Judgment :- 1. This is an appeal against the order in O.P. No. 69 of 1951 on the file of this Court. That O.P. was filed under Art. 226 of the Constitution and the relief claimed was that the records in the Rent Control proceedings in B.R.C. No. 190/1950 before the Rent Controller may be called up and that a writ of certiorari may be issued cancelling the order of eviction passed against the tenant in possession of the building in respect of which the proceedings had been started. The present is the second occasion on which the order on the O.P. has been challenged in appeal. The O.P. was dealt with by a Single Bench of this Court and the learned judge who dealt with the matter passed his first order on 1.10.1951 (KLT 639) allowing the petition and quashing the order of eviction which the Rent Controller had passed against the tenant and which was confirmed by the appellate authority and also in revision by Government. The landlord had preferred A.S. No. 937/1951 against the order allowing the O.P. In the course of the hearing of that appeal it was disclosed that the facts which the learned judge assumed to be admitted and uncontroverted and which were made the basis of his conclusion that the Rent Controller was acting without jurisdiction in ordering eviction of the tenant from the holding, were really non-existent. It had been assumed by him that the release deed taken by the landlord from the mortgagee who had let the tenant in possession of the building under a rental arrangement, had provided for payment of a sum of Rs. 800 to the tenant towards the value of his improvements to the building before his eviction. Copies of the rent deed and the deed of release in respect of the mortgage already referred to were admitted as fresh evidence in appeal and were marked as Exts. I and II and these documents unmistakably showed that the tenant was not authorised to make any improvements in the building rented out to him and that no provision was made in the release deed to pay anything to him on account of the value of improvements. I and II and these documents unmistakably showed that the tenant was not authorised to make any improvements in the building rented out to him and that no provision was made in the release deed to pay anything to him on account of the value of improvements. In view of such a disclosure, the Division Bench which heard A.S. 937 of 1951 felt that it would be proper and desirable to send back the O.P. to the same judge who dealt with it, so that he may reconsider the matter in the light of the relevant facts as they really existed. Accordingly the order dated 1.10.1951 was set aside and the O.P. was sent back to the Single Bench for fresh hearing and disposal. Certain aspects having an important bearing on the questions raised in the O.P. had also been indicated in the order of remand. After a reconsideration of the O.P. the learned judge came to the same conclusion as before and reiterated substantially the same grounds in support of his second order also. He has taken the view that the fact that the release deed Ext. II makes provision for repayment to the tenant of the sum of Rs. 200 which he had advanced to the landlord at the time of the rent arrangement by way of security for the due payment of the stipulated rent, is itself sufficient to deprive the Rent Controller of his jurisdiction to pass an order of eviction. The claim put forward by the tenant that he has effected valuable improvements to the building and that he is entitled to get the value of such improvements also before eviction, is relied on as another ground in support of the view that the Rent Controller was incompetent to entertain the landlord's application for an order to put him in possession of the building. After the O.P. was received back from the Division Bench, the learned judge allowed the petitioner to have the O.P. amended by adding a fresh ground that the Rent Controller acted without jurisdiction in proceeding to consider the grounds on which eviction was sought for without duly considering and deciding whether the denial by the tenant of the landlord's title was bona fide or not. The new ground thus allowed to be added was also relied on by the learned judge as the third ground in support of his conclusion that the Rent Controller had acted without jurisdiction in ordering the eviction of the tenant from the building. Thus the learned judge once again passed an order issuing a writ of certiorari quashing the proceedings passed by the Rent Controller. It is against such an order passed by the learned judge on 10.1.1953 that the landlord has preferred the present appeal. 2. For a proper appreciation of the points arising in this appeal, it is necessary to know the facts having a bearing on those questions. When the appellant purchased the equity of redemption of the building and its site in the year 1121, these were outstanding on mortgage. It was from the mortgagee that the 1st respondent tenant had taken the building on rent by executing the registered rent deed Ext. I of the year 1117. It is seen from the description in Ext. I that what was rented out to this tenant was only the building consisting of a few shop rooms and the attached bath room, latrine and cart-shed. The letting out of the building was on a monthly rental basis, the monthly rent of Rs. 40/- being payable before the 10th of the succeeding month. Towards security for the prompt payment of such rent, an amount of Rs. 200/- was paid in advance by the tenant. It was stipulated in Ext. I that even during the currency of the rental arrangement the landlord will have the right to construct additional buildings at the back premises of the building in the possession of the tenant and that the landlord could undertake such new constructions after giving 10 days' notice to the tenant and without causing any inconvenience to the tenant in the lawful use of the building in his possession. There has also been an express undertaking by the tenant that he will take care to see that no damage is caused to the building and to the electric installations in it and that he will maintain them in proper condition. The rental arrangement was to be in force for a period of 5 years and the stipulation was that at the end of the period tenant should unconditionally surrender possession of the building without putting forward any claims or objections. Ext. The rental arrangement was to be in force for a period of 5 years and the stipulation was that at the end of the period tenant should unconditionally surrender possession of the building without putting forward any claims or objections. Ext. I provided for a right of re-entry in favour of the landlord in case the tenant caused any damage to the building or to the installations and also in case the rent was left in arrears for three consecutive instalments. 3. In the year 1122 the mortgagee executed the release deed Ext. II surrendering all his rights over the building and the site and the premises in favour of the present appellant who had become the ultimate owner of this property as per the sale deed of the year 1121. Out of the consideration for this release deed a sum of Rs. 200/- was reserved with the appellant for repayment of the advance that had been received under Ext. I from the tenant. The appellant who had thus become the landlord in relation to the rental arrangement created by Ext. I, issued notice to the tenant at the end of the period of 5 years fixed in the document, calling upon him to surrender possession of the building. Since this demand was not complied with, the landlord instituted the suit O.S. No. 1050/1122 in the Trivandrum Munsiff's Court for eviction of the tenant from the building and for recovery of the arrears of rent due from him. The tenant resisted the suit and contended that the original owner of the property had agreed to sell the equity of redemption of the property to him and that therefore the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff in contravention of that agreement was invalid and inoperative. The tenant also put forward a claim that in the event of his eviction, he is entitled to get a sum of Rs. 2000/- towards cost of the improvements effected by him in the building. The jurisdiction of the court to entertain the suit for eviction was also questioned by the tenant on account of the provision contained in the Travancore Rent Control Order of the year 1122 which conferred exclusive jurisdiction on the Rent Controller to order eviction of a tenant from a building situated within his territorial jurisdiction. 4. The jurisdiction of the court to entertain the suit for eviction was also questioned by the tenant on account of the provision contained in the Travancore Rent Control Order of the year 1122 which conferred exclusive jurisdiction on the Rent Controller to order eviction of a tenant from a building situated within his territorial jurisdiction. 4. In view of the contentions raised by the tenant as defendant in the civil suit, the landlord approached the Rent Controller by presenting an application which was registered as B.R.C. No. 215/1124 and prayed for an order directing the tenant to surrender possession of the building to the landlord. The ground urged in support of that prayer was that the tenant had left the rent in arrears. But it was found that the amount of such rent had already been deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord in O.S. 1050/1122 and accordingly B.R.C. No. 215/1124 was dismissed. Subsequently the landlord filed another application B.R.C. 248/1124 before the Rent Controller for an order to be put in possession of the building. The request was made on two grounds viz., that the tenant had defaulted in the payment of rent and that the building was required for the landlord's own use for conducting a jewellery business which was stated to be a family concern of the landlord. In opposing this application, the tenant reiterated the contentions which he had raised in the civil suit and raised an additional plea that since those contentions were pending adjudication by the civil court, the Rent Controller had no jurisdiction to pass an order of eviction against the tenant. After a summary enquiry the Controller passed an order in favour of the landlord. On an appeal preferred by the tenant, that order was set aside by the appellate authority who remanded the case for fresh disposal after taking the necessary evidence on the several points arising out of the contentions of the parties. The landlord attempted to get that order of remand revised by Government. But the revision petition was dismissed by an order which restricted the scope of the enquiry contemplated by the remand order to two questions viz., (1) whether there was default of payment of rent on the date of the application and (2) whether the allegation that the building is necessary for the landlord's own use in true. But the revision petition was dismissed by an order which restricted the scope of the enquiry contemplated by the remand order to two questions viz., (1) whether there was default of payment of rent on the date of the application and (2) whether the allegation that the building is necessary for the landlord's own use in true. By this time the Travancore Rent Control Order of 1122 had been replaced by the Travancore-Cochin Building (Lease and Rent Control) Order of 1950 and hence the proceedings were continued under S. 9 of that Order after re-numbering the case as B.R.C. 190/1950. The provisions contained in this section are substantially the same as those contained in S. 6 of the Travancore Building Rent Control Order, 1122, under which the proceedings had been started. As a result of the enquiry conducted by the Controller after remand, he found the second ground urged by the landlord ie., that the claim of the landlord that the building was required for personal use, was bona fide and true. Accordingly an order was passed under S. 9 clause 3(a)(iii) directing that the tenant shall be evicted and that the landlord shall be put in possession of the building. This order was confirmed by the appellate authority and also in revision by Government. It was under these circumstances that the tenant approached this Court and filed O.P. 69 of 1051 for the issue of a writ of certiorari quashing the proceedings passed by the Rent Controller. 5. The correctness of the view taken by the learned judge that in cases where the tenant is entitled to get a refund of the amount paid by him towards security for the due payment of the rent and also in cases where the tenant has a claim for value of improvements effected by him in the building taken on rent by him the Rent Controller has no jurisdiction to entertain an application for eviction and to pass an order directing the landlord to be put in possession of the building, is challenged by the appellant as being unsustainable and erroneous. We are clearly of opinion that this contention of the appellant has to prevail. We are clearly of opinion that this contention of the appellant has to prevail. To ascertain the nature and extent of the Rent Controller's jurisdiction in the matter of entertaining an application for eviction, we have primarily to look to the provisions of the Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Order itself for necessary guidance. There is nothing in the Order to indicate or suggest that cases where the tenant has a claim against the landlord for value of improvements effected by him in the building or for amounts charged on the building are excluded from the scope of the Order. It is clear from the several provisions contained in the Order that subject to the conditions and limitations specified therein, the Order is intended to be comprehensive in its application and scope. S.1 states that the Order applies to the areas mentioned in the Schedule appended to the Order and also to such areas as may be notified by Government from time to time. The Controller's territorial jurisdiction is thus specified. The other conditions necessary to attract his jurisdiction are that the disputes which he is called upon to settle must be between a tenant and a landlord as defined in the Order and that such disputes must relate to a rental arrangement in respect of buildings satisfying the definition as given in S. 2 of the Order. All these conditions have been undoubtedly satisfied in the present case and there is no controversy regarding the same. Where such conditions are satisfied the landlord can get the tenant evicted from the building only by an order passed by the Controller in the manner prescribed by S. 9 of the Rent Control Order. This is made clear by sub-s.1 of S. 9 which states that: "A tenant shall not be evicted whether in execution of a decree or otherwise except in accordance with the provisions of this Clause". It is obvious that the word 'clause' as used in this sub-section is meant to cover the whole of S. 9, because the conditions under which an order of eviction may be passed by the Controller are those specified in sub-s. 2 onwards of S. 9. The only two categories of cases which are excluded from such a jurisdiction conferred on the Controller are those specified in the two Provisos to sub-s. 1. The only two categories of cases which are excluded from such a jurisdiction conferred on the Controller are those specified in the two Provisos to sub-s. 1. The first Proviso states that: "Nothing contained in this clause shall apply to a tenant whose landlord is Government". The second Proviso states that: "Where the tenant denies the title of the landlord or claims right of permanent tenancy, the Controller shall decide whether the denial or claim is bonafide, and if he records a finding to that effect the remedy of the landlord will be to sue for the eviction of the tenant in a civil court." The effect of this Proviso is that where the tenant's claim of right of permanent tenancy or denial of the landlord's title is recorded as having been made bonafide, the Controller ceases to have jurisdiction to consider the grounds of eviction and to pass a order in favour of the landlord. If it was in the contemplation of the Legislature that S.9 was not to apply to cases where the tenant has a claim for some amount charged on the building or for value of improvements effected by him on the building, that category of cases would also have been excluded from the ambit of that Section by adding a third proviso to that effect to sub-s. 1. Where the Legislature has not chosen to provide for any such exclusion, it will be wrong and unjustified to bring about the same result by construing the section in such a manner as to read more into it. The reasoning adopted by the learned judge is that under the Tenancy laws of the State a tenant is entitled to retain possession of the holding until he is paid the value of the improvements effected by him in the holding and that he has a similar right in respect of any other amount due to him for which he has a charge on the holding and that the Rent Control Order cannot be taken to have, either by express words or by necessary implication, authorised the Rent Controller to pass an order of eviction against the tenant which may result in a negation of the rights already mentioned. No doubt in the Cochin area the right of an ordinary tenant to retain possession of the holding until the value of his improvements is paid to him, has been statutorily recognised. Even though there is no such statute governing the rights of tenants in the Travancore area wherefrom the present case has arisen, a similar right in favour of the tenant is recognised there also under certain circumstances. But still it is a debatable question as to how far this right can be claimed by a person who has been put in possession of a building under a rental arrangement. Assuming that in respect of such rental arrangement also the tenant has the right to claim the value of his improvements in the building, there is the further question whether the mere existence of a right to make such a claim against the landlord would oust the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller to pass an order of eviction against the landlord under S. 9 of the Rent Control Order. There is no provision in that Order empowering the Controller to adjudicate upon such claims. Naturally, therefore, it lies within the province of civil court to consider such claims and to adjudicate upon the same by passing an appropriate decree or order when the matter is agitated before such court. Even if there is a decree or order in favour of the tenant directing payment to him of the amount due to him, by way of value of improvements before eviction, he could be evicted only as per the order of the Rent Controller because of the express provision contained in S. 9 that a tenant shall not be evicted whether in execution of a decree or otherwise except in accordance with the provisions of that section. This clearly indicates that irrespective of the question of the existence of the tenant's claim for value of improvements as embodied in a decree or otherwise, the jurisdiction to order his eviction is conferred on the Controller and on him alone and the existence of such a claim cannot stand in the way of his exercising that jurisdiction. The Legislature has conferred such an exclusive and absolute jurisdiction on the Controller in respect of all building tenancies within his territorial jurisdiction excepting those expressly excluded by the two provisos to sub-s.1 of S. 9. The Legislature has conferred such an exclusive and absolute jurisdiction on the Controller in respect of all building tenancies within his territorial jurisdiction excepting those expressly excluded by the two provisos to sub-s.1 of S. 9. By clause (5) of S.15 his orders have been declared final subject only to the appeal and revision specially provided for under Ss. 15 and 16 of the Rent Control Order. So long as the Rent Controller has not transgressed the limits of the jurisdiction conferred on him, the finality of his orders as declared by the statute must hold good. The best that can be said in favour of the tenant in such a situation is that the order of eviction passed against him by the Rent Controller will not have the effect of depriving him of his right to enforce any subsisting claim which he may have against the landlord. It may be open to him to enforce such a claim against the landlord by other appropriate proceedings at the time when the landlord attempts to put the eviction order into execution or at any other stage. The learned judge has taken the view that to permit such a course of action would necessarily involve some delay in the implementation of the eviction order and that the Rent Controller has jurisdiction only to pass orders which could be put into effect immediately. He has observed that: "Cases to which the Rent Control Order applies should therefore be such as admit of being dealt with and final results achieved without delay and by the tribunal specially constituted for the purpose according to the true intent of the Legislature". and that: "A case which does not admit of such kind of treatment has therefore to be regarded as falling outside the ambit of the enactment " There can be no doubt that the aim of all legal proceedings should be to achieve final results with the utmost expedition and more so in respect of cases falling under special statues like the Rent Control Order where the landlord seeks eviction of the tenant for good causes shown against him. But we fail to see how the possibility of some delay in achieving the final results in eviction proceedings can have anything to do with the determination of the Controller's jurisdiction to entertain an application for eviction, just as we fail to appreciate the learned judge's observation that: "Where there is a real claim for value of improvements, the adjudication of which is beyond the competency of the Controller, an application for eviction would be beyond his jurisdiction to consider". The final result of such an application is not achieved through the Controller, as is clear from S.11 of the Rent Control Order. In respect of such an application the Controller's jurisdiction comes to an end with the passing of an order for eviction. S.11 states that such an order made under S. 9 shall be executed by the District Munsiff having jurisdiction over the area in which the building is situated, as if it were a decree passed by him. Even if there is the possibility of some delay in the matter of such execution before the civil court, such a possibility can have no relevancy at all in determining the question of the controller's jurisdiction to entertain and deal with an application for eviction. The Rent Control Order does not also lend any support to the view that the Controller cannot entertain an application for eviction of the tenant in case the latter puts forward a claim for value of improvements. So long as there is no provision in the Rent Control Order empowering the Controller to consider and decide on the reality or tenability of such a claim, it is clear that he cannot refuse to entertain an application for eviction on the ground that the tenant has a real claim for value of improvements. If the Rent Controller were to adopt such a course, the provision in the Rent Control Order for the eviction of the tenant could be completely nullified leaving the landlord in a helpless position. The tenant has only to put forward a claim for value of improvements in answer to an application for eviction and the Rent Controller has to stay in hands. S. 9 of the Rent Controller Order says that the tenant shall not be evicted whether in execution of a decree or otherwise except in accordance with the provisions of that section. S. 9 of the Rent Controller Order says that the tenant shall not be evicted whether in execution of a decree or otherwise except in accordance with the provisions of that section. Thus the result will be that the landlord will be placed in a very sad predicament without any remedy to get back possession of his building. There can be no doubt that in enacting the Rent Control Order the Legislature did not contemplate to bring about such an impossible situation. Even though the primary object of the Rent Control Order is to safeguard the interests of the tenant, it cannot be said that the tenant is enabled to have everything in his own way. The enactment has made certain provisions for the protection of the legitimate interests of the landlord also. Such is the provision contained in S. 9 of the Order enabling the landlord to get an order from the Controller directing the tenant to surrender possession of the building to the landlord under certain specified circumstances. When such circumstances are proved to exist in a given case the Controller gets jurisdiction to deal with an application for eviction and it will be a case of his refusal to exercise that jurisdiction if he declines to entertain such an application for the reason that the tenant has a claim against the landlord for recovery of certain amounts charged on the building. 7. As already pointed out, the conditions necessary to attract the jurisdiction of the Controller to entertain an application for eviction of the tenant have been specified in the Rent Control Order itself and these are that the parties approaching him must occupy the positions of landlord and tenant as defined in the Order, that there must be a rental arrangement between them in respect of a building situated within the territorial jurisdiction of the Controller and that one or more of the grounds enumerated in S. 9 as enabling the landlord to get back possession of the building from the tenant must be made out by him as against the tenant. Where these conditions exist, consideration of extraneous matters would be irrelevant in the matter of determining the Controller's jurisdiction to entertain an application for eviction. This view gains great support from the rulings in Krishnamoorthy v. Parthasarathi (AIR 1949 Madras 780) and in Brij Raj Krishna v. Shaw & Bros. Where these conditions exist, consideration of extraneous matters would be irrelevant in the matter of determining the Controller's jurisdiction to entertain an application for eviction. This view gains great support from the rulings in Krishnamoorthy v. Parthasarathi (AIR 1949 Madras 780) and in Brij Raj Krishna v. Shaw & Bros. (AIR 1951 Supreme Court 115). The learned judge who dealt with the writ application now under consideration has referred to both these rulings, but the view taken by him is that the principles enunciated in those cases are justified only by the particular facts and circumstances of those cases and that as such those principles cannot hold good to the present case. No doubt the facts and circumstances of those two cases are entirely different from those of the present case. But the question that directly arose for consideration in both those cases also was the question of jurisdiction of the Rent Controller to entertain an application for eviction of the tenant. In Krishnamoorthy v. Parthasarathi (AIR 1949 Madras 780) the section that had to be construed was S. 7 of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act of 1946. The provisions of that Section are almost identical with the provisions of S. 9 of the Travancore-Cochin Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Order, 1950. The point raised in the Madras case was that the Rent Controller could not order the eviction of the tenant before the tenancy was determined by quit notice as contemplated by S. 111 of the Transfer of Property Act. That contention was repelled and it was ruled that there is no justification for invoking the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act in deciding the question of jurisdiction conferred on the Rent Controller under S. 7 of the Rent Control Act. It was pointed out that S. 111 of the Transfer of Property Act has no place in the scheme of procedure laid down in S. 7 of the Rent Control Act. Particular emphasis was laid on the expression "whether the execution of a decree or otherwise" as used in clause (1) of S.7 of the Rent Control Act, as indicated of the comprehensive nature of the Controller's jurisdiction to entertain an application for eviction irrespective of any consideration as to whether the Collateral rights, if any, of the tenant have already been determined or not by a decree of Court. It was S.11 of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947 that had come up for the consideration of the Supreme Court in Brij Raj Krishna v. Shaw & Bros. (AIR 1951 Supreme Court 115). That section commenced with the expression "Notwithstanding anything contained in any agreement or law to the contrary" and to that extent the wording of that Section is different from the wording of S. 9 of the Travancore-Cochin Rent Control Order. In other respects the provisions of the two sections are almost similar. The conditions prescribed by the two sections for conferring jurisdiction on the Rent Controller to entertain an application for eviction are also the same. With reference to those conditions the Supreme Court observed as follows: "The Act thus sets up a complete machinery for investigation of those matters upon which the jurisdiction of the Controller to order eviction of a tenant depends". The plain meaning of this statement is that the existence of the conditions prescribed by the Rent Control Order is sufficient in themselves to confer jurisdiction on the Controller to order eviction of the tenant and that it will be wholly unnecessary and irrelevant to take into account extraneous matters as having a direct bearing on the determination of such jurisdiction. We are clearly of opinion that the principles thus enunciated in the two cases referred to above apply with equal force to the present case also. 8. The tenability and the sustainability of the money claims that may be available to the tenant as against the landlord will call for adjudication only when such claims are urged in appropriate proceedings before the proper forum. The question as to how far the rights available under the tenancy laws enabling a tenant to retain possession of the holding until he is paid the value of improvements on such holding will be available to a tenant in possession of a building covered by a simple rental arrangement, will legitimately arise for consideration at that stage. The question as to how far the rights available under the tenancy laws enabling a tenant to retain possession of the holding until he is paid the value of improvements on such holding will be available to a tenant in possession of a building covered by a simple rental arrangement, will legitimately arise for consideration at that stage. Other incidental questions may also arise for consideration in that connection viz., whether it is not open to the tenant to waive the rights available to him under the tenancy laws, by expressly contracting out of such laws and undertaking to unconditionally surrender possession of the holding at the end of the stipulated period without putting forward any claims or objections, as has been done in the present case. So far as the amount paid by the tenant by way of advance to secure the due payment of rent is concerned, his rights stand on a different footing. His claim to get back that amount cannot be a bar to the landlord's right to get an order of eviction. Even after such eviction, it will be open to the tenant to seek recovery of the amount from the landlord as a charge on the building. Other claims also may similarly be enforced in case the tenant gets a decree or order in his favour in appropriate proceedings. 9. There remains only one more point for consideration and that is whether the order passed by the learned judge can be sustained on the last ground relied on by him. According to him the Rent Controller acted without jurisdiction in proceeding to consider the landlord's application on its merits without first disposing of the tenant's objection to the landlord's title, by recording a finding as to whether such objection was bona fide or not. The second Proviso to sub-s.1 of S. 9 of the Rent Control Order is relied on in support of this view. The relevant portion of that Proviso runs as follows: "Where the tenant denies the title of the landlord or claims right of permanent tenancy, the Controller shall decide whether the denial or claim is bona fide and if he records a finding to that effect, the landlord shall be entitled to sue for eviction in a civil court". The relevant portion of that Proviso runs as follows: "Where the tenant denies the title of the landlord or claims right of permanent tenancy, the Controller shall decide whether the denial or claim is bona fide and if he records a finding to that effect, the landlord shall be entitled to sue for eviction in a civil court". It is clear from this provision that the Controller ceases to have jurisdiction to consider the landlord's application on its merits only in cases where the Controller is satisfied that the tenant's denial of the landlord's title or claim of permanent tenancy is bona fide and a finding of that effect is recorded by the Controller. Where he is not so satisfied and no finding is recorded in favour of the tenant, the Controller will be at liberty to exercise his jurisdiction to consider the landlord's application on its merits. It is significant to note that the proviso does not insist that before exercising such jurisdiction the Controller should record a finding that the tenants denial of the landlord's title or claim of permanent tenancy is male fide. Reason is to be recorded only for non-exercise of his jurisdiction and not for its exercise. Naturally, therefore, it has to be presumed that the Controller was satisfied that the tenant's denial of the landlord's title is lacking in good faith when the Controller proceeded to consider the grounds of eviction urged by the landlord. At the worst, the failure on the part of the Controller to record a finding that he was satisfied that the tenant's denial of the landlord's title was malafide can only be said to be a irregular exercise of the jurisdiction that had undoubtedly been vested in him. But it cannot be said that he was acting without jurisdiction so as to justify an interference by the issue of a writ of certiorari. So far as the present case is concerned it is clear that beyond raising an objection that the petitioner before the Controller has not obtained a valid title to the building in question, the tenant did not press forward that objection and ask for a finding at any stage of the proceedings. So far as the present case is concerned it is clear that beyond raising an objection that the petitioner before the Controller has not obtained a valid title to the building in question, the tenant did not press forward that objection and ask for a finding at any stage of the proceedings. On the facts admitted by the tenant himself in his objection petition, his denial of the landlord's title was obviously untenable and that must have been the reason why he did not care to press forward his objection on that score and omitted to raise it as a ground even in the application for writ as first presented by him. It is only the sale of the equity of redemption of the property in favour of the landlord that is alleged to be invalid in view of the existence of an alleged oral agreement of a prior date in favour of the tenant to covey such equity of redemption to him. But so far as the rental arrangement in respect of the building is concerned, the landlord was the mortgagee who was in possession of the building at that time. That mortgagee transferred all his rights over the building to the present appellant as per the release deed Ext. II. Thus even apart from the question of the validity of the sale of the equity of redemption taken by this appellant, it is clear that the rights acquired under Ext. I are sufficient in themselves to clothe the appellant with the authority of a landlord entitled to sustain an application for eviction of the tenant. This is apparent from the definition of the expression 'landlord' as given in the Rent Control Order, which is as follows: "'Landlord' includes the person who is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent of a building, whether on his own account or on behalf of another or on behalf of himself and others or as an agent, trustee, executor, administrator, receiver or guardian or who would so receive the rent or be entitled to receive the rent if the building were let to a tenant". Under such circumstances the learned judge was clearly in the wrong in accepting the new ground raised by the tenant at a belated stage of the proceedings and holding that the Controller acted without jurisdiction in passing the impugned order without formally recording and finding that the denial of the landlord's title was mala fide. 10. The circumstances of the present case were such as not to justify any indulgence being shown in favour of the tenant to have his writ application amended by inserting the new ground mentioned above, at its final stage, ie., even after it had been remanded by the appellate Bench for fresh disposal of the application after a due consideration of the points raised in it. No doubt, clause 2 of R.11 of the Rules framed by this Court to regulate proceedings under Art. 226 of the Constitution gives a discretion to the Court to permit an application filed under that section to be amended under justifiable circumstances. This provision has to be read and understood in the light of the provision contained in clause 1 of R.11 which states that: "No ground shall, except as hereinafter in this rule provided for, be relied upon or any relief sought at the hearing, except the grounds taken and reliefs set out in the Original Petition and the accompanying affidavit". It appears to us that a relaxation of the rigour of this rule by permitting the amendment as contemplated by clause (2) can be thought of only under very exceptional circumstances of a compelling nature and any move in that direction by a party who has been indulging in obstructive and delaying tactics throughout with the least good faith on his part, has to be sternly discountenanced. In view of the conduct of the tenant as disclosed in the present proceedings we feel that the learned judge ought not to have sanctioned the amendment asked for at the closing stage of the proceedings. 11. In the result this appeal is allowed and O.P. No. 69 of 1951 is dismissed with costs throughout to the first counter-petitioner. Advocate's Fee Rs. 100. Allowed.