ORDER : This is plaintiff's revision against the decree dated 24-2-1950 passed by the learned District Judge, Shajapur, in second appeal affirming the decrees of the first Appellate Court and of the trial Court dismissing the plaintiff's suit for a declaration of title. The dispute relates to two annas share in a zamindari in village Berakhedighat, parganna Basoda, District Bhilsa. It was alleged in the plaint that in 1912 a four annas share was purchased from one Krishna Singh jointly by the father of the plaintiff and that of the defendant for a sum of Rs.231/-. The defendants' father Kishore Singh at that time had no money with him and so the plaintiff's father Ganpat Singh had to pay Rs.115/8/- on behalf of Kishore Singh to Kishan Singh. The father of the defendant could not pay the said sum of Rs.115/8 to the father of the plaintiff and therefore by a deed dated 24-12-1912 he relinquished his rights in the said zamindari and abandoned his possession over it. The said deed could not be registered and a formal sale deed could not be executed when Kishore Singh and Ganpat both died. Thereafter in the Khewat the defendant Gajraj Singh was recorded as owner of two annas share, the property remaining joint in the name of the co-sharers. The plaintiff filed a suit for declaration of title on the basis of adverse possession for more than 12 years and wanted that the defendant's name should be struck off from the Khewat and that the partition proceedings should be stayed. The suit was resisted by the defendant on the ground that the partition proceedings had come to an end and thereafter the plaintiff's suit for declaration of title could not be entertained. The substantial point in issue was does the decision in partition suit in the court of Assistant Collector (Naib Suba) operates as res judicata? This issue was decided in favour of the defendant and the suit was dismissed by the trial Court and both the appellate Courts have upheld this decision. The plaintiff has now come to this Court in revision. 2. Mr. Patankar, on behalf of the plaintiff petitioner contends that the revenue Court has not made any inquiry in the plaintiff's title, nor has it given any decision as to the ownership of the property. The plaintiff has now come to this Court in revision. 2. Mr. Patankar, on behalf of the plaintiff petitioner contends that the revenue Court has not made any inquiry in the plaintiff's title, nor has it given any decision as to the ownership of the property. He urges that the question of title was not directly and substantially in issue in the Revenue Court in partition proceedings. 3. From the arguments of the learned counsel on both the sides it appears that the provisions of S.377 Qanoon Mal, Gwalior, Samvat 1983, have been overlooked. For the decision of this suit S.377 is important which rendered into English, runs as follows: "(1) Those suits which are cognizable by the Revenue Courts under this Act will not be entertained in Civil Courts until there is clear direction to that effect in this Act. (2) Once a question by a competent Court is decided between the parties to a suit, that decision will operate as res judicata in subsequent suits between the same parties or their representatives." 4. In the Gwalior Act, (i.e., Qanoon Mal) partition proceedings are governed by chapter 9. Section 119(1) mentions that an application for partition can be made only by a co-sharer whose name and share have been entered in the Khewat and who is not shown in the Khewat as "Gair Quabiz" (without possession). It appears from the proceedings that when the defendant made an application under S.119 for partition of his share in the zamindari in dispute, the plaintiff petitioner had raised an objection that the defendant had never been in possession of the zamindari and so he could not file an application under S.119. After inquiry, it was decided on 9-10-1937 that Gajraj Singh defendant had been in possession of the zamindari, and that the entry in Khewat to that effect is correct. The objection of the plaintiff was overruled and one Amin Sheopujan Singh was appointed for actual partitioning the shares. The question is; whether after the partition, a Civil Court is competent to decide the question of title. A perusal of S.130 of Qanoon Mal Gwalior leads me to the conclusion that a Civil Court has only a limited jurisdiction for the purpose of deciding the question of proprietary title raised in the course of partition proceedings. The question is; whether after the partition, a Civil Court is competent to decide the question of title. A perusal of S.130 of Qanoon Mal Gwalior leads me to the conclusion that a Civil Court has only a limited jurisdiction for the purpose of deciding the question of proprietary title raised in the course of partition proceedings. When an objection regarding title is filed in a partition proceeding, three courses are open to the Revenue Court, (a) to decline to grant the application for partition until the question is determined by a competent Court, (b) to require any party to the case to institute a suit in a competent Court, or (c) to proceed to enquire into the merits of the objection and decide it as a Civil Court. 5. The competence of a Civil Court to decide the question of title, therefore, depends upon the choice exercised by the Revenue Court. If the latter Court passes an order under cl.(a) or cl.(b), the Civil Court has authority to try and decide the question of title but it is a condition precedent that an order under either cl.(a) or cl.(b) should be made. On the other hand, if the Revenue Court takes an action under cl.(c) and proceeds to determine, the question of title itself the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is wholly ousted. In case no order is passed under cl.(a) or cl.(b), it can be presumed that the Assistant Collector (Naib Suba) followed the third course under S.130, Gwalior Quanoon Mal. From a perusal of the provisions of this section, read with the provisions embodied in S.377, it will be manifest that a suit to decide a question of proprietary title in the course of the partition proceedings, cannot be entertained by a Civil Court unless and until it has authority from the Revenue Court to entertain it. 6. Mr. Patankar draws my attention to the provisions of S.112 and S.233(k), U.P. Land. 6. Mr. Patankar draws my attention to the provisions of S.112 and S.233(k), U.P. Land. Revenue Act (No.3 of 1901) and from the absence of such provisions in the Gwalior Quanoon Mal Samvat 1983, he thinks that the rulings of Allahabad High Court and Oudh Chief Court reported in- 'Ram Lakhan Singh v. Rampal Singh', AIR 1921 Oudh 132 (2), (A) - 'Deoki Dube v. Umandat Dube', AIR 1923 All 369 (B) - 'Bhagwan Dutt v. Brij Bhakhan', AIR 1924 Oudh 317 (C) - Mukand lal v. Nawbatlal', AIR 1927 All 635 (D) and -'Ram Rekha v. Lallu Missir', AIR 1931 All 462 (E) and relied upon by the Courts below have no material bearing upon the question in this revision. I do not subscribe to this view. In my opinion, S.130 of Quanoon Mal, Gwalior, corresponds to S.111, U.P. Land Revenue Act, and there is no substantial difference between the two. Section 112, U.P. Land Revenue Act of 1901, of course, lays down that the decrees passed by the Collector shall be held to be the decrees of the Court of Civil jurisdiction of the first instance and shall be open to appeal to the District Judge or to the High Court. It is true that there is no provision for appeal to the District Judge or to the High Court in Gwalior Quanoon Mal, but this alone cannot be considered to be of such significance when it is clearly mentioned in cl.(c) of S.130, Gwalior Quanoon Mal that the Officer in charge of partition can decide the question of title 'as a Civil Court'. It would follow that the decrees of the said Officer passed in partition suit would be considered to be decrees of a Court of Civil jurisdiction, irrespective of the fact whether appeals from them lie or do not lie; to the District Judge or to the High Court. 7. Then S.233(k), U.P. Land Revenue Act.1901, only lays down that a Civil Court cannot take cognizance of a suit for partition except as provided in Ss.111 and 112. The same result is achieved in Gwalior Quanoon Mal by S.130 read with the provisions embodied in S.377 adverted to above. 7. Then S.233(k), U.P. Land Revenue Act.1901, only lays down that a Civil Court cannot take cognizance of a suit for partition except as provided in Ss.111 and 112. The same result is achieved in Gwalior Quanoon Mal by S.130 read with the provisions embodied in S.377 adverted to above. As a general statement of law I am disposed to agree to the remarks of Mukherjee J. at p.465 of - ' AIR 1931 All 462 (E)' that the first question involved in partition proceedings is a question of title. The court has to declare the title of the respective parties before it, and after it has declared the title, it has to proceed to divide and distribute the property. A perusal of chapter 9 of the Gwalior Quanoon Mal will then shew that as soon as an application is made for partition, notice is to be given to the co-sharers and a date is to be fixed for their appearance. They have to file an objection, if any, to the partition. If no question of title is raised by them at this stage, then the nature and extent of the interest of the several parties before the Court is to be declared. This" order would amount to making of a preliminary decree for partition in a Civil Court. It is only after passing of this preliminary decree that the property is divided and shares are allotted. If any party fails to raise any question of title, having had an opportunity to do so, he would be barred from doing so at a later stage by reason of the principle incorporated in explanation 4 to S.11, Civil P.C. 8. Taking tile provisions of Ss.119, 130 and 377, Gwalior Quanoon Mal, into consideration along with the principle incorporated in Expl.4 to S.11, C.P.C., there is no escape from the conclusion that a Civil Court is not competent to decide the question of title after the termination of the partition proceedings in a Revenue Court. In this view of the matter I dismiss the revision with costs.