WANCHOO, C.J.—These are connected revisions against orders of trial court framing certain issues in a form in which the burden of proof has been placed on the applicants. The applicants contend that the burden of proof has been wrongly placed on them and should have been placed on the opposite parties. They have, therefore, come in revision to this court. 2. These cases were referred to a Full Bench on the point whether revision lies in such a matter, particularly because there were conflicting decisions of this court on this question. 3. The first of such decisions is Shankarlal vs. Deenanath (1) (1950 RLW, 249.) in which a learned Single Judge held that wrong allocation of burden of proof was a material irregularity and would justify interference in revision. 4. Then followed Harji vs. Hasti Singh(2) (1951 RLW, 1.) in which another learned Judge held that it would be after the final decision of the case that wrong allocation of burden of proof would afford a good ground for interference by the High Court in revision. 5. The last case in this series is Thakur Bharat Singh vs. Thakur Raj Singh (3) (1951 RLW, 507.). This was decided by a Division Bench and the learned Judges approved the decision in Shankerlals case and over-ruled the decision in Harjis case. 6. A preliminary point has been raised on behalf of the opposite parties. Their contention is that in view of the decision of this court in Purohit Swarup Narain vs. Gopinath(4) (1953 RLW, 629.) no revision lies on the question of wrong allocation of burden of proof as the matter can be raised in appeal, under sec. 105 C.P.C., from the decree that may be finally pressed in the suit. Learned counsel for the applicants, however, contend that the matter cannot be raised in appeal from the decree, under sec. 105, and the decision in Purohit Swarup Narains case, therefore, would not bar the revision. 7. We are of opinion that wrong allocation of burden of proof it is likely to result in prejudice to the party on whom the burden is wrongly put and is, therefore, likely to affect the decision of the suit on the merits. This is a proposition which cannot, in our opinion, be gainsaid. 7. We are of opinion that wrong allocation of burden of proof it is likely to result in prejudice to the party on whom the burden is wrongly put and is, therefore, likely to affect the decision of the suit on the merits. This is a proposition which cannot, in our opinion, be gainsaid. Once, therefore, it is clear that wrong allocation of burden of proof is likely to result in prejudice to the person on whom the burden is wrongly put and is likely to affect the decision of the case on the merits, Purohit Swarup Narains case will fully apply, as the applicants can take a ground under sec. 105, C.P.C., from the decree that may be finally passed. No revision would therefore lie to the High Court merely because burden of proof was wrongly allocated in the sense that a wrong person was required to begin leading evidence on the particular issue on which the burden was wrongly allocated. The argument for the applicants is that by placing the burden wrongly on them they have been required to lead their evidence first with the result that their of leading evidence after knowing the evidence of the other side has been lost. It is urged that this right of leading evidence after knowing the evidence of the other side is a valuable right on appeal from the decree that may be finally passed. Our attention was invited to certain observations in Bir Babu vs. Raghubar Babu (1) (A.I.R. 1947 Patna, 469) where it was said that "the correct placing of onus of proof is a vital point of procedure and an incorrect placing of the onus may, therefore, amount to material irregularity. The effect of requiring the defendant to lead evidence seriously prejudices him by assuming without proof that Hindu Law governs the family of the parties and deprives him of the very valuable right of adducing evidence in rebuttal of that adduced by the plaintiff." It was further observed that "the prejudicial effect of the procedure is not capable of remedy and the High Court ought to interfere in revision". 8. These observations were relied upon in Thakur Bharat Singhs case (2) (1951 R.L.W. 507.). 8. These observations were relied upon in Thakur Bharat Singhs case (2) (1951 R.L.W. 507.). It may, however, be pointed out that Thakur Bharat Singhs case did not consider the question from that point of view from which it has been considered in Purohit Swarup Narains case, and the question whether revision lies on a matter of wrong allocation of burden of proof will have to be dealt with in the light of Purohit Swarup Narains case. 9. Learned counsel for the applicants contend that it is well settled that when both parties have led the entire evidence, burden of proof is immaterial and, therefore, the appellate court may not be in a position to grant relief when the appeal from the decree passed finally reaches it. Our attention was invited to Chidambara vs. Veerama Reddi (3) (A.I.R. 1922 P.C., 228) where it was observed that when the entire evidence on both sides is once before the court the debate as to onus is purely academical. 10. In Md. Aslam Khan vs. Firoz Shah (4) (A.I.R. 1932 P.C., 228) their Lordships of the Privy Council observed that it was not necessary to enter upon a discussion of the question of onus where the whole of the evidence in the case is before the court and it has no difficulty in arriving at a conclusion in respect thereof. 11. Then again in Nand Kishwar Bux vs. Gopal Bux (5) (A.I.R. 1940 P.C. 93.) it was observed that the High Courts judgment did not show that the case was decided on the ground of onus, and the question of onus of proof was of no great importance because both sides had entered into evidence. 12. The argument on behalf of the applicants, therefore, is that the appellate court may come to the conclusion that both sides had produced the entire evidence and burden of proof was immaterial and the applicants would in such a case be seriously prejudiced. It is not contended, however, that the appellate court cannot interfere in a case where burden of proof has been wrongly placed. It is not contended, however, that the appellate court cannot interfere in a case where burden of proof has been wrongly placed. If for example, burden of proof is wrongly placed in a case and the party has, therefore, been misled and has not led sufficient evidence, and the appellate court comes to the conclusion that burden of proof was wrongly placed, it will always give another chance to the party which was prejudiced to produce more evidence by an order of remand. Further suppose that the burden of proof was wrongly placed and the court decided the matter against the party on whom the burden was wrongly placed on the ground of onus. In such a case also the appellate court would have every right to judge the evidence after placing the burden on the right person and give relief. In this connection, reference may be made to the observations by their Lordships of the Privy Council in P.R. Jogi Reddi vs. Chinnabbi Reddi (1) (AIR 1929 P.C., 13) where it was held that: "When the courts below have thrown the onus upon the defendant of proving that the properties he claimed were his own, instead of placing it as it should be upon the plaintiff, the question of fact found cannot be binding upon an appellate court on second appeal; it is necessary for the Privy Council to consider what is the true position." 13. Then in Jogesh Chandra vs. Emdad Meah (2) (AIR 1932 P.C., 28) it was held by their lordships that: "Finding of fact passed on the failure of a party to discharge the onus of proof which the first appellate court wrongly held to be incumbent on him is not a finding on positive evidence and is not binding in second appeal. 14. It seems to us that it is only in a few cases where the entire evidence is there that the appellate court may not interfere on the ground that the burden of proof was wrongly allocated; but in such cases we do not see what harm would arise to the party on whom the burden was wrongly put. 15. The question, however, is not what relief the appellate court will be able to give on appeal from the final decree. 15. The question, however, is not what relief the appellate court will be able to give on appeal from the final decree. The question really is whether the party on whom the burden has been wrongly put can take that as a ground under sec. 105 C.P.C. To that, in our opinion, the only answer is that the ground can be taken, for, obviously wrong allocation of burden of proof is likely to prejudice the party on whom it is wrongly placed and affect the decision of the case on the merits. We are, therefore of opinion that the decision in Purohit Swarup Narains (3) (AIR 1953 Raj., 137.) case fully applies to the case of wrong allocation of burden of proof and such wrong allocation can be challenged by taking a ground under sec. 105 C.P.C. 16. In this view of the matter, these revisions are not entertain able and they are hereby dismissed.