Judgment Rai, J. 1. This appeal by defendants 1, 1(a), 1(b), 4, 13, 20, 21, 32 and 36 is directed against the judgment and decree of the second Additional Subordinate Judge, Mothihari, by which the plaintiffs suit was decreed in part. 2. The plaintiff instituted the present suit for a declaration that the transfers made by Mt. Bhuneshwar Kuer, detailed in the schedule attached to the plaint, were not for legal necessity and were not binding on the reversioners of the estate of Nanhku Chaudhury. The relationship of the plaintiff with Nanhku Chaudhury, will appear from the following genealogy: NANKU CHAUDHURY __________________|_________ | | Wife I Wife II Mt. Manmati Kuer Mt. Bhuneshwar Kuer (died in December 1944) (Defendant No. 38) died on 11-8-48 | | Sm. Rama Kuer Mt. Ramdhari kuer (plaintiff) (died 17 years ago). 3. After the death of Nanhku Chaudhury, his properties were inherited by his two widows Mt. Manmati Kuer and Mt. Bhuneshwar Kuer. After sometime the two widows partitioned the properties by which each got about 67 bighas ot raiyati lands besides other moveable properties. Soon after the partition between the two widows both of them started alienating properties which had been allotted to their shares. Mt. Manmati Kuer, on her part, executed several transfers including a deed of gift dated 2-2-1939, in favour of her daughter Srimati Rama Kuer. Bhuneshwar Kuer also started alienating properties from October 1939 onwards. On 24-9-1940, Sm. Rama Kuer and Mt. Manmati Kuer filed title suit No. 67 of 1940 for setting aside several alienations made by Bhuneshwar Kuer impleading her also as a defendant to the action. On 20-3-1942, title suit No. 67 of 1940 was decreed. The learned Subordinate Judge held in that suit that the transfers were not for legal necessity and that the alienation by Bhuneshwar Kuer without the consent of the other co-widow, was wholly illegal. On 2-2-1945, Mt. Bhuneshwar Kuer instituted title suit No. 12 of 1945 for setting aside about six transfers made by Mt. Manmati Kuer in favour of various transferees including Sm. Rama Kuer. Title Suit No. 12 of 1945 was ultimately decreed on 31-5-1946. Some of the transferees thereafter filed First Appeal No. 272 of 1946. During the pendency of this first appeal Mt. Bhuneshwar Kuer died on 11-8-1948, after which the appellants abandoned that first appeal. 4. Manmati Kuer in favour of various transferees including Sm. Rama Kuer. Title Suit No. 12 of 1945 was ultimately decreed on 31-5-1946. Some of the transferees thereafter filed First Appeal No. 272 of 1946. During the pendency of this first appeal Mt. Bhuneshwar Kuer died on 11-8-1948, after which the appellants abandoned that first appeal. 4. In the present suit which was instituted on 5-9-1945, relief was sought in respect of a large number of alienations made by Mt. Bhuneshwar Kuer. The case of the plaintiff was that the alienations in question had been brought into existence with a mala fide motive without any consideration and without any legal necessity. According to the plaintiff, the alienations were not binding on the reversioners of the estate of Nanhku Chaudhury. 5. The suit was contested by the transferees who pleaded, inter alia, that the transfers in question had been executed for legal necessity and were binding on the reversioners of the estate of Nanhku Chaudhury. Mt. Bhuneshwar Kuer, defendant No. 38, had also filed a written statement supporting the validity of the alienations. 6. The trial Court came to the conclusion that the transferees under most of the documents in question had failed to prove legal necessity for the alienations. On that finding it decreed the suit against all the defendants except defendant 7 against whom the suit was dismissed with costs. The suit as against other defendants, except defendants 16 and 24, was also decreed with costs. Hence, this appeal on behalf of some of the defendants. Defendant 35, who was a donee from Mt. Bhuneshwar Kuer under a deed of gift dated 1-3-1945, has filed a cross-objection. 7. Before I deal with the evidence in the case, I may indicate that five of the transfers under consideration in this appeal had been brought into existence during the lifetime of Mt. Manmati Kuer. They are as follows: "(1) Registered sale deed dated 10-10-1939, (Ext. A) executed by Bhuneshwar Kuer in favour of the father of defendants 1, Ka) and 1(b) for a consideration of Rs. 200. (2) Registered sale deed dated 22-4-1940, (Ext. A-6) executed by Bhuneshwar Kuer in favour of defendant 4 for a consideration of Rs. 300. (3) Registered sale deed dated 1-7-1941, (Ext. A-10) executed by Bhuneshwar Kuer in favour of defendant 13 for a consideration of Rs. 1000. (4) Registered zarpeshgi bond dated 24-3-1944 (Ext. 200. (2) Registered sale deed dated 22-4-1940, (Ext. A-6) executed by Bhuneshwar Kuer in favour of defendant 4 for a consideration of Rs. 300. (3) Registered sale deed dated 1-7-1941, (Ext. A-10) executed by Bhuneshwar Kuer in favour of defendant 13 for a consideration of Rs. 1000. (4) Registered zarpeshgi bond dated 24-3-1944 (Ext. B) executed by Bhuneshwar Kuer in favour of defendant 20 for a consideration of Rs. 1200. (5) Registered sale deed dated 3-10-1944, (Ext. A-1) executed by Bhuneshwar Kuer in favour of defendant 21 for a consideration of Rs. 1625." The Court below has held that the alienations by Bhuneshwar Kuer during the lifetime of Manmati Kuer without her consent were not binding on the next reversioner even if those alienations were made for legal necessity. Learned counsel for the appellants has attacked this finding of the Court below. He has contended before us that if the above-mentioned alienations by Mt. Bhuneshwar Kuer were for legal necessity, then they are binding on the next reversioner, This contention of Mr. Sharma found favour with the learned Judges of the Allahabad High Court in the case of -- Jai Narain Singh V/s. Munna Lal, AIR 1928 All 92 (A). But this decision of the Allahabad High Court was not approved by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in the case of -- Gauri Nath V/s. Gaya Kuar, AIR 1928 PC 251 (B). Before I deal with the judgment of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee, I would like to refer, in this connection, to a judgment of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of -- V/s. Appalasuri V/s. Kannamma Nayuralu, AIR 1926 Mad 6 (C), where their Lordships dealing with the legality and binding nature of an alienation made by a co-widow, held: "If an alienation for necessity is to bind the reversioners, all the widows must join in it". Thereafter came the decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of -- AIR 1928 All 92 (A)1, which I have mentioned above. Their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in the case of -- AIR 1928 PC 251 (B), while dealing with the point under consideration observed as follows: "The general law is so well settled that it scarcely requires restatement. If a Hindu dies leaving two widows, they succeed as joint tenants with a right, of survivorship. Their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in the case of -- AIR 1928 PC 251 (B), while dealing with the point under consideration observed as follows: "The general law is so well settled that it scarcely requires restatement. If a Hindu dies leaving two widows, they succeed as joint tenants with a right, of survivorship. They are entitled to obtain a partition of separate portion of the property so that each may enjoy her equal share of the income accruing therefrom. Each can deal as she pleases with her own life interest, but she cannot alienate any part of the corpus of the estate by gift or will so as to prejudice the rights of the survivor or a future reversioner. If they act together they can burden the reversion with any debts contracted owing to legal necessity, but one of them acting without the authority of the other, cannot prejudice the right of survivorship by burdening or alienating any part of the estate. The mere fact of partition between the two, while it gives each a right to the fruits of the separate estate assigned to her, does not imply a right to prejudice the claim of the survivor to enjoy the full fruits of the property during her lifetime." Dealing with the decision in the case of -- AIR 1928 All 92 (A), their Lordships observed: "In the second case above referred to there was undoubtedly an expression of opinion by the learned Judges of the High Court of Allahabad that where two Hindu widows have separated for purposes of conveniently enjoying the estate left by the husband, if one of them alienates a portion of the estate in her possession under the pressure of legal necessity, the reversioner is bound by such alienation. This opinion was not necessary for the decision of the case, for the Court had already held that the widow who had not executed the mortgage deeds challenged was nevertheless a consenting party to this alienation. It may be noted that the case arose not between the survivor of the widows and the mortgagee but between the mortgagee and the reversioner after the death of both widows. It may be noted that the case arose not between the survivor of the widows and the mortgagee but between the mortgagee and the reversioner after the death of both widows. The opinion of the High Court was therefore obiter and it is not consistent with the judgment of the Privy Council in -- Gajapati Radhamani V/s. Pusapathi Alakajeswari, 19 Ind App 184 (PC) (D)." Thereafter followed a decision, of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of -- Khanta Mandalani V/s. Hem Kumari Debi, AIR 1941 Pat 29 (E), where also it was held that an alienation made by a co-widow without the consent of the other was not valid beyond the lifetime of the executant so as to affect either the right of the surviving widow or of the reversioners. In a later case the Allahabad High Court in the case of -- Krishna Pratap Singh V/s. Prembaba Kunwar, AIR 1942 All 365 (F) followed the view propounded by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in the case of -- AIR 1928 PC 251 (B). Such was the view taken by the Madras High Court in two later decisions in the cases of -- K. S. Yelumalai Chetty V/s. Natesachari, AIR 1944 Mad 310 (G) and -- Kuppuswami Mudali V/s. Thangavelu Mudaliar, AIR 1947 Mad 102 (H). In face of the above-mentioned decisions it is not possible for me to accept the contention of learned counsel for the appellants to the effect that if the alienations by Mt. Bhuneshwar Kuer during the lifetime of Mt. Manmati Kuer were for legal necessity, they will be binding on the reversioners. It has not been established in this case that Mt. Manmati Kuer had given any consent to the above-mentioned alienations. On the strength of the decisions quoted above, I hold in agreement with the court below that the above-mentioned five alienations are not binding on the ultimate reversioners of the estate of Nanhku Chaudhury. 8. Three alienations made by Mt. Bhuneshwar Kuer after the death of Mt. Manmati Kuer are under consideration in this appeal. They are Ext. A-7, Ext. A-8 and Ext. B-5. Exhibit A-8 is a sale deed dated the 1st of March, 1945, executed by Bhuneshwar Kuer in favour of Bibi Murti, defendant 32, wife of Ghafur Mian. In this document there is no mention at all of any legal necessity. Manmati Kuer are under consideration in this appeal. They are Ext. A-7, Ext. A-8 and Ext. B-5. Exhibit A-8 is a sale deed dated the 1st of March, 1945, executed by Bhuneshwar Kuer in favour of Bibi Murti, defendant 32, wife of Ghafur Mian. In this document there is no mention at all of any legal necessity. Learned counsel for the appellants intimated to us that it would not be possible for him to challenge the judgment of the Court below so far as that alienation was concerned. 9. His Lordship then examined the evidence relating to Ext. A-7 and stated:) In my opinion, the Court below had rightly not relied on the evidence of this witness to prove that the sale deed (Ext. A-7) had been executed for legal necessity. Thus, there is no merit in the appeal filed by defendant 32. The judgment of the Court below in respect of Exts. A-7 and A-8 is, therefore, affirmed. 10. Exhibit B-5 is a registered zarpeshgi deed dated 24-5-1945, executed by Bhuneshwar Kuer in favour of Prayag Dass, defendant 39, for a consideration of Rs. 2000. By this document the lady purported to give in zarpeshgi about 2 bighas 1 katha 6 dhurs of land in two villages Siripur and Ghorsahan. The document recited that the amount was needed for payment of rent, to meet the expenses of title suit No. 12 of 1945 and to defray the expenses for the treatment of the eye trouble of the executant. In support of his case defendant 36 has examined a number of witnesses. D. W. 37, Nathu Raut, deposed to the effect that on enquiry by Prayag Dass he had told him that Bhuneshwar Kuer was in need of money for payment of rent and for meeting the cost of litigation and the treatment of her eye trouble. In his examination-in-chief the witness had further deposed that he had seen the Bettiah Raj peon coming and demanding rent from Bhuneshwar Kuer. He also deposed that defendant 38 had developed cataract in her eyes, and at the time of the execution of the zerpeshgi bond in question title suit No. 12 of 1945 was pending. He also deposed to the effect that Rs. 2000 was paid to defendant 38 in his presence. In his cross-examination he, however, said that he did not know what rent was then due from the lady. 11. He also deposed to the effect that Rs. 2000 was paid to defendant 38 in his presence. In his cross-examination he, however, said that he did not know what rent was then due from the lady. 11. Defendant witness 38, Prayag Dass, is defendant 36. He said in his examination-in-chief, that the lady required Rs. 51 towards the payment of arrears of rent, Rs. 400 for the treatment of her eyes and Rs. 1500 to meet the cost of litigation. He further deposed that Mt. Bhuneshwar Kuer was treated for her eye trouble at Motihari and at Patna. The witness made enquiries from Nathu Das and Bhikhari Das about the necessities of Mt. Bhuneshwar Kuer. According to him, Mr. Mahabir Prasad, an eminent Advocate of Patna, had appeared for Bhuneshwar Kuer in that case. The witness has further deposed that he had come to know about the pendency of the suit from one Raghubar Prasad. In his cross-examination it was elicited from him that Raghubar Prasad was not the pairvikar of defendant 38 and that the witness was not aware when the hearing of the suit began. The witness further said in his cross-examination that Dr. Dukhan Ram of Patna had performed the operation in connection with the eye trouble of Mt. Bhuneshwar Kuer. When further pressed in cross-examination he said that he had come to know about the arrears of rent from the Bettiah Raj Tahsildar. 12. D. W. 39, Hazari Lal, defendant 35 to the action, is the son of the brother of defendant 38. He has supported the version of D. W. 38, Prayag Dass. 13. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the Court below was not justified in holding that the transferee under Ext. B-5 has failed to establish legal necessity. He submitted that, according to the evidence of D. W. 38, about Rs. 1500 was required to meet the cost of title suit No. 12 of 1945. He asserted that by filing that suit Bhuneshwar Kuer had succeeded in setting aside several alienations made by Mt. Manmati Kuer and thereby getting back properties for the benefit of the ultimate reversioner. According to him the lady was perfectly justified in incurring loan to, meet the cost of that litigation. He further submitted that she way equally justified in borrowing Rs. 400 to meet the expenses of her treatment. Manmati Kuer and thereby getting back properties for the benefit of the ultimate reversioner. According to him the lady was perfectly justified in incurring loan to, meet the cost of that litigation. He further submitted that she way equally justified in borrowing Rs. 400 to meet the expenses of her treatment. He submitted that both the ladies had been litigating with each other since 1940 with the result that Mt. Bhuneshwar Kuer was without any funds in May, 1945 when she required money for her treatment. 14. Learned Counsel for the plaintiff, on the other hand, contended on the strength of the decisions in the cases of -- Rameshwar Mondal V/s. Provabati Debi, AIR 1915 Cal 141 (2) (I) and -- Ram Asre Singh V/s. Ambica Lal, AIR 1929 Pat 216 (J) that Bhuneshwar Kuer was not entitled to charge the estate for payment of current rent which was really her personal liability. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent further contended that in several other bonds also which are not the subject-matter of this appeal money was alleged to have been borrowed, for her treatment. According to him, it was merely a device on the part of the transferees to get mentioned in their documents a supposed necessity for her treatment. I am afraid the recital in those documents which have been held not to be binding upon the plaintiff and which are not the subject-matter of this appeal are really not relevant for testing the correctness of the recital of necessity in Ext. B-5 for, aught one knows, the recital in those documents may have been incorrect. It is true that the lady had some landed property but in the state of affairs in which she was placed at the relevant time, it was no wonder that she had to incur debts for her treatment. 15. Learned Counsel for the plaintiff further contended that title suit No. 12 of 1945 had been started by Mt. Bhuneshwar Kuer for her own benefit and not for preserving the property for the benefit of the ultimate reversioner because the present plaintiff and her sons, who are defendants in title suit No. 12 of 1945, were the ultimate reversioners and were already in possession of the properties transferred to them by Mt. Manmati Kuer. Bhuneshwar Kuer for her own benefit and not for preserving the property for the benefit of the ultimate reversioner because the present plaintiff and her sons, who are defendants in title suit No. 12 of 1945, were the ultimate reversioners and were already in possession of the properties transferred to them by Mt. Manmati Kuer. I am afraid I am not inclined to agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the plaintiff on this point. Admittedly, there were several other alienees arrayed as defendants in title suit No. 12 of 1945 besides the present plaintiff. The cases relied on by Mr. De, namely, the cases of -- Karimuddin V/s. Gobind Krishna Narain, 31 All 497 (PC) (K) and -- Debi Dayal Sahoo V/s. Bhan Pertap Singh, 31 Cal 433 (L), do not lend support to his contention in this connection. Both the cases have laid down that the costs of litigation for preserving the estate are objects which justify a widow in incurring a debt which may be a charge on the property. It may be that the immediate possession after successful termination of title suit No. 12 of 1945 was to go to Bhuneshwar Kuer herself but, nevertheless, she was fighting that litigation for pre-serving the estate of her husband for the benefit of the reversioner who would succeed after her death. It is by chance that Bhuneshwar Kuer has died. On the date of the execution of Ext. B-5 the present- plaintiff had no interest in praesenti and it was not possible then for anyone to say with certainty as to who the actual reversioner would be. In my opinion, the cost incurred by Bhuneshwar Kuer in prosecuting title suit No. 12 of 1945 was a legal necessity for which she was entitled to encumber the properties of her husband. It is true that the payment of the current rent was her personal concern but out of the consideration of Rs. 2000 Rs. 51 only is said to have been borrowed for payment of the current rent. 16. Defendant 36 has also led evidence to prove that he had made bona fide enquiries regarding the necessity of Mt. Bhuneswar Kuer. He claims to have made enquiries from Nathu Raut and Hazari Lal. It is also admitted that title suit No. 12 of 1945 was pending at that time. 16. Defendant 36 has also led evidence to prove that he had made bona fide enquiries regarding the necessity of Mt. Bhuneswar Kuer. He claims to have made enquiries from Nathu Raut and Hazari Lal. It is also admitted that title suit No. 12 of 1945 was pending at that time. It was argued by learned counsel for the plaintiff that the suit was in fact heard several months after the date of the execution of the zarpeshgi bond in question. That, in my opinion, is not a circumstance to prove that Mt. Bhuneshwar Kuer had no justification for borrowing Rs. 1200 to meet the cost of that litigation. While dealing with Ext. B-5 the trial Court has also made reference to Section 17 of the Bihar Money-Lenders Act according to which the cash consideration should have been paid in presence of the registrar. Before us, however, the question of passing of consideration under Ext. B-5 has not been challenged, hence it is not necessary for me to deal with that aspect of the case any further. In my opinion, the defendant has established that the zarpeshgi bond (Ext. B-5) is binding on the ultimate reversioner. The plaintiffs suit, therefore, should, have been dismissed so far as Ext. B-5 was concerned. 17. Defendant 35 has preferred a cross-objection in respect of the deed of gift dated 1-3-1945 (Ext. C) by which Mt. Bhuneshwar Kuer had gifted to him 1 bigha 9 kathas 12 1/2 dhurs of raiyati land. It is contended on behalf of the plaintiff-respondent that defendant 35 was not entitled to prefer this cross-objection against the plaintiff-respondent. In this connection reliance has been placed on the cases of -- The Official Trustee of Bengal V/s. Charles Josenh Smith, AIR 1920 Pat 77 (M) and -- Mt. Chanda Bibi V/s. Mohanram Sahu, AIR 1934 Pat 134 (N). The decisions in these two cases bear out the contention of learned counsel for the plaintiff; but even if a cross-objection lay, the lady had no right to make a gift of any portion of her husbands properties to her brothers son. In my opinion, the Court below had rightly held that the deed of gift (Ext. C) was not binding on the ultimate reversioner. 18. The result is that the appeal of defendant 36 is allowed with costs of both the Courts payable by the plaintiff. In my opinion, the Court below had rightly held that the deed of gift (Ext. C) was not binding on the ultimate reversioner. 18. The result is that the appeal of defendant 36 is allowed with costs of both the Courts payable by the plaintiff. Defendant 36 will be entitled to Rs. 100 as hearing fee for this Court. The costs in respect of other matters will be calculated proportionately on the valuation of the zarpeshgi deed (Ext. B-5). The appeal of the other defendants is dismissed with proportionate costs payable to the plaintiff-respondent. Hearing fee for this Court is assessed at Rs. 100. The cross-objection preferred by defendant 35 is dismissed but without costs. Misra, J. 19 I agree. 20. I have only to make a few observations with regard to the distinction sought to be drawn by the learned counsel for the appellants in respect of the principle of law laid down in -- AIR 1928 PC 251 (B). It is urged that what is applicable to the case of a co-widow will not govern the case of a reversioner, as, in the case of a co-widow, the widows together, in the eye of law, are to be joint tenants of the estate. In that view of the law it had been held by the Judicial Committee that unless the widows should join together in the execution of a document for transfer, the same would not be binding on the estate as the co-widows hold the estate in coparcenary even if they are in separate enjoyment of portions of the property for the sake of convenience. It is contended that in the case of a reversioner, however, different considerations would apply, because after the death of the widows the consideration which governs the case of the co-widows disappears. This contention, however, cannot prevail, because it has been held that a transfer made by one of the co-widows as such does not affect the estate, although the executant may be bound during her lifetime, as she is estopped from challenging any alienation made by her. If that is the basis on which the decision rests that unless the co-widows should join together in alienating the corpus of the estate of their husband, it would not affect the estate, there is no reason why it would not apply in the same manner to the case of reversioner. If that is the basis on which the decision rests that unless the co-widows should join together in alienating the corpus of the estate of their husband, it would not affect the estate, there is no reason why it would not apply in the same manner to the case of reversioner. In fact, decisions lay a further disability on a co-widow in so far as she is bound by an arrangement arrived at by her with her co-widow so that in the case of an arrangement having been proved, she is estopped from challenging the alienation made by the other co-widow. Unlike that, a reversioner is not bound by such an arrangement which cannot enure beyond the lifetime of the person entering into the arrangement concerned. The point, however, was considered in other cases, viz., -- Ammani Ammal V/s. Periasami Udayan, AIR 1924 Mad 75 (O) and also in --"AIR 1947 Mad 102 (H). The latter was a suit by reversioners instituted to have a declaration that an alienation made by one of the daughters during the lifetime of a daughter was not binding upon the plaintiffs-reversioners, and their Lordships considered the case from that point of view and held that in principle there was nothing to distinguish this class of cases from general considerations arising in the case of co-widows. The distinction, therefore, sought to be drawn cannot succeed.