, with the observation that the objection regarding the maintainability was untenable and that the other questions raised in the counter did not arise at that stage. On appeal, the order of the learned District Munsiff was confirmed by the learned Subordinate Judge, Eluru. The Subordinate Judge was of the opinion that all the objections raised in the counter could be considered by’ the transferee Court having regard the provisions of section 42 of the Civil Procedure Code. In support of this view he relied on a decision of the Allahabad High Court in Sital Prasad v. Messrs. Clement Robson & Co.1 In this appeal filed against that judgment, it is urged by Mr. Veerabhadrayya that the interpretation placed by the learned Subordinate Judge on sections 39 and 42 of the Civil Procedure Code is erroneous and that Sital Prasad v. Messrs. Clement Robson & Co.1, has no material bearing on the point for decision in this case. I agree with him that the decision in Sital Prasad v. Messrs. Clement Robson & Co.1 does not throw any light on the matter for decision in this appeal. It was next urged by the learned counsel for the appellant that the opinion expressed by the Courts below is opposed to the consistent view taken by this Court. I agree with him that the decision in Sital Prasad v. Messrs. Clement Robson & Co.1 does not throw any light on the matter for decision in this appeal. It was next urged by the learned counsel for the appellant that the opinion expressed by the Courts below is opposed to the consistent view taken by this Court. In Arunachalam Pillai v. Shanmugham Pillai2, a Bench consisting of Ramesam and Devadoss, JJ., had laid down that when notice was served on the judgment-debtor to show cause why the decree should not be transmitted to another Court for execution, he had to raise all pleas against execution (such as limitation, or discharge) and any omission to do so, would operate as res judicata against him in subsequent proceedings. The rule is stated in the same way by another Bench of this Court in Subramanian Chettiar v. Ramanadhan Chettiar3. The basis of these rulings is that if a decree is barred by limitation or discharged, the transfer of such a decree to another Court is an infructuous proceeding and ought not to be undertaken, and if a valid plea is available to the judgment-debtor, he should raise it at that stage, and failure to do so would attract the doctrine. Although some of the other High Courts have taken a different view I am bound by the rulings of this Court. But that question does not arise here. The principle enunciated in the cases cited above cannot be extended to a case where the principle of res judicata cannot have any application. In my opinion that governs cases which involved a decision on the executability of the decree. In the present case, the plea is not one of either limitation or discharge, or some other ground which bars execution of the decree. The objection of the judgment-debtor is that the decree cannot be executed against certain properties. In my opinion that governs cases which involved a decision on the executability of the decree. In the present case, the plea is not one of either limitation or discharge, or some other ground which bars execution of the decree. The objection of the judgment-debtor is that the decree cannot be executed against certain properties. In Alagappa Chettiar v. Muthukaruppan Chettiar4, Horwill and Kuppuswami Ayyar, JJ., took the view that in an application for transmission of a decree, it is not necessary for a judgment-debtor to object to the executability of the decree against a particular item of property, though the plea regarding discharge or limitation or other ground which affects execution, has to be raised at the stage when the question of the executability of the decree arises, failure to do which will involve the party concerned in the risk of the applicability of section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code. In my opinion, the last mentioned ruling covers the present case. In the present case, the only objection raised was that the properties within the jurisdiction of the Court of the District Munsiff of Narasaraopet were the self-acquired properties of the second defendant and that the first defendant had nothing to do with them. That does not in any way though the executability of the decree. This question can be very well decided by the transferee Court. If, as contended by the learned counsel for the appellant, every objection raised in the execution proceedings has to be decided by the transferring Court, then the provisions of section 42, Civil Procedure Code, become otiose and there is no objection to be decided by the transferee Court. I think that objections such as raised in this case can be entertained and disposed of by the transferee Court. It follows that the order of the learned Subordinate Judge confirming that of the learned District Munsiff, has to be upheld, though for a slightly different reason. The C.M.S.A. is, therefore, dismissed and the costs of this C.M.S.A. will abide and follow the result of the execution application. K.C. ----- Appeal dismissed.