Judgment Choudhary, J. 1. This appeal by tile judgment debtor No. 3 is directed against the judgment and order of the District Judge, Sahabad, reversing those of Munsif 1st Court, Buxar. One Kesho Rai executed a mortgage in favour of Ramraj Rai respondent No. 1, mortgaging three khatas having an area of 12.93 acres. Subsequently, he sold 9.30 acres to the appellant and 2.27 acres to the judgment debtor No. 2. The remaining 1.36 acres remained in possession of the mortgagor who is judgment debtor No. 1. It may be noted that the judgment debtor No. 2 is a nephew of the mortgagee, respondent No. 1. The decree on mortgage was passed against the mortgagor and the two subsequent purchasers and it was put in execution. The amount of decree calculated till the time of execution came to about Rs 2,700/-. The total valuation of the mortgaged properties as determined under Sec.13, Money Lenders Act came to Rs. 5,000/-. The decree-holder, therefore, wanted to proceed only against the land covered by the purchase of the appellant. He filed an application for the apportionment of the decretal debt. The learned Munsif held that the judgment-debtors Nos. 2 & 3 were entitled to rateable distribution of the liability to pay off the decretal dues in proportion to the extent of their respective purchases. Against that order, the decree-holder preferred an appeal and the lower appellate court reversed the order holding that the decretal debt could not be apportioned in the execution proceeding. In the present appeal, Mr. D. N. Verma on behalf of the appellant has contended that the decree-holder was not entitled to proceed only against the property covered by the sale deed of the appellant and to exonerate the properties covered by the purchase of the judgment-debtor No. 2 as well as those which were in possession of the mortgagor himself. His contention is that the order of the learned Munsif apportioning the decretal debt was quite justified and the executing court had jurisdiction to work out the equity between the parties. In support of his contention he has relied on the case of -- Qaiser Beg V/s. Sheo Shankar Das, AIR 1932 All 85 (A). This case, however, instead of supporting his contention, in my opinion, supports the view of the other side. In support of his contention he has relied on the case of -- Qaiser Beg V/s. Sheo Shankar Das, AIR 1932 All 85 (A). This case, however, instead of supporting his contention, in my opinion, supports the view of the other side. In the course of his judgment, Sulaiman J. observed as follows : "I do not think that it would be equitable and just to apportion the liability and allow the appellant to postpone the sale of his village on condition of his paying the proportionate amount of the decretal money due against his village. It, would be highly inconvenient for an execution court to start an inquiry into the rateable liability of the various items of the mortgaged properties, which properly speaking should be the subject of an investigation in a separate suit for contribution. If the procedure of apportionment were to be adopted, the execution proceedings would be hung up for an inordinately long time and the question would never be settled finally till the matters have been disposed of by the appellate court. So long as the integrity of the mortgage is not broken, I think the mortgagee is entitled to insist on payment of the whole of the amount due to him before any property is released from liability and the court has no power to compel him to submit to a piecemeal redemption. I therefore cannot hold that it is open to us to start an inquiry into the proportionate liability and to allow the appellant to pay his proportion of the mortgage money and save his village against the wish of the mortgagee." On the authority of this case itself, the appellant is not entitled to the order which was passed in his favour by the learned Munsif and he cannot be permitted to pay the decretal debt in proportion to the value of the land purchased by him. Mr. Verma, however, relies upon the order passed in that case of AIR 1932 All 85 (A). In that case, their Lordships took the view that the most equitable and just way for the court was to direct the sales of the properties affected by the various transfers in the inverse order of their priority of dates. Mr. Verma, however, relies upon the order passed in that case of AIR 1932 All 85 (A). In that case, their Lordships took the view that the most equitable and just way for the court was to direct the sales of the properties affected by the various transfers in the inverse order of their priority of dates. It is equitable that the property covered by the last transfer in point of time should be sold first and then that covered by the one just preceding it, and so on, till the amount of the first mortgage is fully paid up or all the properties covered by it have been sold. How far an order of this nature is justified will have to be determined according to the authorities of this Court to which I will refer later on. Mr. Verma has next cited the case of -- Raje-shwar Prasad Narainsingh V/s. Mohd. Khalil-ul-Rahman, AIR 1924 Pat 459 at p. 464 (B), in which it was held that "ordinarily the right of selling property in execution of a mortgage decree in a particular order rests with the decree-holder, and, in the absence of any contract between the parties, the decree-holder may sell the properties in any order he chooses. But the court has power in the circumstances of any particular case, and with regard to the equities arising in favour of the various parties, to direct the order in which the properties should be sold." That was an appeal from the original decree under Order 34, Rule 4, Civil P. C. The court passing an order is entitled in certain circumstances to direct the order in which the properties should be sold, as it will appear from the words used in that rule : "Plaintiff shall be entitled to apply for a final decree directing that the mortgaged property or a sufficient part thereof be sold." That was not a case for execution and, therefore, is of no authority for the proposition raised by Mr. Verma. Verma. He has, however, cited another case reported in the same volume, -- Bhagwan Chandra Das V/s. Dharam Narain Das, AIR 1924 Pat 802 (C), which was a case in execution and, no doubt, supports his view not to the extent of there being rateable distribution of the decretal debt but to this extent only that all the properties must be advertised for sale and when they are actually" brought into execution and become subject to sale it would be then for the court to decide on Just and equitable principles which property ought to be first sold. Justice Das, as he then was, delivered the judgment in that case, Justice Ross agreeing, and held that the decree-holder is entitled to have all the properties mortgaged to him advertised and put up for sale but it is entirely in the discretion of the court to direct in which order the properties should be sold. But, in the subsequent decision in case of -- Rai Sahib Sarju Lal V/s. Baij Nath Prasad Singh, AIR 1923 Pat 44 (D), the same learned Judge held as follows : "Numerous authorities were cited on behalf of the parties before us. It is unnecessary to discuss all those authorities; it is sufficient to say that though here and there a discordant note has been struck, still the balance of authorities is clearly in favour of the view that the decree-holder has the conduct of the sale and is entitled to execute the decree against any of the mortgaged properties he pleases, and that, if any question of equity arises between the decree-holder and the persons to whom the equity of redemption in the mortgaged properties or in any of them may have subsequently become vested, that equity can only be enforced by an independent suit for contribution and not in proceedings for execution. It is quite true that each parcel of the mortgaged properties is liable rateably to its value and that the principle applies with equal force where the mortgagee himself buys the equity of redemption in or more of such parcels or releases any part of the security; but I do not think that an enquiry as to rateable distribution of the mortgage-debt can be made in execution proceedings without serious complications." and his Lordship further observed : "As I have said before the equities arising as a result of the transactions that have taken place since the mortgage was executed without serious inconvenience be worked out in the execution proceedings, and I must prefer the rule which gives the decree-holders complete dominion over the sale leaving the equities to be worked out in a properly, constituted suit between the parties." This case was followed in a subsequent Division Bench case of this Court in -- Sheo Narain Sah V/s. Mt. Deolochnn Kuer, AIR 1948 Pat 208 (E). Thus, the view of this Court is clear that the decree-holder has not unfettered right to choose the properties that he may put to sale and the question of rateable distribution of the decretal debt cannot be gone into at the execution stage. Even under Sec.14, Money Lenders Act, the decree-holder has a choice to select the property against which he wants to proceed. There is, however, one difficulty in the way of the decree-holder in the present case. Under Sec. 56, Transfer of Property Act, if the owner of two or more properties mortgages them to one person and then sells one or more of the properties to another person, the buyer is, in the absence of a contract to the contrary, entitled to have the mortgage-debt satisfied out of the property or properties not sold to him, so far as the same will extend, but not so as to prejudice the rights of the mortgagee or persons claiming under him or of any other person who has for consideration acquired an interest in any of the properties. In the present case, as already indicated, the judgment-debtor No. 3 is purchaser of 9.30 acres and the judgment debtor No. 2 is purchaser of 2.27 acres. Therefore, the appellant cannot take advantage of this section as against the judgment-debtor No. 2. In the present case, as already indicated, the judgment-debtor No. 3 is purchaser of 9.30 acres and the judgment debtor No. 2 is purchaser of 2.27 acres. Therefore, the appellant cannot take advantage of this section as against the judgment-debtor No. 2. But, so far as the remaining land which is in possession of the mortgagor is concerned, this section will be applicable and the appellant will be entitled to have the mortgage debt satisfied first out of that portion. 2 In the result, the appeal is allowed in part. The orders of the courts below are set aside and it is directed that the decree-holder will first proceed against the properties in possession of the mortgagor and, if the decretal debt is not satisfied out of the sale of that property, then he will choose out of the remaining properties against which he likes to proceed. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order for costs in this Court.