Judgment :- 1. The question raised in this appeal is whether anybody other than the legal guardian of a minor can validly convey the properties belonging to the minor. The question is raised in respect of Nairs governed by the Travancore Nair Act, Act II of 1100. The present suit was instituted by the two plaintiffs who are the children of one Krishnan Nair Parameswaran Nair, who had executed a will dated 16.9.1101 in respect of the suit property. By virtue of that testament these plaintiffs became entitled to a half share in this property. When the father died both these plaintiffs were minors and before they attained majority, the entire property had been conveyed under two sale deeds Exts. I and II in favour of deceased Devaki Amma Narayani Amma, the mother of defendants 1 to 4. These defendants are in possession of the property on the strength of these two sale deeds. The first sale deed Ext. I was executed on 30.6.1107 and it is in respect of 35 cents out of the plaint property. The second sale deed Ext. II was executed on 21.3.1116 and it is in respect of the remaining 24 cents of the property. These sale deeds were executed on behalf of these plaintiffs also. The plaintiffs' elder sister Bharathi Amma figured as their guardian in executing Ext. II. They had an elder brother Kesvan Nair Krishnan Nair, and it was he who figured as the guardian of these plaintiffs in executing Ext. I. This Kesavan Nair Krishnan Nair, was not the son of the aforesaid Parameswaran Nair and hence he did not acquire any right in the suit property. He was the son of the plaintiff's mother by her first husband. The plaintiffs have impeached both the sale deeds as absolutely void documents so far as their half share in the property is concerned for the reason that the persons who purported to act as their guardian in conveying their share had no legal authority to convey their property. It is also contended that there was no necessity to execute these sale deeds and that the documents are unsupported by consideration and have not conferred any benefit on the plaintiffs. The trial court held that the documents were executed by competent persons and that the plaintiffs are bound by the same. It is also contended that there was no necessity to execute these sale deeds and that the documents are unsupported by consideration and have not conferred any benefit on the plaintiffs. The trial court held that the documents were executed by competent persons and that the plaintiffs are bound by the same. Accordingly their claim for partition and recovery of their half share in the property was disallowed and the suit dismissed. The lower appellate court came to a different conclusion and held that Krishnan Nair and Bharathi Amma who figured as the guardians of these plaintiffs in Exts. I and II respectively, had no authority to convey the plaintiff's share in the suit property and that the plaintiffs are entitled to ignore the sale deeds as void documents and to claim their share subject to the liability of their share of the father's debt which is a subsisting charge on the property. The suit was therefore remanded to the trial court for passing decree for partition and for allotment to the plaintiffs their half share in the property. The contesting defendant has preferred this appeal challenging the correctness of the view taken by the lower appellate court on the question of the validity and binding nature of Exts. I and II. 2. The question as to who were the persons legally competent to act as the guardians of these plaintiffs during their minority, has necessarily to be determined in accordance with the personal or special law applicable to them. Such is the law embodied in the Nair Act, Act II of 1100. S.10 of the Act provides for the guardianship of the minor children in respect of their person and property. Sub-s. (1) of S.10 states that: "The husband shall be legal guardian of the minor wife, and save as regards married daughters under the guardianship of their husbands, the father, the legal guardian of his minor children in respect of their person and property; provided that the guardianship shall not extend to the right and interest of his wife or children in their tarwad property". Sub-s. 2 states that: "Where a female has minor children by a husband, deceased or divorced, she shall, subject to the provisions of sub-s. 9 of S. 7, be the legal guardian in respect of their person as also the separate property belonging to them". Sub-s. 2 states that: "Where a female has minor children by a husband, deceased or divorced, she shall, subject to the provisions of sub-s. 9 of S. 7, be the legal guardian in respect of their person as also the separate property belonging to them". Where the minor happens to be a married girl, her guardianship will be with the husband. In the case of other minors, the guardianship will be with the father except in cases coming under sub-s. 2 of S. 10, where the guardianship will be with the mother. There is no other provision in the statute, conferring authority on any other person to act as the guardian of the minors in respect of their person or property. Persons other than those specified in S.10 can deprive such authority only when they are duly appointed by a competent court as the guardians of the minor and authorised to deal with the properties of the minor in accordance with the provisions of the Guardian and Wards Act. In the properties dealt with under Exts. I and II, the plaintiffs had a definite half share and that half share was undoubtedly their separate property. It is therefore clear that Krishnan Nair and Bharathi Amma who figured as the guardians of these plaintiffs in Exts. I and II respectively, had no legal authority to function as the guardians of these plaintiffs and to convey their property. The attempt of the defendants to make out that Krishnan Nair and Bharathi Amma must be deemed to have acted under S. 23 of the Nair Act as persons in management of the estate left by the plaintiffs' father, cannot also succeed. That section merely provides for interim management of the properties left by an intestate until such properties are divided among his lineal descendants. It is obvious that the power thus conferred is restricted to the possession and management of the properties so that the same may be conserved for division among the lineal descendants of the intestate and that such power does not extend to the power of conveying the share of any of them. Thus, even if the facts of the present case are such as to attract the provisions of S. 23, the persons in management of the estate left by the father of the plaintiffs would not have been competent to execute outright conveyances like Exts. I and II. Thus, even if the facts of the present case are such as to attract the provisions of S. 23, the persons in management of the estate left by the father of the plaintiffs would not have been competent to execute outright conveyances like Exts. I and II. Further, it has to be remembered that the plaintiffs are not claiming any share in the suit property under any intestate successions, but only under the testamentary disposition that had been made by their father. Hence S. 23 can have no application to the facts of this case and Krishnan Nair who figured as the guardian of the plaintiffs in Ext. I could not also come in the line of lineal descendants of the father of the plaintiffs. The share which devolved on the plaintiffs could not be deemed to be their thavazhi properties and no question of the thavazhi karanvan being in possession and management of the property could also arise for consideration. The evidence is also clear that during the minority of these plaintiffs, they were never under the guardianship of Krishnan Nair or Bharathi Amma; Pws.1 and 2 and Dw.1 have all deposed that these minors were under the care and protection of their mother's sister. Thus it is clear that in executing Exts. I and II conveying the share of these plaintiffs also in the suit property, Krishnan Nair and Bharathi Amma were not acting as persons in actual management of the affairs of these minors. 3. The principle is well settled that a minor's property can be dealt with only by a person who has legal authority to act on behalf of the minor. A person who is not a lawful guardian of the minor cannot sell away the minor's property. This principle was enunciated and emphasised by Lord Robson in Mata Din v. Ahmad Ali (ILR 34 Allahabad 213, PC) in the following words while dealing with the question whether the elder brothers of a Muslim minor who were functioning as the minor's guardians could not sell away the minor's property for discharging the debts binding on the minor: "It is urged on behalf of the appellant that elder brother were de facto guardians of the respondent, and as such, were entitled to sell his property, provided that the sale was in order to pay his debts and was therefore necessary in his interest. It is difficult to see how the situation of an unauthorised guardian is bettered by describing him as a de facto guardian. He may, by his de facto guardianship, assume important responsibilities in relation to the minor's property, but he cannot thereby clothe himself with legal power to sell it". Even though these observations were made in dealing with a case under Muhammadan Law, it is clear that the principle enunciated is in respect of dealings of a minor's property by a person who is not the minor's lawful guardian. The principle enunciated in that case was followed by the Privy Council in a subsequent case i.e. Imambandi v. Mustaddi (ILR 45 Calcutta 878, PC). That too was a case under the Muhammadan Law. All the same it cannot be said that the general principles enunciated in these two cases are confined to dealings with properties of Muslim minors. On the other hand, it is obvious that what is emphasised by these two decisions is that a person dealing with a minor's property must rest his authority on some legal foundation. This aspect has been explained by Beaumont, C. J., in Tulsidas v. Raisingji (AIR 1933 Bombay 15) in the following words : "Dealing with the matter as one of principle I apprehend that if a person claims the right to sell the property of another, he must establish his title so to do. In many cases the right to deal with the property of another may arise from the legal relationship between the parties. But it is certainly strange to suggest that such a power can be acquired by a relationship which has no legal sanction. A so-called guardian de facto is not a guardian at all. He is merely a person who has assumed without authority to act as guardian, and it is a strong thing to hold that by such assumption he has acquired the right to deal with the minor's immovable property". Even though the principle was thus explained in that case, which was one under the Hindu Law, it was ruled in that case that the general principle thus explained did not apply to Hindu Law which had its own special law recognising a power in the de facto manager of the minor's estate to dispose of such estate under certain circumstances. 4. 4. The position of Christian minors was considered by a Full Bench of this court in Punnoose v. Korathu (1951 KLT 223) and there it was ruled that alienation of minor's property by anybody other than legal guardians would be absolutely void. Following the general principles enunciated by the Privy Council in Mata Din v. Ahamad Ali (ILR 34 Allahabad 213) and in Imambandi v. Mustaddi (ILR 45 Calcutta 878), it was held that an alienation of the minor's property by an unauthorised person is absolutely void and the alienee if put in possession, would be a trespasser. It was further held that however good may be the reasons for the alienation, even if it be for discharging the debts unquestionably binding on the estate of the minor, the alienation would still be void if the person granting it has not the competency to convey and that the question as to the character and adequacy of the consideration would arise only in a case where the transaction is entered into by a person having authority. It is clear from all these decisions that the general rule of law is that a minor's property could be validly conveyed only by a person who has lawful authority to represent the minor and to act on behalf of the minor. Such authority may be derived from the personal law governing the minor or from an order of a competent court. However an exception to this general rule has had its recognition under Hindu law. Under the Hindu system of jurisprudence, the power of a person in actual management of the affairs of a minor, includes the power to charge the minor's estate for proper necessities of the minor. The authoritative pronouncement on that question by the Privy Council in Hanooman Persaud Panday's case in 6 Moore's Indian Appeals 393, has been consistently followed over since that pronouncement. After an exhaustive review of the case law on the subject, the basis of the special rule prevailing under the Hindu Law has been explained by His Lordship Mahajan, J. in Bapayya v. Pundarikakshayya (1949 Federal Law Journal 318 at 335) as follows: "The decisions in Hanooman Persaud Panday's case is in accordance with the spirit of Hindu jurisprudence qua payment of debts incurred in certain emergent situations or in regard to alienations of immovable property effected in similar circumstances. The joint family system, the limited powers conferred on a widow and on a Mahant are peculiarities of the Hindu system of jurisprudence. A deduction from these analogies is that a person not having full powers of disposition and hence not being fully authorised can in certain circumstances transfer property and confer a title absolute and indefeasible on the purchaser though he himself does not possess that title. The pious of obligation theory of Hindu Law under which a son is bound to pay the debts of his father is another instance in point. So far as I am able to see, Hindu jurisprudence is based on principles of ethics and morality and whatever money has been taken or an act has been done which has benefited the real owner of the estate, then that loan or act is not repudiated merely on the technical ground of want of authority in the person taking the loan or doing the act. The principle is that if the estate of a person, whether a minor or absentee, or a joint proprietor, has been benefited by the act of a person who does not hold proper authority but who is in management of the estate, then that act must be respected by the true owner and not repudiated merely on the ground of want of authority. In my judgment therefore rule laid down in Hanooman Persaud Panday's case ((1856) 6 MIA 393) regarding the powers of a de facto manager of a minor's estate is based on Hindu system of jurisprudence and in this matter is different from Muhammadan Law and other systems of law. Moreover this decision is now unquestionable even on the doctrine of stare decesis". From the above passage it is abundantly clear that the rule followed under Hindu Law is a special rule peculiar to itself and that the same cannot by analogy be made applicable to other systems of law. Moreover this decision is now unquestionable even on the doctrine of stare decesis". From the above passage it is abundantly clear that the rule followed under Hindu Law is a special rule peculiar to itself and that the same cannot by analogy be made applicable to other systems of law. This position has also been emphasised by His Lordship Mahajan, J. by another passage in the same judgment, which is to the following effect: "Under the Hindu system of jurisprudence it is the necessity of the loan and the pressure on the estate that are the touch-stones, on which its validity and binding character on the minor's estate are judged, while in other systems of law its validity and binding character on the minor depend on the authority of the person incurring it". No more arguments are necessary to repel the contention urged on behalf of the appellant that the position of the minors governed by the Nair Act should be assimilated to that of the minors under the Hindu Law. Nairs are governed by the principles of Marumakkathayam Law as modified by the provisions embodied in the Nair Act which contains special provisions specifying the persons who should represent minors as their legal guardians in respect of their separate property. Self-imposed guardianship or management by other persons will not confer on them any legal authority to deal with the minor's property. Such dealings will be absolutely void and will not in any way affect the minor's interest in such property. The general rule to that effect as enunciated in Punnoose v. Korathu (1951 KLT 223) is applicable to minors governed by the Nair Act also. The lower appellate court was therefore right in holding that Exts. I and II executed by persons having no lawful authority to represent the plaintiffs during their minority have only to be ignored as void documents. Of these two documents, Ext. I alone has been proved to be supported by consideration binding on the plaintiffs to the extent of a prior debt which was already a charge on the property. The lower court has made provision for the payment of the plaintiffs' share of this debt. Coming to Ext. II it was found that it was not supported by any consideration and necessity binding on the plaintiffs. The major portion of the consideration for Ext. II represents the amount invested in mortgages Ext. The lower court has made provision for the payment of the plaintiffs' share of this debt. Coming to Ext. II it was found that it was not supported by any consideration and necessity binding on the plaintiffs. The major portion of the consideration for Ext. II represents the amount invested in mortgages Ext. VI and VII got assigned in favour of the plaintiffs. It is not shown that the plaintiffs have accepted these assignments. In the present suit they have disowned all rights to these mortgages. Under these circumstances, the finding that the plaintiffs are entitled to recover their half share in the suit property with mesne profits from the defendants in possession of the same, does not call for any interference. 5. In the result this appeal is dismissed with costs. Dismissed.